CourtListener 9986873•People v. Hall CA2/1
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Filed 6/28/24 P. v. Hall CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B324967
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA104968)
v.
ELIJAH KAREEM SHABAZZ
HALL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Judith Levey Meyer and Laura L. Laesecke,
Judges. Affirmed as modified.
Robert L.S. Angres, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Viet H. Nguyen, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
A. Procedural Background
A jury convicted defendant Elijah Kareem Shabazz Hall of
one count of first degree murder (count 3); two counts of
attempted second degree robbery (counts 1 and 2); and three
counts of second degree robbery (counts 4, 5, and 6). The jury
found true gang enhancement allegations relating to all six
offenses, and it also found true certain firearm enhancement
allegations pertaining to the first degree murder and second
degree robbery counts. The trial court sentenced Hall to an
aggregate indeterminate prison term of 75 years to life, along
with an aggregate 23-year determinate prison term. Hall’s
indeterminate and determinate prison terms included the gang
and firearm enhancements, several of which were stayed.
In an unpublished decision, we: vacated the gang
enhancement findings for counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6; vacated the
firearm enhancement findings on counts 4, 5, and 6; modified the
judgment to reflect that Hall was entitled to 1,501 days of
presentence custody credit; affirmed the remainder of the
judgment as modified; and remanded the matter to the trial court
to afford the People an opportunity to retry the gang
enhancements on counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 and the firearm
enhancements on counts 4, 5, and 6. We instructed the trial
court to resentence Hall if the People elected not to retry these
enhancements.
1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion because it
“raise[s] no substantial issues of law or fact . . . . ” (Cal. Stds.
Jud. Admin., § 8.1.)
2
On remand, the People chose not to retry the gang and
firearm enhancements. At the resentencing hearing held on
September 19, 2022, the trial court sentenced Hall to an
aggregate prison term of 75 years to life on count 3, followed by a
consecutive aggregate determinate prison term of 12 years
8 months. Regarding the sentence on count 3, the court imposed
a term of 25 years to life, which term the court doubled pursuant
to the “Three Strikes” law, along with a consecutive term of
25 years to life for the firearm enhancement. The determinate
sentence consists of a six-year term on count 4 (the midterm of
three years, doubled pursuant to the Three Strikes law);
consecutive terms of two years each on counts 5 and 6 (one-third
of the midterm of three years, doubled pursuant to the Three
Strikes law); and consecutive terms of one year four months each
on counts 1 and 2 (one-third of the midterm of two years, doubled
pursuant to the Three Strikes law). Hall timely appealed the
judgment.
We appointed counsel to represent Hall on appeal. Hall’s
counsel filed an opening brief in which he raised no issues,
requested that this court independently review the record
pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, and
represented that counsel remained available to brief any
additional issues upon this court’s request.
We independently reviewed the record and asked the
parties to brief the following five issues:
1. Regarding counts 1 and 2, did the trial court err in
finding that the prison sentence for attempted second
degree robbery is 16 months; two years; or three
years; instead of one year; one year six months; or
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two years six months, pursuant to Penal Code2
sections 664 and 213?
2. Did the trial court err in including the $6,136.90
victim restitution award on both amended abstracts
of judgment that were filed on August 29, 2023 (i.e.,
for both the determinate and indeterminate prison
terms), rather than on just one of the two amended
abstracts of judgment?
3. In the August 29, 2023 amended abstract of
judgment for the determinate term, should the trial
court have stated that Hall was entitled to 2,200
actual credits, rather than 1,501 actual credits and
699 local conduct credits?
4. Did the trial court err in ordering Hall to serve his
indeterminate sentence prior to the determinate
sentence?
5. Should the amended abstract of judgment for the
determinate term be modified such that the “Date
Sentence Pronounced” notation for the “Credit for
Time Served” section would be changed from
October 20, 2020 to the date of resentencing,
September 19, 2022?
We received supplemental briefing from the parties on
these issues.
2 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
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B. Discussion
1. The trial court erred in ordering Hall to serve his
indeterminate prison term prior to his determinate
sentence
As we noted in our Procedural Background, ante, the trial
court sentenced Hall to an indeterminate prison term of 75 years
to life for murder, followed by a consecutive aggregate
determinate term of 12 years 8 months in prison. “ ‘[W]henever a
person is sentenced to prison on a life sentence and any other
term of imprisonment for a felony conviction, and the sentences
are to run consecutively, the sentence must provide that the
determinate term of imprisonment shall be served first and the
life sentence shall be consecutive to the determinate term, and
not vice versa.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Garza (2003)
107 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1085, italics added.) In accordance with
this rule, Garza held that a defendant was required to serve his
determinate prison term prior to the commencement of his
indeterminate sentence of 25 years to life. (See id. at pp. 1084–
1085, 1096.) Likewise, we modify the judgment to reflect that
Hall was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 12 years
8 months followed by a consecutive indeterminate prison term of
75 years to life.
2. The trial court correctly identified the middle term for
Hall’s attempted second degree robbery convictions in
calculating his prison sentences for counts 1 and 2
In resentencing Hall on his attempted second degree
robbery convictions (counts 1 and 2), the trial court assumed that
the middle term for each offense was two years. As noted above,
we asked the parties to address whether the middle term for
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attempted second degree robbery is instead one year six months,
as that is half the midterm prescribed for second degree robbery.3
The parties contend the trial court correctly identified two
years as the middle term for counts 1 and 2. We agree. (See
People v. Moody (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 987, 990 [holding that the
middle term for attempted second degree robbery is two years
because § 664 does not apply to attempted second degree
robberies and § 18 prescribes a default two-year midterm prison
sentence for felonies].)
3. Certain modifications should be made to the abstracts
of judgment
The parties agree that the following modifications should
be made to the August 29, 2023 amended abstract of judgment
for Hall’s determinate sentence:
1. The victim restitution award of $6,136.90 should be
stricken;
2. The abstract should be modified to reflect that Hall
was awarded 2,200 days of presentence custody credit
for 2,200 actual days of confinement, rather than for
1,501 days of actual confinement and 699 local
conduct credits; and
3 (See Procedural Background, ante [recapitulating the five
issues for which we sought briefing, the first of which concerns
the penalty for attempted second degree robbery]; § 664, subd. (a)
[indicating that an attempt to commit an offense is typically
punishable by imprisonment “for one-half the term of
imprisonment prescribed upon a conviction of the offense
attempted”]; § 213, subd. (a)(2) [“Robbery of the second degree is
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or
five years.”].)
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3. The “Date Sentence Pronounced” notation for the
“Credit for Time Served” section of the form should be
changed from October 20, 2020 to
September 19, 2022.
In accordance with the parties’ concessions, we hold the
judgment should be modified to reflect these three changes to
Hall’s determinate sentence and instruct the trial court to amend
the abstract of judgment to account for these modifications. (See
Williams v. Superior Court (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 666, 674 [“ ‘An
express concession or assertion in a brief is frequently treated as
an admission of a legal or factual point, controlling in the
disposition of the case.’ ”]; Artal v. Allen (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th
273, 275, fn. 2 [“ ‘[A] reviewing court may make use of statements
[in briefs and argument] . . . as admissions against the party
[advancing them].’ ”].)
We further note that the “Date Sentence Pronounced”
notation for the “Credit for Time Served” section of the
August 29, 2023 amended abstract of judgment for the
indeterminate term also identifies the original date of sentence,
i.e., October 20, 2020. Admittedly, this error appears to be of no
consequence because all the “Credit for Time Served” boxes are
blank, rendering that section of the abstract inapplicable. To
avoid any ambiguity, we instruct the trial court to change the
“Date Sentence Pronounced” notation from October 20, 2020 to
September 19, 2022 on the abstract of judgment for Hall’s
indeterminate term as well.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified as follows: (1) defendant Elijah
Kareem Shabazz Hall shall serve an aggregate determinate
prison term of 12 years 8 months followed by a consecutive
indeterminate prison term of 75 years to life; (2) Hall is entitled
to 2,200 days of presentence custody credit toward his
determinate prison sentence for actual days of confinement, given
that the trial court had resentenced him on September 19, 2022;
and (3) Hall is obligated to pay one victim restitution award in
the amount of $6,136.90 in connection with only his
indeterminate sentence. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.
Upon the issuance of our remittitur, the trial court is
directed to prepare a corrected minute order consistent with this
opinion, amend the abstracts of judgment accordingly, and send
certified copies of the corrected minute order and amended
abstracts of judgment to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. The clerk of the court is directed to send a copy of
the opinion and remittitur to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.272(d)(2).)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
We concur:
CHANEY, J. WEINGART, J.
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