In re I.R. CA2/4

CourtListener 9998158CalctappJul 8, 2024

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Filed 7/8/24 In re I.R. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re I.R., a Person Coming B329912
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP02688A)
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

Plaintiff and
Respondent,

v.

F.L.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from order of the Superior Court of the County of
Los Angeles, Jean M. Nelson, Judge. Affirmed.
Lauren K. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Senior Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________

I.R. (born 2019) was the subject of a dependency petition
filed by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS) under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300.1 I.R. was not removed from his parents, F.L.
(mother) and A.R. (father), and they shared joint physical and
legal custody during the proceedings. The juvenile court
terminated its jurisdiction and issued an exit order pursuant to
section 362.4 that awarded sole legal and physical custody of I.R.
to father. 2 Mother appeals from the exit order and challenges
the juvenile court’s custody award. We conclude the juvenile
court did not abuse its discretion and affirm.

BACKGROUND
A. Prior Referrals
I.R. first came to DCFS’s attention in 2020. An initial
referral alleged father had thrown objects at mother and I.R., and
mother had expressed thoughts of suicide. Later that year,
mother’s therapist initiated another referral, alleging mother and
father argued and yelled at one another with I.R. lying between

1 All statutory references in this opinion are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
2 The Custody Order—Juvenile—Final Judgment filed in the
juvenile court on June 9, 2023 was not included in the record.
However, DCFS moved to augment the record to include this
document, and we grant DCFS’s motion.

2
them. DCFS investigated the referrals but did not initiate
dependency proceedings.
Conflicts between mother and father continued. Law
enforcement service logs for 2021 and 2022 reveal responses to
multiple calls alleging that father battered and threatened
mother, and mother broke into father’s home, destroyed property,
and refused to leave. In November 2021, father was detained for,
but not charged with, intimate partner battery.

B. Operative Referral
In early June 2022, mother initiated a third referral. She
alleged that, during an argument six months earlier, father
slapped her and grabbed her wrist and twisted it, and she kicked
him. She alleged father had a drinking problem and was likely
using drugs, hit her, threatened to kill her, took her phone and
keys, and kicked her out of the home. Mother alleged her
relationship with father ended in November 2021, and she had
left I.R. in father’s care because she was homeless. Mother
alleged she had not seen I.R. in person since February 2022. She
contended she did not go to father’s home because he had gang
affiliations and lived with gang members. Notwithstanding these
allegations, mother said she had no concerns with father’s caring
for I.R. because he was a “good father” who would “not do
anything to harm” I.R.
A social worker reached out to parents and other family
members. Mother disclosed she had been diagnosed with post-
traumatic stress disorder and depression, and her mental health
conditions had been serious enough to necessitate treatment at a
residential care facility for several years. She had been
prescribed medications but had stopped taking them at least a

3
year earlier. Mother admitted she attempted suicide in
September 2021, allegedly because father stopped her from going
to therapy and because she was unable to cope with violence in
the relationship.
Mother alleged father scheduled a time for her to visit I.R.
and then attempted to have sex with her. She alleged father had
given his current girlfriend a black eye, which made mother
concerned for I.R.’s safety.
Father alleged mother was homeless and was not
complying with her mental health treatment. He alleged mother
used drugs and had visited his home multiple times, attempting
to provoke him into a physical altercation. Mother’s instability
made father concerned for I.R.’s safety.
I.R.’s 10-year-old half-brother (brother), who lived with
father and I.R., denied feeling unsafe there and denied father
verbally abused or physically disciplined him. Brother reported
mother “likes to argue with his father” and came to their home
unannounced, circumstances he described as “‘scary.’” Maternal
grandparents described both parents as unstable and unable to
agree on what is best for I.R.

C. Section 300 Petition and Detention
On July 12, 2022, DCFS filed a petition on behalf of I.R.
pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b). According to
the petition’s allegations, parents had a history of engaging in
violent conduct in front of I.R. that placed the child at risk of
serious physical harm, damage, and danger. Further, mother
was alleged to have a history of substance abuse, current
marijuana use, mental and emotional problems, and a history of
self-harming behavior that rendered her incapable of providing

4
regular care for I.R. The petition alleged father knew of these
problems and failed to protect I.R.
In July 2022, father obtained a temporary restraining order
against mother on behalf of himself, I.R., and brother based on
allegations that mother threatened him with a knife and choked
him. The order expired on July 25, 2022. In DCFS’s detention
report, the social worker noted parents’ difficulty communicating
with one another regarding custody and visitation, and father
had sought law enforcement intervention to address mother’s
“unpredictable” behavior.
At the detention hearing on July 26, 2022, the juvenile
court found a prima facie case existed, and I.R. was a person
described by section 300. The court, adopting DCFS’s
recommendation, released I.R. to both parents. Mother was
ordered to complete a mental health assessment. Parents were
ordered to communicate through the Talking Parents application
and enlist the aid of a third party when they exchanged I.R. The
juvenile court issued a stay-away order, forbidding parents from
coming within 100 yards of each other’s residences and from
contacting each other electronically and by phone.
In conversations with the social worker, parents added to
their allegations of the other’s wrongdoing. According to father,
mother broke the security system in his home, hired someone to
kill him, and engaged in self-harming behavior. According to
mother, father raped her during the relationship, and the prior
day, I.R. complained that father hit him in the back with a closed
fist. Mother said she felt abused when parents communicated
over the Talking Parents application.
The clinician who conducted mother’s mental health
assessment opined that mother’s parental capacity was limited

5
due to her limited knowledge of parenting skills and
understanding of how coparenting conflict affects minors in the
household.

D. Jurisdictional and Disposition Hearing
A combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing was
held in October 2022. The count alleging a risk of harm arising
from parents’ history of violent conduct was amended to remove
the allegations of violent conduct by mother and was sustained as
amended. The count alleging parents’ failure to protect was
sustained as pleaded. The count alleging mother’s substance
abuse was voluntarily dismissed. The count alleging mother’s
mental and emotional problems and father’s failure to protect
was sustained as pleaded. The juvenile court found I.R. a person
described by section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), incorporated its
jurisdiction findings, and declared I.R. a dependent of the court.
At the hearing, I.R.’s counsel reported that coparenting was
a “big issue.” “[E]ach time they have the child, the parent
complains of the other parent causing some sort of harm to the
child, and it is kind of a constant ‘he did this/she did this,’” and
the social worker was “getting inundated with a lot of phone calls
and emails.” The juvenile court found no clear and convincing
evidence to remove I.R. from either parent, and it ordered joint
physical custody to stay in place as long as they cooperated with
DCFS and participated in services.
The juvenile court’s order included mental health
counseling and a directive that mother take all prescribed
psychotropic medications, as well as a referral of parents to
counseling to address domestic violence, alcohol abuse, coping
strategies, coparenting, cycle of violence, child protection,

6
personal trauma, and father’s pattern of controlling and
intimidating his partners.
The juvenile court warned parents that, at the upcoming
review hearing, it would “be looking for [their] ability to co-
parent.” The court prohibited parents from making derogatory
comments and false claims about one another and from using I.R.
as a reason to get the other parent in trouble.

E. Father’s Request for Order Admonishing Mother to
Stop False Reports
On January 19, 2023, father filed a request for an order,
alleging mother had made multiple false reports to law
enforcement accusing father of kidnapping or abusing I.R. He
asked the court to admonish mother to stop making false reports
to the police and DCFS. A hearing, attended by both parents,
was held the following week.
On approximately five occasions, DCFS’s counsel told the
juvenile court, mother reported to law enforcement that father
had kidnapped son, and as a result of the reports, father had
been forcefully detained. Mother’s counsel did not deny these
allegations. Instead, her counsel explained, parents had custody
of I.R. on alternating weeks, and exchanges of I.R. were made at
a police station. Mother’s counsel admitted mother sometimes
failed to call father to confirm an exchange 24 hours in advance,
as parents were required to do, and when father did not bring
I.R. to the exchange location, mother reported to law enforcement
that son had not been returned to her. Mother’s reason for
involving the police instead of the social worker, her counsel said,
was because mother had “some difficulty getting a hold” of the
social worker.

7
According to DCFS’s counsel, the social worker had warned
mother that parents’ visitation agreement required her to
confirm each exchange in advance, but mother responded she
didn’t feel the need to do so. Further, DCFS’s counsel reported,
mother sometimes sent her boyfriend, a non-approved person, to
pick up I.R., and mother had gone to father’s home before an
exchange in violation of the stay-away order. DCFS was
concerned the kidnapping reports endangered I.R., and it
supported father’s request for an admonishment. Father’s
counsel concurred with DCFS’s description of the events and
added, “[I]t is really dangerous and has gotten to the point where
the police believe there is active crime and come with guns out
and arrests [sic] the father.”
The juvenile court found the evidence “compelling,” and
stated, mother “need[ed] to change her conduct.” The court
observed, it is “harmful for . . . children to be involved in law
enforcement actions where law enforcement comes in and doesn’t
know the level of danger and may suddenly think there is
something worse going on. And we all know that gun violence
can break out when people don’t understand what is going on.”
The court stated, “If father is not giving over the child, the
mother is to call the social worker. If mother sees bruises or
marks or has concerns about something that is happening to the
child while in father’s care, she is to call the social worker. And it
is an extreme measure to call law enforcement[,] and it is a waste
of law enforcement resources if there is not truly an emergency.”
The court ordered “mother to contact the social worker
regarding abuse or kidnapping allegations.” The juvenile court
warned mother that her failure to follow the order would result in

8
a change of the custody order because “she is putting the children
at risk . . . .”

F. Section 364 Hearing
In the spring of 2023, DCFS recommended termination of
the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. DCFS recommended the grant of
sole legal and physical custody of I.R. to father based primarily
on its concerns about the false kidnapping reports to law
enforcement.
At the May 2023 section 364 hearing, the juvenile court
agreed with DCFS’s recommendations. The court observed that
“conflict between parents can continue to put a child at risk,” and
it was in I.R.’s best interest to give father sole legal and physical
custody to “decrease this conflict that is oftentimes instigated by
mother.” The court found mother had not significantly changed
her conduct since the hearing concerning her false police reports.
The court found mother recently made more false allegations,
contributed to the conflicts to a greater degree than father did,
and failed to follow through on her commitment to take I.R. for a
dental examination. The juvenile court entered a custody order
and final judgment terminating its jurisdiction and granting sole
legal and physical custody of I.R. to father, with mother to have
unmonitored visits.
Mother timely appealed. She contends that the juvenile
court abused its discretion in awarding sole legal and physical
custody of I.R. to father.

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DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law
“Section 362.4 governs the termination of juvenile court
jurisdiction and related orders.” (In re J.M. (2023) 89
Cal.App.5th 95, 112 (J.M.).) “The statute authorizes a juvenile
court to make ‘exit orders’ regarding custody and visitation upon
terminating dependency jurisdiction over a child.” (Ibid.; In re
Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 202—203.) “These exit orders
remain in effect until modified or terminated by a subsequent
order of the superior court.” (J.M., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at
p. 112, citing § 362.4, subd. (b); see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule
5.700.)
“[I]n making exit orders, the juvenile court must look at the
best interests of the child.” (J.M., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at
p. 112, quoting In re John W. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 961, 973.)
“Because juvenile dependency proceedings arise when children
are subject to or at risk of abuse or neglect, ‘[t]he presumption of
parental fitness that underlies custody law in the family court
just does not apply. . . . Rather the juvenile court, which has
been intimately involved in the protection of the child, is best
situated to make custody determinations based on the best
interests of the child without any preferences or presumptions.’
[Citation.]” (Id. at p. 112.) “A finding that neither parent poses
any danger to the child does not mean that both are equally
entitled to half custody, since joint physical custody may not be in
the child’s best interests for a variety of reasons.” (In re Nicholas
H. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 251, 268 (Nicholas H.).) “By the same
token, a finding that the parent from whom custody was removed
no longer poses a risk of detriment or that the parent whose
custody has been subject to supervision no longer requires

10
supervision is relevant to, but not necessarily determinative of,
the best interests of the child.” (Ibid.)
The juvenile court has broad discretion to make custody
orders when it terminates jurisdiction. (J.M., supra, 89
Cal.App.5th at p. 112.) We review the juvenile court’s exit orders
for an abuse of that discretion. (Id. at p. 113.) The juvenile
court’s decision will not be disturbed unless it has exceeded the
limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or
patently absurd determination. (Ibid.) We “‘consider all the
evidence, draw all reasonable inferences, and resolve all
evidentiary conflicts, in a light most favorable to the trial court’s
ruling. [Citation.] The precise test is whether any rational trier
of fact could conclude that the trial court order advanced the best
interests of the child. [Citation.] We are required to uphold the
ruling if it is correct on any basis, regardless of whether it is the
ground relied upon by the trial judge. [Citation.]’” (In re Robert
L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067.)

B. The Juvenile Court did not Abuse its Discretion in
Awarding Sole Legal and Physical Custody to Father
Mother argues that awarding sole legal and physical
custody to father was an abuse of the juvenile court’s discretion
because the evidence suggested I.R. “thrived” in the care of both
parents, and there was no evidence I.R. was unsafe in her care.
She contends the award was speculative and unfair because the
court relied on evidence that she made false kidnapping reports
to police and false reports to the social worker, without
adequately weighing the interests of continuity and stability in
determining I.R.’s best interests. We disagree.

11
Because the custody order was made in a dependency
proceeding, it was not presumed mother was entitled to half
custody because of her parental fitness (J.M., supra, 89
Cal.App.5th at p. 112), and I.R.’s safety in her care was not
dispositive of his best interests. (Nicholas H., supra, 112
Cal.App.4th at p. 268.) Instead, the juvenile court based the
custody order on evidence indicating shared custody was
unworkable due to serious parental conflicts that were often
instigated by mother.
Courts have long recognized that conflict can make it
impossible or impracticable for parents to effectively coparent,
and in such circumstances, a child’s best interests are served by
an award of sole custody. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Battenburg
(1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1344 [“The parents’ attitudes and
actions towards each other indicated that the joint custody
arrangement was not working,” resulting in grant of sole physical
custody to mother]; see J.M., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 108
[affirming exit order awarding sole physical custody to mother
where father was noncompliant and “coparenting between
mother and father was an ‘ongoing issue.’”].)
Here, the juvenile court acknowledged parents’ difficulty in
coparenting early in the case. After reviewing the detention
report, the court directed them to cease making negative
comments about one another reasoning, “That is not helping your
kid when you do that.” It also issued a stay-away order in an
attempt to reduce conflicts. At the jurisdiction and disposition
hearing, the court warned parents that it would be “be looking for
[their] ability to co-parent” at the section 364 review hearing. To
this end, the court forbade parents from texting, calling, and
disparaging each other. The court stated: “[Y]ou are not to use

12
[I.R.] as a tool, as a reason to get the other parent in trouble. You
will permanently, emotionally damage your child.” The court
stated, “Don’t make false claims about what the other parent has
done.”
The parental conflicts persisted, especially in connection
with the exchange of I.R. Evidence in the record shows that
mother failed to comply with parents’ agreement to confirm
exchanges of I.R. in advance, and she sometimes sent an
unapproved person in her place. Then, when father did not
complete the exchange, she reported a kidnapping. Mother did
not express remorse for endangering or causing distress to father
and I.R.,3 and instead, her counsel offered only mother’s desire to
“feel a little more empowerment over her family and her life,”
which caused her to make “some decisions that she now knows
were not ideal.” The juvenile court was not required to overlook
mother’s stated motive for making the reports, her seeming lack
of appreciation of the risk of harm she created,4 and her lack of
contrition.
Moreover, evidence in the record supported the juvenile
court’s finding that mother had not significantly changed her

3 Accusing an innocent person of “felonious conduct and calling in
the police could foreseeably lead to a police investigation, escalation of
the conflict, and arrest, all of which would cause emotional distress.”
(Pool v. City of Oakland (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1051, 1064.)
4 In this appeal, mother still denies she created a dangerous
situation by falsely reporting kidnappings in progress, arguing the
juvenile court’s concern about gun violence was “complete speculation.”
However, in the proceedings below, mother did not deny father’s
counsel’s report that the situation had “gotten to the point where the
police believe there is an active crime and come with guns out and
arrests [sic] the father.”

13
conduct, as she continued to try to “get Dad in trouble” by using
different tactics. The social worker warned mother that her
making false allegations “continues to create conflict[s] with co-
parenting.” Nevertheless, during the month before the section
364 review hearing, mother reported to the social worker that the
then-three-year-old I.R. told her father “‘lost his house’” and said
it was mother’s fault. The social worker found, however, father
was still residing at his address with no plans to move. The same
month, mother reported to the social worker that father sent her
a threatening message. She was unable to substantiate her
accusation, however, because her proof was a screenshot of a
message showing no indication that father was the sender or
mother was the recipient.
This evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that
the parental conflict was “oftentimes . . . instigated by mother,”
and, while both parents tried to manipulate the other and get the
other in trouble, mother did it “to a worse degree than father”
and did not want to accept that her conduct would affect I.R.
Similarly, the court acknowledged, although father could be
“difficult,” he had not endangered mother and son by calling law
enforcement. The juvenile court was within its discretion to
determine that mother had not acted in I.R.’s best interest while
parents attempted to share custody. (See In re John W., supra,
41 Cal.App.4th at p. 974 [“A child’s best interests are not
necessarily served by shuttling between two parents . . . .”].)
Mother does not address the juvenile court’s other concern
with shared custody: joint legal custody would not serve I.R.’s
healthcare needs. Evidence in the record indicates that mother
promised the social worker she would schedule a dental
examination for I.R., but after two months, still had not done so.

14
Father, when asked to make the appointment, immediately
complied and reported a few weeks later that son had been seen
by the dentist. The juvenile court reasonably could conclude that
I.R.’s dental and medical needs would be best served by father’s
having sole custody.
Finally, mother argues, removing her custody was an abuse
of discretion because the juvenile court failed to adequately weigh
stability and continuity in determining I.R.’s best interests as
required by Burchard v. Garay (1986) 42 Cal.3d 531, 538
(Burchard). We disagree.
In Burchard, our high court reversed the appellate court’s
affirmance of a family court’s order awarding sole custody of son
to his father. Custody determinations, our high court held,
required an assessment of the emotional bonds between parent
and child, i.e., “the ethical, emotional, and intellectual guidance
the parent gives to the child throughout his formative years, and
often beyond,” as well as a “factual determination of how best to
provide continuity of attention, nurturing, and care.” (Burchard,
42 Cal.3d at p. 540.)
Our high court concluded that the family court abused its
discretion by basing its custody award on father’s superior
financial circumstances and supposedly superior childcare
arrangement: he could provide in-home care by a stepmother,
whereas mother would need to rely on childcare services while
she worked. These reasons were “insignificant” compared to the
fact that mother had been the primary caretaker from son’s birth
to the trial hearing, no serious deficiency in her care was proved,
and under her care, son had become a happy, healthy, well-
adjusted child. (Burchard, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 541.) Our high
court stressed “the importance of stability and continuity in the

15
life of a child, and the harm that may result from disruption of
established patterns of care and emotional bonds,” and it
concluded that father’s showing was “wholly insufficient to justify
taking the custody of a child from the mother who has raised him
from birth, successfully coping with the many difficulties
encountered by single working mothers.” (Ibid.)
The facts are very different in this juvenile court case.
(J.M., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 112.) As discussed supra,
evidence in the record showed that father parented I.R. alone for
11 months (approximately one-third of I.R.’s life) while mother
was homeless, the social worker reported no issues with father’s
care or home, maternal grandmother described I.R. as “a happy
child,” and mother “ha[d] no concerns regarding the child’s
safety” while I.R. was in father’s care during that period of his
life. Ample evidence established that when mother and father
had shared custody, the arrangement was riddled with conflict
that interfered with coparenting. Thus, the record provides
evidence to show an award of sole legal and physical custody to
father, with unmonitored visits by mother, was a solution that
provided “continuity of attention, nurturing, and care” for I.R.
(Burchard, supra, 42 Cal.3d. at p. 540.) It was not arbitrary,
capricious, or patently absurd.
In sum, from the totality of the circumstances, a rational
trier of fact could conclude that awarding sole legal and physical
custody to father advanced the best interests of I.R. (In re Robert
L., supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 1067.) Accordingly, we conclude

16
the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in making the
order.5

DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.

MORI, J.
We concur:

COLLINS, Acting P.J.

ZUKIN, J.

5 Mother argues for the first time on reply that DCFS did not seek
removal of I.R. from her custody by filing a section 387 petition.
Mother has waived this argument, as she has not explained her failure
to raise it in her opening brief, and further, because she has not
supported the point with reasoned argument or citation to authority.
(Ross v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 722, 736 [deeming
waived arguments raised for the first time on reply, where appellant
made no attempt to show good cause why argument should be
considered]; Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th
270, 277 [point waived when an appellant failed to support a point
with reasoned argument or authority].) In any event, section 387
describes petitions to remove children to a foster home or institution,
and mother has not explained how this section applies to an award of
custody to another parent. (§ 387, subd. (a) [“An order changing or
modifying a previous order by removing a child from the physical
custody of a parent . . . and directing placement in a foster home, or
commitment to a private or county institution, shall be made only after
noticed hearing upon a supplemental petition.” (Italics added.)

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