CourtListener 9968899•People v. Ware CA2/5
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Filed 6/27/24 P. v. Ware CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B325679
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA083082)
v.
JAMES WARE, JR.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, David Gelfound, Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded.
Laini Millar Melnick, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, David A. Voet, Deputy Attorney General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant James Ware, Jr. (defendant) is
before this court on appeal for a fourth time after three earlier
partial or conditional reversals of the criminal judgment against
him. Most recently, this court conditionally reversed the
judgment of conviction and directed the trial court to decide
defendant’s motion for mental health diversion under Penal Code
section 1001.36.1 (People v. Ware (B301990, Apr. 21, 2021)
[nonpub. opn.] (Ware III).) The trial court denied the motion
based solely on its finding that defendant poses an unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety if diversion were granted. The
court then reinstated the 35 years to life prison sentence for
defendant—ten years of which is attributable to two five-year
enhancements under section 667, subdivision (a) for sustaining
prior serious felony convictions. We are asked to decide whether
the trial court’s unreasonable risk of danger finding was error
and whether we must again remand the cause so the trial court
can consider whether to dismiss the prior serious felony
conviction enhancements under prevailing law as recently
amended by Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (SB 81),
which was enacted so courts would more frequently dismiss such
enhancements.
1
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Penal Code.
2
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Offense Conduct Ultimately Resulting in
Defendant’s Conviction for Attempted Criminal
Threats
For the sake of completeness, we reiterate the summary of
defendant’s offense conduct included in our prior opinions.
Early in the morning on February 26, 2015, defendant’s
mother called 911 to report defendant was causing a disturbance
at her house and refusing to leave the property. Defendant left
the scene before the responding police officers arrived.
Later that same morning, defendant’s brother Rick spoke to
defendant by phone and recorded the call without telling
defendant he was doing so. Rick placed the call on speakerphone
so their mother, who was also in the house, could listen in.
Defendant said he wanted to come over to the house so he
could eat, take his diabetes medication, and shower before going
to school. Rick refused to give defendant permission to enter the
house, explaining it was not his house (it was their mother’s) and
reminding defendant he would “assault everybody” whenever he
came over. Defendant then began arguing with Rick, and Rick
repeatedly told defendant he should get counseling or enter a
treatment program to address his substance abuse and mental
health issues. Defendant eventually hung up on Rick.
When defendant called Rick back, Rick again
surreptitiously recorded their conversation. Defendant told Rick
he was “so mad” and “really want[ed] that house to burn down.”
Defendant elaborated, using even more vivid language: “I got a
Molotov cocktail right here. I’ve got a lighter in my hand, Ricky.
And—and I—I got a great big old 40-ounce bottle full of gas, and
I’m going to burn your house down, man.” Rick responded by
3
telling defendant “we really care about you” and “[w]e want you
to go to counseling.”
Defendant, however, was far from done. Over the next ten-
plus minutes, he repeatedly threatened Rick and the other
occupants of the house, stating at one point: “I hate you so much
that I could really trap with you [sic] motherfuckers in there
right now and burn that house down. That’s how I’m feeling
right now. You know what I mean? But you want to talk to me
about a fucking [counseling] program? [¶] . . . [¶] I’m tired of this
motherfucking shit. I’m tired. You think I’m going to—the next
time I go to jail, I just want you motherfuckers to know, yeah, I
deserve that. So whatever life sentence I get or whoever die[s],
whatever happen[s], man, you all—you all brought this shit on
yourself, man, you know? [¶] . . . [¶] “I want you dead, man. I
want your mama dead and your fucking daughter, man, and I’m
going to kill you motherfuckers . . . . I’m going to show you
motherfuckers what real hate is, you know. [¶] . . . [¶] I don’t
want to beg. I don’t want to—you know what, fuck being, I don’t
even want to fucking be alive. You know what I mean?”
Throughout this portion of defendant’s tirade, Rick did not
respond to defendant’s threats other than to reiterate defendant
should enroll in a counseling program and to extol the virtues of
such a program, e.g., that a residential program would provide
defendant with food and an opportunity for Bible study.
The phone conversation continued. Defendant told Rick he
was standing on the roof of the house and could “light all the
exits on fire and you motherfuckers won’t even be able to get out.”
Defendant asked Rick, “Do you hear me on the roof, Ricky?” Rick
responded, “Nope,” and followed up with, “Hey Jamie, the
4
program is going to be great for you.” Defendant’s retort was to
tell Rick his “car is on fire already”; in fact, it wasn’t.
Defendant asked to speak to his mother, and she told
defendant he should go to school and go to counseling. After
defendant continued to protest being kept out of the house and
told Rick he “lit your house on fire,” Rick responded, “Jamie, this
is terrorism.” Defendant said he didn’t care and told Rick maybe
he (defendant) could eat in jail; Rick responded that he thought
“it would be better in a program.” The conversation ended when
Rick indicated he was going to get off the phone and would see
defendant after his “little program”; defendant replied, “you have
a nice day.”
Sometime after the call between defendant and Rick ended,
Rick called 911. Rick told the 911 operator his mother asked him
to call because defendant had come to the house and damaged a
door while trying to break in. Rick’s mother, who also spoke to
the 911 operator during the call, explained defendant broke the
door frame but couldn’t get the door all the way open. In
response to the operator’s questions, Rick said defendant was still
trying to get in the house and seemed like he was on drugs. At
the end of the call, the operator told Rick and his mother to call
back if anything else happened, and the recording ends with
Rick’s mother saying, “I smell um, I smell.”
Rick called 911 again approximately ten minutes later. He
told the operator he thought defendant “just poured gasoline all
over, [and] he’s trying to burn the house down.” The operator
asked, “And you said he put gas all over the house?” Rick
responded, “Y[eah], we have a tape of the thing. And he did it.
And he burst the door down trying to get in.” Rick then said, “It
really smells like gas, or something in here. But we can’t go out
5
because he’s out there. Yea[h], he’s coming back and forth across
the street from the neighbors house, they’re also . . . felons.” The
911 operator told Rick that the police were being sent to his
location and the fire department was also being notified.
Rick told responding police officers that defendant broke
the door and tried to get in the house. One of the officers
examined the house’s side door and found the jamb had been
cracked in a way consistent with someone hitting or kicking the
door. During their inspection of the property, the officers could
smell gasoline when standing in the area of the home’s side door
and front door, and a piece of carpet in front of one of the
doorways later tested positive for the presence of gasoline. The
responding officers took defendant into custody and found a
lighter in his front pocket during a search of his person.
B. The Procedural History Before the Most Recent Trial
Court Proceedings on Remand
The Los Angeles County District Attorney charged
defendant with making criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a)) and
attempted arson (§ 455). Before trial, the People offered
defendant a plea deal whereby the prosecution would recommend
a six-year prison sentence if defendant pled guilty or no contest to
the criminal threats charge. Defendant rejected that deal but
thereafter agreed to an even more favorable agreement, which
the then-presiding trial judge initially approved, that would
result in a probationary sentence (by striking both of his prior
convictions for serious or violent felonies under the Three Strikes
law) with a requirement that defendant enroll in a one-year, live-
in “dual diagnosis” program. After defendant expressed what
the trial court understood as some reticence about whether he
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had a drug problem, however, the trial court withdrew its
approval of the plea agreement and set the case for trial.
The trial jury found defendant guilty of making criminal
threats but not guilty of attempted arson. The jury further found
defendant had sustained three prior serious or violent felony
convictions in 1992: one for voluntary manslaughter and two for
assault with a deadly weapon (both of which were sustained in
the same criminal proceeding). The trial court sentenced
defendant to a prison term of 35 years to life: 25 years to life for
the criminal threats conviction, pursuant to the Three Strikes
law (sections 667, subdivisions (b)-(i) and 1170.12), plus two
consecutive five-year terms under section 667, subdivision (a)(1)
for the qualifying prior serious felony convictions. We later
reversed the criminal threats conviction for instructional error
and the People accepted a reduction of the conviction to
attempted criminal threats. The trial court, at resentencing in
January 2018, made no change in defendant’s 35 years to life
sentence.
Defendant again appealed, arguing the trial court should
have granted a renewed People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
13 Cal.4th 497 motion made at resentencing and we should
remand to give the trial court the opportunity to strike the
section 667, subdivision (a)(1) prior serious felony conviction
enhancements pursuant to the change in law worked by Senate
Bill No. 1393 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), which gave trial courts
discretion to dismiss such enhancements in the interests of
justice. In February 2019, we “remanded for the trial court to
consider whether it wishes to exercise its discretion to strike,
under section 1385, one or both of defendant’s section 667,
7
subdivision (a)(1) enhancements” but affirmed in all other
respects.
On remand, defendant asked the court to exercise its
discretion to dismiss both of his serious prior conviction
enhancements because, among other things, they were remote
(27 years old) and because he suffers from “mental illness issues.”
Defendant also moved the court “to conduct a diversion eligibility
hearing under . . . section 1001.36 to qualify [defendant] for
mental health diversion.”2 Section 1001.36 had been enacted in
June 2018 (Stats. 2018, ch. 34, § 24), i.e., in the period between
2
Section 1001.36 permits a trial court to grant mental
health-based pretrial diversion “if it finds all of the following: (1)
the defendant suffers from a qualifying mental disorder
[including, but not limited to, bipolar disorder and
schizophrenia]; (2) the disorder played a significant role in the
commission of the charged offense; (3) the defendant’s symptoms
will respond to mental health treatment; (4) the defendant
consents to diversion and waives his or her speedy trial right; (5)
the defendant agrees to comply with treatment; and (6) the
defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety [as defined in section 1170.18] if treated in the
community.” (People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 626-627; see
also § 1170.18, subd. (c) [“‘[U]nreasonable risk of danger to public
safety’ means an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will
commit a new violent felony within the meaning of” section 667,
subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv); People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347,
351 [“The cited subdivision of section 667 identifies eight types of
particularly serious or violent felonies, known colloquially as
‘super strikes’”].) Section 1001.36 further provides that criminal
defendants charged with certain offenses—murder, voluntary
manslaughter, and several sex offenses—are automatically
ineligible for relief. (Former § 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).)
8
defendant’s January 2018 resentencing and our February 2019
remand for consideration of Senate Bill No. 1393 discretion.
The trial court denied all relief sought by defendant and
stated it would not change the existing 35 years to life sentence.
Regarding the prior serious felony conviction enhancements
defendant asked the court to strike, the court declined to exercise
its discretion in defendant’s favor in light of his “long history of
violence” and “numerous violations of probation and parole.” As
for defendant’s request for mental health diversion, the court
believed it was prohibited from considering the issue in light of
the scope of our remittitur but it additionally remarked that it
did not believe sufficient evidence established defendant’s mental
disorder played a significant role in the commission of his offense
of conviction.
On appeal in Ware III, the Attorney General conceded the
trial court erred by not reaching the issue of whether defendant
was entitled to mental health diversion. We agreed and held the
trial court’s error in failing to decide the motion for diversion was
not harmless because, among other reasons, it was not clear the
trial court’s observations about defendant’s mental health
reliably translated to a determination that defendant could not
show his asserted mental illness played a significant role in the
commission of his attempted criminal threats offense.
We therefore remanded to give the trial judge an
opportunity to determine whether mental health diversion was
appropriate and to state the reasons for its decision. We
expressed no view on whether such relief should be granted. In
addition, and because the trial court’s mental health diversion
determination might moot the question of whether it erred in
declining to dismiss defendant’s two five-year prior serious felony
9
conviction enhancements, we “defer[red] resolution of that
question for a fourth appeal, if such an appeal is filed.” Our
disposition stated: “The order denying defendant’s motion for
retroactive mental health diversion is conditionally reversed and
the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. If, after a hearing, the trial court
finds defendant suffers from a mental disorder, does not pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, and otherwise meets
the six statutory criteria (as nearly as possible given the
postconviction procedural posture of this case), then the court
may grant diversion. If defendant successfully completes
diversion, then the court shall dismiss the charges. If, however,
the court determines defendant does not meet the criteria under
section 1001.36, or if defendant does not successfully complete
diversion, then his convictions and sentence shall be reinstated.”
C. The Proceedings at Issue in This Appeal
The fourth appeal we contemplated in Ware III is the one
before us now. At an evidentiary hearing held in September 2022
pursuant to the disposition in Ware III, the trial court ruled on
the merits of defendant’s request for mental health diversion. It
did not, however, make further findings on the imposition of the
two prior serious felony conviction enhancements challenged in
Ware III. Instead, “per the remittitur,” the court just reinstated
the same 35 years to life sentence.
In denying defendant’s motion for mental health diversion,
the trial court relied solely on its finding as to the sixth statutory
criterion, i.e., that defendant would pose an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety, as defined in section 1170.18, if treated in
the community. (Former § 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(F).) In so
10
finding, the court reviewed defendant’s criminal history on the
record, including 1992 convictions for assault with a deadly
weapon, a 1992 conviction for voluntary manslaughter with a
personal use of a firearm enhancement,3 a 1995 domestic violence
felony conviction, a 2002 conviction for possession of a device for
arson, a 2003 conviction for battery on a police officer, a 2004
conviction for possessing a deadly weapon in prison, and the
underlying attempted criminal threats offense committed in
2015. The court additionally noted defendant had a history of
violating parole or probation and explained defendant had “a
continuous record [of committing crimes] from [1991] to 2004. He
then serves a lengthy prison sentence, gets released; and, while
on probation, he picks up a new offense, which he’s been
incarcerated [on] since 2015. [¶] So he’s got a history of
committing violence. The argument that he’s gone a long time
without committing anything, he’d been incarcerated.” The court
further observed that defendant had already taken the life of
another person in his past (the voluntary manslaughter
conviction) and had a history of assaultive and “very violent
behavior.”
3
The prosecution’s opposition to defendant’s request for
mental health diversion informed the court that defendant pled
guilty to the voluntary manslaughter charge only after a trial
jury hung on a murder charge and the judge sentencing
defendant for the manslaughter offense remarked on the record
that defendant was “lucky” because he believed the crime was “a
cold blooded murder.”
11
II. DISCUSSION
We review a trial court’s denial of a section 1001.36 motion
for mental health diversion for abuse of discretion. (People v.
Fuller (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 394, 400.) Under that deferential
standard, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s
diversion motion. Defendant’s criminal history—including a
manslaughter conviction, several assaultive offenses, and
possession of a deadly weapon in prison—suffices to support the
trial court’s conclusion that he poses an unacceptable risk of
committing a “super strike” crime if treated in the community.
Remand is still required, however. The trial court imposed
the two section 667, subdivision (a) prior serious felony conviction
enhancements when reinstating defendant’s sentence. This being
defendant’s fourth direct appeal from the reinstated judgment, he
is entitled to the benefit of SB 81, which provides a significantly
more defendant-favorable standard for considering whether to
exercise discretion to dismiss a section 667, subdivision (a)
enhancement. We therefore remand to allow the trial court to
decide, in the first instance, whether dismissal of those
enhancements is warranted under prevailing law.
A. Denial of Mental Health Diversion Was Not an Abuse
of Discretion
As mentioned in the margin earlier, section 1001.36 gave
the trial court discretion to grant mental health diversion if it
was “satisfied that the defendant will not pose an unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if
treated in the community. The court may consider the opinions
of the district attorney, the defense, or a qualified mental health
expert, and may consider the defendant’s violence and criminal
12
history, the current charged offense, and any other factors that
the court deems appropriate.” (Former § 1001.36, subd.
(b)(1)(F).4) The unreasonable risk of danger, as defined, is an
unreasonable risk that the defendant would commit a new violent
felony within the meaning of section 667, subdivision
(e)(2)(C)(iv).5 (§ 1170.18, subd. (c).)
Here, there is no basis to overturn the trial court’s
determination that defendant would pose just such an
unreasonable risk of danger if treated in the community. The
court considered the opinions of the prosecution, the defense, the
testimony of the defense’s mental health expert who testified at
4
A substantively similar provision appears in the current
version of section 1001.36, just in a different place. (§ 1001.36,
subd. (c)(4).) Our analysis is the same under either version of the
statutory subdivision.
5
The “super strikes” therein listed are: (1) a ‘“[s]exually
violent offense,”’ as defined in Welfare & Institutions Code,
section 6600, subdivision (b); (2) oral copulation or sodomy, or
sexual penetration of a child under 14 years of age and more than
10 years younger than the defendant, as defined in sections 286,
288a and 289; (3) a lewd or lascivious act involving a child under
14 years of age, in violation of section 288; (4) any homicide
offense, including attempted homicide, as defined in sections 187
to 191; (5) solicitation to commit murder, as defined in section
653f; (6) assault with a machine gun on a peace officer or
firefighter, as defined in section 245, subdivision (d)(3); (7)
“[p]ossession of a weapon of mass destruction, as defined in
paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of [s]ection 11418”; and (8) any
serious and/or violent felony offense punishable in California by
life imprisonment or death. (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(I–VIII);
Valencia, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 351, fn. 3.)
13
the evidentiary hearing the court held on remand,6 and rather
voluminous written materials submitted by the defense. The
record before the trial court established defendant previously
came close to sustaining a prior super strike conviction
(voluntary manslaughter after a hung jury on a murder charge),
made repeated threats to commit murder during the underlying
attempted criminal threats offense, had a history—both in prison
and out—of possessing or using deadly weapons, had multiple
convictions for assaulting others, and had a consistent history of
committing crimes, even while on probation or parole, that
abated mainly just during the periods when he was in custody.
That, in our view, provides a sufficient reasoned basis for the
trial court to believe defendant posed an unreasonable risk of
committing a super strike like murder, attempted murder, or
solicitation to commit murder if given diversion. (See, e.g., People
v. Hall (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1264-1266 [affirming a trial
court’s unreasonable risk of danger finding under section 1170.18
based on the defendant’s expressed willingness to use deadly
force when committing robberies and the ‘“continual and
consistent escalation”’ in the defendant’s criminal activity].)
6
The expert, Risa Grand, while acknowledging she was not a
“psychic or a mind reader,” opined defendant would not pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to the public. She testified, however,
that if given diversion, defendant would need to be in a “locked
setting.”
14
B. Remand is Required to Permit the Trial Court to
Decide Whether to Dismiss the Prior Serious Felony
Enhancements Under the Law As Amended by SB 81
“Enacted in 2021 [and effective as of January 1, 2022], [SB
81] amended Penal Code section 1385 to guide sentencing courts
in deciding whether to dismiss an enhancement. [Citation.]
Under new section 1385(c), a court ‘shall dismiss an enhancement
if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of
that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.’
[Citation.] In deciding whether to strike the enhancement, ‘the
court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence . . . that
any of [nine enumerated] mitigating circumstances . . . are
present.’ [Citation.] ‘Proof of the presence of one or more of these
circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety.’ [Citation.]” (People
v. McDowell (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1147, 1152-1153.) Among the
specified mitigating circumstances are the circumstances when
the “current offense is connected to mental illness” (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(2)(D)); when more than a single enhancement is alleged
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B)); when the current offense of conviction is
not a violent felony as defined in section 667.5, subdivision (c)
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(F)); and when the enhancement is based on a
prior conviction that is over five years old (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(2)(H)). SB 81 expressly provides that its amendments to
section 1385 “shall apply to all sentencings occurring after
January 1, 2022.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(7).)
Defendant argues the cause should be remanded to allow
the trial court to consider dismissal of his two section 667,
subdivision (a) enhancements under section 1385 as amended by
15
SB 81—including the four specific mitigating circumstances just
discussed. The Attorney General concedes defendant’s “case is
not yet final” but believes the issue does not turn on a question of
retroactivity given SB 81’s express provision that it applies only
to sentencings occurring after January 1, 2022. In the Attorney
General’s view, defendant’s sentence was imposed before January
1, 2022, the disposition in Ware III merely directed reimposition
of that sentence, and SB 81 therefore does not apply.
The Attorney General misunderstands the import of what
occurred on the most recent remand. As a result of our decision
in Ware III—in which we explained the propriety of the section
667, subdivision (a) enhancements was deferred for another
appeal, if necessary—the criminal judgment against defendant
was conditionally reversed. We directed the trial court to
reinstate the judgment if it denied mental health diversion, and
before the court did just that at the hearing in September 2022,
there was no pending judgment against defendant. Thus, in our
view, the September 2022 hearing qualifies as a sentencing (no
matter how perfunctory) occurring after January 1, 2022. That
means SB 81 does apply to defendant and a remand is required to
permit the trial court to decide, in the first instance, whether to
dismiss the section 667, subdivision (a) enhancements under
current law. (See People v. Ochoa, 53 Cal.App.5th 841, 853.)
Because we shall remand for this purpose, we can resolve
defendant’s remaining contentions with dispatch. We need not
discuss defendant’s other arguments challenging imposition of
the section 667, subdivision (a) enhancements or his contention
that Assembly Bill No. 2167 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) is
retroactive. We reject as groundless defendant’s request that a
different trial judge be assigned to decide the matter on remand.
16
(See, e.g., People v. Crew (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1591, 1609, fn. 13
[“[R]emand to a different judge is not warranted due simply to
the possibility that one side or the other may feel unfairly
treated”].)
DISPOSITION
Defendant’s sentence is reversed and the cause is
remanded for resentencing—at which the trial court shall
determine whether section 1385, as amended by SB 81, requires
dismissing one or both of the section 667, subdivision (a)
enhancements alleged against defendant and found true. In all
other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, Acting P. J.
We concur:
MOOR, J. LEE, J.*
*
Judge of the San Bernardino County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to Article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
17
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