CourtListener 9968947•People v. Montanez CA2/5
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Filed 6/27/24 P. v. Montanez CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B327793
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA439509)
v.
PAUL MONTANEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Curtis B. Rappe, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard D. Miggins, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, and Roberta L. Davis and Theresa A.
Patterson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Defendant Paul Montanez (defendant) appeals from the
trial court’s denial of his Penal Code section 1172.6 (former
section 1170.95) petition seeking resentencing on a prior
conviction for murder.1 We consider whether the trial court
correctly found defendant could not make a prima facie case for
relief because his jury found—after our Supreme Court decided
People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark (2016)
63 Cal.4th 522—that defendant was a major participant in the
underlying crimes who acted with reckless indifference to human
life.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Defendant’s Trial and Direct Appeal
In February 2014, defendant went to the home of Norman
Benavides (Benavides) with two acquaintances, Miguel Marquez
and Aaron Gallardo (Gallardo).2 They were ostensibly there to
buy marijuana from Benavides, but instead, they beat and shot
Benavides and fled with a bag.
Defendant was charged with murder and robbery and a
trial jury found him guilty in May 2018. As pertinent here, the
jury found the murder was in the first degree and found true
allegations that the killing was committed while defendant was
engaged in the commission of a robbery and burglary. (§ 190.2,
subds. (a)(17)(A) & (a)(17)(G).)
1
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Penal Code.
2
This court dismissed Gallardo’s appeal from the denial of
his petition for resentencing in November 2023.
2
On direct appeal, defendant argued certain evidence should
have been suppressed, the trial court improperly failed to
consider his ability to pay certain fines and assessments, and he
was entitled to relief under section 1172.6. This court affirmed
the judgment without ruling on defendant’s eligibility for relief
under section 1172.6, explaining at the time that defendant must
avail himself of the petitioning procedure provided by the statute.
B. Defendant’s Petition for Resentencing
Defendant filed a section 1172.6 petition for resentencing in
the trial court in May 2022. The trial court appointed counsel to
represent him.
The prosecution opposed defendant’s petition and argued
defendant was ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6
because the jury instructions and verdict establish he was guilty
of murder even after amendments to the murder statutes,
sections 188 and 189. With its opposition, the prosecution
submitted copies of the instructions given to the jury at
defendant’s trial, which included instructions prepared using the
CALCRIM Nos. 702 and 703 pattern instructions.
The CALCRIM No. 702 instruction provided, in pertinent
part: “If you decide that the defendant is guilty of first degree
malice murder but was not the actual killer, then, when you
consider the special circumstances of murder during the
commission of a robbery and murder during the commission of a
burglary, you must also decide whether the defendant acted with
the intent to kill. In order to prove these special circumstances
for a defendant who is not the actual killer but who is guilty of
first degree malice murder as an aider and abettor, the People
must prove that the defendant acted with the intent to kill.
3
[¶] . . . [¶] If the defendant was not the actual killer, then the
People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that he acted with the intent to kill for the special circumstances
of murder during the commission of a robbery and murder during
the commission of a burglary to be true. If the People have not
met this burden, you must find these special circumstances have
not been proved true.”
The CALCRIM No. 703 instruction specified the factors our
Supreme Court outlined in Banks to decide whether a defendant
qualifies as a major participant in a murder and defined reckless
indifference to human life. In pertinent part, the instruction
provided: “If you decide that the defendant is guilty of first
degree felony murder but was not the actual killer, then, when
you consider the special circumstances of murder during the
commission of a robbery and murder during the commission of a
burglary, you must also decide whether the defendant acted
either with intent to kill or with reckless indifference to human
life. [¶] In order to prove these special circumstances for a
defendant who is not the actual killer but who is guilty of first
degree felony murder as an aider and abettor, the People must
prove either that the defendant intended to kill, or the People
must prove all of the following: [¶] 1. The defendant’s
participation in the crime began before or during the killing; [¶]
2. The defendant was a major participant in the crime; [¶] AND
[¶] 3. When the defendant participated in the crime, he acted
with reckless indifference to human life. [¶] A person acts with
reckless indifference to human life when he knowingly engages in
criminal activity that he or she knows involves a grave risk of
death. [¶] . . . [¶] If you decide that the defendant is guilty of
first degree felony murder, but you cannot agree whether the
4
defendant was the actual killer, then, in order to find these
special circumstances true, you must find either that the
defendant acted with intent to kill or you must find that the
defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life and was
a major participant in the crime. When you decide whether the
defendant was a major participant, consider all the evidence.
Among the factors you may consider are: [¶] 1. What role did the
defendant play in planning the criminal enterprise that led to the
death? [¶] 2. What role did the defendant play in supplying or
using lethal weapons? [¶] 3. What awareness did the defendant
have of particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime, any
weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other
participants? [¶] 4. Was the defendant present at the scene of the
killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the actual murder?
[¶] 5. Did the defendant’s own actions or inactions play a
particular role in the death? [¶] 6. What did the defendant do
after lethal force was used? [¶] No one of these factors is
necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily enough, to
determine whether the defendant was a major participant. [¶] If
the defendant was not the actual killer, then the People have the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted with
either the intent to kill or with reckless indifference to human life
and was a major participant in the crime for the special
circumstances of murder during the commission of a robbery and
murder during the commission of a burglary to be true. If the
People have not met this burden, you must find these special
circumstances have not been proved true.”3
3
Although Clark was decided in 2016 (before defendant’s
trial), optional language incorporating Clark’s list of factors
relevant to assessing reckless indifference to human life was not
5
The trial court held a hearing on defendant’s section 1172.6
petition and denied it, finding defendant could not establish a
prima facie case for relief. The court determined it “[could] look
at the verdict forms and say, along with the jury instructions, the
jury had to find the requirements of Banks and Clark, or specific
intent to kill,” either of which would establish defendant was
ineligible for resentencing because he could be convicted for
murder under current law.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that because the CALCRIM No. 703
instruction listed the Banks “major participant” factors but not
the Clark “reckless indifference” factors, the jury’s special
circumstance findings do not make him ineligible for
resentencing under section 1172.6. That is not the law. A jury
need not be instructed on the Clark factors to properly make a
finding of reckless indifference to human life. (People v. Farfan
(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942; see also CALCRIM No. 703 [stating,
in the instruction’s bench notes, that a trial court should
determine whether Clark’s list of factors relevant to reckless
indifference to human life need be given to the jury].) Because
defendant’s jury could have found the special circumstances true
on a felony murder theory only if it found—post-Banks and
Clark—that he was a major participant in a crime who acted
with reckless indifference to human life, the trial court correctly
concluded he was ineligible for section 1172.6 resentencing.
added to CALCRIM No. 703 until 2020 (after defendant’s trial).
(Compare CALCRIM No. 703 (Sept. 2019) with CALCRIM No.
703 (Apr. 2020).)
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A. Section 1172.6 Eligibility
Section 1172.6 relief “is unavailable if the defendant
was . . . the actual killer, acted with the intent to kill, or ‘was a
major participant in the underlying felony and acted with
reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d)
of [Penal Code] Section 190.2.’ (Pen. Code, § 189, subd. (e)(3); see
§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) The latter reference is to the same statute,
containing the same two elements, that [our Supreme Court] had
clarified in Banks and Clark . . . . [Jury] findings made after
Banks and Clark ordinarily establish a defendant’s ineligibility
for resentencing . . . and thus preclude the defendant from
making a prima facie case for relief. If a jury has determined
beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant was a major
participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life, as
those phrases are now understood and as the Legislature
intended them to be understood when incorporating them into
Penal Code section 189, then that defendant necessarily could
still be convicted of murder under section 189 as amended.
[Citations.]” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 710.)
B. A Post-Banks, Post-Clark Determination that
Defendant Was a Major Participant Who Acted with
Reckless Indifference to Human Life Renders Him
Ineligible for Resentencing Under Section 1172.6
One of the cases the Strong court cites in explaining a post-
Banks, post-Clark jury finding of major participation and reckless
indifference ordinarily precludes section 1172.6 relief (Strong,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at 710) is Farfan, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th 942.
That case, which is analogous to this case in all material
7
respects, held the defendant was properly found ineligible for
section 1172.6 relief. We shall review Farfan and explain why we
reach the same result.
The defendant in Farfan was convicted of first degree
murder (among other offenses) and the jury found true a robbery-
murder special circumstance allegation. (Farfan, supra, 71
Cal.App.5th at 946.) As in this case, the jury received an
instruction based on CALCRIM No. 703 that informed the jury “it
could not find the robbery-murder special circumstance true
unless it was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that [the
defendant] intended to kill or he was a major participant in the
crime, and, when he participated in the crime, he acted with
reckless indifference to human life.” (Id. at 954.) Although
Farfan’s jury returned its verdict after Banks and Clark were
decided, it was “not instructed with the Banks and Clark factors.”
(Id. at 955.)
The Court of Appeal held this did not warrant reversal.
The Farfan court explained our Supreme Court “‘has not required
that juries be instructed on the clarifications, and in the wake of
Banks and Clark, no mandatory language or material changes
were made to the CALCRIM special circumstance instructions.’
[Citations.]” (Ibid.) Accordingly, the court held, “[t]he jury’s
robbery-murder special-circumstance finding constitute[d] a valid
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] had the
intent to kill or was a major participant in the robbery who acted
with reckless disregard for human life, and that finding ma[de]
[the defendant] ineligible for relief under [former] section [1172.6]
as a matter of law.” (Id. at 956.)
The scenario in Farfan is the same scenario we confront
here. Instructing a jury with the list of factors identified in
8
Banks and Clark remains optional for trial court judges and our
Supreme Court has confirmed “the mandatory [jury] instructions
did not change in the wake of Banks and Clark . . . .” (Strong,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at 719.) To be sure, major participant and
reckless indifference findings that pre-date Banks and Clark
often do not foreclose relief under section 1172.6, but the reason
this is so is not because juries must be instructed on all the
particulars of the factors our Supreme Court identified in those
cases. (Ibid.) Rather, Strong explains it is because of more
general changes to the trial environment, including new
arguments and trial strategies available to defense counsel.
(Ibid.)
Defendant argues that even though juries need not be
instructed on the Banks and Clark factors as a general matter,
his jury should have been provided the Clark “reckless
indifference” factors because the Banks “major participant”
factors were enumerated. Defendant believes this incongruence
suggested the reckless indifference element of a special
circumstances finding was less important, lowered the
prosecution’s burden of proof, and “permitted the jury to convict
[him] on an invalid legal theory: that [he] acted with reckless
indifference based solely on the fact that he aided and abetted a
robbery or a burglary.” There are two problems with this
argument. One, and most fundamentally, the CALCRIM No. 703
instruction given to defendant’s jury did define reckless
indifference to human life (“knowingly engag[ing] in criminal
activity that [one] knows involves a grave risk of death”) precisely
in the manner our Supreme Court has defined it. (In re Scoggins
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 676.) There is no reason why defendant’s
trial jury would have thought further elaboration was required or
9
missing (see, e.g., People v. Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 578),
nor reason on this record why enumeration of the factors
identified in Clark—which overlap to a significant degree with
the Banks major participation factors (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
615)—would have made a difference. Two, defendant’s argument
to avoid the same result here as in Farfan ultimately rests on the
incorrect belief, rejected in Strong, that a trial court has a sua
sponte duty to include the Banks and Clark factors in a jury
instruction. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at 719-720; see also
Estrada, supra, at 578.) There is no requirement that the
optional Banks and Clark factors be given (or not given) to a jury
in unison because there is no sense in which elaborating on the
meaning of “major participant” would undermine a reckless
indifference to human life finding; indeed, if anything, the
contrary is true in light of the overlap between the concepts.
Defendant’s alternative contention is that reversal is
required because the trial court erroneously believed the jury had
been instructed on both the Banks and Clark factors.
Notwithstanding our de novo review, defendant apparently
believes this was some sort of an abuse of discretion based on a
mistake of fact. Any mistaken impression the trial court may
have harbored is of no consequence because a trial court does not
“engage in factfinding that requires weighing evidence or
exercising discretion” at the prima facie stage of a section 1172.6
determination. (People v. Flores (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1164,
1170.) Our de novo review encompasses the same materials
considered by the trial court and we hold there was no error in
finding defendant ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter
of law.
10
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, Acting P. J.
We concur:
MOOR, J.
KIM, J.
11
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