In re H.C. CA2/2

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Filed 7/3/24 In re H.C. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re H.C. et al., Persons B330715
Coming Under the Juvenile (Los Angeles County
Court Law. Super. Ct.
No. 22CCJP04353)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LILIANA M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Charles Q. Clay, Judge. Affirmed.
Elizabeth C. Alexander, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavanai, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

******

Liliana M. (mother) appeals from the orders finding
dependency jurisdiction over her children H.C. (born March 2018)
and A.C. (born June 2019), and prematurely challenging findings
regarding Indian ancestry in that dependency jurisdiction, which
has not been terminated, and the inquiry is ongoing. Mother’s
challenge to the jurisdictional findings do not show reversible
error as the unchallenged findings concerning Bernardo C.’s
(father) conduct are sufficient to establish dependency
jurisdiction. Finally, we conclude substantial evidence supports
the juvenile court’s findings, and we affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Referral and petition
The Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (the Department) filed the current petition
following two prior domestic violence referrals involving mother
and father in the children’s home. The Department closed the
prior referrals after not finding sufficient evidence of domestic
violence or abuse directed at the children.
The third referral of domestic violence was made in
September 2022, following mother’s attempt to grab father’s
phone during a dispute leaving him wounded and her arrested.
Mother had reputedly tugged at father’s shirt collar; slapped him;

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and scratched his neck, head and chest. In response, father
pushed mother.
During the investigation, mother admitted to two instances
of domestic violence. She added father had a pattern of saying he
wanted to improve their relationship, only to undermine it with
unfaithfulness. The investigation revealed H.C. had been a
witness to father pushing mother and other incidents besides the
ones in the three referrals. Based on this, the Department filed a
petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,1
alleging the parents’ history of domestic violence placed the
children at risk of harm.
At the initial hearing, the court found H.C. and A.C. to be
children described by section 300 and released them to the
parents’ custody. The parents were ordered to live separately and
to obtain a third party’s help with the custody exchanges.
The Department later learned mother was permitting
father to spend the night in the home, and they were engaging in
daily marijuana use. The parents admitted to the marijuana use,
but denied doing so in the presence of the children or in the
home.
In March 2023, the Department filed a first amended
petition, adding the parents violated the order to live separately
and increased the risk of harm to the children through their daily
use of marijuana.
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) investigation
The Department’s initial petition included a form in which
a social worker reported the parents gave no reason to believe the

1 All further unattributed statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.

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children had Indian ancestry. The parents also filed forms
indicating they had no Indian ancestry. The juvenile court thus
found no reason to believe the children were or might be Indian
children but ordered the Department “to continue to interview all
known relatives and to report back in the future reports.”
In the January 10, 2023 jurisdiction/disposition report, the
Department’s investigator reported no additional relative
information regarding Indian ancestry because the parents had
not made themselves available to be interviewed. The
investigator described many attempts to contact mother and
father. Later, the Department reported when inquiries were
made to the parents in January 2023, they both denied Indian
ancestry and stated all their parents were of Mexican descent.
Jurisdictional and dispositional hearing
Before the May 2023 hearing, father filed a waiver of rights
and indicated he was pleading no contest. Based on this, the
juvenile court found true the allegations father endangered the
children by engaging in domestic violence and in substance
abuse.
Mother’s counsel argued the petition should be dismissed
as to mother, claiming the Department had not shown a current
risk of harm to the children. Children’s counsel disagreed,
arguing the unresolved domestic violence issues and marijuana
use posed a risk of harm to the children. The Department’s
counsel joined with children’s counsel, adding mother had placed
the children at risk of harm by leaving her children in the care of
someone else to facilitate her daily use of marijuana and by
violating the court’s orders.
With regards to mother, the juvenile court dismissed the
physical abuse claim in count a-1 but sustained the counts that

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alleged mother endangered the children by engaging in domestic
violence, by her substance abuse, and by neglecting father’s
substance abuse. The court declared the children dependents of
the court, removed them from the parents, and ordered family
reunification services for mother and father.
Mother filed a timely notice of appeal from the
jurisdictional order.2

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
Mother claims it was reversible error to find ICWA did not
apply. She also argues the jurisdictional findings of the parents’
domestic violence and substance abuse endangering the children
were not supported by substantial evidence.

DISCUSSION
I. Substantial evidence supports the court’s findings
regarding mother
A. Standard of review
We review mother’s challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and
dispositional orders under the substantial evidence standard. (In
re Hailey T. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 139, 145-146 [disposition]; In
re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 450 [jurisdiction].) Under
that standard, “the issue is whether there is evidence,
contradicted or uncontradicted, to support the finding. In making
that determination, the reviewing court reviews the record in the
light most favorable to the challenged order, resolving conflicts in
the evidence in favor of that order, and giving the evidence

2 Father is not a party to the appeal.

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reasonable inferences. Weighing evidence, assessing credibility,
and resolving conflicts in evidence and in the inferences to be
drawn from evidence are the domain of the trial court, not the
reviewing court. Evidence from a single witness, even a party,
can be sufficient to support the trial court’s findings.” (Alexis E.,
supra, at pp. 450-451.)
B. Unchallenged findings concerning father
provide a basis for dependency jurisdiction over
the children
As an initial matter, the juvenile court found father placed
the children at risk of serious physical harm by engaging in
domestic violence with mother and by abusing marijuana and
alcohol. These findings are unchallenged.
The “principle that ‘[d]ependency jurisdiction attaches to a
child, not to his or her parent’ [citation], means that ‘“[a]s long as
there is one unassailable jurisdictional finding, it is immaterial
that another might be inappropriate”’ [citation]. Thus, where
jurisdictional findings have been made as to both parents but
only one parent brings a challenge, the appeal may be rendered
moot. [Citation.] The same is true where there are multiple
findings against one parent; the validity of one finding may
render moot the parent’s attempt to challenge the others.” (In re
D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 283-284.)
“[A] jurisdictional finding good against one parent is good
against both. More accurately, the minor is a dependent if the
actions of either parent bring [the minor] within one of the
statutory definitions of a dependent.” (In re Alysha S. (1996) 51
Cal.App.4th 393, 397.)
Even if mother were found to be nonoffending, the
unchallenged findings as to father support dependency

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jurisdiction over the children. Mother cites In re C.C. (2009) 172
Cal.App.4th 1481 as support for her position her appeal is not
moot on the theory the findings made as to her might have
consequences in a future dependency or family law proceeding.
Yet, mother fails to suggest any way in which the jurisdictional
findings about her could affect a future dependency or family law
proceeding. Because we find no threatened prejudice to mother,
we have no cause to review them. Thus, we affirm the
jurisdictional order based on the unchallenged findings made as
to father.
C. Mother and father’s domestic violence placed
the children at harm
Even if we consider mother’s challenge to the jurisdictional
findings, she does not demonstrate reversal is indicated. Mother
first challenges the finding domestic violence endangered the
children.
The juvenile court sustained the count alleging H.C. and
A.C. were at risk of harm due to the parents’ history of domestic
violence. Domestic violence is a ground for dependency
jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b), due to the
potential for accidental injury to the children. (In re Cole L.
(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 603 (Cole L.).) A juvenile court need
not wait until a child is actually abused or injured to assume
jurisdiction and take necessary steps to protect the child. (In re
I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
Here, H.C. disclosed to her teacher she had seen father
push mother. H.C. refused to go home after school, explaining she
did not want to go home because “my dad . . . hits . . . my mom.”
A.C. also said father hits mother and appeared to imitate the
conduct by having “made a fist and hit her chin.”

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The maternal grandmother reported H.C. had asked her
not to go to work because mother and father were going to start
fighting again, adding there had been incidents of domestic
violence between mother and father beyond those investigated by
the Department.
Mother admitted having pushed father during the
September 2022 incident and claimed he had scratched himself
when she was tugging his shirt. Although the aggressor in this
instance of domestic violence, mother stated father was the
aggressor in prior instances. Mother also showed the social
worker a video in which father could be heard loudly and
aggressively yelling and cursing at mother.
Mother claims reversal is necessary because these facts are
similar to those in Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 606, where
the Court of Appeal reversed the lower court’s assumption of
jurisdiction because the record reflected only a single minor
episode of domestic violence that took place outside the presence
of the children. Unlike in Cole L., the record here contains
evidence of multiple instances of domestic violence, at least some
of which took place in the presence of the children. Substantial
evidence, therefore, supports the jurisdictional finding under
section 300, subdivision (b)(1).
Second, mother contends a pleading error in the first
amended petition is grounds to reverse. Because mother
challenges the pleadings in the petition, we apply the rules
applicable to a demurrer. (In re Nicholas B. (2001) 88
Cal.App.4th 1126, 1133.) We construe the well-pleaded facts in
favor of the petition to determine whether the Department
sufficiently alleged the children were at substantial risk of
serious physical harm as a result of the parents’ failure or

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inability to adequately supervise or protect them. (§ 300, subd.
(b).) A facially sufficient petition “‘requires the pleading of
essential facts establishing at least one ground of juvenile court
jurisdiction.’” (In re Kaylee H. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 92, 108.)
In the amended petition, the Department alleged section
300, subdivision (b)(1), applied because mother and father had a
history of engaging in domestic violence, and had engaged in
violent conduct in the presence of H.C. These allegations are
sufficient to plead the facts essential to establish juvenile court
jurisdiction based on section 300, subdivision (b) because they
show danger to the children created by failure of mother to
adequately protect them from domestic violence.
Mother identifies no defect in these allegations; instead,
she claims an error in a checked box above the allegations is
grounds to reverse. In the original petition, the Department
checked the box alleging the children were at risk of suffering
serious physical harm “as a result of the failure or inability of
[the] parent or legal guardian to supervise or protect the child
adequately.” However, in the amended petition, the Department
checked a different box alleging the children were at risk of harm
“by the inability of the parent or legal guardian to provide
regular care for the child due to the parent’s or legal guardian’s
mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse.”
Despite checking the wrong box in the amended petition, the
allegations of fact on the same page clearly identify the basis for
dependency jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), to
be the failure to protect the children from the domestic violence.
Mother identifies no legal authority for her position that a
mistake in checking a box is grounds to reverse, despite legally
sufficient allegations. She identifies no harm caused by this

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pleading error, e.g., something in the record demonstrating the
mark next to the incorrect box prevented her from preparing for
the hearing.
Therefore, we find substantial evidence supports the
finding dependency jurisdiction exists over the children, and
there are no grounds to reverse based on the error of checking the
wrong box in the first amended petition.
D. Mother and father’s substance abuse
endangered the children
We need not reach mother’s challenge to the jurisdictional
findings on her substance abuse; as discussed above, the
unchallenged findings regarding the parents’ domestic violence
independently support dependency jurisdiction, rendering any
error in the substance abuse findings harmless. “[W]here there
are multiple findings against one parent; the validity of one
finding may render moot the parent’s attempt to challenge the
others.” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 284.) “As long as there
is one unassailable jurisdictional finding, it is immaterial that
another might be inappropriate.” (In re Ashley B. (2011) 202
Cal.App.4th 968, 979.)
Even if we did consider mother’s challenge, substantial
evidence supports the two findings concerning the parents’
substance abuse. One finding concerned mother’s substance
abuse alleged in count b-2 and the other mother’s failure to
protect the children from father’s substance abuse in count b-3.
Dependency jurisdiction for substance abuse exists under
section 300, subdivision (b), when there is excessive use of drugs
or alcohol and this renders “a parent or guardian unable to
provide regular care for a child and either cause the child to
suffer serious physical harm or illness or place the child at

10
substantial risk of suffering such harm or illness.” (In re N.R.
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 531.)
Here, mother and father admitted using marijuana daily. A
social worker smelled marijuana in the family home. The parents
tested positive for marijuana at the start of the proceedings and
then did not participate in further drug testing. As a result,
neither the Department nor the juvenile court could determine
whether parents were excessively using marijuana. There were
reports that the parents failed to make appropriate
arrangements for the children while using marijuana.
Although a finding of substance abuse is not prima facie
evidence of a risk of harm to children of tender years, “a child’s
youth and maturity level can bear upon the care that the child
may require and whether a parent’s or guardian’s substance
abuse places the child at substantial risk of serious physical
harm.” (In re N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 559.) H.C. was five
years old and A.C. was three years old at the time of the May
2023 adjudication hearing. They were young children who
required constant care and supervision. The record here
contained facts showing there was the smell of marijuana in the
home, the parents failed to make appropriate arrangements for
the children when using marijuana and failed to cooperate with
drug testing. A reasonable inference can be drawn from these
facts mother and father placed the five-year-old and the three-
year-old at substantial risk of physical harm through their failure
to provide the constant care and supervision needed. It is also
evidence mother failed to protect the children from dangers
created by father’s substance abuse.

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II. Any ICWA error is not grounds to reverse while the
investigation is ongoing
Mother contends the juvenile court’s findings regarding
ICWA are in error because the Department did not investigate all
relatives. Mother’s contention is premature because the juvenile
court has not terminated dependency jurisdiction or found the
Department has fulfilled its duty of inquiry. On the contrary, the
ICWA investigation is ongoing.
Reversing an initial ICWA order in a dependency
proceeding is not required when the court and counsel are aware
the ICWA inquiry is incomplete. (In re S.H. (2022) 82
Cal.App.5th 166, 179 (S.H.).) “The [Department] must comply
with its broad duty to comp[l]ete all appropriate inquiries and
apprise the court, and the court has a continuing duty to ensure
that the [Department] provides the missing information. So long
as proceedings are ongoing and all parties recognize the
continuing duty of ICWA inquiry, both the [Department] and the
juvenile court have an adequate opportunity to fulfill those
statutory duties.” (Ibid.)
Here, the parents both filed “Parental Notification of
Indian Status,” ICWA-020 forms, indicating they had no Indian
ancestry. Based on this, the juvenile court found it had no reason
to believe H.C or A.C. were Indian children. However, the court
ordered the Department to continue inquiring about the family’s
possible Indian ancestry and to provide additional information in
subsequent reports. This recognizes that “the duty to inquire is a
continuing one.” (S.H., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 176.) Even
while concluding ICWA does not apply, the juvenile court “retains
the power (and duty) to reverse that determination ‘if it
subsequently receives information providing reason to believe

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that the child is an Indian child.’” (Ibid.) Thus, if the ongoing
Department investigation discovers Indian ancestry, the juvenile
court retains the power to make the appropriate orders.
Therefore we find no reversible error regarding ICWA.

DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.

________________________
CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

_______________________________
ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J.

_______________________________
HOFFSTADT, J.

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