CourtListener 9966683•Ramos v. Oros CA2/1
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Filed 6/27/24 Ramos v. Oros CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
MARY RAMOS et al., B330395
Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 19STCV16075)
v.
BRETT M. OROS,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Daniel M. Crowley, Judge. Reversed.
Law Offices of Robin E. Paley, Robin E. Paley and Shivali
Kasbekar for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Ford, Walker, Haggerty & Behar, Neil Tardiff and
Robert Lee Reisinger for Defendant and Respondent.
____________________________
This appeal is from an order vacating entry of default and
default judgment. Defendant submitted evidence to support his
argument that he was never served with the summons. Plaintiffs
countered with evidence he was served. The trial court neither
resolved this credibility dispute nor considered whether the
judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction in the event defendant
was never served.
Instead, the trial court vacated the default and default
judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure1 section 473.5.
Section 473.5 applies when the someone was served, but “service
of a summons has not resulted in actual notice.” (§ 473.5,
subd. (a).) Section 473.5, however, does not apply when the
defendant was never served. Defendant did not claim below or on
appeal that he was ever served.
We conclude the trial court applied the wrong statute and
thus abused its discretion in vacating the entry of default and
default judgment. We reverse and remand because the analytic
fulcrum of the parties’ respective arguments balances on a
credibility determination the trial court did not make and we
decline to make that determination in the first instance.
BACKGROUND
On May 8, 2019, Mary Ramos and Antonio Baker
(plaintiffs) filed a complaint against Brett M. Oros (defendant)
alleging causes of action for motor vehicle and general negligence.
Plaintiffs alleged defendant “ran a red light” and caused a motor
vehicle collision. (Capitalization omitted.)
1Undesignated statutory citations are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2
On February 18, 2020, plaintiffs requested entry of default.
The clerk rejected that request for entry of default because there
was no telephone number for the process server and because the
default was filed “premature[ly].” The clerk required plaintiffs to
file a new proof of service.
On March 26, 2020, Marshal Holly Bryk signed a proof of
service indicating that on March 18, 2020 at 6:34 p.m., she
personally served the summons and complaint on defendant at
an address on George Street in North Haven, Connecticut. This
is the only proof of service upon which plaintiffs rely and
defendant asserts he never received. According to the proof of
service, Bryk served defendant “[w]ho accepted service, with
Identity confirmed by subject saying yes when named, a white
male approx. 25-35 years of age, 6’0”-6’2” tall, weighing
180-200 lbs with brown hair.” (Boldface omitted.)
On July 1, 2020, plaintiffs again requested entry of default.
Plaintiffs’ counsel declared under penalty of perjury that she
mailed the request for entry of default to defendant at the George
Street address. The clerk entered default.
On December 14, 2020, plaintiffs requested entry of a
default judgment in the amount of $212,484.90. The request for
entry of default judgment was “not mailed” to defendant “whose
addresses are unknown to plaintiff or plaintiff’s attorney.”
(Boldface omitted.)
The court rejected plaintiffs’ July 1, 2020 request for entry
of default judgment; plaintiffs filed another such request on
November 24, 2021 seeking $212,447 in damages. Again, the
request for entry of default judgment was not mailed to
defendant because, according to plaintiffs, his address was
unknown.
3
The court entered judgment by default on March 23, 2022
in the amount of $212,447.
On September 22, 2022, defendant filed a motion to set
aside the default and default judgment. Defendant cited
sections 473, 473.5, and the court’s equitable power to set aside a
default and default judgment. Defendant’s claim was that “[o]n
the date of alleged personal service, March 18, 2020, Defendant
was not personally served with the Complaint.” Among other
things, defendant argued there is a “policy favoring trial on the
merits” and pursuant to this policy, “doubts are resolved in favor
of the application for relief from default.”
In a declaration in support of his motion, defendant
represented that from November of 2018 through August of 2021,
he lived in Wallingford, Connecticut. Defendant stated he did not
live at the George Street address on March 18, 2020; instead, his
mother lived there. Defendant also stated he “was not personally
served with the Complaint” and was not at the George Street
address on March 18, 2020, the date Bryk purported to have
served him. Defendant added that that he was a United States
Marine, stationed in Hartford, Connecticut in March of 2020. He
added that he worked 10 to 14 hour days and routinely drove to
Massachusetts. Defendant further averred that in March of
2020, his wife was pregnant, and in June of 2020, his wife was
hospitalized with complications. Defendant stated he has never
been involved in litigation and did not know he had to file an
answer in the current litigation when he was not “personally
served with the Complaint on March 18, 2020.” According to
defendant, he learned about the lawsuit for the first time in
September 2023, when his attorney called him after the default
judgment had been entered.
4
Plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that defendant
did not show he was not personally served with the complaint.
Plaintiffs contended defendant was personally served as reflected
in the proof of service signed by Bryk. Bryk’s declaration in
support of plaintiffs’ opposition stated that she is a sworn peace
officer and duly appointed Connecticut State Marshal. She
stated she personally served defendant on March 18, 2020 and
that defendant identified himself as Brett M. Oros. In a
declaration, Ramos averred Bryk’s description of defendant “is
accurate.” Ramos described defendant as “a white male with
brown hair. He is approximately six feet tall or a little over and
well-built.” Baker also filed a declaration in which he described
defendant as “a white male with dark hair. He is tall, standing
over six feet, and well-built.” He described defendant as
appearing about 25 years old at the time of the accident. A traffic
collision report attached to the opposition identifies defendant’s
address as the George Street address and describes him as a
white male.
In support of his reply, defendant submitted a second
declaration reiterating that on March 18, 2020, he did not live at
the George Street address. On that date, he was at his home
with his pregnant wife and they were “taking precautions against
the Covid-19 pandemic. I [defendant] did not want my wife and
unborn child to get sick.” Defendant also stated that on
March 18, 2020, he was not served at his mother’s home.
Defendant further claimed that in March 2020, his mother was in
a romantic relationship with a “man of similar height and
build . . . .” Defendant again stated that in March 2020, he was a
United States Marine stationed in Hartford, Connecticut.
5
Defendant reiterated he did not learn of the lawsuit until
September 2022 when his attorney contacted him.
The court granted defendant’s motion and vacated entry of
default and default judgment. The trial court reasoned in its
minute order: “CCP § 473.5 provides that if service of a
summon[s] has not result[ed] in actual notice to a party, said
party may file a notice of motion to set aside default within a
reasonable time. A reasonable time is considered to be either the
two years after entry of default judgment or 180 days of receiving
notice of default, whichever comes first.” The court further
explained: “Defendant has provided a proper declaration
attesting that he was never served; there is a general policy that
doubts are resolved in favor of the party seeking to set aside the
default.” The court cited Waite v. Southern Pacific Co. (1923)
192 Cal. 467 (Waite) in which our high court stated, “It is also
well established that it is the policy of the law to bring about a
trial on the merits wherever possible, so that any doubts which
may exist should be resolved in favor of the application, to the
end of securing a trial upon the merits.”2 (Waite, at pp. 470–471.)
The court’s minute order shows that the parties appeared at a
hearing that was not reported, and our record does not include a
settled statement.
2 Waite involved a motion under section 473 for relief from
default on the ground that in filing its answer in federal court,
defendant mistakenly believed that the federal court, and not the
state court, had jurisdiction over the case. (Waite, supra,
192 Cal. at p. 469.)
6
DISCUSSION
We review the order granting the motion to set aside the
default and default judgment for abuse of discretion. (Luxury
Asset Lending, LLC v. Philadelphia Television Network, Inc.
(2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 894, 907 (Luxury Asset Lending).)
The parties dispute whether section 473.5 applies.
Defendant argues section 473.5 applies and that the evidence
demonstrates he satisfied all that statute’s requirements.
Defendant further asserts we can infer “the trial court found:
1) that service of the summons did not result in actual notice to
the Defendant in time to defend [citation]; 2) that the motion was
made in a timely manner [citation]; . . . 3) that the declarations of
the Defendant established that the lack of notice was not caused
by his avoidance of service or excusable neglect [citation;] and
4) that the Defendant has a meritorious defense to the action.”
Defendant further argues even if section 473.5 does not apply,
this court may set aside the default and default judgment based
on equitable principles.
We conclude the trial court erred in relying on section
473.5, which is inapplicable to a defendant who claims he was not
served at all. We need not consider whether defendant satisfied
the requirements for section 473.5 relief because that statute is
inapplicable on its face. We further conclude the trial court must
resolve the credibility dispute over whether defendant was served
before considering equitable or other statutory grounds for relief
from the entry of default and default judgment.
7
A. The Trial Court Erred In Applying Section 473.5 to
Defendant’s Claim That He Was Never Served With
the Summons
Section 473.5 provides in pertinent part: “When service of
a summons has not resulted in actual notice to a party in time to
defend the action and a default or default judgment has been
entered against him or her in the action, he or she may serve and
file a notice of motion to set aside the default or default judgment
and for leave to defend the action.” (§ 473.5, subd. (a).)
The plain language of section 473.5 demonstrates that it
applies “[w]hen service of a summons has not resulted in actual
notice.” (§ 473.5, subd. (a).) The phrase “when service” indicates
that service of the summons occurred. Put differently, a
defendant who was served but did not receive actual notice may
request relief under this statute. As stated in Luxury Asset
Lending, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 908, “[s]ection 473.5
provides relief from default or default judgment to those
defendants who, despite proper service, never received ‘actual
notice’ of the lawsuit in time to defend against it.” The typical
case under section 473.5 “involves constructive or substitute
service” when the trial court “has acquired jurisdiction over a
defendant by proper service of the summons, but that service has
not resulted in actual notice to the defendant . . . .” (Cal. Judges
Benchbook: Civil Proceedings—After Trial (CJER 2017) § 1.36.)
The issue before us is not whether Bryk’s service of the
summons (assuming it occurred) failed to give defendant actual
notice. Instead, defendant claims Byrk never served him and
intimates Bryk may have served his mother’s romantic partner.
To repeat, defendant asserted below and on appeal he was never
served and plaintiffs assert Bryk personally served defendant.
8
Defendant makes no claim that such personal service failed to
provide actual notice to him. Accordingly, the trial court erred in
relying on section 473.5 to vacate entry of default and default
judgment. By applying the wrong statute in evaluating whether
to vacate the entry of default and default judgment, the trial
court abused its discretion. (Waterwood Enterprises, LLC v. City
of Long Beach (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 955, 968 [“A trial court
abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard.”].)
B. Remand Is Necessary for the Trial Court To Make
the Required Credibility Determination as to
Whether Defendant Was Served and If So Whether
To Vacate the Default and Default Judgment
The law provides avenues of relief when a defendant is not
served with a summons. For example, “if a default judgment was
entered against a defendant who was not served with a summons
as required by statute, the judgment is void, as the court lacked
jurisdiction in a fundamental sense over the party and lacked
authority to enter judgment.” (Kremerman v. White (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 358, 370; see OC Interior Services, LLC v.
Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1318, 1330; Dill
v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1444.)
“Under section 473, subdivision (d), the court may set aside a
default judgment which is valid on its face, but void, as a matter
of law, due to improper service.” (Ellard v. Conway (2001)
94 Cal.App.4th 540, 544; see also Sakaguchi v. Sakaguchi (2009)
173 Cal.App.4th 852, 858.) Under section 473, subdivision (b), a
court may set aside judgment on the ground of fraud or mistake.
(Marriage of Park (1980) 27 Cal.3d 337, 342.) In addition, a trial
court may vacate a judgment on equitable grounds when
9
statutory relief is unavailable. (Luxury Asset Lending, supra,
56 Cal.App.5th at p. 910.)
We cannot assess whether these avenues are available to
defendant because the trial court did not make a finding as to
whether defendant was served. The court’s only analysis in our
record is in its minute order, which recites: “Defendant has
provided a proper declaration attesting that he was never served;
there is a general policy that doubts are resolved in favor of the
party seeking to set aside the default.” Defendant does not argue
the court’s minute order reflects a finding that the court credited
defendant’s evidence supporting he was not served.3 At best, it
appears the court found defendant’s declaration was “proper,” not
that the court was crediting defendant’s as opposed to plaintiffs’
evidence as to service. The court’s reliance on Waite further
suggests the trial court relied on the policy favoring a trial on the
merits without resolving the fundamental credibility dispute.
(See fn. 2, ante.)
Notwithstanding the general rule that an appellate court
defers to a trial court’s credibility determinations,4 we cannot
defer to a credibility finding the trial court never made. Although
defendant argues we can conclude the default judgment should
be set aside on equitable grounds, his argument depends on a
finding that he was never served. Specifically, he contends his
declarations show he “was either mistakenly or intentionally not
3 Defendant also does not argue that the court made such a
finding at the hearing, which was not recorded.
4 (See Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344, 365
[“ ‘Credibility is a matter within the trial court’s discretion,’ and
the reviewing court must defer to the trial court’s findings on
credibility issues.”].)
10
served and that the defendant did not learn of the lawsuit” until
his attorney called him. Because the trial court made no such
findings, we remand the case for the trial court to consider anew
whether to vacate the default and default judgment.
Our opinion should not be interpreted to limit the parties’
arguments on remand; we have addressed only the issues
dispositive to this appeal.5 Our opinion also should not be
interpreted to limit the trial court’s discretion upon remand, and
we express no opinion on how the trial court should rule.
5 The parties make additional arguments that we do not
address given our conclusions in the text. For example, our
conclusion that section 473.5 does not apply when defendant
claims he never was served makes it unnecessary for us to
address plaintiffs’ claim that 473.5 does not apply when a
defendant is personally served with the summons. Plaintiffs
argue the trial court erred in resolving “factual doubts” in favor of
defendant. Our record does not show the court resolved “factual”
issues at all as to whether defendant was served. Defendant
argues he proved the requirements of section 473.5 by a
preponderance of the evidence. This argument does not assist
him because we have concluded section 473.5 does not apply to
begin with.
11
DISPOSITION
The order vacating the default and default judgment is
reversed. The case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. Mary Ramos and Antonio Baker are
entitled to costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
CHANEY, J.
12
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