CourtListener 9998853•People v. Torres CA2/1
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Filed 7/9/24 P. v. Torres CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B330922
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA220341)
v.
BRAULIO TORRES,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Michael Garcia, Judge. Affirmed.
John Steinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Nikhil Cooper, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted defendant Braulio Torres of first degree
murder in 2004. In 2022, he filed a petition for resentencing
under Penal Code1 section 1172.6, which the superior court
denied at the prima facie stage. Torres appeals, contending the
court erroneously denied him an evidentiary hearing because it is
possible he was convicted based on an imputed malice theory not
viable under current law.
We disagree. The jury either found Torres guilty as the
perpetrator of murder or as a direct accomplice under an aiding
and abetting theory. Under either scenario, the jury necessarily
found that Torres acted with the intent to kill. Because Torres is
ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law, we
affirm the denial of his petition.
POSTCONVICTION RELIEF UNDER SECTION 1172.6
We begin by briefly summarizing section 1172.6, which was
enacted in 2018 as part of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg.
Sess.).2 The legislation’s overall purpose was “to amend the
felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is
not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act
with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
1 All further unspecified statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2 Section 1172.6 was originally codified as section 1170.95.
The Legislature renumbered the statute as section 1172.6, with
no change in text, effective June 30, 2022. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58,
§ 10.) For ease of reference, we use the current citation
throughout.
2
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) To accomplish this,
the bill added section 188, subdivision (a)(3) “to amend the
natural and probable consequences doctrine,” and added section
189, subdivision (e) “to amend the felony-murder rule.” (People v.
Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843.) Section 188, subdivision
(a)(3) provides, “Except as stated in subdivision (e) of Section 189,
in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act
with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a
person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.”
Section 189, subdivision (e) provides that a person can be held
liable for murder “only if one of the following is proven: [¶]
(1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not
the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted
the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.
[¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as
described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.”
Section 1172.6 allows defendants convicted of murder
under a theory now precluded by section 188 or 189 to petition to
vacate their convictions and be resentenced on any remaining
counts. Defendants must initially make a prima facie showing of
eligibility for relief by demonstrating they can satisfy three
criteria: first, that they were charged by a complaint,
information, or indictment “that allowed the prosecution to
proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)); second,
3
that they “w[ere] convicted of murder . . . or accepted a plea offer
in lieu of a trial at which [they] could have been convicted of
murder” (id., subd. (a)(2)); and third, that they “could not
presently be convicted of murder . . . because of changes to
Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019” (id., subd.
(a)(3)). If the defendant makes a prima facie showing satisfying
all three criteria, the resentencing court must issue an order to
show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing at which the burden
is on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the defendant is ineligible for resentencing. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c),
(d).)
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Summary
Remaining cognizant that fact-finding is restricted at the
prima facie stage (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971), we
rely on the factual statement from our prior opinion (as both
parties likewise do in their appellate briefs) to provide context to
our analysis of the record of conviction.
“[Torres] and Jorge Rosales (Rosales) were members of the
18th Street gang. Uriel Preciado (Preciado) and Pedro Flores
(Flores) were associates of the gang.
“The P Stone Bloods and the Easy Riders were rivals of
18th Street. Their territory was adjacent to that of the 18th
Street gang.
“On July 24, 2001, [Torres] was driving near Crenshaw
Boulevard and 28th Street. Rosales and Preciado were riding in
the car. Three men walked by them and made Easy Rider gang
signs. Rosales made an 18th Street gang sign and then made an
obscene hand gesture. One of the men on the street drew a gun.
[Torres] drove away, stating, ‘We’re going to come back.’
4
“[Torres] drove to his apartment, where he, Rosales and
Preciado drank tequila and smoked marijuana. Flores joined
them at the apartment.
“[Torres] had a cloth bag containing five guns inside his
apartment. He took this bag with him as he, Rosales, Preciado
and Flores left his apartment and got into his car. He sat in the
driver’s seat, Rosales sat in the front passenger seat, Preciado sat
in the back behind [Torres] and Flores sat in the back behind
Rosales. [Torres] distributed guns to the other three.
“[Torres] drove back to the area where they had
encountered the Easy Riders. He drove up and down a number of
streets, looking for them. After finding none, Rosales suggested
they go home. At Montclair and 28th Streets, [Torres] saw
Osama Hadnot (Hadnot) standing on a street corner. Hadnot
was not one of the men they had encountered earlier. [Torres]
called out to Hadnot, ‘What’s up . . . .’ Hadnot began to run.
Shots were fired at him through the open windows on the driver’s
side of the car.
“Los Angeles Police Officers Neil Spitz and Patrick Oliver
were in an unmarked police car across the street, conducting an
undercover narcotics investigation. They saw [Torres]’s car
approach the area, heard gunshots and saw guns being fired from
the front and rear driver’s side windows. They began pursuing
[Torres]’s car. Flores shot at them through the rear passenger’s
side window.
“Other officers joined in the pursuit. [Torres] eventually
crashed his car into another vehicle. He, Rosales and Preciado
fled on foot, while Flores remained in the car. Officers
apprehended [Torres], Rosales and Preciado and took them into
5
custody. The officers also recovered shell casings and the bag
containing the five guns inside [Torres]’s car.
“Hadnot died of multiple gunshot wounds. . . .
“Defense
“On July 24, 2001, [Torres] and Rosales were driving home
after taking care of some errands. At Crenshaw Boulevard and
28th Street, Rosales pointed to three men crossing the street.
The men looked at them and made gang signs. Rosales made an
obscene hand sign. One of the men reached in his pocket and
began running toward [Torres]’s car. Rosales said the men were
shooting at them, so [Torres] drove away. [Torres] did not hear
any gunshots, however, and thought Rosales was hearing things
because he was under the influence of marijuana.
“They went to [Torres]’s apartment, where Rosales drank
alcohol and smoked marijuana. Flores joined them. [Torres]
drove Rosales and Flores to Rosales’s house and then took them
to run an errand. On the way, they saw Preciado at a gas station;
[Torres] offered him a ride.
“Rosales kept talking about the Easy Riders attempting to
shoot him. He asked [Torres] to drive to Crenshaw Boulevard to
see if the men were still there. Rosales said he was going to shoot
the men if he saw them.
“[Torres] drove slowly as he approached the corner at 28th
Street, where Hadnot was standing. Hadnot was not one of the
men that [Torres] and Rosales had seen earlier. Rosales said to
Hadnot, ‘What’s up . . . .’ [Torres] saw that Rosales was holding a
gun. Rosales pushed [Torres] out of the way. [Torres] ducked
down and heard nine shots. He drove away. As he was driving,
he heard more gunshots coming from the back of his car.
Eventually, he lost control of his car and crashed. He fled on foot
6
but was apprehended and arrested.” (People v. Torres (Dec. 28,
2005, B178418) [nonpub. opn.].)
B. Procedural History
In a one-count information filed on March 1, 2002, the
People charged Torres, Rosales, and Preciado under section 187,
subdivision (a) with murdering Hadnot. As to all three
defendants, the information alleged a special circumstance that
the murder was perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm
from a motor vehicle intentionally at a person outside the vehicle
with the intent to inflict death. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(21).) The
information also alleged a gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd.
(b)(1)) and personal firearm use enhancements as to all three
defendants (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c) & (d)).
The case against Torres and Preciado proceeded to a jury
trial.3 The trial court used CALJIC No. 8.10 to instruct the jury
on the elements of murder: “Defendants are accused in [c]ount 1
of having committed the crime of murder, a violation [of s]ection
187 . . . . [¶] Every person who unlawfully kills a human being
with malice aforethought is guilty of the crime of murder. [¶] In
order to prove this crime, each of the following elements must be
proved: [¶] 1. A human being was killed; [¶] 2. The killing was
unlawful; and [¶] 3. The killing was done with malice
aforethought.”
The court defined malice for the jury through CALJIC
No. 8.11, which states in relevant part, “ ‘Malice’ may be either
3 Prior to trial, Rosales pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea
bargain to voluntary manslaughter, admitted personal firearm
use and criminal street gang allegations, and agreed to testify for
the prosecution.
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express or implied. [¶] Malice is express when there is
manifested an intention unlawfully to kill a human being. [¶]
Malice is implied when: [¶] 1. The killing resulted from an
intentional act; [¶] 2. The natural consequences of the act are
dangerous to human life; and [¶] 3. The act was deliberately
performed with knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious
disregard for, human life. [¶] When it is shown that a killing
resulted from the intentional doing of an act with express or
implied malice, no other mental state need be shown to establish
the mental state of malice aforethought.” (CALJIC No. 8.11.)
The court instructed the jury that, if it found a defendant
guilty of murder, it had to determine whether the murder was of
the first or second degree. The court then gave separate
instructions on first and second degree murder. The first degree
murder instruction (CALJIC No. 8.20) stated in relevant part:
“All murder which is perpetrated by any kind of wilfull [sic],
deliberate and premeditated killing with express malice
aforethought is murder of the first degree. [¶] The word ‘willful,’
as used in this instruction, means intentional. [¶] The word
‘deliberate’ means formed or arrived at or determined upon as a
result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and
against the proposed course of action. The word ‘premeditated’
means considered beforehand. [¶] . . . [¶] To constitute a
deliberate and premeditated killing, the slayer must weigh and
consider the question of killing and the reasons for and against
such a choice and, having in mind the consequences, he decides to
and does kill.” The second degree murder instruction (CALJIC
No. 8.30) stated, “Murder of the second degree is the unlawful
killing of a human being with malice aforethought when the
8
perpetrator intended unlawfully to kill a human being but the
evidence is insufficient to prove deliberation and premeditation.”
The court did not instruct the jury on felony murder or the
natural and probable consequences doctrine.
The court did give aiding and abetting instructions. The
court gave CALJIC No. 3.00, which explained that “principals” in
a crime include perpetrators and accomplices, stating, “Persons
who are involved in committing a crime are referred to as
principals in that crime. Each principal, regardless of the intent
or manner of participation is equally guilty. Principals include:
[¶] 1. Those who directly and actively commit the act constituting
the crime, or [¶] 2. Those who aid and abet the commission of the
crime.” The court then utilized CALJIC No. 3.01 to set out the
elements of aiding and abetting liability: “A person aids and
abets the [commission] of a crime when he or she: [¶] (1) With
knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, and [¶]
(2) With the intent or purpose of committing or encouraging or
facilitating the commission of the crime, and [¶] (3) By act or
advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of
the crime.”
The court instructed the jury to determine if the special
circumstance allegation was true only if they found a defendant
guilty of first degree murder.
On August 4, 2004, the jury convicted Torres of first degree
murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), and found true the special circumstance
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(21)) and gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd.
(b)(1)). The jury found not true the personal firearm use
enhancement allegation as to Torres. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).) On
September 13, 2004, the trial court sentenced Torres to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
9
On December 28, 2005, we affirmed the judgment. (People
v. Torres, supra, B178418.)
C. Section 1172.6 Petition
On November 1, 2022, Torres filed his resentencing
petition. The court appointed counsel to represent Torres. The
People filed an opposition and Torres filed a reply.
On May 18, 2023, the court summarily denied the petition,
concluding Torres was ineligible for relief as a matter of law
because “the record of conviction establishes the jury found that
[Torres] acted as a direct aider and abettor of first degree murder
with the intent to kill,” which is still a viable theory of murder.
Torres filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
In reviewing the summary denial of a section 1172.6
petition, “ ‘[w]e independently review a trial court’s
determination on whether a petitioner has made a prima facie
showing.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164,
1174.) Because we conduct an independent review, “we may
affirm a ruling that is correct in law on any ground. [Citation.]”
(People v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 198, 204, fn. omitted.)
B. Torres’s Petition Fails as a Matter of Law Because
the Jury Necessarily Found He Acted with Malice
“[A] court may deny the petition at the prima facie stage if
the record of conviction conclusively establishes that the
petitioner was convicted on a theory not affected by Senate Bill
No. 1437.” (People v. Berry-Vierwinden (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th
921, 931.) Given the information, the jury instructions, and the
verdict—all of which are part of the record of conviction—the jury
10
could have convicted Torres under one of only two theories: he
was the actual killer, or he directly aided and abetted the
commission of the murder. If the jury found Torres guilty as the
actual killer, he would not be entitled to relief under section
1172.6. (§ 189, subd. (e)(1); see People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698, 710 [§ 1172.6 resentencing “relief is unavailable if the
defendant was . . . the actual killer”].) However, it would appear
the jury concluded that Torres was not the actual shooter, as it
found the personal firearm use allegation to be not true as to
Torres.
That leaves the theory that Torres directly aided and
abetted Hadnot’s murder. As the jury was not instructed on
natural and probable consequences, this theory of murder
liability remains valid under current law. (People v. Curiel (2023)
15 Cal.5th 433, 462; People v. Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at
p. 848.) Under the aiding and abetting instructions, the jury
could only find Torres guilty of first degree murder as an aider
and abettor if it concluded that Torres acted “[w]ith knowledge of
the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator,” meaning that Torres
knew the shooter intended to kill, and “[w]ith the intent or
purpose of committing or encouraging or facilitating the
commission of the [murder.]” (CALJIC No. 3.01.) Thus, Torres is
ineligible for relief under section 1172.6.
C. There is No Possibility Torres Was Convicted Based
on Imputed Malice Due to Allegedly Ambiguous Jury
Instructions
Torres contends he adequately alleged a prima facie case
for relief under section 1172.6 because ambiguity in the jury
instructions may have led the jury to convict him without finding
11
that he personally harbored malice. He identifies three alleged
ambiguities, which we discuss in turn.
1. Reference to the “Slayer” in the First Degree Murder
Instruction
Relying first on a purported ambiguity in the instruction on
first degree deliberate and premeditated murder, Torres contends
that “the jury was asked only to find that the direct perpetrator
had the intent to kill.” He focuses on the following statement in
the instruction: “To constitute a deliberate and premeditated
killing, the slayer must weigh and consider the question of killing
and the reasons for and against such a choice and, having in
mind the consequences, he decides to and does kill.” (Italics
added.) Torres argues the jury could have equated “slayer” with
“perpetrator” and, as a result, concluded an accomplice could be
guilty of murder based solely on the intent of the perpetrator.
We are not persuaded. Torres focuses on one instruction in
isolation and ignores that the aiding and abetting instruction
required the jury, if it was to rely on that theory to convict Torres
of first degree murder, to find that as an aider and abettor Torres
knowingly and intentionally helped another kill. (People v.
McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1123.) The jury could not have
found Torres guilty of first degree murder on an aiding and
abetting theory based solely on the slayer’s state of mind;
instead, it had to find Torres knew the full extent of the
perpetrator’s criminal purpose and gave aid or encouragement
with the intent or purpose of facilitating the perpetrator’s
commission of the crime. (Id. at p. 1118.) “[W]e presume a jury
understands and follows the court’s instructions” (People v.
12
Cortes, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 205), and reject Torres’s
invitation to speculate to the contrary.4
2. Alleged Ambiguity in the Malice Instruction
Torres next argues that the instruction on malice created
ambiguity that may have led the jury to impute malice to him
because that instruction “focused on the act itself, and not the
intent of the aider and abettor.” This argument is meritless for
the same reasons just discussed. As noted, the aiding and
abetting instruction directed the jury to assess the accomplice’s
intent, including that he acted to promote the murder with
knowledge of the slayer’s unlawful purpose, and we presume the
jury followed that instruction along with all the other
instructions.
3. Reference to the Equal Guilt of Principals
Torres lastly argues that the instruction defining
“principals” to include both perpetrators and accomplices
contributed to the ambiguity caused by other instructions
because it stated, “Each principal, regardless of the intent or
manner of participation is equally guilty.” (CALJIC No. 3.00.)
He also points to portions of the prosecutor’s closing argument
that echoed this “equally guilty” language. This instruction, a
former version of CALJIC No. 3.00, “generally stated a correct
4 Torres makes a similar argument based on language from
an instruction on the special circumstance allegation which
referred to the intent of “the perpetrator.” But the jury was
instructed to consider the special circumstance allegation as to
Torres only after it had found him guilty of murder, which for the
reasons discussed meant that the jury found he acted with the
intent to kill.
13
rule of law,” in that “[a]ll principals, including aiders and
abettors, are ‘equally guilty’ in the sense that they are all
criminally liable.” (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014)
60 Cal.4th 335, 433.) However, past cases have observed that the
instruction “could be misleading if the principals in a particular
case might be guilty of different crimes and the jury interprets
the instruction to preclude such a finding.” (Ibid.; see also People
v. McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1122 [holding an accomplice to
murder can, under some situations, be liable for a greater crime
than the perpetrator].)5
Cases criticizing the “equally guilty” language because in
theory an aider and abettor could be guilty of a greater or lesser
crime than the perpetrator do not suggest that the jury in this
case could have convicted Torres of murder based on a theory of
imputed malice. The trial court instructed the jury it must
decide separately whether each defendant was guilty. As to
Torres, the only charge before the jury was murder under
instructions requiring a finding that he intended to kill. Again,
Torres ignores that the aiding and abetting instruction required
the jury, in order to convict him of murder as an accomplice, to
find that he personally knew the perpetrator’s criminal purpose
and gave aid or encouragement with the intent or purpose of
facilitating the commission of the crime. (People v. Johnson
(2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 641 [where the jury was instructed that
5 Since Torres’s trial, this standard instruction “has been
revised to address the circumstance that aiders and abettors are
not always guilty of the same crime as the actual perpetrators.
(See Use Note to CALJIC No. 3.00 (Spring 2010 rev.) . . . .).”
(People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at
p. 433.)
14
the defendant could be guilty of murder as an accomplice only
upon proof “that [the] defendant knew [the perpetrator] intended
to kill [the victim], that he intended to aid and abet [the
perpetrator] in committing the killing, and that he did in fact aid
him in that killing,” any ambiguity created by the “ ‘equally
guilty’ ” language in former CALCRIM No. 400 “would have
[been] cleared up”].)
D. Torres’s Reliance on Implied Malice Cases is Inapt
Torres relies on People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972
and People v. Maldonado (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1257 to argue the
instructions permitted the jury to convict him as an aider and
abettor without finding he acted with malice. Both cases are
distinguishable because they involved section 1172.6 petitions
arising from convictions for aiding and abetting implied malice
crimes. (People v. Maldonado, at pp. 1262-1263 [first degree
lying-in-wait murder]; People v. Langi, at pp. 981-983 [second
degree implied malice murder].) Because the underlying crimes
in Langi and Maldonado were premised on implied malice, the
jury in each case was not required to find the perpetrator acted
with the intent to kill. By finding only that the accomplice was
aware of the perpetrator’s “unlawful purpose” (under the aiding
and abetting instruction) leading to an implied malice killing, the
jury did not necessarily find the accomplice acted with express
malice. (People v. Maldonado, at pp. 1266-1267; People v. Langi,
at p. 982.) Here, the underlying conviction for first degree
murder was not premised on implied malice, and the jury thus
found Torres knew the perpetrator acted with a purpose to kill.
Coupled with its finding Torres intended that the murder be
15
committed, the jury necessarily found Torres acted with express
malice.6
E. The Trial Court Did Not Engage in Improper Fact-
finding
Lastly, Torres contends that the resentencing court
engaged in improper fact-finding in denying his petition. We
disagree. The court’s written order cites People v. Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th 952, which articulates the scope of a court’s review at
the prima facie stage. In addition, the court’s analysis focused
exclusively on the jury instructions and the jury’s verdict.
In any event, based on our independent review of the
record of conviction, we conclude that Torres is ineligible for relief
under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. People v. Flint (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 607, upon which Torres relies, is inapposite as in
that matter we determined, after independent review, that the
record of conviction did not refute the defendant’s claim of
eligibility for relief. (Id. at p. 613.)
6 People v. Lee, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th 1164, cited by Torres,
is also distinguishable. In that case, this court held that the
defendant had made a prima facie showing he was entitled to
relief under section 1172.6 where he had been convicted of
murder under the provocative act doctrine at a time when “case
law imposed culpability on all perpetrators of the underlying
crime so long as the provocateur acted with malice, and did so in
furtherance of the common criminal design,” and the jury
instructions reflected that theory. (Id. at pp. 1170-1171, 1182.)
Here, in contrast, Torres was not prosecuted on any legally
recognized theory of imputed malice, and under the instructions
the jury was required to find he acted with actual malice.
16
DISPOSITION
The order denying Torres’s petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6 is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
BENDIX, J.
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