CourtListener 9998863•In re J.F. CA2/2
Full text
Filed 7/9/24 In re J.F. CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re J.F., a Person Coming Under B331573
the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP03412A)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
D.F.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Lucia J. Murillo, Judge Pro Tempore.
Affirmed.
David M. Yorton, Jr., under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Brian Mahler, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
D.F. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court order
terminating her parental rights over her daughter, J.F. (minor,
born July 2016).1 She contends that the juvenile court’s order
must be reversed because she was denied effective assistance of
counsel2 during the permanency planning phase of these
proceedings and at the Welfare and Institutions Code section
366.263 hearing.
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Section 300 petitions and hearings
In June 2020, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a section 300 petition
1 Demetrice P. (father), minor’s father, is not a party to this
appeal.
2 On January 30, 2024, mother filed a petition for habeas
corpus raising this same argument. (Case No. B334788.) We
considered her petition concurrently with this appeal and denied
it.
3 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
2
on behalf of minor and her younger half-sibling, K.S.4 The
petition alleged that K.S. was at risk of harm due to his father
engaging in threatening acts toward mother (counts a-1 and b-2),
and both children were at risk of harm as a result of mother’s
history of substance abuse and abuse of marijuana in the home
(count b-1) and mother having marijuana in the home within
access to the children (count b-3). At the detention hearing, the
juvenile court appointed counsel to represent mother and ordered
minor to remain released to mother.
In August 2020, DCFS filed an amended section 300
petition on behalf of the two children. The petition included the
original counts and additionally alleged that the children were at
risk of harm based on father’s history of engaging in violent
conduct with mother and other unnamed partners, including a
threat to kill mother while she was pregnant with minor in 2016,
and which had resulted in his arrests in 2017 and 2018. The
juvenile court maintained its prior detention orders.
In November 2020, the juvenile court held a combined
jurisdiction and disposition hearing. It sustained counts b-1 and
b-2 as slightly amended by interlineation, dismissed the
remaining counts, and assumed jurisdiction over minor pursuant
to section 300, subdivision (b)(1). Thereafter, it declared minor a
dependent of the court, ordered minor removed from father’s
custody and to remain placed in mother’s custody, and granted
mother family maintenance services. Mother’s case plan
consisted of random or on-demand drug testing for six months
4 Jurisdiction over K.S. was terminated on April 25, 2022,
granting mother and K.S.’s father joint legal custody and giving
K.S.’s father sole physical custody of the child.
3
and a full drug treatment program if she showed a positive test
with increasing levels, a parenting program, and individual
counseling to address case issues.
Section 342 and section 387 petitions, interim review reports, and
hearings
In January 2021, DCFS filed a section 342 petition and a
section 387 petition on behalf of the two children. The section
342 petition alleged that the children were at risk of harm based
on mother and her male companion, Jay M.5 (Jay), engaging in a
violent altercation in which Jay choked and pushed mother, and
mother failing to protect the children from Jay by allowing him to
frequent the home and have access to the children (counts a-1
and b-1). The section 387 petition alleged that the previous
disposition had not been effective in protecting the children
because mother had a history of substance abuse and was
arrested for driving while being under the influence of drugs in
September 2020 (count s-1).
In February 2021, DCFS filed an amended section 342
petition on behalf of the children. The amended petition included
the original counts and additionally alleged that the children had
been harmed and/or were at risk of harm based on mother
physically abusing minor in the past by forcibly striking the child
with a belt (counts a-2, b-2, j-1) and mother failing to protect
minor from being physically abused by Jay, who had forcibly
struck the child with his hands (counts a-3, b-3, and j-2). At the
detention hearing, the juvenile court ordered minor detained
from mother’s custody and granted mother monitored visitation.
5 Jay is sometimes referred to as Jared M.
4
In April 2021, DCFS reported minor had been placed in the
home of caregiver and nonrelated extended family member Ms. P.
In March 2021, Ms. P. reported that some incidents had recently
occurred involving mother and Jay. On one occasion, mother and
Jay called Ms. P. and demanded that she give mother a portion of
any money that Ms. P. was receiving for caring for minor. On
other occasions, mother called and demanded to speak to minor;
Ms. P. heard Jay yelling in the background that Ms. P. needed to
answer to mother. In mid-March 2021, Jay and some of mother’s
friends harassed Ms. P. in her car while she was driving minor.
In April 2021, the juvenile court held adjudication and
disposition hearings on the amended section 342 and 387
petitions. The juvenile court sustained count b-1 and dismissed
the remaining counts of the section 342 petition, finding true that
mother and Jay had engaged in a violent altercation in which Jay
choked and pushed mother, and mother failed to protect the
children from Jay by allowing him to frequent the home and have
access to the children. The juvenile court sustained count s-1 of
the section 387 petition, finding that the previous disposition had
not been effective in protecting the children. It ordered minor
removed from parental custody and granted mother family
reunification services. Mother’s case plan consisted of, among
other things, monitored visitation.
Six-month review period and hearing (§ 366.21, subd. (e))
In October 2021, DCFS reported that minor continued to
live with Ms. P., who provided her with support and affection.
Because minor had behavioral issues that included her becoming
physically aggressive toward others, she was receiving
therapeutic services that included an Intensive Field Capable
Clinical Services (IFCCS) team. Minor was “continu[ing] to share
5
a lot of stories describing incidents witnessed in the home of
mother that involved violence” and had “identified her fear of
being physically disciplined if she [told] what . . . happened in
[mother’s] home.”
Mother was not in compliance with her case plan.
Although she was scheduled to have visitation three times per
week, three hours per visit, Ms. P. reported that mother failed to
attend many visits and, when she did attend a visit, she often
arrived late or left early. In August 2021, DCFS held a Child and
Family Team (CFT) meeting with mother, during which mother
claimed that she was no longer in a relationship with Jay and
had no contact information for him.
On October 25, 2021, the juvenile court held the six-month
review hearing. It found that continued jurisdiction was
necessary, mother had not made substantial progress with her
case plan, and returning minor to parental custody would be
detrimental to the child. Family reunification services were
ordered for an additional six months, and DCFS was ordered to
provide a written monitored visitation schedule.
12-month review period and hearing (§ 366.21, subd. (e))
During this review period, minor continued to live with
Ms. P., who was cooperative with DCFS and continued to meet
the child’s health and educational needs. Minor appeared to be
thriving in the home and was developing a close bond with her
caregiver. Minor also continued to receive therapeutic services.
Mother was still not in full compliance with her case plan.
She was not participating in conjoint counseling with minor
because of her continued struggles with sobriety and minor
working through her behavioral issues, which DCFS ascribed to
6
the child having been exposed to domestic violence between
mother and Jay.
Up until March 2022, mother was having regular
monitored visits with minor at a Chuck E. Cheese restaurant.
Minor was happy to see mother and sad when visits ended, and
mother brought games and snacks to these visits. However,
during a March 2022 visit, mother reportedly pinched minor
when she and minor were unsupervised. Following this reported
incident, minor refused to have further visits with mother.
On April 25, 2022, the juvenile court held the 12-month
review hearing. Mother testified that she had ended her
relationship with Jay in mid-2021 and that the last domestic
violence incident between them occurred around that time.
The juvenile court found that continued jurisdiction was
necessary, mother had only made partial progress with her case
plan, and returning minor to parental custody would be
detrimental to the child. Family reunification services were
continued for another six months, and the juvenile court
maintained mother’s case plan, including monitored visitation.
18-month review period and hearing (§ 366.22)
During this review period, minor continued to thrive with
Ms. P. and receive therapeutic services.
Mother was in partial compliance with her case plan. She
was still not visiting with minor due to the child’s continued
refusal to do so. A DCFS social worker spoke with minor via the
telephone and during monthly home visits to encourage the child
to communicate with mother to no avail. When the social worker
would ask minor if she would be open to a visit that would be
monitored by a social worker, the child became upset, cursed at
7
the social worker, and became physically aggressive toward
Ms. P. or her therapist.
In June 2022, DCFS had a CFT meeting with mother,
during which mother accused Ms. P. of “coaching [minor] into not
wanting to have visits” with her. DCFS social workers told
mother that they would work with minor and her service
providers to see if visitation could be resumed.
In July 2022, the social worker and the child’s IFCCS team
had a meeting to discuss how to assist minor with resuming visits
with mother. The IFCCS team stated that they would continue
to consult with minor on a weekly basis regarding visits.
In mid-October 2022, DCFS obtained a police report about
a domestic violence incident between mother and Jay that had
occurred in February 2022, which mother had not previously
disclosed to DCFS.
On October 13 and 26, 2022, the juvenile court held the 18-
month review hearing. It admitted multiple DCFS reports into
evidence and heard testimony from mother.
Mother said that she called the police on Jay in June 2022
for becoming physically aggressive with her after they
encountered each other on a bus; she had not seen Jay for one
year prior to that incident. Mother did not mention the February
2022 incident. Mother also denied pinching minor in March
2022.
After entertaining this evidence and oral argument, the
juvenile court found that continued jurisdiction was necessary,
mother had only made partial progress with her case plan, and
returning minor to parental custody would be detrimental to the
child. In making its findings, the juvenile court stated that
mother was not credible. It terminated mother’s family
8
reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. Finally,
the juvenile court expressly ruled that all prior orders not in
conflict with these new orders were to remain in full force and
effect.
Section 366.26 report
Following the 18-month review hearing, minor continued to
live and thrive with Ms. P., who was confident that she would be
able to provide the child with a happy, stable, and safe home
through adoption if parental rights were terminated. Minor
continued to refuse to have any visits with mother despite the
IFCCS team consulting with the child on a weekly basis on this
issue. Ms. P. also told DCFS that minor once “destroyed her
living room and broke her television” after a social worker had
asked the child about resuming visits with mother.
DCFS also reported that it had received a video that was
filmed in June 2021 in which minor told Ms. P. that mother
wanted minor to lie about Ms. P. and the social workers.
Mother’s section 388 petition and hearing
On February 22, 2023, mother filed a section 388 petition,
in which she requested reinstatement of her family reunification
services. Mother asserted that her circumstances had changed
because she was no longer in a relationship with Jay and she had
completed some service programs, and it was in minor’s best
interests to be “reunite[d] with a parent who has continued to
work on her case plan and resolve the issues that brought this
case to court.”
That same day, the juvenile court held an interim hearing
that was scheduled as a section 366.26 hearing. The court asked
mother’s counsel why an evidentiary hearing should be held on
the petition, particularly with respect to section 388’s second
9
prong (minor’s best interests), given the record’s demonstration of
a lack of visits between minor and mother. Counsel responded
that DCFS’s reports did not indicate why minor had refused to
visit mother, and that Ms. P.’s brother, Archie M. (Archie), had
called mother and said that minor had been asking about her.
Counsel for DCFS and minor each replied that DCFS’s reports
did indicate minor’s reasons for refusing to visit mother, namely
the fact that minor had experienced trauma while in her care,
and that DCFS social workers and the IFCCS team had been
addressing this issue with the child.
The juvenile court summarily denied the petition, stating
that, “even with an evidentiary hearing,” mother would “be
unable to make out the [best interest] prong given the age of the
case and the refusal by the minor to visit.”
Initial section 366.26 hearing
On May 31, 2023, the juvenile court held the initial section
366.26 hearing. The matter was continued so that DCFS could
provide a supplemental report that assessed whether the
beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption potentially
applied to one or both of the parents.
Last minute information for the court
In July 2023, DCFS reported some evidence that pertained
to each element of the beneficial parental relationship exception.
The report also noted: (1) mother told minor to make up lies
about Ms. P. and the social workers in June 2021, (2) minor had
been refusing to visit mother since March 2022 and once
destroyed items in Ms. P.’s home when asked about resuming
visits with mother, and (3) the IFCCS team reported that they
would continue to consult with minor on a weekly basis as to
10
visits with mother. Based on the reported information, DCFS
believed that the exception was inapplicable.
Continued section 366.26 hearing
At the onset of the July 19, 2023, hearing, mother’s counsel
asked for a continuance and sought to enter into evidence a
purported recording of a June 2023 telephone conversation
between mother and minor. Counsel for minor and DCFS
objected.
The juvenile court ordered mother’s counsel to provide a
transcript of the recorded conversation for the purpose of
learning the reasons behind the conversation and the recording of
it to avoid “any due process issues on appeal in the event
parental rights are terminated.” The court also ordered DCFS to
interview Archie to learn “how he facilitated a conversation
between [minor] and mother, why it happened, what kind of
contact he has with [minor], [and] how often he sees [minor] and
[Ms. P.],” and to provide a report with the obtained information.
At the request of minor’s counsel, the court admonished mother
not to record any further conversations between her and the child
or to promise minor that she would be returning to mother’s care,
advising mother that “it is against the law to record [phone]
conversations without people’s consent.”
Last minute information for the court
In August 2023, a DCFS social worker interviewed mother,
Ms. P., the IFCCS team, and Archie in order to investigate the
recorded telephone conversation between minor and mother.
Mother played the recording of the telephone conversation
for the social worker, which had taken place on Archie’s and the
maternal grandmother’s phones. The conversation lasted around
five to 10 minutes, during which mother asked minor if she
11
missed mother and the maternal grandmother, and minor replied
“‘Yeah.’” Minor was generally quiet during the conversation and
sounded nervous when responding to mother’s questions.
Ms. P. reported that she, Archie, and minor were at a
family event at the time that this telephone conversation
occurred. Ms. P. acknowledged that minor was allowed to have
unmonitored contact with the maternal grandmother but not
with mother. Ms. P. also said that she was initially confused as
to why minor had become upset at the event and wanted to leave
early, and only learned later about the child’s unauthorized
conversation with mother.
The IFCCS team informed the social worker that minor
was “very upset about the situation” and felt that she may have
caused Ms. P. to “get into trouble.” The team also said that minor
had not expressed any interest in further visits with mother.
Archie said that he had known mother for a few years,
wanted to help mother in her efforts to stay in contact with
minor, and did not know that the child had previously expressed
not wanting to have contact or visits with mother. Archie also
disclosed that he felt “like he was placed in the middle of this
case” without sufficient knowledge about it.
Section 366.26 hearing (Sept. 7, 2023)
The juvenile court admitted multiple DCFS reports into
evidence. Over DCFS and minor’s objection, it also admitted into
evidence a transcript of the June 2023 recorded telephone
conversation, noting that it would give the document “the weight
it is due.” The juvenile court then entertained oral argument.
Mother’s counsel asked the juvenile court to apply the
beneficial parental relationship exception and referenced its
three elements. As for the first element, counsel admitted that
12
mother had not maintained regular contact or visitation with
minor based on the child’s refusal to visit after March 2022.
Counsel claimed that the real reason minor did not want to visit
mother was because she was being coached by Ms. P. to make
these statements. As for the second element, counsel pointed out
that minor had lived with mother for the majority of her life,
knew mother was her mother, and had a “close relationship” with
mother. As for the third element, counsel argued termination of
parental rights would mean that minor “would lose a connection
with her biological family and family members who want to be
part of her life.”
Minor’s and DCFS’s respective attorneys asked the juvenile
court to find the child adoptable and that no statutory exception
applied. Regarding the June 2023 recorded conversation, minor’s
counsel noted that the child was under the impression that she
would be talking with maternal grandmother before mother came
onto the phone call, and that it was “highly inappropriate” for
mother to have unmonitored contact with the child and for the
conversation to be recorded. As for the raised exception, DCFS’s
counsel contended that mother failed to meet her burden in
proving all three elements, and that “affection” between a parent
and child does not prove the exception.
The juvenile court found minor to be adoptable and that no
statutory exception to adoption applied. In so ruling, the court
expressly noted that minor had refused to visit mother despite
involvement with her IFCCS team and her therapeutic services
provider, there was no evidence that anyone had coached minor
to refuse visits, and there was evidence that minor was “trapped”
into having a phone conversation with mother in June 2023.
13
Parental rights were terminated, and Ms. P. was
designated as minor’s prospective adoptive parent.
Appeal
Mother’s timely appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends that the juvenile court’s order terminating
her parental rights to minor must be reversed because she did
not receive effective assistance of trial counsel. Specifically, she
argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a
section 388 petition on mother’s behalf, requesting reinstatement
of family reunification services during the period between
counsel’s discovery of the June 2023 telephone conversation and
the September 2023 section 366.26 hearing. According to mother,
had “[a] section 388 petition been filed, the DCFS monitor who
was present at the March 2022 monitored Chuck E. Cheese visit,
Archie, the social worker who interviewed Archie, mother,
[Ms. P.], and possibly [minor] herself could have been called as
witnesses to establish the best interest prong of a section 388
petition. [Also,] [t]he social worker could have been cross-
examined as to why she failed to follow the juvenile court’s
specific direction to interview Archie ‘on how he facilitated a
conversation between [minor] and mother [and] why it
happened.’”
I. Standard of review and relevant law
As both parties point out, “[a] parent in a dependency
proceeding is entitled to competent counsel and to judicial review
of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. [Citations.]” (In re
M.F. (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 86, 108; see § 317.5.) “To establish
ineffective assistance of counsel in dependency proceedings, a
parent ‘MUST DEMONSTRATE BOTH THAT: (1) [her]
14
appointed counsel failed to act in a manner expected of
reasonably competent attorneys acting as diligent advocates; and
that (2) this failure made a determinative difference in the
outcome, rendering the proceedings fundamentally unfair in that
it is reasonably probable that but for such failure, a
determination more favorable for [the parent’s] interests would
have resulted.’ [Citations.] In short, [the] appellant has the
burden of proving both that [her] attorney’s representation was
deficient and that this deficiency resulted in prejudice.” (In re
Dennis H. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 94, 98.)
“When a parent seeks to assert ineffective assistance of
counsel on direct appeal (as opposed to by writ of habeas corpus),
appellate courts further limit their review to consider only those
claims ‘“where ‘there simply could be no satisfactory explanation’
for trial counsel’s action or inaction.”’ [Citation.]” (In re M.F.,
supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 109.)
Pursuant to section 388, a parent of a dependent child may
petition the juvenile court for a hearing to modify a previous
order based on changed circumstances or new evidence. (§ 388,
subd. (a)(1).) “The parent seeking modification [of an order under
section 388] must ‘make a prima facie showing to trigger the
right to proceed by way of a full hearing. [Citation.]’ [Citations.]
There are two parts to the prima facie showing: The parent must
demonstrate (1) a genuine change of circumstances or new
evidence, and that (2) revoking the previous order would be in the
best interests of the [child].” (In re Anthony W. (2001)
87 Cal.App.4th 246, 250; see also In re Stephanie M. (1994)
7 Cal.4th 295.) In determining whether the parent has met her
burden, “the court may consider the entire factual and procedural
15
history of the case.” (In re Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181,
189.)
II. Mother was not denied effective assistance of counsel
We conclude that mother’s appointed counsel was not
deficient for failing to file a section 388 petition on mother’s
behalf.6 Mother has not demonstrated that trial counsel was
incompetent by failing to file a section 388 petition between June
2023 and September 2023.
Urging us to conclude otherwise, mother directs us to her
June 2023 recorded telephone conversation with minor.
According to mother, trial counsel should have brought a section
388 petition asking for visitation based upon the contents of that
telephone conversation. For the reasons set forth below, we
reject mother’s argument; trial counsel may have had a tactical
reason for not filing a section 388 petition based upon the
recorded telephone conversation.
A. The June 2023 recorded telephone conversation
1. Violation of the juvenile court’s order for monitored
visitation
The June 2023 recorded telephone conversation was an
express violation of the juvenile court’s order that mother’s
visitation with minor be monitored.
This monitored visitation order had been in place since
February 2021, or for over two years in the underlying
proceedings. Despite the juvenile court’s clear instructions,
mother willfully violated the order when speaking to minor over
6 Mother also seems to argue that the juvenile court erred in
denying her visitation in March 2022 “without a finding of
detriment.” The juvenile court made no such order in March
2022.
16
the telephone at a time when minor believed that she would be
speaking to her maternal grandmother, which was allowed. As
such, a reasonably competent attorney would not have filed a
section 388 petition requesting the reinstatement of family
reunification where the information that formed the basis of the
request was obtained through the parent’s willful violation of a
court order. (See Civ. Code, § 3517 [“No one can take advantage
of his own wrong”]; see also § 213 [“Any willful disobedience or
interference with any lawful order of the juvenile court
. . . constitutes a contempt of court”]; People v. Torrez (1995)
31 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1091–1092 [counsel is not required to make
futile motions to appear competent].)
2. Recording was inadmissible
The recording of the telephone conversation (and the
transcript thereof) were inadmissible under state law. Penal
Code section 632 expressly forbids the recording of confidential
communications without the consent of all parties and makes
such recordings inadmissible “in any judicial, administrative,
legislative, or other proceeding.” (Pen. Code, § 632, subd. (d).)
For the purposes of this statute, a confidential communication
“means any communication carried on in circumstances as may
reasonably indicate that any party to the communication desires
it to be confined to the parties thereto, but excludes a
communication made in a public gathering or in any legislative,
judicial, executive, or administrative proceeding open to the
public, or in any other circumstance in which the parties to the
communication may reasonably expect that the communication
may be overheard or recorded.” (Pen. Code, § 632 subd. (c),
partially abrogated as to criminal proceedings as stated in People
v. Guzman (2019) 8 Cal.5th 673, 679–684.) Mother did not have
17
the right to consent to the recording of the conversation on
minor’s behalf because minor was a dependent of the court and
was represented by her own counsel. (See In re L.J. (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 741, 752 [in dependency proceedings, a child’s
appointed counsel serves as the child’s guardian ad litem and is
responsible for protecting the child’s best interests].) A
reasonably competent attorney would not have filed a section 388
petition based upon an illegal telephone recording. (People v.
Torrez, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1091–1092.)
3. Recording did not establish a prima facie showing
of changed circumstances or new evidence
Even if the juvenile court properly admitted and considered
the recorded telephone conversation for the purposes of a section
388 petition, the substance and context of the conversation did
not make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances or new
evidence. (See § 388; In re Anthony W., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at
p. 250.) “The change in circumstances or new evidence must be of
such significant nature that it requires a setting aside or
modification of the challenged order. [Citations.]” (In re A.A.
(2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 597, 612.)
Following the 18-month review hearing in October 2022,
minor continued to live with Ms. P., who had consistently been
providing minor with a happy, stable, and safe home.
Meanwhile, minor continued to refuse to have any visits with
mother.
The June 2023 telephone conversation confirmed that
minor did not want to reunify with mother.7 Although minor
7 Mother complains that DCFS did not comply with the
juvenile court’s order that it interview Archie to learn “how he
18
responded to mother’s question as to whether she missed her and
her maternal grandmother in the affirmative, minor was
generally quiet during the conversation and sounded nervous
when responding to mother’s questions. Following that
conversation, minor became quiet, with Ms. P. only learning later
about the child’s unauthorized conversation with mother.
Notably, the IFCCS team reported that minor was upset
about the situation, but not because she wanted to have a
relationship with mother; she was upset because she felt that she
may have caused Ms. P. to “get into trouble.” In fact, the team
again confirmed with minor that she did not want to visit with
mother.
4. No prejudice
Even if counsel had filed a section 388 petition as mother
insists, it is not reasonably probable that the juvenile court would
have found that mother made a prima facie showing that
circumstances had changed or that the requested relief was in
minor’s best interests.
As of June 2023, the following information was known to
the juvenile court: (1) minor had been a dependent of the court
for two and one-half years; (2) mother had already received 18
months of family reunification services, which were terminated in
October 2022; (3) minor did not want further visits with mother
based in part on having experienced trauma while in her care;
(4) minor became verbally and physically aggressive on separate
occasions when asked if she would be open to resumed monitored
visits with mother; (5) minor was thriving in Ms. P’s home, where
facilitated a conversation between [minor] and mother [and] why
it happened.” As set forth above, the appellate record affirms
that DCFS spoke with Archie about the telephone conversation.
19
she had lived since April 2021; (6) Ms. P. sought to adopt the
child if parental rights were terminated; and (7) the section
366.26 hearing was originally scheduled to occur in February and
May 2023. In light of this information, it is not reasonably
probable that mother would have satisfied the statutory
requirements of section 388 had counsel filed a petition for
modification on mother’s behalf. (See In re Marilyn H. (1993)
5 Cal.4th 295, 309 [once the parent has been given a reasonable
period of time to reunify with children and has been unsuccessful,
“the child’s interest in permanency and stability takes priority”];
In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317 [“After the
termination of reunification services, the parents’ interest in the
care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer
paramount”]; see also Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023)
14 Cal.5th 609, 627 [“to promote the prompt resolution of the
child’s custody status and her permanent and stable placement,
the law sets a presumptive 18-month limit on reunification
services”].)
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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
____________________, J.
ASHMANN-GERST
We concur:
_______________________, P. J.
LUI
________________________, J.
CHAVEZ
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