CourtListener 9997504•Conda v. Xsolla CA2/5
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Filed 7/3/24 Conda v. Xsolla CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
RHOTUNDA CONDA, B316369
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super.
Ct. No. 19STCV41974)
v.
XSOLLA (USA), INC.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Richard L. Fruin, Jr., Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded.
Tron & Tron, Lanny M. Tron and Terry L. Tron for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
Blank Rome, Dennis Ehling, and Caitlin Sanders for
Defendant and Respondent.
___________________________
Plaintiff sued her former employer for retaliation in
violation of the Federal Employment and Housing Act (FEHA),
Labor Code sections 98.6 and 1102.5, and related claims.
Defendant moved for summary judgment, and the trial court
granted the motion. Plaintiff appeals and argues this was error
because there are disputed issues of material fact precluding
summary judgment.
The parties are familiar with the facts, and our opinion
does not meet the criteria for publication. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.1105(c).) We accordingly resolve the cause before us,
consistent with constitutional requirements, via a written opinion
with reasons stated for our conclusion that there do exist triable
issues of material fact solely as to plaintiff’s causes of action
predicated on a retaliation theory of liability. (Cal. Const., art.
VI, § 14; Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1261-
1264 [three-paragraph discussion of issue on appeal satisfies
constitutional requirement because “an opinion is not a brief in
reply to counsel’s arguments”; “[i]n order to state the reasons,
grounds, or principles upon which a decision is based, [an
appellate court] need not discuss every case or fact raised by
counsel in support of the parties’ positions”].)
* * *
Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party
shows “[it] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law” because,
among other things, the nonmoving party cannot establish “[o]ne
or more elements of the[ir] cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subds. (c), (o)(1) & (p)(2); QDOS, Inc. v. Signature
Financial, LLC (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 990, 998.) Summary
judgment should be denied only if there are “genuine” or “triable”
issues of fact to be resolved at trial—that is, “if, the evidence
would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find . . . in favor of the
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party opposing the motion.” (Serri v. Santa Clara University
(2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 860 (Serri).) We review a trial
court’s summary judgment ruling de novo. (Minish v. Hanuman
Fellowship (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 437, 455.)
1. Summary Adjudication of Conda’s First Cause of
Action for FEHA Retaliation Requires Reversal
To prevail on a claim for retaliation under FEHA, Labor
Code section 1102.5, or Labor Code section 98.6, a plaintiff must
establish—among other things—that she engaged in an activity
that is protected under one of those statutory schemes. (Gov.
Code, § 12940, subd. (h); Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005)
36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042 (Yanowitz); Lawson v. PPG Architectural
Finishes, Inc. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 703, 709 (Lawson); St. Myers v.
Dignity Health (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 301, 314 (Myers).)
FEHA prohibits an employer from discriminating against
or harassing an employee “because of race, . . . medical condition,
. . . sex, [or] gender,” among other enumerated criteria. (Gov.
Code, § 12940, subds. (a), (j).) The retaliation provision of FEHA
forbids an employer from firing an employee ‘ “because the person
has opposed any practices forbidden under’ FEHA.” (Husman v.
Toyota Motor Credit Corp. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1168, 1192
(Husman); see Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (h).)
In evaluating claims for FEHA retaliation, California uses
a burden-shifting mechanism. First, an employee must establish
a prima facie case of retaliation by producing evidence to show
that (1) she engaged in a “protected activity,” (2) the employer
subjected her to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal
link existed between the protected activity and the employer’s
action. (Yanowitz, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1042; Miller v.
Department of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, 472; Husman,
supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1192-1193.) If the employee meets
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this burden, it is rebuttably presumed that the employer engaged
in retaliation, and the burden shifts to the employer to set forth
“a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment
action.” (Yanowitz, at p. 1042.) The burden then “shifts back to
the employee to prove intentional retaliation.” (Ibid.)
The parties do not dispute that Conda was subject to an
adverse employment action (termination), so we focus on whether
she raised triable issues of material fact as to whether she
engaged in protected activity and whether there was a causal
link between her protected activity and her termination.
A. Protected Activity
A retaliation claim may be brought by an employee who has
“ ‘complained of or opposed conduct that the employee reasonably
believes to be discriminatory, even when a court later determines
the conduct was not actually prohibited by the FEHA.’ ”
(Yanowitz, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1043.) “Opposing practices
forbidden by FEHA includes . . . participating in an activity
perceived by the employer as opposition to discrimination,”
“whether or not so intended by the individual expressing the
opposition.” (Nealy v. City of Santa Monica (2015) 234
Cal.App.4th 359, 380; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11021, subd.
(a)(1)(D).)
In September 2018, Conda informed Agapitov she planned
to commence investigating employee allegations of a “hostile
work environment,” “harassment,” and “retaliation” (as well as
violations of the company’s drug and alcohol-free workplace
policy).1 It is also undisputed that Lubensky separately advised
1 Conda advised she was not disclosing the names of the
complainants because “there is tremendous fear of retaliation”
4
Agapitov that Conda had received complaints of employees
“making racial slurs.” Conducting an investigation into either
category (or both categories) of FEHA-prohibited behavior is
undoubtedly protected activity; the investigations were meant to
identify and redress discriminatory or unlawful behavior, i.e.,
actions to oppose practices forbidden by FEHA and related laws.
B. Causal link
The trial court erred in concluding that Conda failed to
raise a triable issue as to causation. Conda proffered evidence
from which a factfinder could reasonably conclude that Agapitov
resented her for conducting an investigation into complaints of
discrimination she had received. Evidence in the summary
judgment record reveals that in response to her September 2018
email informing him of the complaints and her intent to
investigate, Agapitov called her and was “irate,” asking her
“why are you trying to do an investigation?” He demanded she
stop investigating. Less than four months later, he terminated
her. The timing of the relevant events is probative of a causal
link. (Hawkins v. City of Los Angeles (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 384,
394 [“Circumstantial evidence such as proximity in time between
protected activity and alleged retaliation may establish a causal
link”]; see also Allen v. Iranon (9th Cir. 2002) 283 F.3d 1070,
1078 [even 11 months between activity and adverse action can
support an inference that an employment decision was
retaliatory].)
and she additionally explained to Agapitov that there are
“a number of people involved” and she had consulted with outside
counsel. These details, combined with her decision to investigate,
indicate Conda made a preliminary assessment that the
complaints were credible (or at least that they could not be
dismissed as not credible).
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C. Xsolla Proffered a Legitimate Reason for Firing
Conda, but She Adduced Substantial Evidence of
Pretext and Retaliatory Animus
In seeking summary judgment, Xsolla claimed it fired
Conda not in retaliation for her opposition to, and attempt to
investigate, FEHA-prohibited behavior but because Agapitov was
dissatisfied with Conda’s work performance. We will assume
that there was sufficient evidence of this proffered legitimate
reason to shift the burden to Conda to show “ ‘a triable issue by
producing substantial evidence that the employer’s stated
reasons were . . . pretextual, or that the employer acted with a
[retaliatory] animus.’ ” (See Serri, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at
p. 861.)
Conda’s summary judgment evidence carries that burden.
Agapitov admitted that his decision to fire her was “wrong” and a
“mistake.”2 Conda was also given multiple explanations about
her termination, some of which were obviously contradictory.
To take one example, Lubensky explained that Conda’s position
was eliminated while Agapitov stated that she was fired for her
deficient performance. To take another, Agapitov’s claim of
deficient performance was contradicted by Conda’s written
performance evaluations at Xsolla, Lubensky’s testimony that
Conda’s performance did not support her termination, Conda’s
receipt of a discretionary bonus in December 2018, and
Agapitov’s later recorded admission to Conda that firing her was
“emotional and . . . the wrong decision.” These contradictions are
2 The trial court overruled Xsolla’s objection to the transcript
of Agapitov’s apologetic phone call. Because Xsolla did not appeal
that ruling, we do not address its propriety and consider the
transcript as part of the record properly before us.
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good indicia of pretext and a factfinder could rely on this showing
of pretext and all the other evidence in the summary judgment
record to infer retaliation was a substantial motivating factor in
Agapitov’s decision to terminate Conda.
2. Summary Adjudication of Most of Conda’s
Retaliation-based Theories of Liability (the Second
Cause of Action for Failure to Prevent FEHA
Retaliation, the Fourth Cause of Action for
Retaliation Under Labor Code Section 1102.5, and
the Fifth Cause of Action for Wrongful Termination
in Violation of Public Policy) Also Require Reversal
The parties agree that this claim rises and falls with the
FEHA retaliation claim, and provided no separate analysis in
their briefs for this cause of action. Because this claim is
derivative of Conda’s FEHA retaliation claim, it also survives
summary adjudication.
Labor Code section 1102.5 prohibits employers from
retaliating against whistleblowing activities, such as reporting
what she reasonably believes is a violation of a local, state, or
federal law. (§ 1102.5, subd. (b).)
Conda’s claim under Labor Code section 1102.5 is premised
on her complaints of what she purports amounted to violations,
or what she reasonably believed to be violations, of FEHA and
Labor Code section 98.6. For the same reasons Conda’s claims
for retaliation under FEHA survive summary adjudication, so
does her claim for retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5.3
3 Indeed, in light of our Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Lawson, supra, 12 Cal.5th 703, summary adjudication of Conda’s
Labor Code section 1102.5 claim arguably presents an even
stronger basis for reversal than her FEHA-based retaliation
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Finally, the policy underlying a claim for wrongful
termination in violation of public policy “must be supported by
either constitutional or statutory provisions,” and the common
law claim cannot be broader than the statute on which it
depends. (Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880,
889-890; City of Moorpark v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th
1143, 1159; Dutra v. Mercy Medical Center Mt. Shasta (2012)
209 Cal.App.4th 750, 756.) Because there are triable issues of
fact regarding Conda’s FEHA and Labor Code section 1102.5
retaliation claims, her claim for wrongful termination in violation
of public policy survives summary adjudication to the extent it is
based on those claims.
3. Summary Adjudication of Conda’s Labor Code
Section 98.6 Claim, Her Claim for Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED), and Her
Request for Punitive Damages Was Proper
Labor Code section 98.6 prohibits an employer from
terminating an employee because she has complained that she is
owed wages. (Lab. Code, § 98.6, subd. (a).) As with FEHA
retaliation, a claim for retaliation under Labor Code section 98.6
claim. (Id. at p. 712 [“By its terms, section 1102.6 describes the
applicable substantive standards and burdens of proof for both
parties in a section 1102.5 retaliation case: First, it must be
‘demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence’ that the
employee’s protected whistleblowing was a ‘contributing factor’ to
an adverse employment action. (§ 1102.6.) Then, once the
employee has made that necessary threshold showing, the
employer bears ‘the burden of proof to demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence’ that the alleged adverse employment action
would have occurred ‘for legitimate, independent reasons’ even if
the employee had not engaged in protected whistleblowing
activities”], italics added.)
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requires a good faith belief of entitlement to unpaid wages.
(St. Myers, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 307 [Labor Code section
98.6 “prohibits discharging an employee for filing a bona fide
complaint . . . relating to her rights under the jurisdiction of the
Labor Commissioner”].) Conda’s claim is based on her complaint
that she received a VP-level bonus instead of a c-level bonus.4
Conda has not raised a triable issue as to whether she had
a good faith belief she was owed a c-level bonus. Conda cites
Davis v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1302,
1331, fn. 20 for the proposition that “wages” include “bonuses.”
Not only is the material cited dicta, but the case the Davis court
cited—Neisendorf v. Levi Strauss & Co. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th
509, 522—observed that “nothing in the public policy of this state
concerning wages . . . transforms [an employee’s] contingent
expectation of receiving bonuses into an entitlement.” Neisendorf
stated that only “once a bonus has been promised as part of the
compensation for service, and the employee fulfills all the agreed-
to conditions,” is a promised bonus considered wages that must
be paid. (Ibid.) Here, it is undisputed that the bonus program
under which Conda was given a VP-level bonus was not
implemented until December 2018—long after Conda signed her
employment agreement that entitled her to a base salary of
$180,000 with eligibility to receive a 20 percent bonus. Thus, she
had no good faith belief that she was legally entitled to unpaid
wages because she received a VP-level rather than a c-level
bonus.
Conda asserts that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment on her claim for IIED because she raised a
triable issue as to whether Xsolla’s conduct was extreme and
4 Conda did not assert a separate claim for unpaid wages.
9
outrageous. IIED requires a showing of “outrageous conduct
beyond the bounds of human decency.” (Janken v. GM Hughes
Electronics (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 55, 80 (Janken).)
Conda’s IIED claim is premised on the same allegations
underlying her claims for retaliation in addition to the ultimatum
Agapitov gave her to accept a VP-level bonus and have a future
at Xsolla, or to accept a c-level bonus and be fired. The conduct
Conda’s IIED claim is based on falls short of extreme and
outrageous as a matter of law. (See Moncada v. West Coast
Quartz Corp. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 768, 780-781 [false promises
of compensation that would allow employees to retire if they
continued to work, although showing “a callous disregard” for the
employees, was not extreme or outrageous as matter of law];
Janken, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 80 [“personnel management
activity is insufficient to support a claim” of IIED, even if
improperly motivated]; see Cornell v. Berkeley Tennis Club (2017)
18 Cal.App.5th 908, 946 [actions that may have violated FEHA
did not rise to level of extreme and outrageous].)
“ ‘[S]ummary [adjudication] “on the issue of punitive
damages is proper” only “when no reasonable jury could find the
plaintiff’s evidence to be clear and convincing proof of malice,
fraud or oppression.” ’ ” (Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court
(2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 762.) Conda’s operative complaint
seeks punitive damages in connection with each of its causes of
action. The request for punitive damages claim as to the Labor
Code section 98.6 and intentional infliction of emotional distress
causes of action is obviously doomed in light of our holding that
summary adjudication of those claims was proper. Summary
adjudication of the punitive damages request as to the other
claims was also proper, in our view, because the summary
judgment record discloses no substantial evidence on which a
10
jury could rely to find the existence of oppression, fraud, or
malice. (See, e.g., Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc. (2009) 175
Cal.App.4th 702, 716-717.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed, the order granting summary
judgment is vacated, and the cause is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Specifically, the trial
court is to enter a new order denying summary adjudication of
Conda’s claims for FEHA retaliation, failure to prevent the same,
retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5, and wrongful
termination in violation of public policy; and granting summary
adjudication for Xsolla as to the Labor Code section 98.6 and
IIED claims as well as the request for punitive damages.
Conda is awarded costs on appeal.
LEE, J.*
WE CONCUR:
BAKER, Acting P. J
MOOR, J.
Judge of the San Bernardino County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
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