People v. Francis CA1/3

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Filed 6/27/24 P. v. Francis CA1/3

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A168321

v. (Contra Costa County
CARLOS RONTEZ FRANCIS, JR. Super. Ct. No. 05001011394)
Defendant and Appellant.

Carlos Francis appeals from an order denying his petition to vacate two
convictions for attempted murder that he sustained in 2012, and to
resentence him for his other 2012 offenses. (Pen. Code, § 1172.6.)1 The trial
court denied the petition after issuing an order to show cause, holding a full
evidentiary hearing, and concluding that the People carried their burden of
proving Francis is guilty of the attempted murders under current law. While
the trial court likely erred in concluding that Francis stated a prima facie
case for relief, it reached the correct conclusion after issuing an order to show

Statutory references are to the Penal Code. Francis filed his
1

resentencing petition under former section 1170.95, which was amended and
renumbered as section 1172.6 without substantive change. (People v. Vargas
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 947, fn. 2 (Vargas); see Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)

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cause, namely that Francis is not entitled to resentencing under section
1172.6. Accordingly, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
The 2012 Convictions
In 2012, Francis and his codefendant, Miles, were jointly tried on
multiple charges arising out of two separate gunshot attacks committed on
April 5 and May 27, 2010. The People alleged that both sets of crimes were
committed for the benefit of the “Deep C” criminal street gang. (§ 186.22,
subds. (b)(1), (b)(4).) This appeal pertains exclusively to the April 2010
incident, and we limit our discussion accordingly.
Francis and Miles were charged by amended information with
committing the following offenses on April 5, 2010: attempted murder of
R. Boyd (§§ 187, 664, count 1); attempted murder of S. Jackson (§§ 187, 664,
count 2); shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246, count 3); and active
participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a), count 7). As to the
first three charges, the prosecution alleged distinct gun use enhancements for
each defendant.
For committing the attempted murder of Boyd, Francis was charged
with enhancements for personally inflicting great bodily injury (§ 12022.7,
subd. (a)) and for “personally” using, and “intentionally and personally”
discharging a firearm, causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd (c)–(d)).
The prosecution did not allege that Miles personally inflicted great bodily
injury on Boyd, or that Miles personally discharged a firearm. Instead, they
alleged a section 12022.53 gun enhancement applied to Miles because he was
criminally responsible for the use and intentional discharge of a firearm
proximately causing great bodily injury and committed the attempted murder

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for the benefit of a criminal street gang within the meaning of section 186.22
(§ 12022.53, subds. (c), (d), (e)(1)).
For attempting to murder Jackson, Francis was not charged with an
enhancement for personally inflicting great bodily injury, but the prosecution
did allege that Francis personally and intentionally used and discharged a
firearm causing her great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subds. (c)–(d)). As to this
attempted murder, Miles was again charged with a section 12022.53 firearm
enhancement based on his intent to benefit a street gang (id. at subd. (e)(1)).
So too for the charge of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle; the prosecution
alleged Francis personally used and intentionally discharged a firearm
causing great bodily injury to Boyd and Jackson, and Miles was charged with
a gun enhancement for the use and intentional discharge of a firearm,
proximately causing great bodily injury, but there was no allegation that
Miles personally used a firearm.
Jury instruction pertaining to the attempted murder charges included
CALJIC No. 8.66, which defined the elements of attempted murder to include
“express malice aforethought, namely, a specific intent to kill,” and CALJIC
No. 3.02, which set forth requirements for finding a defendant guilty of
attempted murder as an aider and abettor under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. Regarding sentence enhancements requiring proof of
great bodily injury, the jury was repeatedly instructed that great bodily
injury means “significant or substantial physical injury,” and does not include
“trivial,” “minor,” or “moderate” harm.
The jury found Francis guilty of both attempted murders, shooting at
an occupied vehicle, and the gang participation offense, which was described
in the verdict as street terrorism. The jury found true special allegations
that in committing the attempted murder of Boyd, Francis personally

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inflicted great bodily injury, and personally “used, and intentionally and
personally discharged a handgun,” causing great bodily injury. The jury also
found that in committing the offense of shooting at an occupied vehicle,
Francis personally “used, and intentionally and personally discharged a
handgun,” thereby causing great bodily injury to Boyd and/or Jackson. In
closing arguments, almost no mention was made of Jackson’s injury being
serious, and the jury did not find that Francis personally discharged a
handgun causing great bodily injury to her. Nor did it find that Francis
committed his shooting offenses for the benefit of a gang.
The jury found Miles not guilty of attempted murder, and not guilty of
shooting at an occupied vehicle, and they failed to reach a verdict as to
whether he committed the gang participation offense.
Francis was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 35 years to life,
which was reduced on appeal to 34 years and eight months to life. (People v.
Francis (Jan. 20, 2017, A137765) [nonpub. opn.].)
The Resentencing Petition
In May 2022, Francis filed his petition for resentencing. Acting in
propria persona and checking every box on the form petition, Francis
declared that: a complaint, information or indictment filed against him
permitted the prosecutor to proceed under a theory of murder under which
malice was imputed solely on the basis of his participation in a crime or of
“attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine”;
he was convicted of murder, attempted murder or manslaughter following a
trial or pursuant to a plea in lieu of a trial where he could have been
convicted of murder or attempted murder; and he could not presently be
convicted of murder or attempted murder due to changes to section 188 and

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189 that went into effect January 1, 2019, pursuant to the enactment of
Senate Bill No. 1437.
The People opposed the petition on the ground that Francis is ineligible
for resentencing as a matter of law. They argued that the record of Francis’s
2012 convictions shows that he was the actual shooter and was convicted of
attempted murder as the actual attempted killer of Boyd and Jackson. The
People reasoned that the jury’s findings that Francis personally used a
firearm and personally inflicted great bodily injury establish that he
“indisputably acted as the shooter as a matter of law.” Consequently, the
People requested that the court deny Francis’s petition for failure to state a
prima face case.
With the assistance of appointed counsel, Francis filed a reply brief in
support of his petition. Disputing that he was ineligible for resentencing,
Francis argued that at the prima facie stage the court was required to accept
the petition allegations as true because they were not contradicted by his
record of conviction. Francis relied on the fact that the jury at his 2012 trial
had been instructed regarding aider and abettor liability and the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, contending it was conceivable the jury relied
on these principles to convict him of the attempted murders without finding
he was the “ ‘actual killer’ ” who attempted to kill Boyd and Jackson.
The Prima Facie Case Finding
On November 15, 2022, the trial court issued an order to show cause,
finding that the petition allegations were sufficient to make a prima facie
case of entitlement to relief because they were not contradicted by the “very
limited record of conviction.” The court reasoned that the information
charged Francis with attempted murder in a generic manner that permitted
the prosecution to proceed under the natural and probable consequences

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doctrine; the jury instructions permitted the jury to find Francis guilty of
attempted murder if they believed that murder was a natural and probable
consequence of assault with a firearm or shooting at an occupied dwelling;
and the natural and probable consequences doctrine had been rendered
invalid by amendments to section 188 and 189.
In reaching its conclusion, the court acknowledged the record of
conviction does show Francis was the actual shooter because the jury made
special findings that he personally inflicted great bodily injury and personally
used a firearm causing great bodily injury. But the court concluded those
findings were not dispositive because they did not establish that as a matter
of law Francis harbored the specific intent to kill when he shot the victims.
Thus, the court found, “[g]iven the fact that the jury was instructed on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, the defendant has made a prima
facie showing that he is eligible for relief.”
The Order Denying Francis’s Petition
At an April 2023 hearing on the order to show cause, the People
submitted evidence of the court file and trial transcript pertaining to
Francis’s 2012 criminal case. The court heard argument and took the matter
under submission. On June 7, 2023, the court issued an order denying
Francis’s petition for resentencing.
Factual Findings
The court limited its consideration of the trial record to evidence that
pertained to the April 2010 shooting incident. It ruled further that it would
not consider (1) evidence that had been introduced only against Miles or
(2) evidence of “gang activity” that was no longer admissible under current
law, citing People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665. From the evidence, the
court made the following findings of fact.

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The shooting attack occurred in the city of San Pablo on April 5, 2010,
at around 11:00 a.m. At the time, Jackson was pregnant with Boyd’s child
and Boyd was driving Jackson to her home. While stopped at an intersection,
Boyd noticed a truck driving in the wrong lane and pulling up alongside his
car. Francis was in the front passenger seat of the truck, holding a black
gun, and Miles was in the back passenger seat. Boyd knew both men, who
had played baseball with his younger brother. Boyd did not see Miles holding
a gun, nor did he see the driver of the truck. He heard gunshots and his car
window shatter before he lost consciousness. Boyd was shot in the temple
and neck. Jackson was shot in the leg.
At around 8:30 p.m. on the day of the shooting, Francis sent a text
message to his cousin, which stated “ ‘check to see if he’s dead for me,’ ” and
Francis’s cousin responded that she would.
In the aftermath of the shooting, Boyd did not initially tell the police
what he remembered about the incident because he was afraid for his family.
However, in June 2010, he reported that Francis was the shooter. Boyd
identified Francis from a six-pack photo lineup, but he was afraid about
retaliation against his family and did not want to testify. At trial, Boyd
testified that Francis and Miles were both in the courtroom and ultimately
identified Francis from his photograph.
Forensic evidence offered at trial showed that eight gunshots were fired
at Boyd’s car from a vehicle that passed on the driver’s side, leaving seven
bullet holes in the car. Three shots were fired when the shooter’s car was
slightly behind Boyd’s car, one or two were fired when the cars were next to
each other, and the shooter fired his gun three more times as his vehicle
moved ahead of Boyd’s car. A nearby gunshot recording device indicated that
the shots were fired in rapid succession.

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Findings of Law
The resentencing court framed its inquiry as whether the prosecution
carried its burden “to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is
guilty of [attempted] murder under the current state of California law.”
(Citing § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) Accordingly, the court separately addressed
the elements of attempted murder, which require (1) the specific intent to kill
another person, and (2) a direct but ineffective step toward killing that
person.
Regarding specific intent, the court made two material findings. First,
Francis’s conduct during the incident supports an inference that he harbored
express malice. (Citing, e.g. People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 741–742
(Smith).) Specifically, Francis shot at Boyd and Jackson “at point blank
range,” and hit them both, causing injury. He aimed his gun directly at both
victims and fired eight shots into their vehicle, as his vehicle drove past them
in their stopped car. Second, “in addition to proving express malice,” the
prosecution proved Francis’s intent to kill Jackson with evidence that he
created a “kill zone,” and that Jackson was in that kill zone when she was
shot. (Citing People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 607 (Canizales).)
Regarding the other element of attempted murder, the court found the
prosecution proved that Francis committed an act in furtherance of his intent
to kill: “Clearly, by actually shooting both victims, the defendant committed
an act in furtherance of his intent to kill.”
In light of its findings that the prosecution proved Francis committed
two counts of attempted murder, the court concluded that Francis is not
entitled to resentencing and denied his petition.

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DISCUSSION
Francis contends the order denying his petition must be reversed
because the evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that he is
guilty of the attempted murder of Jackson. The People seek affirmance of the
order on two independent grounds, contending that (1) Francis is ineligible
for resentencing as a matter of law; and (2) the record supports the finding
that Francis is guilty of Jackson’s attempted murder under current law.
I. Resentencing Law and Procedure
In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), which amended provisions of the Penal Code
pertaining to the felony-murder rule (§ 189) and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine (§ 188) in order “ ‘to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to
kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952,
959 (Lewis).) Senate Bill 1437 also “created a special procedural mechanism
for those convicted under the former law to seek retroactive relief under the
law as amended,” by filing a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95,
which was later renumbered as section 1172.6. (People v. Strong (2022) 13
Cal.5th 698, 708 (Strong); see also Lewis, at p. 959.)
In 2021, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.), which amended section 1172.6 to allow defendants convicted of
attempted murder to file resentencing petitions. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); see
People v. Hurtado (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 887, 891 (Hurtado).) Section 1172.6
now provides that a resentencing petition may be filed by a person previously
convicted of murder pursuant to a theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, a person

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convicted of “attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine,” and a person convicted of manslaughter, “when all of the following
conditions apply”: (1) the charging document filed against the petitioner
permitted the prosecution to proceed under a theory of murder under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on the person’s participation in a
crime, or pursuant to a theory of “attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine”; (2) the petitioner was convicted of murder,
attempted murder or manslaughter following a trial or plea proceeding at
which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted
murder; and (3) the “petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or
attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective
January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
The procedure for seeking resentencing relief “begins with the filing of
a petition containing a declaration that all requirements for eligibility are
met [citation], including that ‘[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted
of murder or attempted murder because of changes to [Penal Code] Section
188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019,’ the effective date of Senate Bill
1437.’ ” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708, quoting § 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).)
Upon receipt of a facially valid petition, “the court must evaluate the petition
‘to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.’ ”
(Strong, at p. 708.) At that stage, the “court may look at the record of
conviction, which will necessarily inform its ‘prima facie inquiry under
section [1172.6], allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential
merit from those that are clearly meritless.’ ” (People v. Williams (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251 (Williams); see Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)
“If the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that the
defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition.”

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(Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708, citing § 1172.6, subd. (c).) If, on the
other hand, “the defendant has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to
relief, ‘the court shall issue an order to show cause.’ ” (Strong, at p. 708,
quoting § 1172.6, subd. (c).)
II. Francis’s Prima Facie Showing
As a preliminary matter, we reject Francis’s contention that the People
waived the right to dispute the prima facie finding in this case by electing not
to file an appeal from that ruling. Francis fails to support his premise that
the prima facie finding was an independently appealable order. “ ‘ “It is
settled that the right of appeal is statutory and that a judgment or order is
not appealable unless expressly made so by statute.” ’ ” (People v. Mena
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 146, 152.) Section 1238 lists orders and judgments that
may be appealed by the People, which include an “order made after
judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the people.” (§ 1238,
subd. (a)(5).) The prima facie finding that triggers an order to show cause in
a section 1172.6 proceeding is a post judgment order, but it is only a
preliminary ruling that does not by itself entitle the petitioner to any relief,
and thus does not necessarily affect the substantial rights of the People.
Francis cites People v. Hampton (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1092
(Hampton), which is inapposite, as that case was an appeal by the People
from an order granting a petition for resentencing. The Hampton court found
that an order determining that the “defendant is entitled to [resentencing]
relief qualifies as ‘[a]n order made after judgment, affecting the substantial
rights of the people,’ and is appealable under section 1238, subdivision (a)(5).”
(Id. at p. 1101.) Hampton does not hold that a prima facie finding in a
resentencing proceeding is an independently appealable ruling.

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Francis contends that Hampton is nevertheless “on point” because the
Hampton court analogized section 1172.6 to section 1170.126, which codifies
the procedure for seeking resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act of
2012 (the Reform Act). (Hampton, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1100–1101.)
Indeed, the Hampton court did recognize that the two schemes share a
common feature, in that the initial eligibility determination under both
resentencing schemes is not just an “ ‘idle exercise,’ ” but affects the People’s
burden of proof going forward. (Id. at p. 1101, quoting People v. Superior
Court (Martinez) (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 979, 987 (Martinez).)2 However, the
Hampton court did not find that this burden shifting necessarily affects a
substantial right of the People. Instead, the court held that it was the order
granting the resentencing petition that “resulted in a substantial
modification of the original judgment” and was therefore appealable under
section 1238, subdivision (a)(5). (Hampton, at p. 1101.)
Francis offers no authority supportive of his contention that this court
“should not” consider whether he made a prima facie showing to justify
issuance of the order to show cause. Of course, a finding that a prima facie
case has not been made is reviewable in an appeal from an order denying a
resentencing petition. (See e.g., Williams, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th 1244; People
v. Harrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 429 (Harrison).) We see no reason why the

2 Martinez held that an initial eligibility ruling under the Reform Act
was properly challenged by the People via a writ petition because either:
(1) the order was appealable, and an appeal was not an adequate remedy
under the circumstances of that case; or (2) the trial court acted in excess of
its jurisdiction. (Martinez, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 988.) Martinez’s
appealability analysis was subsequently discredited and disregarded as dicta
in People v. Montellano (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 148, 155–157 [holding that the
preliminary eligibility ruling under the Reform Act is not directly
appealable].

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same should not be true of a finding that a prima facie case has been made.
Such a finding is reviewable in an appeal from an order denying—or
granting—a resentencing petition. After all, where a prima facie finding has
been made in error, a defendant is, as a matter of law, ineligible for relief.
More difficult is the question whether Francis, in fact, made a prima
facie showing that he is entitled to relief. Rulings made at the prima facie
stage of a section 1172.6 resentencing proceeding are reviewed de novo.
(Williams, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1251–1252; Harrison, supra, 73
Cal.App.5th at p. 437.) We conclude that the allegation in Francis’s petition
that he can no longer be found guilty of attempted murder due to changes to
section 188 and 189 is refuted by his record of conviction, which shows that
he was convicted as the actual attempted murderer—the person who shot the
victims. Although two defendants were charged with participating in the
attempted murders, the jury found only Francis guilty of those offenses, and
only Francis was charged with, or found by the jury to have been, the person
who personally discharged a firearm inflicting great bodily injury during the
April 2010 incident.
The fact that Francis was the actual shooter makes him ineligible for
resentencing relief as a matter of law because it is definitive proof that the
attempted murder convictions were not based on a theory of imputed malice
that was rendered invalid by amendments to section 188 and 189. (Hurtado,
supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 893 [as the “attempted murderer” petitioner was
ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law]; see also People v. Delgadillo
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 233 [petitioner not entitled to relief when the “record
. . . makes clear” he was the actual killer]; People v. Harden (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 45, 55, 57 [affirming denial of petition at prima facie stage when

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record of conviction “conclusively” established petitioner was the actual
killer].)
The trial court recognized that Francis was convicted as the actual
shooter, but it concluded that the jury’s special circumstance findings were
not dispositive because they did not incorporate a finding that Francis
harbored the specific intent to kill. This reasoning fails to consider other
relevant parts of the record of conviction, including the jury verdicts finding
Francis guilty of both attempted murders and his codefendant Miles not
guilty of either crime. The jury was instructed that the crime of attempted
murder requires proof of two elements: “1. A direct but ineffectual act was
done by one person towards killing another human being; and [¶] 2. The
person committing the act harbored express malice aforethought, namely, a
specific intent to kill unlawfully another human being.” In finding that
Francis was guilty of the attempted murders and Miles was not, the jury
necessarily found that Francis was the actual shooter and that he harbored a
specific intent to kill when he shot the victims.
Apparently, the trial court believed Francis might be eligible for
resentencing even though he was the shooter because the jury was instructed
regarding the natural and probable consequences doctrine. To be sure, the
natural and probable consequences doctrine is no longer a valid theory of
attempted murder liability. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) And the jury was instructed
on natural and probable consequences as part of the aiding and abetting
instructions. However, the record of conviction in this case demonstrates
that Francis’s convictions for the attempted murder of Boyd and Jackson
were not based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine because he
was not convicted on an aiding and abetting theory.

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The jury was instructed that in order to find a defendant guilty of
attempted murder as an aider and abettor under a “natural and probable
consequences” theory, they had to be “satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt”
that the following four facts were true: “1. The crimes of Assault with a
Firearm and/or Shooting at an Occupied Motor Vehicle were committed;
[¶] 2. That the defendant aided and abetted those crimes; [¶] 3. That a co-
principal in that crime committed the crimes of Attempted Murder; and
[¶] 4. The crime of Attempted Murder was a natural and probable
consequence of the commission of the crimes of Assault with a Firearm and/or
Shooting at an Occupied Motor Vehicle.” Considered together, the verdicts
and special circumstance findings show that the jury did not find that
Francis was an aider and abettor, nor did they find that a coprincipal
committed the attempted murders. Instead the jury found that Francis alone
was guilty of attempted murder and of personally using a firearm to inflict
great bodily injury.
Because the record of Francis’s 2012 convictions shows conclusively
that he is not eligible for resentencing, he did not make a prima facie showing
that he was entitled to relief under section 1172.6. Thus, the court would
have been justified in denying this petition at the prima facie stage. (Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) Instead, the court issued an order to show cause
based on its view that a prima facie showing had been made. Although the
ensuing evidentiary hearing was unnecessary, it garnered findings that
eliminate any arguable doubt regarding Francis’s ineligibility for
resentencing.
III. Francis is Guilty of the Attempted Murder of Jackson
As our background summary reflects, the trial court found that the
People proved Francis is guilty of both attempted murders under current law.

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On appeal, Francis concedes implicitly that he is guilty of Boyd’s attempted
murder and that he shot Jackson. But he contends that the People failed to
prove the second element of attempted murder as to Jackson—that he
harbored the specific intent to kill her. “While the superior court acts as an
independent fact finder in determining whether the People have met their
burden, on appeal, the reviewing court applies the substantial evidence
standard to the superior court’s findings.” (Vargas, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at
p. 951.)
The specific intent element of attempted murder is established with
proof of express malice, as these two concepts “are, in essence, ‘one and the
same.’ ” (Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 739.) “Express malice requires a
showing that the assailant ‘ “ ‘either desire[s] the result [i.e., death] or
know[s], to a substantial certainty, that the result will occur.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) “[I]t
is well settled that intent to kill or express malice, the mental state required
to convict a defendant of attempted murder, may in many cases be inferred
from the defendant’s acts and the circumstances of the crime. [Citation.]
‘There is rarely direct evidence of a defendant’s intent. Such intent must
usually be derived from all the circumstances of the attempt, including the
defendant’s actions. [Citation.] The act of firing toward a victim at a close,
but not point blank, range “in a manner that could have inflicted a mortal
wound had the bullet been on target is sufficient to support an inference of
intent to kill. . . .” ’ ” (Id. at p. 741.) Indeed, an inference that the shooter
acted with intent to kill is not necessarily foreclosed when the evidence shows
that the shooter fired only once before abandoning his efforts, or that the
victim escaped death due to the shooter’s poor marksmanship. (Ibid.)
Here, the prosecution presented evidence that Francis fired not just one
but eight bullets while in close range and direct proximity of two unarmed

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victims sitting in their car. Francis fired multiple shots in rapid succession
while his victims were essentially trapped in a stationary vehicle, and indeed
he managed to hit them both. This evidence supports a reasonable inference
that Francis acted with express malice when he shot Jackson. (Smith, supra,
37 Cal.4th at pp. 739, 741.) Thus, we conclude that the trial court’s finding
that Francis attempted to murder Jackson is supported by substantial
evidence.
Francis disputes the finding of express malice, contending there is no
evidence that he “knew to a substantial certainty” that Jackson’s death would
occur. This argument overlooks that such knowledge can be inferred from
evidence of Francis’s own conduct as the shooter who attacked Boyd and
Jackson. We also reject Francis’s contention that the trial record shows he
did not know Jackson was in the car. Francis cites Jackson’s trial testimony
that she did not see the shooter, which does not establish that Francis did not
see her. Boyd testified that he saw and recognized Francis and Miles before
Francis fired a barrage of bullets at the victims, and Jackson testified that,
before shots were fired, Boyd pushed her head down in an attempt to protect
her. Francis would by that time have had ample opportunity to see Jackson
in the passenger seat next to Boyd as the car Francis was riding in pulled up
from behind Boyd’s vehicle. This conclusion finds additional support in
evidence that Francis’s gun shots left bullet holes in the back and front
panels on the driver’s side of Boyd’s car, shattered the back and front
windows of the driver’s side, and also shattered the front windshield.
Substantial trial evidence shows that Francis was positioned to see both
victims before and during the time when he shot them. The law does not
require that Francis have had a clear view of Jackson’s face to be found guilty
of her attempted murder.

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Francis also disputes the trial court’s finding that Francis’s intent to
kill Jackson was established by evidence that Francis intended to create a
“kill zone” that included Jackson. Francis argues that although his 2012 jury
was instructed regarding the kill zone theory of proving specific intent, the
Supreme Court has since limited the scope of this doctrine so that it no longer
justifies his conviction for the attempted murder of Jackson. (Citing
Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 602.)
Our finding that there is substantial evidence of Francis’s express
malice makes it unnecessary to consider his arguments about the kill zone
theory, but in any event they lack merit. In its order denying the
resentencing petition, the trial court provided a detailed explanation of the
kill zone theory of culpability, including its current requirements as set forth
in Canizales. Canizales states that in order for a jury to base a finding of
specific intent on a kill zone theory, they must conclude “(1) the
circumstances of the defendant’s attack on a primary target, including the
type and extent of force the defendant used, are such that the only reasonable
inference is that the defendant intended to create a zone of fatal harm—that
is, an area in which the defendant intended to kill everyone present to ensure
the primary target’s death—around the primary target and (2) the alleged
attempted murder victim who was not the primary target was located within
that zone of harm.” (Canizales, at p. 607.)
Here, the circumstances of Francis’s shooting attack show that Boyd
and Jackson were seated next to each other in a stationary vehicle, and
Francis was in close range of both victims when he fired his gun eight times
into the vehicle. These circumstances constitute substantial evidence that
Francis harbored the requisite specific intent to kill both victims “within the
zone of fatal harm.” (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 607.)

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Disputing that he intended to create a kill zone, Francis relies on cases
that involved materially different facts. (People v. Booker (2020) 58
Cal.App.5th 482; People v. Cardenas (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 102.) In Booker,
the defendant fired directly at his target victim; there was no evidence he
fired a “spray of bullets” or that any bullets reached the passenger side of the
victim’s car; and indeed the victim’s passenger was not injured. (Booker, at
p. 500.) Here, Francis rapidly fired multiple bullets while in close range of
Boyd’s car, spraying the entire left side of the car and injuring both Boyd and
Jackson. Cardenas involved an altercation among two groups of strangers
that occurred in a restaurant parking lot. (Cardenas, at p. 106.) The
appellate court found evidence the defendant had fired shots at a specific
victim, which subjected “everyone near” the target to a lethal risk, but this
evidence did not support a reasonable inference that the defendant intended
to create a kill zone. (Cardenas, at pp. 115–116.) This case is distinguishable
because Jackson was confined in a stationary vehicle sitting next to Boyd
when Francis sprayed a barrage of bullets directly at them. This evidence,
which supports an inference of express malice, also supports an inference
that Francis intended to create a kill zone within Boyd’s car that included
both Boyd and Jackson. (See People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176, 205–
206 [“fact a defendant chose to shoot into a confined space or at a defined
group in close proximity to each other strengthens the inference that the
creation of a kill zone was intended”]; People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313,
330–332 [“defendant and his cohort fired a flurry of bullets at the fleeing car
and thereby created a kill zone” that included passengers].)
For all these reasons, we reject Francis’s contention that there is
insufficient evidence to prove he intended to kill Jackson. The trial court’s
findings that the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Francis

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committed two counts of attempted murder is supported by substantial
evidence. These findings establish an alternative valid basis for denying the
resentencing petition.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Francis’s petition for resentencing is affirmed.

TUCHER, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

FUJISAKI, J.
RODRÍGUEZ, J.

People v. Francis (A168321)

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