People v. Peacock CA2/3

CourtListener 9997920CalctappJul 5, 2024

Full text

Filed 7/5/24 P. v. Peacock CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B331833

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A646845
v.

HENRY LAWRENCE PEACOCK,
JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Hector E. Gutierrez, Judge. Affirmed.

Robert L.S. Angres, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey,
Assistant Attorney General, Charles S. Lee and Michael C.
Keller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Henry Lawrence Peacock, Jr., appeals from the trial court’s
order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code
section 1172.6.1 We affirm because the record of conviction
establishes Peacock was the sole perpetrator and actual killer.
He thus is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The charges and jury verdicts
In 1988 the People charged Peacock with the murder
and attempted robbery of Luis (Ruben) Zepeda. The People
alleged Peacock personally used a firearm in the commission
of the offenses, and that he murdered Zepeda while engaged
in the commission of robbery. Peacock was the sole defendant
named in the information.
In July 1989 a jury convicted Peacock of the first degree
murder and attempted robbery of Zepeda. The jury found true
the allegations that Peacock personally used a firearm and
that he murdered Zepeda while engaged in the commission or
attempted commission of robbery. The trial court sentenced
Peacock to life in the state prison without the possibility
of parole, plus two years for the firearm enhancement. The
court stayed the sentence on the attempted robbery count.
Another panel of this court affirmed Peacock’s conviction.
(People v. Peacock (Feb. 11, 1992, B045750) [nonpub. opn.].)
More than three decades later, on March 30, 2022, Peacock
—representing himself—filed a form petition for resentencing
under section 117[2.6]. Peacock checked boxes on the form

1 References to statutes are to the Penal Code. Effective
June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was renumbered section
1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)

2
stating (1) the information filed in his case “allowed the
prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other
theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely
on that person’s participation in a crime,” (2) he was “convicted
of murder . . . following a trial,” and (3) “[he] could not presently
be convicted of murder . . . because of changes made to Penal
Code §§ 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019.” Peacock also
checked a fourth box that stated, “Having presented a facially
sufficient petition, I request that this Court appoint counsel
to represent me.”
The trial court appointed counsel for Peacock. The
prosecution filed a response to Peacock’s petition, contending
Peacock was “not eligible for relief as a matter of law” because
he was “the actual killer.” The prosecution stated, “The jury
was instructed on first-degree felony murder, but the only theory
presented to the jury was that Petitioner was the actual killer.”
The prosecution noted Peacock’s jury was not instructed on
aiding and abetting. The prosecution attached to its response
the jury instructions and verdict forms from Peacock’s 1989 trial.
Peacock filed a reply. Peacock didn’t deny being the
actual killer. Instead, he contended two of the jury instructions
given at his trial–CALJIC Nos. 8.20 and 8.21—permitted the jury
to convict him “based on an imputed malice theory.”2 Peacock

2 The then-current version of CALJIC No. 8.21, entitled
“First Degree Felony-Murder,” provided,
“The unlawful killing of a human being,
whether intentional, unintentional or
accidental, which occurs [during the
commission or attempted commission of

3
argued, “Consistent with the jury verdict, Petitioner could
have been convicted under a then (but no longer) valid theory
of causation whereby Defendant was not the actual killer but
was rather the ‘proximate cause’ of decedent’s death: there is
nothing inherent in the jury’s verdict and in the trial court’s
jury instructions that would rule out an accident or some other
proximate causation of death which doesn’t rise to the level of
‘actual killer.’ ” Peacock also argued the jury’s “true” finding
on the allegation that he “personally used a firearm” in the
commission of the murder and attempted robbery was “not
a basis at the prima facie stage” to deny his petition.
The court held a hearing on June 27, 2023. The district
attorney and Peacock appeared by Webex. Peacock’s court-
appointed counsel appeared in person. Peacock confirmed
he could see and hear the court.

the crime] of robbery is murder of the first
degree when the perpetrator had the specific
intent to commit such crime. [¶] The specific
intent to commit robbery and the commission
or attempted commission of such crime must
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
The current CALCRIM jury instruction on first degree
felony murder contains similar language: the defendant must
have intended to commit the underlying felony, such as robbery
and, while committing or attempting to commit that underlying
felony, the defendant personally committed an act “that directly
caused the death of another person.” A person “who was the
actual killer” “may be guilty of felony murder even if the killing
was unintentional, accidental, or negligent.” (CALCRIM No.
540A.)

4
The court stated, “This matter is calendared for a
prima facie determination as to Mr. Peacock’s Penal Code
section 1172.6 petition.” The court asked “if either attorney
would like to augment the record or add anything” to the papers
they’d submitted. The prosecutor replied, “No. I’m going to
submit on my pleadings, Your Honor.”
Peacock’s counsel said he’d had “the chance to do some
more research” after he filed his brief. Counsel cited People v.
Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972 and People v. Maldonado (2023)
87 Cal.App.5th 1257. Those cases, counsel said, hold “if there’s
any now invalid legal theory under which the jury could have
convicted” or “even confusing jury instructions which contradict
each other,” the court should find a prima facie case.
Counsel continued, “And that’s what we have here. . . .
[W]hat we have with the jury instructions given where the
jury could have convicted [Peacock] without him being the
actual killer based on imputed malice.” As for the firearm
enhancement, counsel argued the jury could have made that
finding “if the discharge of the firearm was made without intent
to kill but was simply an accident.” Counsel then referred to
“reckless indifference to human life” and a “major participant.”
Counsel stated, “[N]one of [the verdicts] actually have a finding
that the defendant was the actual killer.”
The prosecutor stated Langi “involved a second-degree
murder and aiding and abetting instruction, so that would not
be applicable here.” The prosecutor continued, “[T]here are
no aiding and abetting instructions [in] Peacock’s case. It was
all or nothing. He . . . was either the actual killer or he had
to be found not guilty. And by virtue of them convi[ct]ing him,
he was convicted as the actual killer.”

5
The prosecutor added, “Then or now in a felony murder
prosecution, he is not eligible for relief. He could currently
be convicted of a felony murder as the actual killer without
any further showing but the fact that he killed the victim. And
once you establish that, there’s really nothing further to look at
at the prima facie stage.”
In reply, Peacock’s counsel reiterated that “it [apparently
referring to the killing] could have been accidental or
unintentional.”
After both counsel submitted, the court said, “I began
my review last week, and I was here for some time yesterday
in the afternoon into the early evening reviewing the petition,
the People’s response, and the reply brief authored by [Peacock’s
counsel].” The court described the verdicts and listed the nine
jury instructions that “were key in the court’s analysis.” The
court cited People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45 (Harden)
and discussed it at some length.
The court then stated,
“The only theory the People proceeded on was
that Peacock acted alone and was the actual
killer. The jury returned a true finding on the
personal use allegation. [¶] The natural and
probable consequences doctrine was not read
to the jury. No jury instructions were given
as to aiding and abetting or even suggested
that another perpetrator was involved. There
was no instruction as to accomplice liability. [¶]
The record of conviction in Mr. Peacock’s case
irrefutably establishes as a matter of law that
the jury determined he was the actual killer,

6
and this court reaches this conclusion without
any fact-finding, weighing of evidence, or
credibility determinations and bases its
decision only on the jury instructions, Penal
Code section 189, and the relevant case law
that I cited. [¶] For the foregoing reasons, the
court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
that defendant Peacock was convicted as the
actual killer under a valid theory of murder
within the revised Penal Code section 189.
The petition for relief is respectfully denied.”
DISCUSSION
1. Governing law
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
1437) amended existing law on accomplice liability for murder
“ ‘to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person
who is not the actual killer . . . .’ ” (People v. Gutierrez-Salazar
(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 411, 417, quoting Stats. 2018, ch. 1015,
§ 1(f); § 189, subd. (e)(1).) To accomplish this goal, Senate Bill
1437 limited accomplice liability under the felony-murder rule
and eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine
as it relates to murder, to ensure a person’s sentence is
commensurate with his individual criminal culpability. (See
generally People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 986; People v.
Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843; People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 957, 971 (Lewis).) Under the amended statute,
a person may be convicted of felony murder only if (1) he was
the actual killer; or (2) he was not the actual killer but, with the
intent to kill, he aided and abetted the actual killer’s commission
of murder; or (3) he acted as a “major participant” in a felony

7
listed in section 189 and acted with “reckless indifference
to human life.” (§ 189, subd. (e), as amended by Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § 3; see Gentile, at p. 842.) Senate Bill No. 775
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), effective January 1, 2022, extended
resentencing eligibility to individuals convicted of murder on
any “other theory under which malice is imputed to a person
based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” (Stats.
2021, ch. 551, § 2(a).)
Senate Bill 1437 also provided an avenue for a person
convicted under the former law to petition the sentencing court
to vacate his conviction and be resentenced if he could no longer
be convicted under the amended law. (People v. Strong (2022)
13 Cal.5th 698, 708–709 (Strong); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 959–960.) If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing
of entitlement to relief, the trial court must issue an order to
show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing,
the prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the petitioner is guilty under the amended law.
(§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(3); Strong, at pp. 708–709.)
At the prima facie stage, the trial court takes as true
the petitioner’s factual allegations and assesses whether the
petitioner would be entitled to relief if those allegations were
proved. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) However, “[t]he
record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial court’s
prima facie inquiry under section 117[2.6], allowing the court
to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that
are clearly meritless.” (Ibid.) The jury instructions are part
of the record of conviction, because the instructions “given at
a petitioner’s trial may provide ‘readily ascertainable facts from
the record’ that refute the petitioner’s showing, and reliance

8
on them to make the eligibility or entitlement determinations
may not amount to ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence
or the exercise of discretion,’ ” which may not take place until
after an order to show cause issues. (People v. Soto (2020)
51 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1055, review granted on other grounds
Sept. 23, 2020, S263939, and held for Lewis, review dismissed
Nov. 17, 2021, and opinion citable to the extent not inconsistent
with Lewis; see People v. Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941, 949
[jury instructions showed trial court never instructed the jury on
the natural and probable consequences doctrine; summary denial
of petition affirmed].) The verdicts also are part of the record of
conviction. (Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 47–48, 55–56
[affirming summary denial of petition; jury instructions and
verdicts irrefutably established as a matter of law that defendant
was ineligible for resentencing].)
We independently review the trial court’s determination
that Peacock failed to make a prima facie showing. (People
v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251; Harden, supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at p. 52.)
2. Peacock is ineligible for resentencing as a matter
of law
Peacock asserts he established a prima facie case for relief.
He says “scrutiny of the record of conviction does not inevitably
lead to th[e] conclusion [that he was the actual killer as a matter
of law] nor does any other information in the record establish
ineligibility for relief.” Peacock contends “whether appellant
acted alone or not in the commission of his criminal conduct
requires a finding of fact that is not permitted at the prima facie
stage.” Peacock then states: “[E]ven if the trial court did not err
in concluding from the record of conviction that appellant acted

9
alone, it could not thereafter conclude as a matter of law that
appellant was necessarily ‘the actual killer’ within the meaning
of section 189, subdivision (e)(1).” Why is that? Because, Peacock
says, he “might have caused the victim’s death but lacked an
intent to kill or a depraved heart,” and “nothing in the record
of conviction establishes that the jury could not have imputed
malice” to him.
It is difficult to know what to make of these contentions.
Peacock seems to be asserting, in the alternative, that either
he wasn’t the killer—someone else was—or he was the killer
but it was an accidental or “unintentional” killing.
We previously granted the Attorney General’s request
for judicial notice of the reporters’ transcripts of Peacock’s trial.
At the trial, Angel Valdiviez testified he and Zepeda drove to
Los Angeles from Texas to visit family and their friend Arturo
Ozaeta. Zepeda was driving a Chevrolet pickup truck. They
picked up their friend from his workplace and drove to a
supermarket to buy film. As Valdiviez opened the glove box
to put the film in it, he heard someone say, “ ‘All of you step
back away from the truck.’ ” Valdiviez looked up and saw
a “gun toward[ ] [Zepeda’s] head.”
Valdiviez, Ozaeta, and Zepeda all stepped away from the
truck. Zepeda had his hands up. “Right after that,” Valdiviez
heard a shot—“a pow”—and then two more shots. Zepeda said,
“ ‘He shot me. He shot me.’ ” Valdiviez saw Zepeda had been
shot in the side. Zepeda approached the shooter and they started
to struggle. Valdiviez went to help Zepeda. Blood was “really
squirting out” of Zepeda. Ozaeta ran to call 911. The shooter
had a gun—a small revolver—in his right hand. The gun slipped
out of his hand.

10
Valdiviez and Zepeda were beating up the shooter. Zepeda
was bleeding from the side of his chest. Blood was going down
his shirt. Zepeda stood up, gasping for air. Valdiviez tried to
help Zepeda to the truck and they both fell into the truck.
Valdiviez turned and the shooter was going down the street.
Valdiviez and Ozaeta “held [the shooter] in the street until [a]
security guard [from the store] put . . . handcuffs on him and
brought him back to the scene,” and put him in a police car.
At trial, Valdiviez identified Peacock as the shooter.
He said he remembered the shooter’s face: “It’s in my dreams
every night.” Ozaeta also identified Peacock at trial.
Zepeda suffered a gunshot wound to the left chest.
The bullet went through his left lung, then his aorta, then his
right lung, and “came to lie” in his right chest wall. This “severe
gunshot injury through the aorta and lungs” caused the victim
to go into cardiac arrest.
Peacock testified on his own behalf at trial. He told
the jury that, around noon that day, he was at a bus stop and
ran into “a guy I know of named Snake.” Peacock had “[s]een
him around the neighborhood a lot of times” but didn’t know
his real name. Peacock had a gun in his back pocket “[f]or
protection.”
Both Peacock and Snake got on the bus, then later got off.
They decided to “ ‘get a beer.’ ” Peacock went into a store to
buy beer. He “told [Snake] to hold my gun.”
Peacock came out of the store about five or ten minutes
later. He didn’t see Snake. He saw people by a truck and heard
“some screaming and some saying ‘help.’ ” Peacock “walked over
there to see what was going on.” He saw “a guy laying [sic] in
the back of the truck bleeding.”

11
Peacock crawled into the truck to help the man. Peacock
“didn’t really feel a heartbeat” so he “started pumping his heart
several times.” Peacock was doing C.P.R. Peacock then got out
of the truck to ask for help and “they jumped on me.”
At the court’s jury instruction conference with counsel,
the court noted Peacock’s defense was “an alibi.” “[F]or that
reason,” the court continued, there was “no issue as to whether
or not he’s an aider and abettor. He either is the perpetrator
or he’s not, correct?” Peacock’s counsel replied, “Correct. I don’t
think there should be anything about an aider and abettor.”
The prosecutor did not mention aiding and abetting or
any other accomplice liability theory in his closing argument.
The prosecutor said the case was “a whodunit.” Nor did
Peacock’s counsel tell the jury that Peacock was merely an
accomplice. Instead, he argued the prosecution witnesses were
“mistaken” about who the shooter was.
Peacock contends “this court should not consider the
reporter’s transcripts from appellant’s original trial” because
“[a] court may not take judicial notice of irrelevant matters.”
But the transcripts of Peacock’s trial are not “irrelevant.”
They are part of the record of conviction.3

3 In his request for judicial notice of the trial transcripts,
the Attorney General states, “The transcripts of the trial are
relevant to this appeal because the superior court relied upon
those transcripts at the hearing on appellant’s petition for
resentencing.” The Attorney General appears to be mistaken.
Nothing in the record indicates the district attorney submitted
the trial transcripts; he filed copies of the jury instructions and
the verdict forms only. At the hearing on the petition, Peacock’s
counsel asked the court to “put on the record what it’s relying on
. . . in the prima facie case.” The court stated it had “read and

12
Moreover, even without the trial transcripts, we would
affirm the denial of Peacock’s petition. No other defendant or
alleged perpetrator is mentioned in the information or anywhere
else in the record. The jury instructions establish Peacock’s jury
was not instructed on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine or any other theory imposing liability on him as an
accomplice to a murder by Snake or anyone else. (See People v.
Bodely (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1193, 1198, 1201 [“jury instructions
contained no reference to an accomplice”; denial of petition
at prima facie stage affirmed]. Cf. People v. Beaudreaux (2024)
100 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1232, 1247 (Beaudreaux) [same; record
of conviction—instructions, verdicts, and jury’s findings—“refute
conclusively [defendant’s] attempt to allege entitlement to section
1172.6 relief”]; People v. Mares (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1158, 1161,
1167–1169 (Mares) [appellate court “need not credit the truth of
any fact in the preliminary hearing transcript” to affirm denial
of petition at prima facie stage; “record supports no theory other
than those where [defendant] was the actual killer”], review
granted May 1, 2024, S284232.) The verdict forms demonstrate
the jury convicted Peacock of first degree murder under the
felony-murder rule and found true the allegation that, in the
commission of the offenses, Peacock personally used a firearm.4

considered” Peacock’s petition, the People’s response, and
Peacock’s reply. The court detailed the verdict forms and the jury
instructions attached as exhibits to the prosecution’s response,
listing the CALJIC number and Bates stamp number of each.
4 See Beaudreaux, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1244–1246
[distinguishing People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588
because, in that case—unlike in Beaudreaux—the jury was
instructed on natural and probable consequences].

13
As the sole and actual perpetrator of Zepeda’s murder,
Peacock is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. (People
v. Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 969–973 (Garcia) [affirming
denial of resentencing because record of conviction “unequivocally
establishes” defendant was the sole perpetrator and actual
killer]; Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 47–48, 56 [same];
People v. Bratton (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1100, 1104–1105, 1110–
1111, 1128 [affirming denial of petition at prima facie stage;
defendant was shooter; jury convicted defendant of first
degree murder with personal use of firearm enhancement and
felony-murder special circumstance]; People v. Hurtado (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 887, 889, 893 [no need for a hearing because
“the defendant was the only person who committed the crime”];
People v. Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735, 743–744; People
v. Gallo (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 594, 599–600; People v. Edwards
(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 666, 669, 674 [affirming summary denial
of resentencing petition where record of conviction showed
defendant was actual killer]; see also People v. Delgadillo (2022)
14 Cal.5th 216, 233 (Delgadillo) [defendant “not entitled to any
relief under section 1172.6” because he “was the actual killer
and the only participant in the killing”]; Beaudreaux, supra,
100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1239 [defendant bound by jury’s findings
that he personally and intentionally fired a weapon in the course
of an attempted robbery that caused the victim’s death].)
Finally, Peacock contends “the record of conviction does
not exclude the possibility that [he] only proximately caused the
victim’s death.” This contention borders on the unintelligible.
Peacock’s defense at trial was not that he “only proximately
caused” Zepeda’s death. His defense was that Snake did it, and
he was inside the store at the time. (Cf. Beaudreaux, supra,

14
100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1241 [defendant’s denial of responsibility
for victim’s death “put in issue his role in [victim’s] killing, and
he had the incentive and opportunity at trial to claim that he
did not personally shoot [victim]”].)
Peacock relies on People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1
and People v. Vang (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 64. Our colleagues
in the Third District summarized those cases in Garcia, supra,
82 Cal.App.5th at p. 971:
“In Lopez, the victim was bludgeoned to death
during a home-invasion robbery involving two
perpetrators, but there was no direct evidence
that the defendant was the person who
bludgeoned the victim. (Lopez, at pp. 5–10, 19.)
Similarly, in Vang, there was no direct
evidence that the defendant personally
committed the act that killed his wife. There,
the defendant, who had a long history of
domestic violence, got into an argument with
his wife and followed her after she fled in a car.
(Vang, at pp. 69–70.) He eventually forced her
to stop and coerced her into his vehicle through
force or fear. (Id. at p. 69.) As he was driving
away, she opened the door and jumped out of
the vehicle; the fall from the vehicle resulted
in her death. (Ibid.)”
Here, again, Peacock never contended at trial that he
somehow acted as Snake’s accomplice—one of two perpetrators
as in Lopez. Instead, Peacock testified under oath that he wasn’t
even there, plainly implying Snake must’ve been the shooter—
using Peacock’s gun—while Peacock was in the store.

15
Moreover, as we have explained, a person “who was the
actual killer” “may be guilty of felony murder even if the killing
was unintentional, accidental, or negligent.” (CALCRIM No.
540A. See Beaudreaux, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1243–1244
[“even assuming hypothetically [defendant] could produce
evidence of [an] accidental discharge” of the firearm, it wouldn’t
matter; “[w]e still have the long-standing rule that a defendant
is guilty of felony murder if, while intending to commit a
qualifying felony, he personally performs an act that causes
death, regardless of whether the fatal act was intentional
or accidental”].)
In sum, the record of conviction conclusively establishes
Peacock was the sole perpetrator and actual killer. “As the
Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear, the structure of
section 1172.6 shows the Legislature intended for the trial courts
to winnow petitions, rejecting those without any merit at the
prima facie hearing based on information contained in the
record of conviction.” (Mares, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1173,
citing Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971, Delgadillo, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 233, Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 700;
People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 464.)

16
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order denying Henry Lawrence Peacock,
Jr.’s, petition for resentencing.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

ADAMS, J.

17

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.