Kaufman v. Adani CA1/3

CourtListener 9986726CalctappJun 28, 2024

Full text

Filed 6/28/24 Kaufman v. Adani CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

STEVEN J. KAUFMAN, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
A169221
v.
ALON ADANI, et al., (Marin County Super. Ct.
No. CV0000222)
Defendants and Appellants.

The parties’ pending dispute arises from a twenty-year business
partnership between plaintiff Steven Kaufman and defendant Alon Adani,
which involved the creation of over twenty LLC entities, numerous real
estate holdings, and tens of millions of dollars in assets. Kaufman and
plaintiff Cornerstone Communities QOF II, LLC1 filed suit against
defendants Adani, Nicalo, LLC, Cornerstone Communities QOF I, LLC,
Cornerstone Communities I, LLC, 556 Ross St. Downtown LLC, Downtown
Station RRSQ LLC, Cornerstone Communities II, LLC, and Mendocino
Downtown LLC (jointly, defendants), alleging eighteen causes of action for
various wrongs.

1 Although plaintiffs also name Cornerstone Communities QOF II, LLC

as a defendant in their complaint, that entity only appeared as a plaintiff in
connection with the motion to compel, and we thus excluded it from the list of
defendants for purposes of this appeal.

1
On appeal, defendants challenge the trial court’s partial denial of their
motion to compel arbitration. They assert the trial court erred in refusing to
compel arbitration of various claims related to a promissory note executed by
defendant Nicalo and the creation and funding of defendants Cornerstone
Communities QOF I, LLC, Cornerstone Communities I, LLC, 556 Ross St.
Downtown LLC, Downtown Station RRSQ LLC, Cornerstone Communities
II, LLC, and Mendocino Downtown LLC. We conclude the claims related to
the promissory note are subject to arbitration, but otherwise affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Fact Background
A. Cornerstone SA
Kaufman has been a long-time commercial real estate investor. Based
on Kaufman and Adani’s close friendship, they entered into a joint business
venture operated via an entity called SA Structure, LLC (SA Structure).
Kaufman and Adani were the sole members and managers of the company.
They executed an operating agreement for SA Structure, which contained an
arbitration provision. SA Structure was renamed Cornerstone Properties SA,
LLC (Cornerstone SA) in 2010.
In 2009 and 2011, Kaufman acquired two commercial real estate
properties valued at $12.4 million and placed them within Cornerstone SA.
Adani did not contribute capital towards the purchase of these properties.
In July 2018, Adani informed Cornerstone SA’s accountants that he
had obtained a loan from Kaufman to “ ‘purchase[ ] 50% of [Kaufman’s]
capital interest’ ” in Cornerstone SA. The following month, Adani executed a
promissory note on behalf of Nicalo, LLC (Nicalo) reflecting a loan of
$4,249.337.72 (Nicalo note). Adani is the sole member of Nicalo. Kaufman
did not sign the note.

2
Based on the Nicalo note and Adani’s representations, the accountants
provided Adani with a 50% capital interest in Cornerstone SA’s assets and
transferred the approximate $4.25 million from Kaufman’s capital account to
Adani’s capital account. In 2021, a few years after execution of the
promissory note, the properties were valued in excess of $32 million.
B. The Other Cornerstone Entities
Kaufman held the majority of his real estate assets in Cornerstone
Properties II S, LLC (Cornerstone II S). Kaufman was the sole member of
this entity and the owner of the assets.
Around 2014, Kaufman formally appointed Adani as the manager of
Cornerstone II S. While Kaufman remained a manager, he relied on Adani to
primarily operate the business. In exchange, Kaufman and Adani agreed
Adani would receive fifty percent of the net profits of the properties he was
managing, and fifty percent of the profits of the sale of any such property
after Kaufman was reimbursed for his invested capital in the property. The
operating agreement for Cornerstone II S did not contain an arbitration
provision, and instead provided that “[t]he parties each submit to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the courts in Santa Clara County, California.”
In 2015, Cornerstone II S moved most of its properties into separate
LLCs, each named for the property location2 (the CPSA entities), “ ‘to limit
[the] full exposure of one large entity.’ ” The CPSA entities each had
separate operating agreements, each designating Adani as the manager.

2 These entities are: CPSA – Airport Industrial Park, LLC; CPSA –

Neotomas and Corporate Center, LLC; CPSA – Corporate Center, LLC; CPSA
– Neotomas, LLC; CPSA – Mendocino, LLC; CPSA – Old Redwood Highway,
LLC; CPSA – River and Fulton, LLC; CPSA – Santa Rosa, LLC; CPSA – Todd
Road, LLC; and CPSA – Westwind and Laughlin, LLC.

3
Some of these agreements contained arbitration provisions. Others did not,
and instead stated disputes must be resolved in court.
Kaufman and Adani subsequently executed amended operating
agreements for all the CPSA entities.3 These amended operating agreements
uniformly contained arbitration provisions, which required that “any
controversy or dispute arising out of or related to this Agreement . . . shall be
resolved by binding arbitration . . . .”
In 2019, Kaufman and Adani created Cornerstone Properties
Management SA LLC (Cornerstone Management) for “any lawful business
. . . including but not limited to the management of real properties.” Around
the same time, they formed Cornerstone coLAB, LLC (Cornerstone coLAB).
Adani served as manager of both entities. The current operating agreements
for Cornerstone Management and Cornerstone coLAB also contain
arbitration provisions, which mirror the arbitration provision of the CPSA
entities.
At some point prior to 2020, Kaufman began suffering from dementia.
These symptoms included intense pain, brain fog, and memory issues that
have made it “very difficult” to focus on and understand complex financial
and business documents and transactions. Kaufman alleges that, after he
began suffering from the effects of dementia, Adani took advantage of his
condition. He contends Adani presented numerous documents to Kaufman as
ordinary and routine business documents requiring immediate signature.
However, Kaufman now asserts these documents materially altered the
terms of Adani’s compensation and the parties’ rights and ownership
interests to Kaufman’s detriment.

3 Kaufman asserts this happened in 2020. The agreements, however,
are dated in 2016, 2017, or 2019.

4
C. Potrero Partners and the QOZ Entities
In 2011, Cornerstone II S formed Potrero Partners LLP (Potrero
Partners) with a different investor, Josh Smith. Kaufman and Smith signed
an amendment to Potrero Partners’ operating agreement to provide Adani
with a ten percent interest in the company’s profits to compensate Adani for
identifying properties for investment.
In 2019, Potrero Partners sold a set of properties, the sale of which
generated approximately $42 million for Kaufman and $7.8 million for Adani.
At the time, certain areas in the country had been designated Qualified
Opportunity Zones (QOZs), investments which Adani claimed could provide
deferred capital gains taxes. Kaufman asserts Adani convinced him to
pursue the QOZ tax-saving strategy, but he did not understand the details of
the investment or Adani’s intent for those projects. Accordingly, Kaufman
and Adani formed Cornerstone Communities QOF I, LLC (QOF I) and
Cornerstone Communities QOF II (QOF II), which would hold Adani’s and
Kaufman’s proceeds respectively. They also formed two QOZ business
entities—Cornerstone Communities I, LLC (Cornerstone Communities I) and
Cornerstone Communities II, LLC—and three QOZ property-holding, lessee
entities—556 Ross St Downtown, LLC, Mendocino Downtown, LLC, and
Downtown Station RRSQ, LLC (jointly, the QOZ entities).
Kaufman was designated the manager of QOF II, while Adani was the
manager for QOF I and the remaining QOZ entities. The operating
agreements for QOF I, QOF II and the QOZ entities did not contain
arbitration provisions.
As part of these QOZ transactions, two QOZ entities entered into
ground leases with CPSA-Mendocino, LLC to develop certain properties

5
already owned by CPSA-Mendocino, LLC. Adani and employees of
Cornerstone Management supervised and managed these projects.
After the funds from Potrero Partners had transferred to QOF I and
QOF II, Adani began transferring money from Kaufman’s account in QOF II
to Cornerstone Communities I, including a lump sum of $32 million.
Kaufman asserts he did not consent to the transfers and, because Adani is
the sole manager of Cornerstone Communities I, he has lost control of the
transferred funds. He further contends Adani has claimed a 50% ownership
interest in Cornerstone Communities I even though Kaufman’s QOF II assets
form the majority of funds in Cornerstone Communities I.
Procedural Background
In June 2023, plaintiffs Kaufman, individually and as trustee under
Declaration of Trust dated October 30, 1998, and QOF II (jointly, plaintiffs)
filed a complaint for monetary damages against Adani, Nicalo, QOF I, QOF
II, and the QOZ entities. The complaint alleged eighteen causes of action:
(1) breach of contract (all plaintiffs against Adani); (2) breach of the duty of
loyalty (all plaintiffs against Adani); (3) civil theft (all plaintiffs against all
defendants); (4) fraud in the inducement (all plaintiffs against Adani);
(5) intentional misrepresentation (all plaintiffs against Adani);
(6) concealment (all plaintiffs against Adani); (7) constructive fraud (all
plaintiffs against Adani); (8) negligent misrepresentation (all plaintiffs
against Adani); (9) negligence (all plaintiffs against Adani); (10) conversion
(all plaintiffs against all defendants); (11) unjust enrichment (all plaintiffs
against all defendants); (12) financial abuse of a dependent adult (Kaufman
against all defendants); (13) rescission (all plaintiffs against all defendants);
(14) judicial dissolution (all plaintiffs against the QOZ entities);
(15) accounting (all plaintiffs against Adani); (16) aiding and abetting (all

6
plaintiffs against Nicalo and the QOZ entities); (17) breach of contract
(Kaufman against Nicalo); and (18) declaratory judgment (Kaufman against
Adani).
Kaufman asserted Adani utilized his position of trust with Kaufman to
transfer money and property interests from Kaufman to himself. These acts
of alleged malfeasance included (1) utilizing misrepresentations and
omissions to incorporate a perpetual “profits interest” provision into a 2014
management agreement for Cornerstone II S, (2) failing to remove certain
properties out of Cornerstone II S that were not subject to the management
agreement, (3) failing to track his capital investments in the CPSA
properties, (4) utilizing the Cornerstone Management and Cornerstone
coLAB operating agreements to create a 50/50 ownership structure rather
than a 50/50 profit structure, (5) altering the compensation structure for the
CPSA entities by changing the benchmark calculation from Kaufman’s
invested capital to the fair market value of the property minus existing debt
on the property, as well as artificially setting reduced valuations for the
CPSA-held properties, (6) reducing the benchmark calculations further via
grant agreements in connection with the CPSA-held properties,
(7) improperly causing various Cornerstone entities to take at least eight
loans, totaling over $40 million, on different Cornerstone properties to
maximize “profit draws” to himself, rather than reducing debt as required by
the operating agreements, (8) fraudulently asserting a 50% capital interest in
Cornerstone SA based on an alleged promissory note between Nicalo and
Kaufman, (9) using his position of trust “to induce [Kaufman] to alter his
closing instructions [for the sale of Potrero Partner assets] and direct that his
funds be transferred to a qualified opportunity zone entity at closing”,
(10) abusing his position of trust by creating unfavorable operating

7
agreements for Cornerstone Communities I, QOF I, and QOF II, which
provided Adani with complete control over the entities and assets, and
(11) improperly transferring money from QOF II to Cornerstone
Communities I and misrepresenting his ownership rights in Cornerstone
Communities I.
Adani filed a motion to compel arbitration. He alleged the operating
agreements of Cornerstone SA, Cornerstone Management, and Cornerstone
coLAB, along with the amended operating agreements for the CPSA entities,
all contained binding arbitration provisions that encompassed the complaint
allegations. Nicalo, QOF I, and the QOZ entities joined the motion to compel.
Plaintiffs opposed the motion to compel. They asserted no arbitration
provision existed between themselves, Nicalo, and the QOZ entities, and
many of the claims did not relate to the CPSA entities’ operating agreements
or any other agreement with an arbitration provision.
The trial court granted in part and denied in part Adani’s motion to
compel arbitration. Specifically, and as relevant to this appeal, the court
denied the motion as to plaintiffs’ claims relating to the Nicalo note and the
QOZ entities in the first through fifteenth, and eighteenth causes of action.
The court also denied the motion as to the fourteenth, sixteenth, and
seventeenth causes of action in full.
Specifically, the court first concluded the 2003 operating agreement for
SA Structure—later Cornerstone SA—did not encompass all the claims in the
complaint because at the time of contracting, the operating agreement was
for the limited purpose of rehabilitating and selling a single home in Tiburon.
The court also found the provision unenforceable because it failed to identify
the arbitration provider or any applicable rules or procedures.

8
Next, the court rejected Adani’s argument that the Cornerstone
Management operating agreement, the Cornerstone coLAB operating
agreement, and the various CPSA entities’ operating agreements required
arbitration of all claims. The court reasoned that because the QOZ entities’
operating agreements did not contain an arbitration provision but instead
contained integration clauses, and those entities received their funds from
Potrero Partners—a company separate from the Cornerstone business—
Adani had failed to show that the QOZ agreements were part of an ongoing
series of transactions that should subject them to a Cornerstone entity’s
arbitration provision. The court also found the venue provision in the Nicalo
note, which applied to any proceeding “related to” the note, superseded any
applicable earlier arbitration provision.
Defendants timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, defendants assert the trial court erred by failing to compel
all claims to arbitration. They contend they have standing to invoke the
relevant arbitration provisions, and the claims at issue fall within the scope
of those provisions.
“ ‘In general, “[t]here is no uniform standard of review for evaluating an
order denying a motion to compel arbitration. [Citation.] If the court’s order
is based on a decision of fact, then we adopt a substantial evidence standard.
[Citations.] Alternatively, if the court’s denial rests solely on a decision of
law, then a de novo standard of review is employed.” ’ [Citation.] In the
absence of conflicting extrinsic evidence, ‘ “[w]hether and to what extent
[nonsignatories] can also enforce the arbitration clause is a question of law,
which we review de novo.” ’ ” (Jensen v. U-Haul Co. of Cal. (2017) 18
Cal.App.5th 295, 300.)

9
I. Legal Principles
“ ‘California has a strong public policy in favor of arbitration and any
doubts regarding the arbitrability of a dispute are resolved in favor of
arbitration.’ ” (Aanderud v. Superior Court (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 880, 890
(Aanderud).) As the language of Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2
“makes plain, the threshold questions presented by every motion or petition
to compel arbitration are whether an agreement to arbitrate exists [citations]
and, if so, whether the parties’ dispute falls within the scope of that
agreement.” (Ahern v. Asset Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th
675, 686–687.) The party seeking arbitration bears the preliminary burden
of proving the existence of an applicable agreement to arbitrate. (San
Francisco Police Officers’ Assn. v. San Francisco Police Com. (2018) 27
Cal.App.5th 676, 683.) Once an agreement to arbitrate is established, the
party opposing arbitration has the burden to show the arbitration provision
does not encompass the claims in the complaint. (Aanderud, at p. 890.)
Absent an agreement to arbitrate, a dispute may not be ordered to
arbitration. (Ahern v. Asset Mgmt. Consultants, Inc., supra, 74 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 687–688 [“ ‘ “[T]he terms of the specific arbitration clause under
consideration must reasonably cover the dispute as to which arbitration is
requested.” ’ ”]; accord Civ. Code, § 1648 [“[h]owever broad may be the terms
of a contract, it extends only to those things concerning which it appears that
the parties intended to contract”].)
“ ‘ “[T]he decision as to whether a contractual arbitration clause covers
a particular dispute rests substantially on whether the clause in question is
‘broad’ or ‘narrow.’ ” [Citation.] “A ‘broad’ clause includes those using
language such as ‘any claim arising from or related to this agreement[ ]’ ”
[citation] or “ ‘arising in connection with’ the agreement” [citation]. “. . .

10
‘There is no requirement that the cause of action arising out of a contractual
dispute must be itself contractual. At most, the requirement is that the
dispute must arise out of [the] contract.’ ” ’ [Citations.] Broad arbitration
clauses are interpreted to apply to extracontractual disputes between the
contracting parties, ‘ “so long as they have their roots in the relationship
between the parties which was created by the contract.” ’ [Citations.] In
deciding whether a dispute has its roots in the relationship created by the
contract, we ‘examine[ ] the nature of the agreement and of the claims and
their relationship to one another . . . .’ ” (Howard v. Goldbloom (2018) 30
Cal.App.5th 659, 663–664.)
II. The Arbitration Provisions
Defendants assert the claims before this court must be compelled to
arbitration based on: (1) a 2003 operating agreement for SA Structure, later
renamed Cornerstone SA; (2) a 2019 operating agreement for Cornerstone
Management; and (3) various operating agreements, dated between 2016 to
2019, for the CPSA entities. We examine the terms of these agreements and
consider whether they apply to the pending dispute.
A. The Cornerstone SA Operating Agreement
In 2003, Kaufman and Adani created SA Structure for operating a joint
business venture. In its “Part Seven Miscellaneous” section, paragraph five,
the operating agreement stated the “[c]haracter of [the] [b]usiness” was “the
transaction of any and all lawful business under the laws of the State of
California,” but both Kaufman and Adani acknowledge it was created for the
purpose of rehabilitating a single residential property. The operating
agreement included the following dispute resolution provision: “Any dispute
or discomfort arising out of or in connection with this agreement, including

11
disputes between or among the members, shall be settled by the [sic]
negotiation, mediation and arbitration.”
In the same section, paragraph 10, it provides that the parties “intend
a fair, balanced, and ‘win-win’ arrangement between and among themselves.
If this intent is hereafter frustrated by unusual change in circumstances
which occurred outside the control of the parties or from circumstances none
of the parties reckoned with at the time of entering into this contract, and
which create an undue and unreasonable hardship on any of the parties or
gross inequities between the parties, then the parties desire, through fair and
reasonable modifications, a rebalancing of the relationship through
arbitration.”
In “Part Three Profits and Losses,” the agreement provides salary will
be paid for services performed in winding up the affairs of the LLC, “under
any applicable provisions of the California Limited Liability Company Act, in
a reasonable amount as agreed between the parties having an interest in the
LLC or by arbitration.”
In the Miscellaneous section, the operating agreement further states, in
the event of any uncertainty in interpretating the agreement, that the parties
would be bound by either (1) “an interpretation given in writing by the
attorney who drew this agreement,” or if no longer practicing, (2) “a written
interpretation by a senior member of the last law firm with which the named
attorney practiced.” The provision then provides, “If that law firm has ceased
to be in existence at the time of such interpretation, then written
interpretation shall be obtained by arbitration.” The “General Information”
section left blank the subsection titled, “Attorney Who Drafted This
Agreement.”

12
In 2010, the operating agreement was amended to rename the entity
Cornerstone SA. No other amendments were made to the operating
agreement. It is undisputed that two additional properties were added by
Kaufman to Cornerstone SA’s portfolio in 2009 and 2011.
B. The CPSA Entities’ Operating Agreements
In 2015, Kaufman moved the majority of his real property holdings
from Cornerstone II S into ten different LLCs, referred to as the CPSA
entities. Initially, the operating agreements for the CPSA entities were not
uniform, with some containing arbitration provisions and some without.
Kaufman and Adani subsequently executed amended operating agreements,
which uniformly contained arbitration provisions.4 Those provisions stated
in relevant part: “In the event that any controversy or dispute arising out of
or related to this Agreement . . . has not been resolved by mediation . . . such
Dispute shall be resolved by binding arbitration at San Francisco, California,
by and under the rules of JAMS/Endispute . . . .”
C. The Cornerstone Management Operating Agreement
In 2019, Kaufman and Adani formed Cornerstone Management for
“any lawful business . . . including but not limited to the management of real
properties.” The parties dispute whether Cornerstone Management’s purpose
was solely property management of the real property assets held by the
CPSA entities, or broader management of the various Cornerstone entities.
The complaint states Cornerstone Management’s operating agreement
“purports to create an entity through which the other Cornerstone entities
were to be managed.” (Italics added.) Conversely, Adani’s declaration states

4 The amended agreements are dated between 2016 and 2019, but

Kaufman asserts he did not sign these amended operating agreements until
2020.

13
“Cornerstone holdings are managed through [Cornerstone Management],”
(italics added), and Cornerstone Management’s employees consist of property
and business managers and maintenance technicians. We further note
Cornerstone Management is not identified as a manager in the operating
agreements of any other Cornerstone entities.
The Cornerstone Management operating agreement also contains an
arbitration provision that mirrors the provision in the CPSA entities’
operating agreements.
III. Whether the Dispute Falls Within the Scope of the Arbitration
Provisions
A. Claims Against Adani Generally
On appeal, Adani asserts the entirety of the complaint arises out of his
role as a fiduciary for Kaufman, which is inherently tied to his role as
manager of the various Cornerstone entities. Because Cornerstone SA’s and
Cornerstone Management’s operating agreements, among others, contain
arbitration provisions, he asserts those provisions should encompass any
claim against him related to the Cornerstone business generally.
Undoubtedly, the arbitration provisions at issue are all broad,
requiring arbitration of disputes arising out of or related to/in connection
with the agreements. However, the scopes of the provisions are explicitly
limited to the agreements at issue. “Where, as here, the parties have
separate contractual relationships, which involve separate enterprises and
most importantly separate commercial risks, an arbitration clause which
governs one contractual relationship cannot be imposed in the other
relationship without undermining the parties’ reasonable expectations.”
(Marsch v. Williams (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 250, 256.) That the parties
entered into separate agreements—on different dates—to establish different

14
corporate entities—holding different real estate assets—indicates they did
not expect to establish a general transactional relationship governed by the
arbitration clause of any one particular agreement.5
Adani offers no evidence to the contrary. He has failed to identify any
arbitration provision that applies to all Cornerstone entities and operations.
And Adani, as the party seeking to compel arbitration, has the burden of
proving the existence of an applicable arbitration agreement between the
parties. (San Francisco Police Officers’ Assn. v. San Francisco Police Com.,
supra, 27 Ca.App.5th at p. 683.) We thus assess each of plaintiffs’ claims
separately to determine whether they fall within the scope of the arbitration
provisions contained in the Cornerstone SA, the Cornerstone Management, or
the CPSA operating agreements.
B. Claims Related to the Nicalo Note
The first group of claims the court declined to compel to arbitration
were those related to the Nicalo note. The court concluded the operating
agreement for Cornerstone SA did not encompass the claims related to the
Nicalo note, and the Nicalo note itself did not contain an arbitration
provision.
On appeal, Adani asserts these claims arise out of his role as manager
of Cornerstone SA and are subject to the arbitration provision therein. He
further contends Cornerstone SA’s arbitration provision is not fatally
uncertain. We agree.

5 Adani acknowledges in his brief that the arbitration provisions

constitute “agreement[s] to arbitrate disputes arising out of or relating to the
entities governed by those agreements.” (Italics added.)

15
1. The Cornerstone SA Operating Agreement Applies
The applicable operating agreement for Cornerstone SA encompasses
any dispute “arising out of or in connection with” the agreement. And the
parties do not dispute that Cornerstone SA’s original purpose—renovating a
single home—was expanded when Kaufman transferred two additional
properties into its holdings. Because the parties did not alter any terms of
Cornerstone SA’s operating agreement despite changing its name and
expanding its purpose, it is reasonable to presume the parties intended the
operating agreement, including the arbitration provision, to continue to apply
to the expanded business. Kaufman has not offered any evidence to the
contrary. (See Aanderud, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 890.)
“The operative question is whether [the plaintiff’s] claims ‘ “have their
roots in the relationship between the parties which was created by the
contract.” ’ ” (Howard v. Goldbloom, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 667.) Here,
the claims related to the Nicalo note involve two properties held by
Cornerstone SA. Kaufman’s allegations against Adani related to both his
creation of an allegedly fraudulent loan document and his alleged abuse of
his role as manager of Cornerstone SA. Specifically, the complaint—in
discussing Adani’s creation of the promissory note—states:
• “Adani used his authority as Manager to once again obtain
significant rights in [Cornerstone SA] for his own benefit.”
• “Adani caused Cornerstone’s accountants to shift more than $4
million in property rights from [Kaufman] to himself”;
• These discussion between Adani and Cornerstone’s accountants
occurred during business meetings and/or in connection with the
preparation of Cornerstone SA’s tax returns; and

16
• Adani “fabricated the explanation and Nicalo Note he provided to
[Cornerstone SA’s accountants] in order to justify a 50% capital
interest in Cornerstone SA.”
These allegations are certainly rooted in the Cornerstone SA operating
agreement because they allege mismanagement by Adani in his role as
manager of Cornerstone SA. Adani would have no ability to impact the
ownership and capital accounts of Cornerstone SA if he were not managing
Cornerstone SA. And Adani was appointed manager of Cornerstone SA via
its operating agreement. Thus, the claims related to the Nicalo note are
directly connected to the Cornerstone SA operating agreement and trigger
application of the arbitration provision. (See Buckhorn v. St. Jude Heritage
Medical Group (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1407.)
In response, plaintiffs contend the Nicalo note’s forum selection clause
supersedes the Cornerstone SA operating agreement’s arbitration provision.
That provision reads as follows: “[Nicalo] consents to the exclusive
jurisdiction of California and further agrees that the venue for any action or
proceeding relating to this Note shall be in Marin County, California.” We
disagree.
As an initial matter, we observe the Nicalo note is not a contract
between the parties but rather a unilateral obligation by Nicalo/Adani and
unsigned by Kaufman. As such, it cannot modify the arbitration provision in
the Cornerstone SA operating agreement, which requires any modifications
or alterations to be made by “written agreement or authorization of all the
members.”
Moreover, as explained in Suski v. Coinbase, Inc. (9th Cir. 2022) 55
F.4th 1227—a case on which plaintiffs rely—“[u]nder California law, ‘ “[t]he
general rule is that when parties enter into a second contract dealing with

17
the same subject matter as their first contract without stating whether the
second contract operates to discharge or substitute for the first contract, the
two contracts must be interpreted together and the latter contract prevails to
the extent they are inconsistent.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1230.) But here, the Nicalo
note neither addresses the same subject matter nor conflicts with the
operating agreement’s arbitration provision.
Substantively, the Nicalo note does not address Adani’s authority as
manager of Cornerstone SA, management of Cornerstone SA assets, or his
duties in interacting with Cornerstone SA’s accountants. As to forum, the
Nicalo note states, “the venue for any action or proceeding relating to this
Note shall be in Marin County, California,” and “the exclusive jurisdiction” is
California. “[A]ny action or proceeding” does not preclude arbitration. In
Ramirez–Baker v. Beazer Homes, Inc. (E.D. Cal. 2008) 636 F.Supp.2d 1008,
an employer sought to arbitrate an employee dispute based on an applicant
statement signed by the plaintiff when she was initially hired. (Id. at
p. 1014.) The plaintiff had subsequently signed agreements containing
integration clauses that made no reference to arbitration, and she claimed
these subsequent agreements negated her original applicant statement’s
arbitration provision. (Id. at p. 1015.) The court rejected her argument and
noted there was no showing the subsequent agreements were expressly or
implicitly inconsistent with her arbitration obligation. Where one agreement
identifies arbitration as the forum for resolving disputes, and a subsequent
agreement omits any reference to such a forum, “ ‘any doubts must be
resolved in favor of arbitration.’ ” (Id. at p. 1017.)
Because the Nicalo note does not specify a forum, it does not conflict
with the arbitration provision in the operating agreement. (See Alexander v.
Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 723, 726–727 [“Forum means ‘[a]

18
court or other judicial body. . . . Venue is ‘[t]he county or other territory’ in
which a case may be heard’ ”].) Accordingly, the claims related to the Nicalo
note are subject to the arbitration provision in the Cornerstone SA operating
agreement.
2. The Cornerstone SA Operating Agreement Is Not
Fatally Uncertain
The trial court also concluded the arbitration provision was
unenforceable because it was ambiguous and uncertain, and plaintiffs
reassert this argument on appeal.
Both the Federal Arbitration Act and California law express a strong
public policy in favor of arbitration. (See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16; Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1280 et seq.) “Consequently, courts will ‘ “indulge every intendment to give
effect to such proceedings.” ’ ” (Adajar v. RWR Homes, Inc. (2008) 160
Cal.App.4th 563, 568.) The policy favoring arbitration, however, does not
apply unless it is determined that the parties agreed to arbitrate their
disputes, which requires an analysis of the state law principles that govern
the formation and interpretation of contracts. (See Badie v. Bank of America
(1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 790.)
Plaintiffs assert the parties never had a meeting of the minds because
the arbitration provision is ambiguous as to what disputes are subject to
negotiation verses mediation verses arbitration.6 However, “[i]t is not
uncommon for an arbitration provision to require some initial negotiation or
mediation step before leading into arbitration; and such step does not make

6 Plaintiffs’ claim that “other provisions [in the operating agreement]

. . . suggest that disputes should be resolved in court” is poorly taken. Their
sole reference is to an attorney’s fee provision allocating costs, which is silent
on issues of forum selection.

19
the arbitration provision less binding.” (Cheshire v. United States Olympic
Comm. (C.D.Cal. Jun. 3, 2019, No. CV 18-5763-GW(RAOX)) 2019 WL
12381183, at *6, fn. 7.) While we recognize the provision does not expand on
these steps, we decline to conclude the lack of detail renders the provision
ambiguous. Because the provision uses “and” rather than “or,” all claims are
subject to arbitration. (Compare with Covillo v. Specialty’s Café (N.D.Cal.
Oct. 17, 2012, No. C 11-00594 DMR) 2012 WL 4953085, at *2 [arbitration
agreement’s reference to “either arbitration or mediation” suggested a
nonbinding process].)
Next, plaintiffs contend the arbitration provision is fatally ambiguous
because it fails to identify an arbitration provider or applicable rules or
procedures. On this point, HM DG, Inc. v. Amini (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th
1100 (HM DG) is instructive. In that case, the parties’ agreement contained
an arbitration provision that gave the parties three choices on how to jointly
select an arbitrator “in accordance with the applicable United States
Arbitration and Mediation Rules of Arbitration.” (Id. at pp. 1104, 1107.) The
plaintiff argued the arbitration provision’s failure to specify a specific
arbitrator, the office that would administer the arbitration, the related
arbitration rules, and the arbitration’s location evidenced a lack of mutual
consent. (Id. at pp. 1107–1109.) The court disagreed, concluding the
agreement sufficiently evidenced a meeting of the minds. (Id. at pp. 1108–
1109.) The court concluded the arbitration provision did not need to identify
a single method for selecting an arbitrator to be valid. (Id. at p. 1108.) It
explained Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.6 authorized courts to appoint
an arbitrator “to ensure a party’s contractual right to arbitrate is enforced.”
(Id. at p. 1108.) The court further explained selection of arbitration rules and
location are “part and parcel of the appointment of an arbitrator . . . . Thus,

20
under section 1281.6, the absence of a specified forum or set of rules in an
arbitration clause does not invalidate the agreement to arbitrate.” (Id. at
p. 1110.) The court concluded the arbitration provision at issue “clearly
evidence[d] the parties’ intention to submit their dispute to arbitration” and
was enforceable. (Id. at p. 1111.)
Likewise, the arbitration provision in the Cornerstone SA operating
agreement is not unenforceable due to its failure to specify the manner in
which the arbitration would proceed. In the event the parties were unable to
agree on an arbitrator, the applicable rules, or location, then the court has
authority to establish those details. (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.6 [“In
the absence of an agreed method [for appointing an arbitrator], . . . the court,
on petition of a party to the arbitration agreement, shall appoint the
arbitrator.”]; id., § 1282 [“Unless the arbitration agreement otherwise
provides . . . [t]he arbitration shall be by a single neutral arbitrator”]; id., §
1282.2, subd. (a)(1) [neutral arbitrator will set the time and place of the
arbitration]; id., § 1284.2 [“Unless the arbitration agreement otherwise
provides . . . each party to the arbitration shall pay his pro rata share of the
expenses and fees of the neutral arbitrator”]; HM DG, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1110 [appointment of arbitrator includes “the forum and rules that will
govern the arbitration”].)
The cases on which plaintiffs rely are distinguishable. Those cases
either (1) address unconscionability (see Solo v. Am. Assn. of Univ. Women
(S.D. Cal. 2016) 187 F. Supp.3d 1151)—an issue not asserted by plaintiffs,
likely because they cannot argue “ ‘the overall bargain was unreasonably one-
sided’ ” (id. at p. 1158), or (2) involved uncertainty over whether the parties
agreed to a certain arbitration provision (see Avery v. Integrated Healthcare
Holdings, Inc. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 50, 66 [defendant “failed to present

21
sufficient evidence establishing the specific Fair Treatment Process it
presented to the trial court was the Fair Treatment Process to which
Plaintiffs agreed”]; Maganallez v. Hilltop Lending Corp. (N.D. Cal. 2007) 505
F.Supp.2d 594, 602 [“the addendum does not evidence a meeting of the minds
regarding which agreement is subject to arbitration”]; Lindsay v.
Lewandowski (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1618, 1623 [contract uncertain as to
what the parties intended by the phrase “binding mediation”].) None of these
issues are applicable here.
We likewise find plaintiffs’ reliance on Flores v. Nature’s Best
Distribution, LLC (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th 1 unavailing. In Flores, the court
found the arbitration provision unenforceable because it failed to (1) “identify
with which entity or entities plaintiff had agreed to” arbitrate, (2) specify
which claim would be subject to arbitration verses the grievance procedure
contained in the collective bargaining agreement, and (3) state which set of
the American Arbitration Association (AAA) rules would apply. (Id. at pp. 9–
10.) The first two bases are inapplicable to the current dispute. The third
basis identified in Flores is distinguishable because the defendant first
sought to enforce AAA rules that became effective 12 years after the plaintiff
signed the agreement, and then argued—without any supporting evidence—
that an alternative set of rules had been in effect at the time. (Id. at p. 10.)
The Flores court thus found the agreement at issue ambiguous because of the
defendant’s inability to identify the applicable rules at the time the plaintiff
executed the agreement. The Flores court did not reach any broader
conclusions regarding how arbitration provisions must identify any rules or
procedures.

22
3. Nicalo is Entitled to Enforce the Arbitration Provision
Nicalo asserts it is entitled to arbitrate the claims against it, despite
being a nonsignatory to the arbitration agreement, under the doctrines of
agency and equitable estoppel.
A party seeking to compel arbitration must generally establish that he
or she was a party to an arbitration agreement. (DMS Services, LLC v.
Superior Court (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1352–1353 (DMS Services);
JSM Tuscany, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1236.)
However, both California and federal courts have recognized certain
exceptions which permit a nonsignatory to an agreement with an arbitration
clause “to compel arbitration of, or be compelled to arbitrate, a dispute
arising within the scope of that agreement.” (DMS Services, at p. 1353; see
also Metalclad Corp. v. Ventana Environmental Organizational Partnership
(2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1705, 1713–1714.) These exceptions include when a
nonsignatory defendant is acting as an agent of a signatory to the arbitration
agreement (Dryer v. Los Angeles Rams (1985) 40 Cal.3d 406, 418) and under
the doctrine of equitable estoppel (Jensen v. U-Haul Co. of California (2017)
18 Cal.App.5th 295, 306 (Jensen)).
“ ‘ “The significant test of an agency relationship is the principal’s right
to control the activities of the agent.” ’ ” (Violette v. Shoup (1993) 16
Cal.App.4th 611, 620.) However, an agency relationship with a signatory,
without more, is generally insufficient to allow a nonsignatory to enforce an
agreement to arbitrate. (Jensen, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at pp. 304–305.) A
nonsignatory defendant may compel arbitration only “where there is a
connection between the claims alleged against the nonsignatory and its
agency relationship with the signatory.” (Cohen v. TNP 2008 Participating
Notes Program, LLC (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 840, 863.)

23
Here, there is undoubtedly an agency relationship between Adani and
Nicalo. Adani is the sole member and manager of Nicalo. The complaint
alleges Nicalo “is a vehicle by which Adani has received money owed to him
in his personal capacity and through which he contracted during the relevant
times set forth in this Complaint.” The complaint further asserts: (1) “Adani
has control of and directed [Nicalo], and they acted, in part, through Adani’s
own conduct and representations . . .”, and (2) “Adani created and signed a
promissory note on behalf of his entity, Defendant Nicalo,” which provided
the basis for the ownership rights he claimed in the Cornerstone SA
properties.
Moreover, the claims alleged against Nicalo are tied to its agency
relationship with Adani. Nicalo acted as Adani’s agent in creating the note
and receiving the alleged interest in Cornerstone SA. As alleged in the
complaint, Nicalo was “a vehicle by which Adani has received money owed to
him in his personal capacity and through which he contracted during the
relevant times set forth in this Complaint.” Accordingly, plaintiffs’ claims
against Nicalo are directly connected to its agency relationship with Adani in
participating in the Nicalo note.
In sum, plaintiffs’ claims against Adani and Nicalo related to the Nicalo
note should be compelled to arbitration. This includes (1) the first through
thirteenth, fifteenth, and eighteenth causes of action as against Adani, to the
extent those claims arise from the Nicalo note and related conduct, (2) the
third, tenth through thirteenth, and sixteenth causes as against Nicalo, and
(3) the seventeenth cause of action against Nicalo.7

7 While we recognize the seventeenth cause of action—the breach of

contract claim against Nicalo—solely addresses enforcement of the Nicalo
note, its enforceability is contingent on a determination of whether Adani
24
C. Claims Regarding the QOZ Entities
The second group of claims at issue relates to the transfer of funds from
Potrero Partners to QOF I and QOF II, the subsequent structuring of QOF I,
QOF II, and the QOZ entities via their respective operating agreements, the
redistribution of funds between QOF I, QOF II, and the QOZ entities, and the
designation of ownership interests in the QOZ entities.8
Defendants assert they do not seek to compel arbitration of these
claims based on QOF I, QOF II, or the QOZ entities’ operating agreements.
Rather, they assert these claims must be compelled to arbitration pursuant to
the arbitration provisions in Cornerstone Management’s and the CPSA
entities’ operating agreements. Specifically, defendants assert the claims
against them are subject to arbitration because the claims “center[ ] on the
allegation that [Adani] caused [Kaufman] to invest in the QOZ Entities by
exploiting [Adani’s] role as Cornerstone[’s] manager.”
As explained in Part III.A., ante, each company functions pursuant to a
separate operating agreement. Those operating agreements set forth the
relevant company’s ownership and management structure. Outside of these
operating agreements, defendants have failed to identify any overarching

fraudulently created the note. Accordingly, it is appropriate to include this
claim in the matters subject to arbitration. (See Yeh v. Suprior Court (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 264, 272 [nonsignatory defendant may invoke arbitration
clause when claims against the nonsignatory are “ ‘ “intimately founded in
and intertwined” with the underlying contract obligations.’ ”].)
8 To the extent plaintiffs assert Adani was directing Cornerstone

entities to investigate qualified opportunity zone opportunities or
participating in those projects, such claims would be subject to arbitration.
However, we interpret the trial court’s order as already compelling those
claims to arbitration.

25
agreement regarding management of Cornerstone assets generally.9
Accordingly, we consider whether the Cornerstone Management and CPSA
entities’ operating agreements require arbitration of these specific QOZ-
related claims.
Banc of California, National Association v. Superior Court (2021) 69
Cal.App.5th 357, provides a useful analogy. In that case, the parties
executed various loan documents, as well as entered into an aircraft usage
agreement, but only the usage agreement contained an arbitration provision.
(Id. at p. 369–370.) On appeal, the defendant argued all of the claims should
be arbitrated because the loan documents and aircraft usage agreement were
“interrelated.” (Id. at p. 370.) The court disagreed, explaining “the question
for the trial court was whether the parties’ dispute related to the aircraft
usage agreement. It did not. Nothing in the record . . . shows the breach of
the loan documents was in any way related to the aircraft usage agreement
. . . .” (Ibid.) The court further noted that while discounted prices under the
usage agreement may serve as the “incentive” for the loans, “this does not
show that the parties’ dispute—over [defendant’s] alleged breach of the loan
documents—was in any way related to the aircraft usage agreement.” (Id. at
pp. 370–371.)
We reach a similar conclusion as to the claims involving QOF I, QOF II,
and the QOZ entities. Kaufman received the funds at issue from the sale of
properties held by Potrero Partners. Potrero Partners was not a Cornerstone
entity, but a separate LLC owned by Kaufman and a third party. Likewise,

9 Unlike the Nicalo note, which directly references Adani’s role and

duties as manager of Cornerstone SA, the claims regarding the QOZ entities
do not reference Adani’s role as a manager of a specific Cornerstone entity.
Instead, those claims refer more generically to Adani’s position of trust.

26
the sold properties were not owned by a CPSA entity or managed by
Cornerstone Management. While two QOZ entities eventually collaborated
with a CPSA entity to develop a parcel of real estate, the allegedly improper
ownership structure and funding of the QOZ entities is not “rooted” in the
later real estate collaboration. Rather, the claims involving QOF I, QOF II,
and the QOZ entities are directly connected to the ownership and
management structure established by those entities’ operating agreements,
and Adani’s subsequent use of his authority under those operating
agreements to transfer funds out of QOF II and assign himself allegedly
disproportionate ownership percentages in the QOZ entities.
To the extent the QOZ allegations relate to conduct that occurred prior
to Adani and Kaufman executing the operating agreements for QOF I, QOF
II, and the QOZ entities, defendants have failed to meet their burden to prove
an agreement to arbitrate. A motion to compel arbitration requires an
evidentiary showing. (See Rosenthal v. Great W. Fin. Sec. Corp. (1996) 14
Cal.4th 394, 413.) “ ‘[B]ecause the existence of the agreement is a statutory
prerequisite to granting the petition, the petitioner bears the burden of
proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence.’ ” (Theresa D. v.
MBK Senior Living LLC (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 18, 24.)
Defendants argue the claims arise from Adani’s role as Cornerstone
Management’s manager and reference the complaint’s allegation that
Cornerstone Management’s operating agreement “purported to create an
entity through which the other Cornerstone entities were to be managed.”
While complaint allegations can constitute judicial admissions that concede
“ ‘ “the truth of [the] matter,” ’ ” we find this allegation insufficient. (See
Shirvanyan v. Los Angeles Cmty. Coll. Dist. (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 82, 100.)
This allegation only states what the operating agreement “purports” to do,

27
and then references “the other Cornerstone entities,” without specification.
(Italics added.) Use of the word “the” seems to suggest—at most—all existing
Cornerstone entities, which would exclude QOF I, QOF II, and the QOZ
entities because they had not yet been formed. Moreover, defendants’
interpretation of this allegation appears to conflict with Adani’s declaration,
which states Cornerstone Management managed “Cornerstone holdings,” an
apparent reference the real property holdings.
We recognize the complaint also asserts Adani initially “used his
position of trust and undue influence to induce” Kaufman to transfer his
funds from Potrero Partners to QOF I and QOF II. Defendants argue this
allegation can only refer to Adani’s fiduciary duties as manager of
Cornerstone Management. But this argument requires us to make
assumptions unsupported by the record. For example, “position of trust”
could refer to Adani’s role as manager of Cornerstone II S, which provided
Potrero Partners with its initial funding. And the Cornerstone II S operating
agreement did not contain an arbitration provision and instead expressly
vested exclusive jurisdiction in “the courts in Santa Clara County,
California.” The reference to “position of trust” could also relate to Adani’s
unspecified role in connection with Potrero Partners, which he claims as his
basis for his $7.8 million “finder’s fee.” Or this phrase could relate to
Kaufman and Adani’s close friendship, including Adani serving as Kaufman’s
“personal advisor.” Accordingly, reference to Adani using his position of trust
and undue influence—without any connection to Adani’s duties as manager
of Cornerstone Management—is insufficient to trigger the arbitration
provisions in the Cornerstone entities’ operating agreements.
Finally, defendants argue the claims involving the QOZ entities are
covered by the Cornerstone Management arbitration provision and/or the

28
CPSA arbitration provisions because the QOZ entities were created with the
purpose of investing in properties already owned by the CPSA entities. But
the alleged harm Kaufman suffered is not measured by or dependent on the
later land agreements between the QOZ entities and the CPSA entities or
Adani’s management of those projects. Kaufman’s claims are instead rooted
in the structure and funding of QOF I, QOF II, and the QOZ entities.
While the arbitration provisions in the Cornerstone Management and
CPSA entities’ operating agreements are broad, they are not unlimited. The
record does not evidence that the dispute regarding the structure and funding
of QOF I, QOF II, and the QOZ entities is connected to Adani’s role with
Cornerstone Management and the CPSA entities Adani, not Cornerstone
Management, is identified as the manager of QOF I, QOF II, and the QOZ
entities. Because we reach this conclusion, we need not consider whether the
QOZ entities have standing to compel arbitration as nonsignatories to the
arbitration agreements.
In sum, the trial court properly denied defendants’ petition to compel to
arbitration plaintiffs’ claims against Adani, QOF I, QOF II, and the QOZ
entities related to these entities. This includes (1) the first through
thirteenth, fifteenth, and eighteenth causes of action as against Adani, to the
extent those claims arise from structuring and funding of QOF I, QOF II, and
the QOZ entities and related conduct, and (2) the third, tenth through
fourteenth, and sixteenth causes as against QOF I, QOF II, and the QOZ
entities.10

10 We reach this conclusion based on the allegations and record

currently before this court. If plaintiffs subsequently assert that their claims
regarding QOF I, QOF II, and the QOZ entities arise from Adani’s role and
duties as manager of Cornerstone Management, then this opinion should not
29
IV. The Risk of Duplicative Litigation Does Not Justify Compelling
Arbitration
Finally, defendants assert the trial court’s order, which divides certain
causes of action into arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims, “will lead to
duplicative litigation, the risk of inconsistent rulings, and a waste of court
and party resources.” We disagree.
To the contrary, “[t]he proposition that a court should compel
arbitration . . . merely to avoid duplicative litigation, is . . . simply wrong.”
(Goldman v. KPMG, LLP (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 209, 233; see ibid. [“Parties
who have not agreed to arbitrate may not be compelled to do so . . . .”].)
Rather, courts are empowered to stay litigation and/or arbitration
proceedings to avoid conflicting rulings on common issues. (See Abaya v.
Spanish Ranch I, L.P. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1497 [“ ‘While there is a
strong public policy in favor of arbitration, there is an “equally compelling
argument that the Legislature has also authorized trial courts to refuse
enforcement of an arbitration agreement [or stay the arbitration] when, as
here, there is a possibility of conflicting rulings.” ’ ”]; Fitzhugh v. Granada
Healthcare & Rehab. Ctr., LLC (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 469, 475 [“ ‘the court,
may, in its discretion, refuse to compel arbitration or may stay arbitration
where “there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or
fact.” ’ ”].) None of the cases defendants cite require arbitration of claims that
are not subject to a valid arbitration provision, merely to avoid duplicative
litigation.11 (See, e.g., Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc. v. United Food and

be interpreted as preventing defendants from filing a subsequent petition to
compel such claims to arbitration.
11 Defendants Adani and Nicalo assert the trial court erred by refusing

to apply the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 3 et seq.; FAA) to the 2003
Cornerstone SA arbitration provision and sustaining certain objections to
30
Commercial Workers Union, Local 791, AFL-CIO (1st Cir. 2003) 321 F.3d
251, 254 [considering whether to consolidate three “concededly arbitrable”
grievances]; Garden Grove Community Church v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel
Co. (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 251, 265 [addressing consolidation of “two
agreements to arbitrate, each one of which is separately arbitrable.”].)
Next, defendants argue the court’s order is ambiguous as to which
claims are compelled to arbitration and which remain in court. As an
example, they reference allegations in the complaint regarding Adani’s
receipt of a $7.8 million “finder’s fee” from Potrero Partners. However, the
claims clearly challenge Adani’s use of Kaufman’s funds and the subsequent
ownership and structuring of the QOZ entities.12 To the extent such
ambiguities exist regarding which claims within which causes of action are
subject to arbitration, it appears to be an issue with the structure of the
complaint and how the causes of action are framed. And the pending appeal
does not encompass any challenges to the adequacy of the complaint.13

Adani’s declaration. However, Adani and Nicalo only assert these points in
arguing that claims arising out of that operating agreement should be
compelled to arbitration. Because we have already concluded that provision
is enforceable (see Part III.B.1., ante), we need not address these additional
arguments.
12 Separately, we also note Adani has not indicated plaintiffs’ objections

to his receipt of a finder’s fee has any connection to any Cornerstone entity or
associated operating agreement/arbitration provision.
13 Defendants do not appear to contest the trial court’s ability to split

causes of action into separate claims, some of which are subject to
arbitration. We agree this approach is appropriate to the extent the causes of
action encompass multiple primary rights. (See Galarsa v. Dolgen California,
LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 639, 653–654 [“California has a rule against
splitting a cause of action.” However, “ ‘a “cause of action” is comprised of a
“primary right” of the plaintiff, a corresponding “primary duty” of the
defendant, and a wrongful act by the defendant constituting a breach of that
31
Finally, defendants argue plaintiffs may seek to improperly utilize
discovery through the court proceedings to benefit their arbitration claims.
However, protective orders frequently contain provisions limiting the use of
materials to certain proceedings. We are confident counsel is capable of
managing this concern and will seek discovery orders as appropriate.
DISPOSITION
The order is reversed in part and affirmed in part. The parties shall
bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(3).)

duty.’ ”].) Much of the ambiguity raised by defendants could be potentially
resolved by an amended pleading in which each cause of action only asserts a
single primary right. We do not opine on this issue as it is not before this
court.

32
_________________________
Petrou, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Tucher, P. J.

_________________________
Fujisaki, J.

A169221/Kaufman et al. v. Adani et al.

33

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.