People v. Lopez CA4/1

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Filed 7/8/24 P. v. Lopez CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D082105

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN354161 )

DONTREL LOPEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Carlos O. Armour, Judge. Affirmed; remanded with directions.
Cynthia M. Jones, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A.
Sevidal, Lynne M. McGinnis, and James M. Toohey, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

After his 2017 guilty plea to attempted murder and assault with a
deadly weapon, Dontrel Lopez petitioned the superior court under Penal
Code1 section 1172.6 (formerly section 1170.95) to resentence him. After
hearing oral argument, the court denied the petition without issuing an order
to show cause. Lopez appeals, contending that the superior court erred when
it denied his petition at the prima facie stage of the proceedings. We disagree
that Lopez was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his section 1172.6
petition because he was the actual shooter. However, as Lopez argues and
the People agree, the abstract of judgment does not accurately set out the
superior court’s oral pronouncement of the restitution fine and parole
revocation fine. As such, we remand this matter with directions to the
superior court to correct the abstract of judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The San Diego County District Attorney’s office filed a second amended
information charging Lopez with attempted premeditated murder
(§§ 664/189/187, subd. (a); count 1), carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a); count 2),
robbery (§ 211; count 3), and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245,
subd. (a)(1); count 4). As to counts 1 through 3, the information further
alleged Lopez personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and personally
inflicted great bodily injury on the victim causing permanent paralysis
(§ 12022.7, subd. (b)).
On October 3, 2017, Lopez pleaded guilty to attempted murder
(count 1) and assault with a deadly weapon (count 4). Regarding count 1, he
admitted the enhancements alleging the personal use of a firearm under
section 12022.5, subdivision (a) and the personal infliction of great bodily
injury causing permanent paralysis under section 12022.7, subdivision (b).

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
2
To this end, in his plea of guilty/no contest form, Lopez wrote the
following statement under penalty of perjury:
“I unlawfully attempted to murder a human being and in
doing so, personally . . . inflicted great bodily injury which
caused permanent paralysis and used a handgun [in] the
commission of the offense . . . .”

At the sentencing hearing, the superior court and Lopez engaged in the
following exchange related to the attempted murder offense:
“Q As to Count One, that on or about October 30, 2015, you
did unlawfully attempt to murder Colin A[.], a human
being, in violation of Penal Code Section 187(a) and Penal
Code Section 664, how do you plead to that charge?

“A Guilty, your Honor.

“Q And do you admit that, in the commission and
attempted commission of the offense, you personally used a
firearm, to wit, a handgun, within the meaning of Penal
Code Section 12022.5, paren A? Do you admit that
allegation?

“A Yes, your Honor.

“Q And do you admit that in the commission and
attempted commission of the above offense, you personally
inflicted great bodily injury upon Colin A[.], not an
accomplice to the above offense, causing Colin A[,] to suffer
paralysis of a permanent nature, within the meaning of
Penal Code Section 12022.7, paren B? Do you admit that
allegation?

“A Yes, your Honor.”

The court dismissed the remaining charges and allegations and
sentenced Lopez to the stipulated term of 25 years in prison.
On January 28, 2022, Lopez filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6. After the parties briefed the matter, the superior court heard
oral argument at a prima facie hearing. The court denied the petition finding
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that Lopez was ineligible for relief as a matter of law because he was the
“direct perpetrator.” In reaching that conclusion the court read the “plain
language of the change of plea form . . . , which describes the factual basis of
the plea:”
“Unlawfully attempted to murder a human being and in
doing so, personally inflicted great bodily injury which
caused permanent paralysis, and used a handgun during
the commission of the offense.”

Lopez filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
A. Section 1172.6 Petition
We review a denial of resentencing under section 1172.6 for failure to
present a prima facie case using a de novo standard of review. (People v.
Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14.)
In 2019, the California Legislature amended sections 188 and 189,
which made changes to existing law such that murder liability could no
longer be imposed on a defendant who was not the actual killer, did not act
with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony
who acted with reckless indifference to human life. (People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis).)
Section 1172.6, subdivision (a) provides a procedure by which a
convicted person may seek resentencing under the new law. After the
offender files the appropriate petition, the court must appoint counsel to
represent the offender, and the matter is set for hearing to determine
whether the petitioner has made a prima facie showing that he or she is
entitled to relief. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 961–963, 967.) In making
that preliminary determination, the court may rely on the record of

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conviction but may not engage in factfinding, weighing of evidence, or the
exercise of discretion. (Id. at p. 972.)
A petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law if the record of
conviction establishes that he or she was not convicted under any theory of
liability affected by the Legislature’s amendments to the law of murder.
(People v. Mancilla (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 854, 866–867.) A record of
conviction may include the charging document and the plea form. (See, e.g.,
People v. Saavedra (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 444 (Saavedra).)
The only theory of attempted murder identified for resentencing
eligibility in section 1172.6 is “attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); see People v. Coley
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548 (Coley) [the statute “applies by its terms only
to attempted murders based on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine”].) The natural and probable consequences doctrine is a means by
which malice can be implied by the factfinder if the person “ ‘willfully does an
act, the natural and probable consequences of which are dangerous to human
life, and the person knowingly acts with conscious disregard for the danger to
life that the act poses.’ ” (People v. Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 953,
citing People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 653.)
“In the plea context, a petitioner convicted of murder is ineligible for
resentencing if the record establishes, as a matter of law, that (1) the
complaint, information, or indictment did not allow the prosecution to
proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, or another theory of imputed malice; (2) the
petitioner was not convicted under such theory; or (3) the petitioner could
presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder under the law as
amended by [section 1172.6].” (People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974,

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987 (Flores).) As we discuss post, the record of conviction conclusively
establishes that Lopez was not convicted under any theory of imputed malice,
and therefore the trial court did not err in denying his petition at the prima
facie stage.
Lopez makes three primary arguments here. First, he asserts his
admission to the factual basis for his plea did not establish “undisputed facts
that could be relied on to deny his petition at the prima facie stage.” Second,
he claims the elements of the offenses and attendant enhancements he
admitted are insufficient to establish his ineligibility for relief. Specifically,
he argues his pleas neither prove he acted with malice nor that he was the
direct perpetrator. Third, he asserts that “public policy weighs against”
denying a resentencing petition in guilty plea cases at the prima facie stage.
We find these arguments unpersuasive.
In his plea form, Lopez admitted under penalty of perjury that he:
(1) unlawfully attempted to murder a human being; (2) in the process of
attempting to murder someone, he personally inflicted great bodily injury,
which caused permanent paralysis; and (3) used a handgun in the
commission of the offense.
In addition, at the hearing on his change of plea, Lopez was placed
under oath and confirmed to the court that those statements were true and
correct.
Neither the amended complaint nor the plea form included any
reference to the natural and probable consequences doctrine or to any other
theory of imputed or vicarious liability. In fact, the amended complaint
specified that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate and
premeditated, and the admissions in support of the plea similarly were
focused on Lopez’s personal conduct. This fact alone seems to place Lopez

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beyond the reach of section 1172.6, subdivision (a) because that section
“applies by its terms only to attempted murders based on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine.” (Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 548.)
Moreover, Lopez’s sworn statements also establish his intention to kill,
placing him outside the reach of section 1176.2. Not only did he admit that
he “attempted to murder a human being,” but Lopez also explained how he
did it (using a gun) and the devastating effects of his attempt (personally
inflicting great bodily injury, i.e., causing permanent paralysis). Generally,
the admission to attempted murder carries with it an intent to kill. (See
People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 739 [“ ‘[a]ttempted murder requires
the specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act
toward accomplishing the intended killing’ ”], quoting People v. Lee (2003) 31
Cal.4th 613, 623.) Although the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
at one time, provided an exception to that rule (see id. at pp. 624-625), as we
discussed ante, there is not even a hint of that doctrine here. Lopez’s plea
goes far beyond a generic statement that he attempted to kill another human.
Rather, Lopez explicitly acknowledged that he paralyzed someone in that
attempt when he used a gun. Therefore, when Lopez pleaded guilty to
attempted murder under those specific facts, he necessarily admitted his
intent to kill.
A recent decision of Division Three of our court supports our conclusion
that Lopez’s plea makes him ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6
as a matter of law. In Saavedra, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at pages 446–447, the
appellate court affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that a defendant charged
with attempted premeditated murder was ineligible for resentencing relief as
a matter of law, based upon his plea statement that he “ ‘willfully, unlawfully
and with malice aforethought attempted to murder [three] human beings, by

7
personally discharging a firearm at the vehicle [they] were occupying, within
the meaning of . . . section 12022.53.’ ” The court concluded that the plea
statement established that Saavedra was the actual shooter. “The factual
basis for the plea cannot reasonably be construed as potentially imposing
liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine because it is a
theory of vicarious liability, and Saavedra did not act vicariously.”
(Saavedra, at p. 448.)
As in Saavedra, Lopez’s plea to attempted murder, read in tandem with
his admissions of use of a firearm and personally causing great bodily injury,
negates any possibility of vicarious liability. It is true that in Saavedra, the
reviewing court placed emphasis on the plea form’s use of the word “by,”
i.e., that Saavedra specifically admitted that he attempted the murder “ ‘by
personally discharging’ ” the firearm. (Saavedra, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at
p. 447.) Lopez’s plea form did not use the preposition “by” to link his
admissions, but after he admitted that he attempted to murder someone, he
added the following: “in doing so[, I] personally . . . inflicted great bodily
injury which caused permanent paralysis and used a handgun [in] the
commission of the offense . . . .” We read “in doing so” here to serve the same
grammatical function as “by” in Saavedra. Simply put, we do not see how
Lopez’s plea form, considered in its entirety, can be read as anything but a
sworn admission that Lopez attempted to murder the victim, and in doing so,
personally inflicted great bodily injury through his personal use of the
firearm. Such an admission is necessarily inconsistent with the imposition of
liability for attempted murder based on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.
Despite Saavedra’s applicability to the instant matter and the People’s
reliance on it in their respondent’s brief, Lopez does not address that case

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whatsoever. Rather, Lopez argues the instant matter is analogous to Flores,
supra, 76 Cal.App.5th 974. There, the defendant pleaded no contest to a
charge of second-degree murder. The charging document did not specify or
exclude any specific theory of murder; and “[i]n entering his plea, [the
defendant] did not admit to or stipulate to any particular theory of murder.”
(Id. at p. 987.) However, in Flores, the factual basis for the murder plea was
a preliminary hearing transcript, and the defendant never admitted the truth
of the testimony in that transcript. (Id. at p. 991.) In contrast, Lopez
admitted under oath in his plea that he attempted to murder the victim
(a charge that included the element of his intent to kill). He did not assert,
suggest, or imply that the murder attempt was merely part of a natural and
probable consequence of the conduct of someone else.
Similarly, our analysis does not change if we consider People v. Rivera
(2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217 as Lopez urges us to do. In that case, the court
found that the defendant did not admit the truth of the evidence presented to
the grand jury despite stipulating to the grand jury transcript as the factual
basis for his plea. (Id. at p. 235.) Thus, the grand jury evidence was not
sufficient to establish the defendant acted with actual malice. (Ibid.)
Leaving open the possibility a grand jury or preliminary hearing transcript
could be enough to foreclose relief where a petitioner does not contest the
evidence, the appellate court found the grand jury transcript insufficient to
defeat a facially sufficient petition at the prima facie stage. (Id. at
pp. 235–239.) Unlike Rivera, Lopez here swore in his plea form and testified
under oath that the factual basis for his plea was true and that he was
pleading guilty because he actually caused the paralyzing injury in an
attempt to murder the victim. In this sense, Lopez agreed to facts (shooting
the victim and causing paralysis) beyond the mere elements of murder.

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As such, the record of conviction establishes he is ineligible for relief, and
Rivera is not helpful to Lopez’s cause.
Additionally, we are not persuaded by Lopez’s argument that People v.
Dillingham (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 688 mandates a different result here.
In Dillingham, the trial court––in determining whether the defendant’s two
prior first degree burglary convictions qualified for the imposition of serious
felony enhancements––took judicial notice of documents in the court files.
Relying upon the information for each charged burglary, both alleging
burglary of a residence, the change of plea transcript for the charge to which
the defendant pleaded guilty, and the jury verdict form finding him guilty of
burglary in the first degree, the trial court found both convictions to be
residential burglaries and imposed two five-year serious felony
enhancements. (Dillingham, at p. 696–697.) On appeal, the Court of Appeal
assessed whether either offense qualified for the “serious felony”
enhancement as a “burglary of a residence.” (Id. at p. 697.) The appellate
court determined the enhancement was properly applied to one of the
convictions, by virtue of the date of the offense, because, based on the
elements, it qualified as a residential burglary as a matter of law. (Id. at
p. 699.) For the second conviction, however, the court determined the
enhancement could not be sustained because entry into a residence did not
become an element of first-degree burglary until after the date of the
defendant’s conviction. (Id. at p. 699–700.) The court found the trial court’s
reliance on language in the information was improper because it was
“ ‘superfluous,’ ” did not “add to the elements of the crime, posed no issue
which was necessarily adjudicated by the judgment, and thus was not the
subject of collateral estoppel.” (Id. at p. 700, citing People v. Alfaro (1986) 42
Cal.3d 627, 636 (Alfaro).) In its analysis, the appellate court observed that

10
proof of the serious felony enhancement was not limited to the elements of
the crime but instead can include “ ‘proof of any matter which was necessarily
adjudicated by the judgment and which defendant had an incentive to
contest.’ [Citation.]” (Dillingham, at p. 700.) On the facts before it, however,
the court found “ ‘the prosecution had no need to prove, defendant had no
incentive to contest, and the trier of fact no duty to decide’ the allegation of
residency” and thus there was insufficient proof the conviction was for the
qualifying “ ‘ “burglary of a residence.” ’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
As Lopez acknowledges, however, the primary decision upon which the
court relied in Dillingham, Alfaro, supra, 42 Cal.3d 627, was overruled in
People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343, which held that a trial court can rely
on the “entire record of the conviction” in determining a prior conviction
allegation. (Guerrero, at p. 355.) In response to this substantial obstacle,
Lopez contends his “concern does not turn on what facts are established by
the record of conviction, but rather whether the plea form’s use of boiler plate
language ‘I admit’ should be treated as a binding admission of ‘facts’ when a
plea only requires a stipulation to a factual basis.” Whether Lopez’s
admissions were legally required for the trial court to accept his plea
(§ 1192.5, subd. (c)) does not change the content of what he admitted. And
Lopez made admissions in open court that went beyond his statement in his
change of plea form. As Saavedra makes clear, the specific language of the
factual basis for Lopez’s plea––as admitted by Lopez under penalty of perjury
and under oath in open court––is legally consequential as a binding
admission. Thus, Lopez’s argument is meritless, and his reliance on
Dillingham is misplaced.
Finally, Lopez asserts that public policy weighs against the denial of
petitions at the prima facie stage for cases involving guilty pleas. In support

11
of this assertion, Lopez claims the enactment of Senate Bill No. 775 (Stats.
2021, ch. 551)to broaden eligibility for relief to those who pleaded guilty to
voluntary manslaughter “recognized this reality.” Not so. Section 1172.6
does not apply different standards to petitions at the prima facie stage
depending on whether the conviction resulted from a jury finding or from a
guilty plea. Although the “ ‘prima facie bar was intentionally and correctly
set very low’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972), a petition may
nevertheless be denied at the prima facie stage if the defendant was
convicted as the direct perpetrator. (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
45, 47 [actual killer ineligible for relief under section 1170.95 as a matter of
law].) In section 1172.6 prima facie stage proceedings, a “conviction after a
guilty plea should not be accorded less weight and finality than a murder
conviction after a jury trial” if the record of conviction shows the defendant
was not prosecuted under a theory made faulty by Senate Bill No. 1437
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015). (People v. Nguyen (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 1154, 1167.)
Based on the language of the statute and the nature of the proceedings,
Lopez fails to demonstrate the prima facie analysis for convictions secured
through guilty pleas should be more forgiving than the same convictions
rendered after a jury trial. Thus, Lopez’s public policy argument fails.
Nevertheless, Lopez points to excerpts from the preliminary hearing
transcript and asserts there was evidence his brother was armed and may
have been the shooter. But Lopez did not stipulate to the preliminary
hearing transcript as a factual basis for the plea, the prosecutor urged the
trial court not to use the preliminary hearing in reaching its decision, and it
appears the trial court did not in fact rely on the preliminary hearing
transcript to deny the petition. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the

12
evidence offered at the preliminary hearing somehow undermines the trial
court’s denial of Lopez’s section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage.
For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the trial court that Lopez is
ineligible for relief as a matter of law under section 1172.6.
B. Abstract of Judgment
Lopez contends, and the People concede, that the abstract of judgment
and minute order do not accurately reflect the trial court’s oral imposition of
a restitution fine of $5,000 and a stayed parole revocation fine of $5,000.
Both the minute order and abstract of judgment recorded the imposition of a
restitution fine and parole revocation fine, each in the amount of $10,000.
Because this does not accurately reflect the trial court’s oral pronouncement
of judgment, the minute order and abstract of judgment must be corrected.
Where a discrepancy exists between the oral pronouncement of
judgment and the minute order or abstract of judgment, the oral
pronouncement controls. (People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385.)
The abstract of judgment and minute order must accurately reflect the
court’s oral pronouncement of judgment because, although not the judgment
of conviction, they represent “ ‘ “the process and authority for carrying the
judgment and sentence into effect.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.) “Courts may correct clerical errors at
any time, and appellate courts (including this one) that have properly
assumed jurisdiction of cases have ordered correction of abstracts of
judgment that did not accurately reflect the oral judgments of sentencing
courts.” (Ibid.)
During the sentencing hearing, the trial court issued two restitution
fines. The trial court stated, “The restitution fine is $5,000. The additional
restitution fine is $5,000 and that is stayed as long as his parole, if he

13
receives parole, is not revoked.” After correcting its calculation of credits, the
trial court again addressed the additional restitution fine, stating, “The
additional restitution fine under .45 is $5,000 that is stayed as long as any
post-release supervision is not revoked.”
In contrast to the oral pronouncement of judgment, the abstract of
judgment and minute order both list each fine as $10,000. These are
inconsistent with the trial court’s oral pronouncement and should be

corrected.2 As a result, we shall remand this matter to the superior court
with instructions to correct the minute order and abstract of judgment to
reflect the $5,000 restitution fine and parole revocation fine issued by the
trial court. (People v. Mitchell, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 185.)
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order denying Lopez’s petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6 is affirmed. This matter is remanded to the superior
court with instructions that it correct the abstract of judgment and minute
order so both are consistent with this opinion and the superior court’s oral
pronouncement during sentencing. The superior court also shall forward the

2 When the trial court readdressed the additional restitution fine, it
appears to have invoked section 1202.45, subdivision (b), that references post-
release supervision rather than subdivision (a) that references parole. Based
on the language of sections 3451 and 1192.7, it does not appear Lopez could
be subject to section 1202.45, subdivision (b), after being convicted of
attempted murder. In any event, the abstract of judgment correctly recorded
the trial court’s reference to the parole revocation subdivision.
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amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, J.

DATO, J.

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