CourtListener 9987741•People v. Vital CA3
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Filed 7/2/24 P. v. Vital CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Placer)
----
THE PEOPLE, C098081
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 62178854)
v.
RAFAEL VITAL,
Defendant and Appellant.
After a jury found defendant Rafael Vital guilty of attempted murder, evasion of a
peace officer, and assault, the trial court sentenced defendant to life with the possibility of
parole plus 23 years. On appeal, defendant contends that: (1) his counsel was ineffective
for failing to oppose the admission of his custodial statement; (2) the trial court erred in
not staying his sentence and for imposing a consecutive term for the evasion conviction;
and (3) his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to these alleged sentencing errors.
Finding no merit to these contentions, we affirm.
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I. BACKGROUND
While on patrol in Roseville, a police officer noticed a red pickup truck stopped in
a hotel’s driveway. A records check revealed the truck’s registered owner, defendant,
was on active probation. After passing the officer, defendant drove into another parking
lot; the officer followed in his patrol car. Defendant then turned around, drove directly
toward the officer’s car, and fled at high speed. The officer activated his emergency siren
and pursued defendant onto the freeway. Defendant drove onto the shoulder and stopped.
The officer got out of his car, drew his firearm, and yelled, “police” and “show me your
hands.” Defendant leaned out of the driver’s seat window with his hands extended and
the officer saw a muzzle flash and heard a gunshot. The officer took cover. As he stood
up to return fire, the officer saw another muzzle flash and heard a second gunshot. The
officer took cover again.
Defendant drove off and the officer continued the pursuit. After exiting the
freeway, defendant crashed his truck, jumped on its hood, scaled a chain-link fence, and
fled. Police apprehended defendant several hours later.
Investigator David Woodruff advised defendant of his right to remain silent and
his right to have an attorney present pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
Defendant affirmed that he understood these rights. Defendant said he had fled in fear of
his life and in self-defense after a police officer pulled a gun on him for no reason.
Defendant claimed he did not own a gun, had never fired a gun at the police officer, and
did not stop on the freeway during the pursuit.
Investigator Woodruff asked defendant when he had last “got[ten] high,” to which
defendant responded that had “nothing to do with me.” Having found a pipe in
defendant’s truck, Investigator Woodruff specifically asked when defendant had last
smoked methamphetamine; defendant said he did not know but admitted to smoking a lot
generally. When asked if he had smoked the prior night, defendant said he did not know.
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When Investigator Woodruff turned the conversation back to the incident by
asking “what happened yesterday,” defendant responded “I told you what I told you and
that’s it. That’s all I’m gonna say.” A different investigator then began asking questions
of defendant. Defendant responded to several questions but then said “No more
questions, no more questions . . . I already answered them.” Later, after Investigator
Woodruff resumed questioning, defendant again said “no more questions.” The
investigators told defendant they did not believe him and continued to push back on his
version of events. Defendant responded, “I’m just not gonna talk to someone that just
doesn’t believe me. You heard that story.”
The People charged defendant with attempted murder (Pen. Code,1 §§ 664, 187,
subd. (a)), evading a peace officer with willful disregard (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)),
and assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)). As to the attempted murder,
it was alleged that: (1) the offense was willful, deliberate, and premeditated; (2) the
offense was committed against a peace officer and defendant knew or reasonably should
have known the victim was a peace officer (§ 664, subd. (e)); and (3) defendant
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)). As to the
assault, the People alleged defendant personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (d)).
The People also alleged six aggravating circumstances.
At trial, the officer involved in the incident testified he was more afraid to die on
that freeway than he had ever been when deployed in Afghanistan. After the incident, the
officer could not stop himself from shaking.
Defendant testified in his defense. He admitted that on the night of the incident he
was on probation with outstanding warrants and tried to get away after seeing law
enforcement. He further admitted he shot his gun twice after pulling over on the freeway.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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But he insisted he had shot “toward the ground” and never intended to kill anyone.
Rather, defendant claimed he was just trying to get away and wanted to scare the officer
off. Defendant said he was not high that night and the last time he had used was a couple
of days prior. In rebuttal, the People introduced a video recording of defendant’s
custodial interrogation in which he said (contrary to his trial testimony) that on the night
of the offense he ran because the officer pulled a gun on him, that he did not own a gun,
and that he had not shot at the officer on the freeway.
The jury found defendant guilty of attempted murder, evading a peace officer with
willful disregard, and assault with a semiautomatic firearm. The jury found true the
firearm and peace officer allegations as well as three aggravating circumstances. The
jury found not true that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated.
In a subsequent proceeding, the trial court found true two additional aggravating
circumstances.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated it had read and considered the
probation officer’s report and the People’s sentencing brief. The probation report
recommended consecutive sentencing for the attempted murder and the evasion
conviction because “the crimes and their objectives were independent of one another.” In
their sentencing brief, the People stated, as to the evasion conviction, that “the Court has
the discretion to sentence the defendant to a full and consecutive term for that offense or
a concurrent term.” The People repeated this point during argument, noting that “the
Court still has discretion . . . to either impose it consecutively or concurrently.” Defense
counsel argued several points but “most importantly” asked the court to exercise its
discretion to strike the 20-year firearm enhancement. The trial court ultimately declined
to do so and sentenced defendant to: (1) life with the possibility of parole for the
attempted murder; (2) 20 years for the firearm enhancement associated with the
attempted murder; and (3) a consecutive term of three years (the upper term) for evading
a peace officer. The trial court also sentenced defendant to the upper term of nine years
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for the assault plus the upper term of 10 years for the associated firearm enhancement but
stayed both sentences under section 654.
Defendant timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
Admissibility of Defendant’s Custodial Statement
Defendant contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to exclude
defendant’s custodial statement because it was involuntary and violated Miranda.
To establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show his
counsel’s performance was deficient and that he suffered prejudice as a result. (People v.
Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198; Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-
692.) If either element of the ineffective assistance of counsel analysis has not been
proven, the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance fails. (Strickland, at p. 697.) We
presume that “counsel’s actions fall within the broad range of reasonableness, and [we]
afford ‘great deference to counsel’s tactical decisions.’ ” (Mickel, at p. 198.) “ ‘Counsel
may not be deemed incompetent for failure to make meritless objections.’ ” (People v.
Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 732.)
Defendant claims the investigators violated his Miranda rights because he did not
expressly waive those rights at the start of the interview and subsequently invoked his
right to remain silent several times. But even assuming a Miranda violation, defendant’s
statement could still be used for impeachment purposes. “Miranda was not intended to
grant the suspect license to lie in his or her testimony at trial, and thus if an ensuing
statement obtained in violation of Miranda is voluntary, the statement nonetheless may
be admitted to impeach a defendant who testifies differently at trial.” (People v. Coffman
and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 55; see also People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015,
1075; People v. Peevy (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1184, 1188; Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S.
222, 225-226 [“The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use
perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent
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utterances”].) That is precisely how the People used the evidence here. Defendant’s
statement to Investigator Woodruff was introduced only in rebuttal after defendant
testified in contradiction to that prior statement.
Defendant argues it was improper to use his statement for impeachment because it
was involuntary. We disagree. “The test for the voluntariness of a custodial statement is
whether the statement is ‘ “the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice” ’
or whether the defendant’s ‘ “will has been overborne and his capacity for self-
determination critically impaired” ’ by coercion.” (People v. Cunningham (2015)
61 Cal.4th 609, 642.) Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding a
statement involuntary. (Id. at p. 643.) “A statement is involuntary [citation] when,
among other circumstances, it ‘was “ ‘extracted by any sort of threats . . . , [or] obtained
by any direct or implied promises.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 79.)
“Voluntariness does not turn on any one fact, no matter how apparently significant, but
rather on the ‘totality of the circumstances.’ ” (Ibid.)
We have reviewed the video of defendant’s interrogation and conclude that the
investigators were not overbearing or coercive. Their questioning was not abusive, and
defendant never appeared browbeaten or intimidated. The record thus belies defendant’s
claim that his statement was involuntary.
Urging the contrary conclusion, defendant points out that he never expressly
waived his Miranda rights. But a Miranda waiver need not be express. (See North
Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441 U.S. 369, 375-376.) Where, as here, a Miranda warning
was given and understood, and the accused actively participated in the interview and was
responsive, an implied waiver is established. (See Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010)
560 U.S. 370, 384.) Defendant also argues that investigators did not sufficiently
determine whether he was impaired given the methamphetamine pipe found in his car.
We note that an interviewee may still give a voluntary statement even when under the
influence of drugs. (See People v. Perdomo (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 605, 617; People v.
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Hensley (2014) 59 Cal.4th 788, 814 [“In the absence of evidence of coercion, ‘we cannot
conclude that defendant’s statement was involuntary solely because of any alleged
physical or mental condition’ ”].) But more importantly, there is no evidence defendant’s
faculties were impaired during the interrogation. Defendant was aware throughout the
interview and his answers were coherent and responsive. And at trial, defendant testified
that he had not been high at the time of the offense.
Finally, defendant claims that the custodial statement was involuntary because
investigators ignored his efforts to invoke his right to silence. We question whether,
when understood in context, the claimed invocations actually amounted to an invocation
of the right to remain silent. (See People v. Sanchez (2019) 7 Cal.5th 14, 49 [“[W]hen, as
in this case, a defendant has waived his Miranda rights and agreed to talk with police,
any subsequent invocation of the right to counsel or the right to remain silent must be
unequivocal and unambiguous”].) But even assuming that they did, we still conclude,
under the totality of the circumstances, that defendant’s custodial statement was
voluntary. (See People v. Nguyen, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1078 [concluding that
statement taken in violation of Miranda was voluntary]; People v. Jablonski (2006)
37 Cal.4th 774, 814 [rejecting argument that “Miranda violations themselves, if repeated
and persistent, are sufficient to establish involuntariness” because such violations do not
“ ‘inherently constitute coercion’ ”].)
Because defendant’s statement was voluntary, it could be used to impeach
defendant’s testimony at trial even if his Miranda rights were violated. Any challenge by
trial counsel that the statement was involuntary or obtained in violation of Miranda
would have been futile. Accordingly, we reject defendant’s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. (See People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 732 [“ ‘Counsel may
not be deemed incompetent for failure to make meritless objections’ ”].)
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Staying Sentence for Evasion of a Peace Officer
Defendant next argues the trial court erred in failing to stay the sentence under
section 654 for the evasion offense. He also contends his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to argue that the sentence should be stayed.
Section 654, subdivision (a) provides that “[a]n act or omission that is punishable
in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such
provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one
provision.” “ ‘The proscription against double punishment in section 654 is applicable
where there is a course of conduct which . . . comprises an indivisible transaction
punishable under more than one statute . . . . The divisibility of a course of conduct
depends upon the intent and objective of the actor, and if all the offenses are incident to
one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of them but not for more than
one.’ ” (People v. Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 162; see also People v. Corpening
(2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311 [explaining that where the case involves a single course of
conduct, the reviewing court must “consider whether that course of conduct reflects a
single ‘ “intent and objective” ’ or multiple intents and objectives”].) To permit multiple
punishments, “ ‘there must be evidence to support a finding the defendant formed a
separate intent and objective for each offense for which he was sentenced.’ ” (Coleman,
at p. 162.) Where the trial court does not stay a sentence pursuant to section 654 and
offers no factual basis for its decision, we presume the court found that the defendant
harbored a separate intent and objective for each offense. (People v. Jones (2002)
103 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1147.) We review the record for substantial evidence to support
the trial court’s implied determination. (People v. Jimenez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 409,
425; People v. Racy (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1336-1337.)
Defendant submits he had only a single objective in committing the attempted
murder and the evasion offense—to escape. But substantial evidence supports the
conclusion that defendant entertained multiple criminal objectives. Rather than continue
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to flee, defendant elected to pull over on the freeway and open fire on the pursuing
officer. These were distinct acts, and the trial court could have reasonably determined
they were committed with separate objectives. Further, the trial court could have
concluded that defendant had time to reflect before shooting at the officer. (See People v.
Jimenez, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 426 [holding that § 654 did not bar multiple
punishments for evading a peace officer and assault because the defendant’s “initial
efforts trying to evade . . . and his subsequent assaultive conduct, ‘were volitional and
calculated, and were separated by periods of time during which reflection was
possible’ ”].) As one court explained, “[i]t is one thing to commit a criminal act in order
to accomplish another; . . . section 654 applies there. But that section cannot, and should
not, be stretched to cover gratuitous violence or other criminal acts far beyond those
reasonably necessary to accomplish the original offense.” (People v. Nguyen (1988)
204 Cal.App.3d 181, 191.) “[A]t some point the means to achieve an objective may
become so extreme they can no longer be termed ‘incidental’ and must be considered to
express a different and a more sinister goal than mere successful commission of the
original crime.” (Ibid.) Such is the case here. Consequently, we find no merit in
defendant’s section 654 claim.
Defendant relatedly argues—in passing and without citation to authority—that the
decision not to stay his evasion sentence “may have also violated his constitutional right
to due process of law and a fair trial.” We consider only those arguments sufficiently
developed to be cognizable. (People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 482, fn. 2.) “To
the extent defendant perfunctorily asserts other claims, without development . . . they are
not properly made” and may be “rejected on that basis.” (Ibid.) We reject defendant’s
underdeveloped contention for this reason.
Finally, having concluded that the trial court did not err, we find no ineffective
assistance of counsel for not arguing that the sentence for evasion should be stayed. (See
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People v. Pierce (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1337 [“Since the claim fails on its merits,
defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance”].)
Consecutive Sentences
Defendant claims the trial court erred in imposing a three-year term for evading a
peace officer consecutively to his other sentences. According to defendant, the trial court
was required to state its reasons for choosing a consecutive term instead of a concurrent
term. This claim has been forfeited by defendant’s failure to raise the argument below.
(See People v. Morales (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1084; People v. Scott (1994)
9 Cal.4th 331, 356 [“[C]omplaints about the manner in which the trial court exercises its
sentencing discretion and articulates its supporting reasons cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal”].)
Anticipating this conclusion, defendant argues his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to raise the issue, claiming there “simply can be no satisfactory explanation” for
not doing so. We disagree. At sentencing, defense counsel focused on his request to
have the 20-year firearm enhancement stricken. He was not required to jeopardize his
argument about the firearm enhancement and risk alienating the court by also arguing
that the three-year term for the evasion conviction should be imposed concurrently. This
is especially true given that the People had already informed the trial court it had
discretion to impose either a consecutive or a concurrent term. Defense counsel thus
could have made a reasonable tactical decision to not shift the focus away from his
primary goal of having the firearm enhancement stricken.
We further conclude that, even had defense counsel raised this issue, it is not
reasonably probable defendant would have obtained a better result. Absent evidence to
the contrary, we presume the trial court knew and followed the law. (People v. Ramirez
(2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042.) The court indicated it had read and considered the
probation report, which explained why a consecutive term was appropriate, and the
People told the court it had discretion to impose either a consecutive or a concurrent term.
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The court was thus well aware of its discretion, and it is not reasonably probable the court
would have imposed a concurrent term had defense counsel raised the point.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
Wiseman, J.*
We concur:
/s/
Hull, Acting P. J.
/s/
Mauro, J.
* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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