CourtListener 9998852•People v. Watson CA2/4
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Filed 7/9/24 P. v. Watson CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B328070
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A950372
v.
SHAYLOR WATSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ronald S. Coen, Judge. Affirmed.
William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven E. Mercer,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
A jury convicted defendant and appellant Shaylor Watson
of robbery and two special circumstance murders, one of which he
committed when he was 18 years old.1 On the murder Watson
committed when he was 18 years old, the trial court sentenced
him to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) plus two
years in state prison.
In 2022, Watson filed a motion for proceedings preserving
evidence under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261
(Franklin), in preparation for an eventual youth offender parole
hearing under Penal Code section 3051.2 The trial court denied
Watson relief, noting section 3051 facially does not extend to
individuals who committed their offenses between the ages of 18
and 25 and received LWOP sentences. In denying relief, the court
rejected Watson’s argument that section 3051, as currently
construed, violates equal protection principles.
Watson timely appealed. On appeal, he renews his
argument, raised in the trial court, that by not extending relief to
individuals who committed their offenses between the ages of 18
and 25 and received LWOP sentences, while extending relief to
individuals who committed their offenses between the ages of 18
and 25 and received life sentences with the possibility of parole,
1 The record is missing much of the procedural background
surrounding Watson’s original convictions. We therefore take
judicial notice of our opinion resolving his direct appeal in People
v. Watson (Jun. 15, 1994, B056452) [nonpub. opn.]. (Evid. Code,
§ 452, subd. (d).)
2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
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section 3051 offends equal protection. He also renews his
argument (raised below but not addressed by the trial court) that
the statute, by rendering him ineligible for a youth offender
parole hearing, violates state constitutional proscriptions against
cruel or unusual punishment. We affirm.
DISCUSSION
I. Our Supreme Court recently rejected Watson’s equal
protection argument
When the parties filed their briefs, reviewing courts were
spilt on the equal protection question presented in this case, and
the issue was pending before our Supreme Court. (Compare
People v. Hardin (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 273, 286-288, 290, review
granted January 11, 2023, S277487 [section 3051 violates equal
protection because there is no rational basis for disparate
treatment between similarly situated young adults with a life
without parole sentence and young adults with lesser sentences]
with People v. Jackson (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 189, 196-197, 199-
200; People v. Bolanos (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1069, 1079, review
granted Apr. 12, 2023, S278803; People v. Sands (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 193, 204-205; In re Murray (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th
456, 463-465; People v. Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 769, 777-
781; People v. Morales (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 326, 347-349; People
v. Ngo (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 116, 125-127, review granted May
17, 2023, S279458 [section 3051 distinction between young adults
with LWOP sentences and young adults with lesser sentences
does not violate equal protection].)
Recently, however, our Supreme Court resolved the equal
protection question at issue here. (People v. Hardin (2024) 15
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Cal.5th 834 (Hardin).) It agreed with the majority position of
appellate court cases, concluding the provision of section 3051,
subdivision (h) excluding individuals sentenced to LWOP for
crimes committed between ages 18 and 25 from youth offender
parole hearing eligibility does not violate equal protection.
(Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 838-839.) Because we are bound
to follow the Supreme Court’s lead, we reject Watson’s argument
that section 3051 violates equal protection. (Auto Equity Sales,
Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
II. We reject Watson’s cruel or unusual punishment
argument
Watson next argues that, by rendering him ineligible for a
youth offender parole hearing, section 3051, subdivision (h)
violates state constitutional proscriptions against cruel or
unusual punishment.3 We disagree.
In determining whether a sentence constitutes cruel or
unusual punishment, the proper inquiry “focuses on whether the
punishment is ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the offense and the
offender, or stated another way, whether the punishment is so
excessive that it ‘“shocks the conscience and offends fundamental
notions of human dignity.”’” (In re Palmer (2021) 10 Cal.5th 959,
972.) When challenging a sentence as being cruel and/or unusual
in violation of the federal and California Constitutions, “[a]
defendant has a considerable burden to overcome.” (People v.
3 Unlike the federal Constitution, which bans “cruel and
unusual punishments” (U.S. Const., 8th Amend.), the California
state Constitution bans “[c]ruel or unusual punishment.” (Cal
Const., art. I, § 17.)
4
Bestelmeyer (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 520, 529.) “The doctrine of
separation of powers is firmly entrenched in the law of California
and the court should not lightly encroach on matters which are
uniquely in the domain of the Legislature.” (Ibid.) Reviewing
courts must always remain “aware that it is the function of the
legislative branch to define crimes and prescribe punishment.”
(Ibid.) Because it is the Legislature which determines the
appropriate penalty for criminal offenses, “[f]indings of
disproportionality have occurred with exquisite rarity in the case
law.” (People v. Weddle (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1196.)
Applying these principles, and having considered case law
addressing the issue presented here and other related issues, we
conclude Watson’s LWOP sentence does not violate state or
federal constitutional proscriptions against cruel and/or unusual
punishment. Our colleagues’ analysis in People v. Montelongo
(2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1016, 1030-1032 (Montelongo) is both
instructive and dispositive. In Montelongo, after conducting a
thorough analysis of relevant case law (which we incorporate by
reference), Division Seven of this court concluded an LWOP
sentence imposed on a defendant who committed murder when
he was 18 years old was not cruel and unusual punishment under
the Eighth Amendment. (Ibid.) In reaching this holding, the
Montelongo court noted: “Unless and until the United States
Supreme Court, the California Supreme Court, the Legislature,
or the voters by initiative change the law, we are bound to apply
it.” (Id. at p. 1032.) Although Montelongo only addresses a
5
challenge under the federal constitution, we conclude its analysis
likewise applies to the California state proscription against cruel
or unusual punishment. We therefore reject Watson’s contention
that his LWOP sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate.4
4 Cf. People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1380
[“‘Drawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to the
objections always raised against categorical rules. The qualities
that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an
individual turns 18. By the same token, some under 18 have
already attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach.’
[Citation.] But ‘[t]he age of 18 is the point where society draws
the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood’
[citation], and that is the line the high court has drawn in its
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.”]; People v. Argeta (2012) 210
Cal.App.4th 1478, 1482 [“‘These arguments regarding sentencing
have been made in the past, and while ‘[d]rawing the line at 18
years of age is subject . . . to the objections always raised against
categorical rules . . . [, it] is the point where society draws the line
for many purposes between childhood and adulthood.’ [Citations.]
Making an exception for a defendant who committed a crime just
five months past his 18th birthday opens the door for the next
defendant who is only six months into adulthood. Such
arguments would have no logical end, and so a line must be
drawn at some point. We respect the line our society has drawn
and which the United States Supreme Court has relied on for
sentencing purposes, and conclude Argeta’s sentence is not cruel
and/or unusual . . . .”].
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DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s order denying Watson’s motion
for a Franklin hearing.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
CURREY, P. J.
We concur:
COLLINS, J.
MORI, J.
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