People v. Ayala CA4/3

CourtListener 9954601CalctappJun 27, 2024

Full text

Filed 6/27/24 P. v. Ayala CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G062442

v. (Super. Ct. No. 22CF0883)

FRANCISCO JOSE AYALA, JR., OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Michael J. Cassidy, Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Melanie L. Skehar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette
C. Cavalier, Warren J. Williams, Kathryn Kirschbaum and Sahar Karimi,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
Defendant Francisco Jose Ayala, Jr., stands convicted of
carjacking and receiving stolen property. He contends his trial attorney was
ineffective for eliciting testimony that undermined his identification defense
and for failing to object to one aspect of the prosecutor’s closing argument.
He also claims the trial court committed evidentiary and sentencing error,
and he was improperly convicted of both taking and receiving the same
vehicle. As respondent rightfully concedes, defendant’s last claim has merit,
and therefore we reverse his conviction for receiving stolen property.
However, finding defendant’s remaining arguments unavailing, we affirm the
judgment in all other respects.
FACTS
On the morning of April 8, 2022, R.M. was carjacked by two
Hispanic men in the parking lot of a Home Depot in Santa Ana. R.M. did not
see the men when he first parked his 2006 Ford Explorer at the store. But as
he was about to exit the vehicle, a man in a white shirt opened his door and
told him to step outside. R.M. restarted his vehicle, hoping he could drive
away. But a second man, who was wearing a black shirt, put a bladed
weapon against his ribs and told him he had three seconds to get out of the
vehicle. R.M. complied, and after the men departed in his vehicle, he called
911.
R.M. told responding officers that the man in the white shirt was
short and stocky, and the other man was taller and thinner with facial hair
and a tattoo. He described the taller man’s weapon as a knife-like object,
roughly six to eight inches in length.

2
The following evening at 10:00 o’clock, Santa Ana Police Officer
Travis Kennedy stopped a 2006 Ford Explorer near the intersection of
Standard and Edinger for a traffic violation. When Kennedy approached the
vehicle, he saw two Hispanic men inside; defendant, who was behind the
wheel, and defendant’s cousin, who was in the front passenger seat. Both of
the men were wearing black gloves, even though it was a warm night, in the
high 70’s. Defendant had a mustache and a slight beard, as well as a tattoo
near his right wrist. He was listed on his driver’s license as being 5 feet, 11
inches tall.
During the stop, Kennedy searched the Explorer and found a
dagger with a four-inch blade underneath the driver’s seat. He also
discovered the vehicle was wanted in connection with R.M.’s carjacking. At
that point, the police brought R.M. to the scene for an infield showup. While
defendant was handcuffed and standing between two police officers, R.M.
identified him as the man in the black shirt who had carjacked him the
previous day. He also identified the dagger Kennedy found as the weapon
defendant had used during the heist. However, when asked if he could
identify defendant’s cousin, R.M. eliminated him as a suspect.
At trial, R.M. was unable to identify defendant in the courtroom.
He said he was afraid to identify anyone because even though one of the
suspects had been arrested, the other carjacker was still at large.
The defense theory was misidentification. In attempting to prove
defendant was not involved in the carjacking, defense counsel presented an
in-custody alibi witness who testified that he was smoking marijuana with
defendant at defendant’s house on the morning of the carjacking. In addition,
a defense investigator testified that he showed R.M. an array of photos that
included defendant’s picture before trial, but R.M. was unable to identify

3
defendant as a suspect. And lastly, the defense called an expert witness who
testified about the various factors that impact the reliability of eyewitness
identifications.
However, in the end, the jury convicted defendant as charged of
carjacking and receiving stolen property, with an enhancement for personally
using a deadly weapon during the carjacking. In separate proceedings,
defendant pleaded guilty to a drug charge and was found to be in violation of
probation on four other cases. The trial court sentenced him to five years in
prison for his crimes.
DISCUSSION
I.
Alleged Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for Eliciting Harmful Testimony
Defendant faults his attorney for failing to recognize and take
advantage of certain evidentiary deficiencies in the prosecution’s case.
According to defendant, his attorney not only failed to seize on those
deficiencies, she elicited testimony that cured them and ended up employing
a trial strategy that was constitutionally defective. However, for the reasons
explained below, we do not believe defense counsel represented defendant in
a manner that violated his constitutional rights.
A. Applicable Law
Criminal defendants have the right to effective assistance of
counsel under both the state and federal Constitutions. (Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668; In re Cordero (1988) 46 Cal.3d 161, 180.) In
order to establish a violation of that right, the defendant must prove his
attorney’s performance fell below the standard expected of reasonably
competent counsel, and there is a reasonable probability he would have
obtained a more favorable result absent counsel’s shortcomings. (People v.

4
Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1003.)
That is a demanding standard. (People v. Carter (2003) 30
Cal.4th 1166, 1211.) “To counteract the natural tendency to fault an
unsuccessful defense, a court reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance must
‘indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance.’ [Citation.]” (Nix v. Whiteside
(1986) 475 U.S. 157, 165.) We will not “‘second-guess reasonable, if difficult,
tactical decisions in the harsh light of hindsight’ [citation].” (People v. Weaver
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 925–926.) Indeed, our high court has made it clear
that such decisions are “virtually unchallengeable.” (Strickland v.
Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 690.)
B. Factual and Procedural Background
Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is premised on
the assumption the prosecution failed to prove two essential points during its
case-in-chief: 1) The vehicle that defendant was driving when Kennedy
pulled him over was actually R.M.’s stolen vehicle; and 2) R.M. actually
identified defendant during the infield showup procedure.
With respect to the first point, the prosecution established the
vehicle taken from R.M. was a 2006 Ford Explorer, and defendant was
driving a 2006 Ford Explorer when Kennedy pulled him over the follow day.
However, the prosecution did not present any direct evidence that the
vehicles were one in the same. It was not until defense counsel’s cross-
examination of Kennedy that this became clear.
While inquiring about the circumstances of the stop, defense
counsel asked Kennedy if, after stopping defendant, he discovered his vehicle
was wanted in connection with a carjacking investigation. After Kennedy

5
said yes, defense counsel then asked, “And that carjacking was from the day
before, April 8th, at 9:00 a.m.?” Again, Kennedy answered in the affirmative.
As for the second evidentiary issue – R.M.’s identification of
defendant – the prosecutor established through R.M. that when the police
took him to the scene of defendant’s traffic stop, they told him that just
because a suspect was in custody, that did not mean he was guilty of any
crime. They then showed him defendant and his cousin one at a time. R.M.
was unable to identify defendant’s cousin. However, he identified defendant
as the man who was wearing the black shirt during the carjacking. When
asked at trial why he identified defendant, R.M. said “his physical
appearance was more or less like the person who stole my car.”
During her cross-examination of Kennedy, defense counsel
inquired more into the identification process. Kennedy testified the only
person who was with R.M. when he identified defendant was “Officer
Johnson.”1 Therefore, Kennedy did not have personal knowledge about what
R.M. said during the identification process. Nevertheless, defense counsel
asked Kennedy if he had any information as to how certain R.M. was when
he identified defendant. Kennedy answered, “Officer Johnson related to me
[R.M.] was absolutely certain that [defendant] was the guy who conducted
the carjacking.”
Following the prosecution’s case-in-chief, defense counsel moved
for an acquittal pursuant to Penal Code section 1118.1. Counsel argued there
was insufficient evidence connecting defendant to the carjacking because
R.M. was unable to identify defendant in court, and he testified he identified

1
Officer Johnson did not testify at the trial, and his first name
does not appear in the trial record.

6
defendant in the field merely because he “more or less” resembled one of the
carjackers. Defense counsel acknowledged that she had elicited testimony
from Kennedy that R.M. had expressed absolute certainty to Officer Johnson
when identifying defendant in the field. However, because that testimony
involved multiple layers of hearsay, and because Johnson was unavailable to
testify at trial, defense counsel argued it was insufficient to prove defendant
was involved in the carjacking.
In response, the prosecutor pointed out that not only was
defendant identified by R.M. in the field, he also matched R.M.’s description
of the black-shirted carjacker as being tall and thin with facial hair and a
tattoo. In addition, R.M. identified the dagger found under defendant’s car
seat as the weapon that was used against him during the carjacking. Given
all this evidence, as well as the fact that defendant and his cousin were
wearing gloves when they were stopped, the trial court determined there was
sufficient evidence to allow the issue of defendant’s identification to go to the
jury.
The court then discussed whether the vehicle defendant was
driving when he was stopped was actually the vehicle that was taken from
R.M. As to that issue, the court noted, “[R.M.] never said, ‘Yeah, that was my
car’ that they stopped. Never got a license number. Never got anything to
connect that car to anybody. [¶] All you have is [defendant] in the car with
the dagger and an ID in the field. Nothing that ever identified the car as
being [R.M.]’s car.”
In response to these concerns, the prosecutor relied on testimony
that defense counsel had elicited from Kennedy on cross-examination.
Namely, Kennedy’s testimony that the vehicle defendant was driving when
he pulled him over was wanted in connection with R.M.’s carjacking. In light

7
of that testimony, and all of the other circumstantial evidence bearing on the
issue, the trial court found there was sufficient evidence to allow the jury to
find that defendant was driving R.M.’s vehicle when Kennedy pulled him
over. Therefore, it denied defendant’s motion for an acquittal. After that, the
defense put on its three witnesses in an attempt to convince the jury that
defendant was not involved in the carjacking. But, as it turned out, that
defense ultimately proved unsuccessful.
C. Analysis
Defendant does not fault his attorney for focusing on the issue of
identification as a broad trial strategy. However, he contends it became clear
following Kennedy’s direct examination that there were holes in the
prosecution’s case-in-chief. Therefore, defense counsel should have refrained
from asking Kennedy any questions on cross-examination and simply rested
her case without calling any witnesses. That way, the prosecution would
have been deprived of sufficient evidence to overcome the acquittal motion.
And defense counsel could have focused on the lack of evidence to support the
charges instead of trying to convince the jury that her witnesses were
credible and persuasive.
“[I]t is a recognized defense strategy that in some cases it is best
to stand on the evidence the prosecutor has presented and take the position
that it doesn’t amount to the crime charged.” (Jimenez v. Sisto (N.D. Cal.
2009) 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126641, at *20.) However, that can be a risky
strategy, and when used in a losing case, the defendant will often complain
that a more vigorous defense was not employed. (See United States v. Katz
(2d Cir. 1970) 425 F.2d 928, 930.) Thus, “the determination whether to put
the prosecution to its proof is generally a tactical trial strategy which cannot
form the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance. [Citations.]” (Wajeel v.

8
Foulk (C.D. Cal. 2015) 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95755, at *27.)
This rule is consistent with our experience that few cases are so
cut and dried as to dictate a particular trial strategy for the defense. More
often “[t]here are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given
case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular
client in the same way. [Citation.]” (Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466
U.S. at p. 689.) With that in mind, we find defense counsel’s strategy in this
case was not unreasonable; nor is it reasonably likely defendant would have
fared better had his attorney handled his defense differently.
Several considerations drive us to this conclusion. First, even if
defense counsel had not elicited any detrimental testimony from Kennedy on
the issue of identification, that would not have prevented the prosecution
from putting on additional evidence in response to defendant’s motion for
acquittal. Indeed, defendant admits the prosecution had evidence that the
vehicle he was driving when he was pulled over by Kennedy belonged to
R.M.2 Thus, had defense counsel not elicited that evidence from Kennedy at
trial, the prosecution could have asked the court to reopen its case to
establish that fact. (People v. Riley (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 754, 764-766.)
There being no evidence of bad faith on the part of the prosecution, it is
unlikely the trial court would have refused such a request. (Ibid.)
More fundamentally, defendant understates the nature and
extent of the evidence the prosecution presented in its case-in-chief.
Assuming defense counsel had not elicited any unfavorable testimony from
Kennedy, and the prosecution was not permitted to reopen its case, the

2
At the preliminary hearing, Kennedy testified that upon stopping
defendant, he ran the license plate on his vehicle and determined it was
wanted in connection with R.M.’s carjacking.

9
evidence implicating defendant in the carjacking was still substantial.
Although R.M. did not identify defendant at trial, he said that was because
only one of the two carjackers had been arrested. The implication was that
R.M. feared reprisals from the second carjacker if he implicated defendant at
trial.
That would explain why R.M. offered such a tepid response when
asked why he identified defendant in the field. He told the jury it was
because defendant “more or less” resembled the black-shirted carjacker. But
during the actual identification process, R.M. made it clear he believed
defendant was that suspect. While admitting the carjacking happened fast
and made him nervous, R.M. unequivocally stated “that is him,” meaning the
black-shirted carjacker, when he saw defendant in the field. R.M. also
identified the dagger that was found under defendant’s seat after Kennedy
pulled him over. Based on the size and color of the dagger, R.M. identified it
as the weapon defendant had pressed against his ribs to gain his compliance
during the carjacking.
The prosecution also established defendant matched the
description R.M. gave the police of the black-shirted carjacker, in that he was
tall and thin with facial hair and a tattoo. And, defendant and his cousin
were wearing gloves when Kennedy stopped them, which was suspicious
given how warm it was that evening.
Beyond implicating defendant in the carjacking, this evidence
also proved the vehicle he was driving was R.M.’s. In fact, the evidence
implicating defendant in the carjacking of R.M.’s 2006 Ford Explorer made it
astronomically unlikely that he was driving a different vehicle of the exact
same year, make and model some 36 hours after the carjacking took place. It
stands to reason, as well, that the police would not have brought R.M. to the

10
scene in the first place if they did not have good reason to believe, through
records or otherwise, that the vehicle was his.
Irrespective of any facts that were elicited by defense counsel, the
totality of the prosecution’s evidence was sufficient to defeat defendant’s
motion for acquittal, which merely required substantial evidence of the
charged offenses. (See People v. Maciel (2013) 57 Cal.4th 482, 522 [noting the
purpose of a Penal Code section 1118.1 motion is simply to weed out those
few instances in which prima facie proof of the charged crimes is lacking].)
The substantial nature of the evidence also leaves little doubt
that defense counsel’s decision to put on an affirmative defense, rather than
simply to rely on the perceived weaknesses in the prosecution’s case, was a
reasonable trial tactic. (Kokinda v. Coleman (E.D. Pa. 2017) 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 64895.) Although her trial strategy ultimately proved unsuccessful,
that does not mean she was derelict for failing to adopt the strategy that
defendant offers with the advantage of 20-20 hindsight. (Ward v. Hall (11th
Cir. 2010) 592 F.3d 1144, 1164 [“the fact that a particular defense was
unsuccessful does not prove ineffective assistance of counsel”].) Perceiving
neither deficient performance nor resulting prejudice from defense counsel’s
chosen strategy, we reject defendant’s claim that his attorney was
constitutionally ineffective.
II.
Failing to Object to the Prosecutor’s Closing Argument
Defendant claims his attorney was also ineffective for not
objecting to a comment the prosecutor made about his expert witness in
closing argument. We disagree.

11
A. Factual and Procedural Background
At trial, the defense called psychologist Steven Frenda as an
expert witness on eyewitness identification. At a pretrial hearing on the
scope of Frenda’s testimony, defense counsel said she intended to ask him
about “human memory, proper ways and improper ways to conduct a photo
lineup, and the pitfalls of a showup identification.” The trial judge told
defense counsel that would be fine, so long as she did not ask Frenda about
any of the specific facts in the case.
During her questioning of Frenda, defense counsel adhered to
that limitation. She asked Frenda about the current research in the area of
memory and eyewitness identification, and he said there have been studies
showing that infield showups can be unduly suggestive, especially when the
suspect is being held by the police in handcuffs. Even though that is exactly
how defendant was being detained when R.M. identified him, defense counsel
did not ask Frenda about the reliability of R.M.’s identification.
However, even if she had questioned Frenda on that topic, it
would not have been a fruitful exercise. That is because Frenda made it clear
in his testimony that psychologists like himself can only explain the science
of human memory and the factors that bear on the reliability of eyewitness
identifications; they cannot determine whether a particular identification is
reliable.
In his closing argument, the prosecutor acknowledged Frenda’s
testimony about the suggestibility of infield showups. However, he also noted
that Frenda “wasn’t asked to give an opinion about the specific facts of this
case.” The prosecutor then pointed out that although R.M. had identified
defendant while he was handcuffed and surrounded by police officers, R.M.
also eliminated defendant’s cousin as a suspect under the exact same

12
circumstances. The prosecutor argued this proved the showup procedure
used in this case was not unduly suggestive, and R.M.’s identification of
defendant was reliable.
B. Analysis
Defense counsel did not object to this argument. However,
defendant contends she should have because the prosecutor improperly
implied the defense was trying to “hide the ball” by not asking Frenda to give
an opinion regarding the specific facts of this case. However, as explained
above, Frenda himself testified he was not in a position to offer an opinion
about whether R.M.’s identification of defendant was reliable. Therefore, it is
unlikely the jury interpreted the prosecutor’s brief remark as a jab against
defense counsel, as opposed to a legitimate observation about the inherent
limitations of her case.
Moreover, the context of the remark shows it was aimed at a
broader point unrelated to anything Frenda said or did not say during his
testimony. The prosecutor was simply trying to make the case that, despite
the inherent problems associated with infield showups, the circumstances
surrounding R.M.’s identification of defendant were such as to render the
identification reliable. Of course, as was her right, defense argued just the
opposite in her closing argument, so the jury got to hear both sides of the
issue. Given all of these circumstances, the prosecutor’s challenged remark
was relatively unimportant. Therefore, defense counsel was not derelict for
failing to object to it. (Compare People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 224
[defense counsel deemed ineffective for not objecting to critical identification
evidence that the prosecutor had promised not to present at trial].)

13
III.
The Trial Court’s Handling of Defense Counsel’s Alibi Witness
Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to allow his
alibi witness Joshua Baron to testify in civilian clothing. However, any such
error was harmless under the circumstances presented.
A. Factual and Procedural Background
Baron was in custody at the time of defendant’s trial. On the
morning he was scheduled to testify, defense counsel told the judge she had
been trying for weeks to arrange for him to appear at trial in civilian
clothing. However, due to no fault of her own, there had been a mix-up at the
jail, and her clothing exchange order never got processed. Consequently,
Baron was brought into court wearing orange inmate pants and a green shirt
that had “OC Jail” printed on it. Defense counsel told the judge she could
obtain civilian clothing for Baron in five minutes, but because the judge was
already ten minutes late in commencing trial that morning, he refused
counsel’s request for a continuance. Defense counsel then asked if Baron
could at least turn his shirt inside out, so the jury would not see the OC Jail
logo on it while he was testifying. However, the judge determined that was
unnecessary because it would still be obvious to the jury that Baron was in
custody.
In fact, during his testimony, Baron readily admitted he was
currently serving time in jail, having suffered felony convictions for second
degree burglary, receiving stolen property, and unlawful vehicle taking.
Baron also admitted that he and defendant were such good friends that he
considered defendant to be “like a brother” to him. Regarding the day in
question, Baron told the jury he arrived at defendant’s house at 10:00 a.m.,
which was an hour after R.M. was carjacked. Per their usual routine, he and

14
defendant smoked marijuana together for a while, before Baron had to catch
the bus for work. During that time, Baron did not notice any Ford Explorers
on the street in front of defendant’s house.
B. Analysis
In the interest of fairness, it is generally preferrable to have a
defendant’s in-custody witnesses testify in civilian clothing, as opposed to jail
garb. (See People v. Froehlig (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 260, 264.) That’s because,
as defendant notes, optics can be very important to the jury. However, “[t]he
appearance of a defense witness attired in prison clothes does not . . .
adversely affect the presumption of innocence or carry with it the inference
that the defendant is a person disposed to commit crimes. [Citations.]”
(Ibid., italics omitted.) Therefore, its impact on the defense is less
consequential than if the defendant himself is made to testify in prison
clothing. (Ibid.)
The possibility of prejudice is also diminished when, as here, the
jury is instructed, “The fact that a witness is in custody does not by itself
make a witness more or less believable.” There being nothing in the record to
suggest otherwise, we presume the jury followed this instruction. (People v.
Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 138-139.)
Even if it did not, Baron had an independent credibility problem
stemming from his prior felony convictions. (See People v. Hinton (2006) 37
Cal.4th 839, 888 [the law plainly permits a witness to be impeached with
evidence that he or she has been convicted of a felony].) Because Baron’s
testimony was susceptible of impeachment by virtue of his criminal history,
his prison clothing was essentially superfluous to his credibility. (See People
v. Valenzuela (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 180, 194.)

15
Irrespective of Baron’s credibility problems, the substance of his
testimony was not very helpful to the defense. While he claimed he was
smoking marijuana with defendant at 10:00 a.m. on the morning of the
carjacking, he admitted he had no idea where defendant was or what
defendant was doing an hour earlier, when R.M.’s vehicle was taken.
The court’s refusal to accommodate the request for an
incarcerated witness to change from prison to civilian clothing, even when
facing an additional 5-minute delay, is concerning, as is refusing a simple,
alternative request to turn a shirt inside out in an attempt to mask prison
garb. Trial courts must remain vigilant in their efficient use of time,
particularly when it comes to juries, but never at the expense of creating
greater potential for unfair prejudice to the accused. Still, the circumstances
present here demonstrate that any error in having Baron testify in jail
clothing was patently harmless. Reversal is not required under any standard
of care.
IV.
Cumulative Error
Defendant contends that even if the alleged errors discussed
above do not individually warrant reversal, their combined effect violated his
right to a fair trial. However, defendant’s attorney put on a robust defense,
and the lone alleged trial court error was de minimis under the
circumstances presented. There is no reasonable basis to conclude that
defendant would have obtained a more favorable verdict had the alleged
errors never occurred.

16
V.
Improper Dual Convictions
Nonetheless, it is well established that a defendant cannot be
convicted of both stealing and receiving the same property. (People v. Garza
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 866, 874-875; People v. Allen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 846, 852;
People v. Jaramillo (1976) 16 Cal.3d 752, 757.) The parties agree, and so do
we, that rule applies here to preclude defendant’s conviction for receiving
stolen property. (People v. Magallanes (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 529.)
Therefore, we will reverse defendant’s conviction for that offense. (Id. at p.
536.)
VI.
Sentencing
Lastly, defendant argues the trial judge erred in sentencing him
to the middle term of five years for his carjacking offense, as opposed to the
lower term of three years. Defendant asserts imposition of the middle terms
constituted an abuse of discretion because the judge failed to consider the
trauma he endured as a child. However, the record shows the judge properly
considered that factor in formulating his sentencing decision. As such, there
is no reason to disturb defendant’s sentence.
A. Factual and Procedural Background
As reflected in the presentence probation report, defendant was
only 23 years old when he carjacked R.M.’s vehicle. However, prior to that
time, he had already suffered four felony convictions and a dozen
misdemeanor convictions for such crimes as possessing stolen property,
vehicle theft, resisting arrest, and hit and run. Defendant’s extensive prior
record was one of six aggravating factors cited in the probation report,

17
against only one mitigating factor, that being his status as a youthful
offender.
When interviewed by probation, defendant said he had a happy
childhood and a loving and supportive family. But, as part of her sentencing
brief, defense counsel included investigative reports indicating otherwise.
The reports revealed that defendant had witnessed considerable physical
abuse between his parents while growing up. He was also forced to sell
candy on the streets to support his father’s drug habit. And, in his early
teens, after his parents got divorced, defendant started using drugs himself,
while he was living in a van with his father. Things improved for defendant
as a young adult after he got sober, moved into a place with his girlfriend,
and they had a child together. However, defendant’s father broke into their
residence and continued to cause problems, which resulted in defendant
relapsing and the departure of his girlfriend.
In light of these circumstances, defense counsel contended in her
sentencing brief that if defendant was not suitable for probation, he should
receive the lower term of three years on the carjacking count, pursuant to
Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) (section 1170(b)(6)). Defense
counsel echoed that argument at the sentencing hearing, again citing
defendant’s childhood trauma as a justification for the lower term. For its
part, the prosecution urged the court to impose the upper term of nine years
for the carjacking offense.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge said he had read and
considered the probation report and the parties’ sentencing materials. He
also acknowledged defendant’s youth and the circumstances cited in defense
counsel’s sentencing brief, which was an obvious nod to defendant’s childhood
trauma. However, after denying probation, the judge decided the overall

18
circumstances warranted the middle term of five years on the carjacking
count, not the lower term defense counsel had requested. The judge stayed
sentence on the remaining counts and struck the weapon enhancement for
purposes of sentence. He also revoked and terminated probation on
defendant’s other cases.
B. Analysis
Section 1170(b)(6) provides, “[U]nless the court finds that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances that
imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice, the
court shall order imposition of the lower term if any of the following was a
contributing factor in the commission of the offense: [¶] (A) The person has
experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not
limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence.”
Defendant argues the trial judge did not affirmatively comply
with this statute because, in choosing the middle term on the carjacking
count, he did not expressly balance the aggravating circumstances against
the mitigating circumstance of defendant’s childhood trauma, nor did he
make an express finding that imposition of the lower term would contravene
the interests of justice. However, “[a]bsent evidence to the contrary, we
presume that the trial court knew the law and followed it.” (People v.
Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042.) It is defendant’s duty to prove the trial
court misunderstood the scope of its discretion or acted in an irrational or
arbitrary fashion in arriving at its sentencing decision. (People v.
Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 988.)
Here, there is nothing to suggest the trial judge was unaware of
section 1170(b)(6) or failed to follow it in imposing defendant’s sentence. In
fact, it was readily apparent from defense counsel’s sentencing brief and

19
hearing arguments that she was relying on that statute in advocating for
imposition of the lower term. Moreover, in sentencing defendant on the
carjacking count, the judge made it clear he was taking into account the
circumstances outlined in the brief, which focused extensively on defendant’s
childhood trauma. The judge also referenced those circumstances in striking
the weapon enhancement.
However, in arriving at defendant’s sentence, the judge also
considered the probation report, which shows that defendant has an
extensive criminal record and that the seriousness of his crimes has
increased over time. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2).) And, the judge
expressly found that three additional aggravating circumstances were
applicable in this case: 1) the carjacking involved the threat of great bodily
harm; 2) defendant engaged in conduct that indicates a serious danger to
society; and 3) defendant was on probation when he carried out his crimes.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1), (b)(1) & (b)(4).)
On this record, it is reasonable to conclude the trial judge was
fully aware of the presumption for the lower term under section 1170(b)(6)
but that he determined the numerous aggravating circumstances outweighed
the mitigating ones – including defendant’s childhood trauma – such that
imposition of the lower term on the carjacking count would defeat the ends of
justice. Therefore, there is no reason to disturb defendant’s sentence.

20
DISPOSITION
Defendant’s conviction for receiving stolen property is reversed.
In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

DELANEY, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

MOORE, J.

21

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.