CourtListener 9987314•People v. Peinado CA2/6
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Filed 7/1/24 P. v. Peinado CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B328460
(Super. Ct. No. 21CR04401)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)
v.
TAMMIE LYNN PEINADO,
Defendant and Appellant.
Tammie Lynn Peinado appeals from the judgment after a
jury convicted her of controlled substance and weapons offenses.
She contends the evidence was seized in an unlawful search. We
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The convictions are based on drugs and weapons police
found in appellant’s jacket and purse and on her person. At the
preliminary examination, the magistrate denied appellant’s
motion to suppress the evidence. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (f).)
The superior court denied her renewed motion to suppress. (Pen.
Code, § 1538.5, subd. (i).)
A police officer saw appellant’s car stopped for
approximately five to 10 seconds on Miller Street near the busy
intersection with Chapel Street. A man, A.G., was standing by
the passenger side talking to the driver. One or two vehicles
went around the stopped car. A.G. got into the car and it drove
off. Officers could not see inside the car through its tinted
windows.
The officer followed the car in his marked patrol car and
pulled it over. Appellant was in the driver’s seat. A.G. was in
the front passenger seat. He told the officer he was on
postrelease community supervision (PRCS). A large jacket was
partially draped on appellant’s leg and partially on the center
console. It was “folded up almost” and “almost wrapped up in a
ball.”
The officer told both occupants to get out of the car. A.G.
complied. Appellant refused approximately 17 times. The officer
stated he was going to conduct a PRCS search of the areas to
which A.G. had access. She finally got out of the car but
attempted to take the jacket with her. The officer did not know
what might be in the jacket and was concerned it might contain a
weapon. He told her to leave the jacket in the car and offered to
give it to her after she exited the car. She did not respond to the
offer but stated there was nothing in the jacket. She ultimately
got out of the car without the jacket.
The officer then began to search the car in “the immediate
area where [the passenger] had access to.” When the officer
grabbed the jacket, he felt a bulge of crystalized substance.
Based on his experience, he recognized it as methamphetamine.
He removed a clear plastic baggie containing what he recognized
by sight as methamphetamine from the front pouch of the jacket.
The officer then searched the car. In a purse directly
2
behind the driver’s seat was a loaded handgun, a digital scale
with methamphetamine on it, and an additional baggie of
methamphetamine.
Appellant was arrested for the methamphetamine and was
searched. On her person was another bag of methamphetamine.
In denying the motion to suppress, the magistrate found
reasonable suspicion to stop the car based on a Vehicle Code
violation of impeding traffic. The magistrate concluded the
search of the jacket was justified based on the passenger’s PRCS
terms and his access to the jacket in the car. The magistrate also
found that appellant resisted the officer in violation of Penal
Code section 148. Appellant did not consent to the jacket search.
The motion to suppress was renewed in the trial court,
based on the preliminary examination evidence. (Pen. Code,
§ 1538.5, subd. (i).) The court described a video of the traffic
violation that had been admitted at the preliminary examination
as showing the car stopped very close to the intersection with
part of the car in one lane and most of the car in another lane.
The court denied the motion.
The jury convicted appellant of possessing
methamphetamine while armed with a firearm (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a); count 1), possessing
methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; count
2), transporting methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379,
subd. (a); count 3), and carrying a loaded unregistered concealed
firearm (Pen. Code, § 25400, subds. (a)(1) & (c)(6); count 4). The
jury also found true allegations that appellant was armed with a
firearm in the commission of counts 2 and 3 (Pen. Code, § 12022,
subd. (c)). The trial court placed her on two years’ probation with
terms including 180 days in jail.
3
DISCUSSION
“ ‘The burden is on the prosecution to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence the facts justifying a warrantless
search.’ ” (People v. Johnson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 717, 729.)
“Where, as here, a suppression motion is made before a
magistrate in conjunction with a preliminary hearing and no new
evidence is presented in superior court, we . . . defer to the
magistrate’s express and implied findings of fact if supported by
substantial evidence. [Citations.] We independently assess
whether the challenged search or seizure violates the Fourth
Amendment, applying federal constitutional standards.” (People
v. Tacardon (2022) 14 Cal.5th 235, 242.)
Police may stop a vehicle and detain the occupants based
on a traffic law violation. (People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530,
564 [illegal lane change].) The stop here was justified by a
violation of Vehicle Code section 22400, subdivision (a), which
states in relevant part: “No person shall bring a vehicle to a
complete stop upon a highway so as to impede or block the
normal and reasonable movement of traffic unless the stop is
necessary for safe operation or in compliance with law.”
Appellant stopped her car in the middle of the street during rush
hour traffic, talked to the male subject, and let him into the car,
forcing one or two cars to go around her. Nothing in the record
reflects that appellant stopped the car for its safe operation.
After the officer made the traffic stop, he lawfully ordered the
occupants to exit the car. (Pennsylvania v. Mimms (1977) 434
U.S. 106, 109-111; Lomax, at p. 564.)
Every person on PRCS is subject to a warrantless search by
a peace officer. (Pen. Code, §§ 3453, subd. (f), 3465; People v.
Douglas (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 855, 864.) The passenger here
told the officer he had PRCS search conditions.
4
We apply parole search principles to a PRCS search.
(People v. Douglas, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 860.) Thus, “an
officer does not have to articulate facts demonstrating that the
parolee actually placed personal items or discarded contraband in
the open areas of the passenger compartment. . . . Rather, an
officer may search only those areas where he or she reasonably
expects, in light of all the circumstances, that the parolee could
have placed personal items or discarded contraband.” (People v.
Schmitz (2012) 55 Cal.4th 909, 929-930.) The officer “may search
items of personal property if the officer reasonably believes that
the parolee owns the items or has the ability to exert control over
them.” (Id. at p. 930, fn. omitted.) In Schmitz, the court upheld
the search of an empty bag of chips and the inside of a pair of
shoes, both in the back seat, which were accessible to the parolee
sitting in the front passenger seat. (Id. at pp. 913, 932-933.)
The passenger here had access to the jacket that was lying
partially on the center console. “[I]t was objectively reasonable
for [the officer] to search those areas of defendant’s car where
[the passenger] could have concealed contraband upon becoming
aware of police activity.” (People v. Cervantes (2017) 11
Cal.App.5th 860, 871 [upholding search of unlocked center
console based on front passenger’s probation search condition].)
This case is thus unlike Claypool v. Superior Court (2022) 85
Cal.App.5th 1092, where the parolee in the back seat of a moving
car did not reasonably have access to the locked glove
compartment whose key was on the same keychain as the
ignition key.1
1 We do not address the Attorney General’s alternative
theory for search of the jacket as a search incident to arrest for
resisting (Pen. Code, § 148) because: (1) it is unnecessary in light
of the PRCS search, and (2) on appeal the prosecution may not
5
The discovery of methamphetamine in the jacket gave the
officer probable cause to believe the vehicle contained additional
drugs. (People v. Dey (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1322.)
Pursuant to the automobile exception, the officer then lawfully
searched the rest of the vehicle and its contents, including the
purse. (United States v. Ross (1982) 456 U.S. 798, 800; People v.
McGee (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 796, 804 [unlawfully possessed
marijuana authorized search of purse in vehicle].)
After appellant was arrested for possession of the
methamphetamine found in the car, her person was lawfully
searched incident to arrest. (United States v. Robinson (1973)
414 U.S. 218, 235; People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 719-720.)
The motion to suppress evidence was properly denied.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J. CODY, J.
offer a justification for a search it did not rely upon in the trial
court (Lorenzana v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 626, 640).
6
John F. McGregor, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
G. Martin Velez, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Jason Tran and Charles Chung, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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