In re Isabella G. CA2/1

CourtListener 9998182CalctappJul 8, 2024

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Filed 7/8/24 In re Isabella G. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re ISABELLA G., a Person B321917
Coming Under the Juvenile (Los Angeles County
Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 18LJJP00277)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ARMANDO C.,

Objector and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Stephanie M. Davis, Judge Pro Tempore.
Appeal dismissed.
David M. Yorton, Jr., under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Objector and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Veronica Randazzo, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________
The dependency proceedings below involve two children:
Abraham C., who is the son of appellant Armando C. and his
former girlfriend, Linda C. (Mother); and Isabella G., Abraham’s
older half sibling, who is the daughter of Mother and her former
boyfriend Thomas G. When the dependency proceedings
commenced in 2018, based on allegations of general neglect by
Mother, Armando was in prison and would not be eligible for
parole for around 10 years. Armando received notice of the
dependency proceedings involving his son Abraham and
expressed his desire to participate in the adjudication and
disposition hearings by videoconference or telephone and to have
counsel appointed to represent him. His participation at the
hearings was not facilitated (apparently because of technological
concerns), and the matter proceeded to the permanency planning
stage without his appearance or representation by counsel.
In March 2022, Armando filed petitions under Welfare and
1
Institutions Code section 388 and Ansley v. Superior Court
(1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 477 (Ansley), arguing his due process
rights were violated because the juvenile court did not secure his
presence at the adjudication and disposition hearings and
appoint counsel to represent him, despite his requests for same

1
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

2
made in advance of the hearings. He requested, among other
things, that the juvenile court vacate the section 366.26
permanency planning hearing and set a new adjudication and
disposition hearing. As to Isabella (Mother and Thomas’s
daughter) Armando asserted that the due process violations in
his son Abraham’s case prevented him from seeking presumed
father status as to Isabella (with whom he had not had contact
2
for more than five years since she was three years old). The
court granted the petition in Abraham’s case, and set the matter
for a new disposition hearing (which was later held), and denied
the petition in Isabella’s case. Armando filed this appeal,
3
challenging the denial of his petition as to Isabella.
Respondent Los Angeles County Department of Children
and Family Services (DCFS) filed a motion to dismiss the present
appeal arguing, among other things, that Armando lacks

2
In this context, a presumed parent is one who “receives
the child into their home and openly holds out the child as their
natural child.” (Fam. Code, § 7611, subd. (d).) A presumed
parent may seek reunification services, custody, or visitation. (In
re J.W.-P. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 298, 301 (J.W.-P.).)
3
In March 2023, while this appeal was pending, the
juvenile court terminated Armando’s and Mother’s parental
rights to Abraham, and Mother’s and Thomas’s parental rights to
Isabella. Armando appealed, challenging the order terminating
his parental rights to Abraham based on asserted violations of
the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; (ICWA))
and California law implementing ICWA. We rejected his
challenge and affirmed the order terminating parental rights. (In
re Armando C. (Nov. 8, 2023, B328451) [nonpub. opn.].) The
order terminating parental rights is final.

3
standing to maintain this appeal because he is not a party to the
proceedings involving Isabella. As explained below, we agree
with DCFS’s position, and dismiss this appeal.
BACKGROUND
I. The Participants in the Underlying Dependency
Proceedings
In March 2018, Isabella (then, five years old) and Abraham
(then, nearly two years old) came to the attention of DCFS based
4
on a referral alleging general neglect by Mother. During DCFS’s
investigation of the 2018 referral, Mother identified Thomas as
Isabella’s father and stated his whereabouts were unknown and
he was not visiting Isabella. In or around 2013, in prior
dependency proceedings involving Isabella, Thomas was deemed
Isabella’s presumed father.
Mother identified appellant Armando as Abraham’s father
and stated he was in prison (where he remained throughout
these dependency proceedings). Less than a year after
Abraham’s birth, Father was arrested and incarcerated, and he
was thereafter convicted of assault with a firearm and criminal
threats, with a firearm enhancement. He was sentenced to 14
5
years in prison. Mother was never married to Armando or
Thomas, and the dates of her relationships with each are not
clear from the record before us.

4
The allegations against Mother are not germane to this
appeal, so we do not discuss them herein.
5
A “CDCR [California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation] Inmate Locator” printout, attached to DCFS’s
May 1, 2018 Addendum Report, stated Armando’s parole eligible
date would be in June 2028.

4
Apparently DCFS contacted Armando in prison in March or
April 2018 concerning the referral against Mother. On or around
April 20, 2018, Armando wrote a letter to a DCFS social worker,
acknowledging the open case involving his son Abraham and
making a recommendation regarding placement. He did not
reference Isabella by name in the letter (as he did Abraham), but
he made multiple references to “my kids” and requested that they
not be placed with any of Mother’s relatives.
II. Detention and Adjudication/Disposition
Based on its investigation, on April 24, 2018, DCFS
obtained a warrant authorizing removal of Isabella and Abraham
from Mother, and placed both children in the same foster home.
On May 1, 2018, DCFS filed a dependency petition concerning
Isabella and Abraham, with allegations against Mother under
section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j). At the detention hearing
held the same day, the juvenile court deemed Thomas to be
Isabella’s presumed father and Armando to be Abraham’s
presumed father. The court made detention findings against the
three parents, and the children remained placed in the same
foster home. Armando did not appear at the detention hearing.
On May 17, 2018, the juvenile court issued a form JV-450
“Order for Prisoner’s Appearance at Hearing Affecting Parental
Rights” to secure Armando’s presence at the
adjudication/disposition hearing scheduled for July 9, 2018. The
order referenced Abraham’s case only (and not Isabella’s), and
stated the court could not accommodate the parent’s appearance
by videoconference or telephone in a manner that complies with
the California Rules of Court.
On or around June 22, 2018, DCFS sent Armando notice of
the adjudication and disposition hearings, which were scheduled

5
over two days, July 9 and July 26, 2018. The notice listed both
Abraham’s and Isabella’s names and case numbers. In the
Jurisdiction/Disposition Report, DCFS recommended no
reunification services for Armando (with Abraham) under section
361.5 due to the length of his prison sentence and his conviction
for a violent felony.
On July 2, 2018, Armando signed a form, waiving his right
to appear at the July 9, 2018 adjudication/disposition hearing in
Abraham’s case. Three days later, on July 5, 2018, he signed a
form JV-451 “Prisoner’s Statement Regarding Appearance at
Hearing Affecting Parental Rights,” indicating on the form that
he wanted an attorney appointed to represent him at the July 9,
2018 hearing in Abraham’s case, and that he wanted to
participate in the hearing by videoconference or telephone but he
did not want to be physically present in court.
We take the following facts from the above-referenced
opinion in Armando’s appeal from the order terminating his
parental rights to Abraham, In re Armando C., supra, B328451,
pages 4-5, because the record before us does not include some of
the relevant documents:
“At the adjudication hearing on July 26, 2018, Mother
pleaded no contest to an amended count under section 300,
subdivision (b). . . . The court set the matter for a disposition
hearing. [Armando] was not present at the adjudication
hearing. . . . For reasons not clear from the record, his
participation at the hearing was not facilitated.
“In advance of the disposition hearing, [Armando] again
signed forms requesting counsel, waiving his physical presence,
and indicating he wanted to participate by videoconference or
telephone. This time, a prison official checked a box on the form

6
indicating the prison could not provide [Armando] ‘with
videoconference or telephonic technology that complies with’ the
California Rules of Court.
“At a hearing on January 23, 2019, the juvenile court
sustained an additional count against Mother under section 300,
subdivision (b) and proceeded with the disposition hearing.
Mother was present and [Armando] was not (either physically or
virtually). Nor was [Armando] represented by counsel. The court
declared Abraham a dependent of the court, removed him from
Mother and [Armando], and ordered him placed under DCFS’s
supervision. The court ordered reunification services and
visitation for Mother, but not [Armando]. Twenty months later,
on September 18, 2020, the juvenile court terminated Mother’s
reunification services and scheduled a section 366.26 permanency
planning hearing for Abraham. [Armando] still had not appeared
at a hearing in this matter.
“On December 20, 2021, at a continued section 366.26
hearing, an attorney made a special appearance on behalf of
[Armando], but was not appointed to represent him. [Armando]
participated virtually from his place of incarceration. The
juvenile court noted this was [Armando]’s first appearance in
these dependency proceedings. The court continued the matter at
DCFS’s request and ordered that the prison make Father
available at the next hearing by video or telephone. . . .”
Isabella’s case also proceeded to the permanency planning
stage, with participation from Thomas, her presumed father.
III. Armando’s Section 388 Petitions
On March 11, 2022, Armando filed a petition concerning
Abraham under section 388 and Ansley, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d
477, requesting, among other things, that the juvenile court

7
vacate the section 366.26 hearing and set a new adjudication and
disposition hearing. He argued his due process rights were
violated because the juvenile court did not secure his presence at
the adjudication and disposition hearings and appoint counsel to
represent him, despite his requests for same made in advance of
the hearings. (In re Armando C., supra, B328451, pp. 5-6.)
Armando also filed a petition concerning Isabella under
section 388 and Ansley. He argued that the above-described
violations of his due process rights in Abraham’s case “prevent[ed
him] from seeking paternity as to [Isabella].” He requested the
following relief: (1) take the section 366.26 hearing off calendar
and set a new adjudication and disposition hearing in Isabella’s
case based on the due process violation in Abraham’s case; and
(2) place Isabella in his custody and/or order reunification
services for him with Isabella. Quoting Ansley, Armando
asserted he was not required to show that the change in order
would be in Isabella’s best interests: “[A] judgment that is
proven void due to lack of due process notice suffers from a fatal
jurisdictional defect. It may not be perpetuated on the rationale
that setting it aside would not, in the court’s view, be in the best
interests of the child.” (Ansley, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d at p. 490.)
Armando submitted the following exhibits in support of the
section 388 petition in Isabella’s case: the dependency petition;
the Detention Report; the May 1, 2018 Addendum Report; the
Jurisdiction/Disposition Report; the juvenile court’s May 17, 2018
order for his appearance at the adjudication/disposition hearing
in Abraham’s case, his waiver of his right to appear, and his
additional response on form JV-451; and the January 23, 2019
minute order from the continued adjudication/disposition hearing
in Abraham’s case. We summarized above the pertinent

8
information in these documents. Armando also attached to the
petition a statement he wrote on or about January 8, 2022,
regarding the (unsuccessful) efforts he made to participate in
these dependency proceedings. He also explained in the
statement that he was initially “willing to give [his] son up for
adoption [be]cause [he] didn’t want to separate him from his
sister Isabella”; but now he believed he would be released from
prison sooner than 2028 due to “positive programming,” and he
“want[ed] to continue to be a part of [his] kids[’] lives.” He did
not include any facts in the letter indicating he could establish he
was Isabella’s presumed father.
The juvenile court set the section 388 petitions for a
hearing. Armando was present via Webex at the May 3, 2022
hearing on his petitions, and he appeared through appointed
counsel. DCFS’s counsel and counsel for Isabella and Abraham
(hereafter, the children’s counsel) agreed with Armando that
Abraham’s case should be set for a new disposition hearing. The
court accordingly granted Armando’s petition in Abraham’s case.
Counsel for Isabella’s presumed father Thomas, the
children’s counsel, and DCFS’s counsel objected to the juvenile
court granting Armando any relief in Isabella’s case. Thomas’s
counsel noted Thomas signed Isabella’s birth certificate; he was
found to be her presumed father in prior dependency proceedings
in 2013; Mother and Thomas listed Thomas as Isabella’s father
on their parentage questionnaires in the present dependency
proceedings; and the juvenile court found Thomas to be Isabella’s
presumed father in the present dependency proceedings.
Thomas’s counsel also asserted there was nothing in the record
indicating Armando held Isabella out as his child.

9
The children’s counsel agreed with Thomas’s counsel that
there was nothing in the record that would support a finding that
Armando was Isabella’s presumed father. The children’s counsel
also argued that the requested change in order was not in nine-
year-old Isabella’s best interest because, “She does not have a
relationship with [Armando]. She does not recall any contact
with him. She does not recognize him to be her father, and she
only knows [Thomas] as her father. And she is currently thriving
in her placement.”
DCFS’s counsel asserted there was no due process violation
in Isabella’s case because her presumed father Thomas received
notice of the jurisdiction and disposition hearings, and Armando
was not even entitled to notice as to Isabella because “there was
no mention of [him] being [her] father.” Counsel also noted
Armando had not had contact with Isabella since his arrest and
incarceration in 2016 (more than five years before), and there
was no existing relationship between them that would warrant
having two presumed fathers in her case.
Armando’s counsel argued “alleged fathers” have a right to
notice of dependency proceedings (but he did not state facts
indicating Armando was as an alleged father of Isabella at the
time of Isabella’s adjudication and disposition hearings). Counsel
explained Armando was not requesting that the juvenile court
grant him presumed father status at this hearing. Rather, he
was requesting that the court return the case to the disposition
stage, so he would have an “opportunity to seek paternity” as to
Isabella. Counsel suggested there might have been a time when
Isabella lived in the same household as Armando, but counsel did
not specify the timeframe or state facts indicating Armando could
establish he was a presumed father to Isabella.

10
The juvenile court clarified Armando’s position with
counsel: “He wants to be given the opportunity to file a JV-505
[Statement Regarding Parentage] and have the court determine
whether or not he is presumed?” Armando’s counsel responded,
“That and more, essentially. So basically everything. He wants
to be given all the opportunities to contest all the issues as to
disposition that he wasn’t afforded due to the lack of legal
counsel.” The court made further inquiry: “But, in essence, he’s
asking -- if I understand, if he had counsel at the time, he would
have made an argument with respect to being considered
[Isabella]’s presumed father as well as [Thomas]; correct? Is that
what you’re saying?” Armando’s counsel replied, “Yes, Your
Honor. We wouldn’t be filing this [section] 388 motion if that was
essentially not the case because what would be the point? If
[Armando] is not the presumed father, he essentially doesn’t have
a right to custody.”
The juvenile court denied Armando’s petition as to Isabella,
stating Armando had made no showing “that at the time, when
paternity was decided, there were facts that he had that he could
have presented to the court to allow the court to consider him to
be [Isabella]’s presumed father.” The court continued: “But I
actually do have the facts as they existed at that time, and they
are that he had not had any contact with [Isabella] since 2016.
And we were in 2018 at the time [of the adjudication/disposition
hearing], so that would have been two years where he had had no
contact with [Isabella] at all. So that’s the first thing. He hasn’t
presented any new evidence to support the granting of the
[section] 388 [petition] as to her.”
The juvenile court also found a change in order was not in
Isabella’s best interests, stating, “And I do agree that case law is

11
6
clear and the statute[ ] is clear that there is an opportunity to
have two presumed fathers or two presumed parents when it is
factually appropriate and in the child’s best interests. [¶] This is
not one of these cases. [Armando] has had absolutely no contact
with this child, and she is nine years old. And if we go to 2016,
then she was three years old at the time that he last had contact
with her. And, again, he has not established any ongoing contact,
any type of relationship with her at all. [¶] And I also have to
take into consideration the fact that she is nine years old, does
not recognize him as her father, does not really recall him or have
a relationship with him.”
Armando filed a timely notice of appeal from the order
denying his section 388 petition in Isabella’s case.
IV. Relevant Juvenile Court Proceedings During
Pendency of This Appeal
We take the following facts from our opinion in Armando’s
appeal from the order terminating his parental rights to
Abraham:
“[Armando] was present via Webex at the August 31, 2022
disposition hearing for Abraham, and he was represented by
counsel. The juvenile court removed Abraham from [Armando],
granted [Armando] virtual and telephonic visitation, and denied
reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(12) (the
parent has been convicted of a violent felony) and subdivision

6
Family Code section 7612, subdivision (c) provides, in
pertinent part, “In an appropriate action, a court may find that
more than two persons with a claim to parentage under this
division are parents if the court finds that recognizing only two
parents would be detrimental to the child.”

12
(e)(1) (services would be detrimental to the child due to the
parent’s incarceration). The court scheduled a section 366.26
permanency planning hearing for Abraham.” (In re Armando C.,
supra, B328451, p. 10.)
“On March 13, 2023, the juvenile court proceeded with the
section 366.26 hearing. [Armando] was present via Webex from
his place of incarceration, and he was represented by counsel. . . .
The court terminated parental rights of the three parents, finding
no exception applied, and selected adoption as the appropriate
permanent plan for Abraham and Isabella, with the caregiver
designated as the prospective adoptive parent. The court found
by clear and convincing evidence that the children were
adoptable.” (In re Armando C., supra, B328451, pp. 11-12.) As
mentioned above, Armando appealed from the order terminating
his parental rights to Abraham, contending that the juvenile
court and DCFS failed to comply with ICWA and California law
implementing ICWA. We affirmed the order terminating
parental rights, which is now final. (Id. at pp. 2-3, 18.)
DISCUSSION
In this appeal, Armando contends the order denying his
section 388 petition as to Isabella must be reversed, and the
matter must be remanded for a new adjudication/disposition
hearing in Isabella’s case, because of the due process violations in
Abraham’s case which resulted in his absence from the children’s
combined adjudication/disposition hearing. He argues he was
deprived of the opportunity to seek presumed father status as to
Isabella at the adjudication/disposition hearing.
DCFS filed a motion to dismiss this appeal, arguing (1)
Armando lacks standing to maintain this appeal and (2) the
appeal is moot because the juvenile court terminated parental

13
rights over Isabella at a hearing where Armando was present,
and Armando did not challenge the order. We agree with DCFS’s
argument on standing, so we need not address the mootness
argument.
“[O]nly parties of record may appeal.” (In re Joseph G.
(2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 712, 715.) To become a party of record, an
alleged father in a dependency proceeding must “appear[] and
assert[] a position” as to his parentage of the child. (In re Emily
R. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1356; see In re Paul H. (2003) 111
Cal.App.4th 753, 759 [alleged father had standing to appeal from
the order terminating parental rights where he appeared in the
matter, made efforts to obtain paternity testing, and provided an
account of his interactions with the child’s mother to support his
claim that he was the child’s biological father].)
Here, Armando appeared in Isabella’s case, but he never
asserted a position regarding his parentage as to her. Rather, he
expressly declined to assert such a position at the section 388
hearing. He informed the court that he wanted an opportunity to
assert that he was Isabella’s presumed father (although she
already had a presumed father), but he was not seeking
presumed father status at that time.
Armando did not allege any facts in his section 388 petition
indicating he is Isabella’s presumed father. Nor did he submit to
the juvenile court a form JV-505, Statement Regarding
Parentage, which would have required the juvenile court to make
7
a determination as to his parentage. (See Cal. Rules of Court,

7
We note there are no facts in the appellate record
indicating Armando is Isabella’s presumed father, and he makes

14
rule 5.635(h).) Nothing prevented Armando from seeking
presumed father status in Isabella’s case, but he never did so in
the year after the juvenile court denied his section 388 petition
and before the court terminated parental rights over Isabella.
Armando put the cart before the horse. He sought to
return Isabella’s case to the disposition stage, by citing due
process violations in Abraham’s case, without first attempting to
establish he is a party to Isabella’s case (by asserting a position
8
as to parentage). He has no standing to maintain an appeal as
to Isabella, and we dismiss this appeal.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

CHANEY, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J. BENDIX, J.

no offer of proof in his appellate briefing indicating he is
Isabella’s presumed father.
8
At the time of the combined adjudication/disposition
hearings in Isabella’s and Abraham’s cases, there was nothing in
the juvenile court record indicating Armando was an alleged
father of Isabella, let alone a presumed father. An alleged parent
may not seek reunification services, custody, or visitation at a
disposition hearing; only a presumed parent may do so. (J.W.-P.,
supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 301.)

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