People v. Mora CA2/3

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Filed 6/26/24 P. v. Mora CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B327812

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA489914)
v.

CARRIE MORA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Enrique Monguia, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard B. Lennon and Olivia Meme, under appointments
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kim Aarons and Taylor Nguyen,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

A jury convicted defendant Carrie Mora of child custody
deprivation as to her two children, J.M. and M.M. (Pen. Code,
§ 278.5, subd. (a)),1 and of kidnapping her son J.M. (§ 207,
subd. (a)). On appeal, Mora contends the trial court erroneously
excluded evidence of intimate partner battering (IPB) and of out-
of-court statements made by her daughter, M.M., that were
probative of Mora’s belief that the children were in danger of
imminent harm. Mora also argues the prosecutor committed
misconduct in closing argument. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Carrie and Joshua Mora married in 2009.2 J.M. was born
in 2010. M.M. was born in 2015, by which time the Moras were
separated. Joshua filed for divorce in September 2015. Mora and
Joshua were awarded joint custody of the children.
At the end of 2018, Mora moved to Arizona. She filed a
request for a “move-away” order in family court. In 2019, the
family court entered a custody order granting Joshua primary
custody of both children and granting Mora visitation on the
second and fourth weekends of the month during the school year.
Both parents at times resorted to contacting law enforcement for
assistance in policing the custody and visitation order. In
December 2019, and again in August 2020, Joshua called the
police when Mora kept the children overnight against his wishes.
In August 2020, Mora called the police when Joshua took the

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

2 Because Carrie and Joshua share the same last name, we
refer to Joshua by first name only. No disrespect is intended.

2
children on vacation, claiming he did not give her any details
about the trip or allow her daily phone calls with the children.
In late August 2020, the family court modified the order to
allow Mora visitation with the children on alternating weekends
from Thursday to Monday. Mora was “frustrated” that her move-
away request had not been granted.3 Her next visit after the
modified order was issued was for Labor Day weekend. Mora
picked up both children on Thursday, September 3, 2020. Mora
testified that during the drive to Arizona that Friday, M.M. made
comments “that were disturbing.” She also testified that on
Saturday, M.M. engaged in other “concerning” and
“inappropriate” behavior: “She had a little unicorn horn, and she
strapped it around her waist. And it was . . . kind of like a, you
know, male genitalia, and she was running around[,] and, you
know, making motions. And it’s just things that I had never seen
her do before, and there was [sic] some other things.” On cross-
examination, Mora clarified that M.M. used a unicorn headband
“in an inappropriate sexual way” by “strapp[ing] it on as if it was
a penis” and making “thrusting movements.”
On Monday, September 7, Mora attempted to contact
agencies and helplines, but they were closed for Labor Day. She
also called the Yavapai County Sheriff’s Department in Arizona
and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. Both said
they could not help. Per the terms of the custody and visitation
order, Mora was required to return both children to Joshua at
3:00 p.m. She texted him to say she was “running late.” At
around 6:00 p.m., having not heard from Mora again, Joshua
contacted the Glendora Police Department. A Glendora police
officer tried to contact Mora but could not reach her.

3 It is not clear if the court denied the move-away request, or
whether it remained pending as of August 2020.

3
On Tuesday, September 8, Mora contacted an advocacy
center that helps families experiencing trauma and abuse. Mora
was advised to obtain a police report. Mora called the Chino
Valley Police Department in Arizona and reported M.M.’s
statements and behavior. Mora also called the Glendora Police
Department in California. She testified that she told an officer
that she feared for her children’s safety “because of the abuse
that had gone on for so long. I couldn’t return them, not as a
mom.” On Thursday, September 10, Mora filed an emergency
petition in the Yavapai County Superior Court, which was
denied.
In the meantime, Joshua moved ex parte in family court for
temporary emergency orders. On September 10, the family court
granted Joshua’s ex parte request, ordered Mora to return the
children to Joshua’s custody immediately, and authorized the
district attorney to take further action. After a warrant issued
for Mora’s arrest, a Glendora Police Department officer requested
and received an emergency cell phone “ping” for Mora’s phone.
He located her in Phoenix. With the information, Chino Valley
police recovered the children and arrested Mora on September 12.
Charges, Trial, and Verdict
The People charged Mora with kidnapping J.M. and M.M.
(§ 207, subd. (a); counts 1 and 2), and child custody deprivation
(§ 278.5, subd. (a); counts 3 and 4).
Following a September 2022 trial, the jury found Mora
guilty of kidnapping J.M. (count 1), and child custody deprivation
as to both children (counts 3 and 4). The jury was unable to
reach a unanimous verdict on the charge of kidnapping M.M.
(count 2). In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury also found true the
aggravating factor that J.M. and M.M. were particularly
vulnerable. The jury was unable to reach unanimous findings

4
regarding two other aggravating factors charged—that Mora
carried out the crime with planning, sophistication, or
professionalism; or that she took advantage of a position of trust
or confidence to commit the offenses.
On count 1, the court suspended imposition of sentence and
granted Mora probation for a five-year term, with the condition
that she serve 180 days in county jail. The court stayed
sentencing on counts 3 and 4.
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by
Excluding Mora’s IPB Evidence
Mora argues the trial court erred in excluding IPB
evidence. She contends the IPB evidence showed she did not
have the requisite specific intent to commit child custody
deprivation; helped demonstrate that she honestly believed the
children were in danger of imminent harm, which supported her
defense to kidnapping; and would have bolstered her credibility.
We find no error.
A. Pretrial proceedings
Before trial, Mora filed a motion in limine seeking to
introduce evidence of Joshua’s past domestic violence against her
and the effects of that abuse on her mental state. Mora sought to
call: eyewitnesses to Joshua’s alleged physical abuse of her in
2014, and alleged verbal abuse at an unspecified time; a police
officer who recorded Mora’s reports of Joshua’s physical abuse of
her in 2015; the Chino Valley police officer who took Mora’s
statement in September 2020 about Joshua’s past abuse and
Mora’s fear of harm to her children; and Dr. Nancy Kaser-Boyd, a
psychologist who evaluated Mora and would testify about IPB
and its effects.

5
The trial court denied Mora’s motion and excluded evidence
and testimony related to allegations of domestic violence by
Joshua. The court found the evidence was neither “probative nor
material here as to whether or not there was imminent danger to
the children based on the theory of danger directly to the
children, not violence to the defendant.” The court further found
that prior domestic violence was not relevant to imminent danger
because “it doesn’t matter subjectively what [Mora] believe[d,]” as
the only issue was “whether or not there was a valid court order
. . . in effect at the time that she chose not to return the children.”
The court also indicated the IPB evidence was “immaterial and
not probative of [the defense’s] theory,” because the defense was
not arguing that Mora feared that returning the children to
Joshua would expose them to domestic violence.4
B. The IPB evidence was not probative of specific
intent under section 278.5, subdivision (a)
On appeal, Mora contends the trial court erred by finding
the IPB evidence irrelevant to the section 278.5, subdivision (a)
child custody deprivation counts. Mora asserts the IPB evidence
showed her actions were justified and therefore was relevant to
negate the claim that she “maliciously deprived” Joshua of
custody. We disagree. Mora’s argument misapprehends the
intent the People were required to prove under the statute.
Section 278.5, subdivision (a) penalizes “[e]very person who
takes, entices away, keeps, withholds, or conceals a child and

4 As to the proposed testimony from the police officers who
took reports from Mora in 2015 and 2020, the court further
suggested the evidence was inadmissible because it was hearsay
not subject to an exception. Mora has not argued that portion of
the trial court ruling was an abuse of discretion.

6
maliciously deprives a lawful custodian of a right to custody, or a
person of a right to visitation . . . .” This provision employs the
statutory definition of “ ‘maliciously,’ ” which “import[s] a wish to
vex, annoy, or injure another person, or an intent to do a
wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of law.”
(§ 7, subd. (4); People v. Neidinger (2006) 40 Cal.4th 67, 79.)
Malice “ ‘ “functions to ensure that the proscribed conduct
was ‘a deliberate and intentional act, as distinguished from an
accidental or unintentional’ one.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Jo
(2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1159 (Jo), quoting People v. Rodarte
(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1170.) The statutory definition of
“malice” and “maliciously” incorporates two types of malice:
“ ‘[m]alice in fact,’ which ‘consists of actual ill will or intent to
injure’ and ‘malice in law,’ which ‘may be “presumed” or “implied”
from the intentional doing of the act without justification or
excuse or mitigating circumstances.’ ” (Jo, at p. 1159, quoting In
re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1020, 1028.)
In this case, the People expressly relied on a malice-in-law
theory to prove child custody deprivation. As such, the People
were only required to prove that Mora intended to deprive Joshua
of custody and knew her actions violated the custody order.
(People v. Weber (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 7 (Weber) [the
defendant “maliciously obstructed” a street and sidewalk by
intending to block traffic knowing that such obstruction was a
wrongful act]; see also People v. Man (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d
Supp. 1, 4–5.) The evidence reflects, and Mora does not dispute,
that she intentionally violated the custody order by keeping J.M.
and M.M. with her in Arizona after the time for her visit had
expired.

7
Thus, IPB evidence regarding Mora’s subjective beliefs was
not probative of malice-in-law under section 278.5,
subdivision (a). Her “good faith” belief that her actions were
warranted did not negate the “malice” element of child custody
deprivation. (See Weber, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d Supp. at p. 7 [the
trial court had no duty to sua sponte instruct the jury on a good
faith belief defense where the defendant was charged with
“maliciously obstructing” traffic].) By focusing on her reasons for
withholding the children, Mora “has confused the motive behind
the doing of the act with the intent with which it was done.”
(People v. Bohmer (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 185, 190 [the trial court
did not err by failing to instruct on specific intent because a
defendant who placed an object on a railroad track was guilty of
malicious obstruction even if it was intended as a “ ‘symbolic
protest’ ”].)
Because the People pursued a malice theory under
section 278.5 requiring only that Mora intentionally committed a
wrongful act, the IPB evidence was not relevant to negate the
malice element. (Cf. Jo, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1168–1170
[domestic violence evidence was relevant to negating malice
under section 278.5 when the prosecution originally pursued both
malice-in-fact and malice-in-law].)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting
Mora’s arguments that the IPB evidence was admissible for that
purpose.
C. The IPB evidence was not relevant to show
imminent harm under section 207,
subdivision (f)(1)
Mora also contends the trial court erred by excluding the
IPB evidence because it was relevant to prove a defense to

8
kidnapping J.M. (count 1) under section 207, subdivision (f)(1).
Mora argues the IPB evidence helped establish that she believed
returning J.M. to Joshua’s custody would place him in danger of
imminent harm. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial
court’s rejection of this argument.
Under section 207, subdivision (a), “[e]very person who
forcibly, or by any other means of instilling fear, steals or takes,
or holds, detains, or arrests any person in this state, and carries
the person into another country, state, or county, or into another
part of the same county, is guilty of kidnapping.” However,
section 207, subdivision (a) does not apply to “any person who
steals, takes, entices away, detains, conceals, or harbors any child
under the age of 14 years, if that act is taken to protect the child
from danger of imminent harm.” (§ 207, subd. (f)(1); In re Michele
D. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 600, 612 [§ 207, former subd. (e)(1) states
affirmative defense to kidnapping].)
Here, Mora proffered evidence to establish Joshua
subjected her to physical or verbal abuse, and expert testimony
confirming that Mora had the characteristics of a domestic
violence victim. Dr. Kaser-Boyd’s report reveals that she would
have testified that Mora was “histrionic” and “hypervigilant”
about her children’s safety.
Mora’s proposed IPB evidence did not purport to
demonstrate J.M. was actually in danger of imminent harm. The
evidence of Joshua’s abusive acts related only to Mora, not the
children, and it concerned acts that occurred years before the
September 2020 visit. Mora does not contend she feared her
children were in danger of imminent harm directly arising out of
Joshua’s abuse of her.

9
Indeed, on appeal, Mora asserts that rather than
demonstrating imminent harm to the children, the IPB evidence
would have established that Mora believed the children were in
imminent danger. She asserts this belief was relevant, whether
or not there was actual evidence of imminent harm, and even if
her belief was unreasonable. However, section 207,
subdivision (f)(1), sets forth a defense to kidnapping when there
is evidence of danger of imminent harm, not merely when the
defendant subjectively believes that to be the case.
Mora offers no authority, and we have found none, to
support reading subjective belief—whether reasonable or
unreasonable—into section 207, subdivision (f)(1).5 “The
Legislature’s chosen language” is “the most reliable indicator of
its intent . . . .” (MacIsaac v. Waste Management Collection &
Recycling, Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1082.) We therefore
do not “insert what has been omitted or omit what has been
inserted” when interpreting the language of a statute. (Breslin v.
City and County of San Francisco (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1064,
1079; People v. Guiamelon (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 383, 410 [court

5 Mora refers to CALCRIM No. 1225, which in part states:
“An imminent harm is an immediate and present threat of harm.
Belief in future harm is not sufficient, no matter how great or
how likely the harm is believed to be. The defendant must have
believed that the child was in imminent danger.” This portion of
the instruction appears to direct the jury to focus on the temporal
element of the harm and the requirement of imminent, rather
than future, harm. To the extent Mora relies on CALCRIM
No. 1225 to interpret section 207, subdivision (f)(1) as
incorporating a subjective belief element, we observe that jury
instructions “are not themselves the law, and are not authority to
establish legal propositions or precedent.” (People v. Morales
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 48, fn. 7.)

10
declined to read an exemption into antikickback statute for
defendants “who acted in a good faith but mistaken belief” that
payments were legal].)
This is especially true where the Legislature has, in similar
statutes, expressly included a defendant’s belief as an element of
a defense. For example, the affirmative defense to child custody
deprivation applies to a person who has “a good faith and
reasonable belief that the child . . . will suffer immediate bodily
injury or emotional harm . . . .” (§ 278.7, subds. (a) & (b).) The
inclusion of a “belief” requirement in section 278.7, and the
omission of any comparable element in section 207,
subdivision (f)(1), suggests the Legislature did not intend the
latter imminent harm exception to turn on a defendant’s
subjective beliefs. (Tyrone W. v. Superior Court (2007) 151
Cal.App.4th 839, 850 [“When ‘ “ ‘ “a statute on a particular
subject omits a particular provision, the inclusion of such a
provision in another statute concerning a related matter
indicates an intent that the provision is not applicable to the
statute from which it was omitted” ’ ” ’ ”].)
Mora’s arguments rely on reasoning from cases that arise
in the homicide and self-defense contexts; she appears to seek to
analogize section 207, subdivision (f)(1) to perfect and imperfect
self-defense. Yet, Mora fails to cite any legal authority to support
her implicit claim that authorities explaining or considering the
relevance of IPB evidence to defenses to homicide have any
applicability to a defense to kidnapping. Even if the analogy
were apt, such authorities indicate that IPB evidence was
properly excluded in this case.
For example, in People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073
(Humphrey), the California Supreme Court explained the

11
permissible uses of IPB evidence in murder cases. The court
reviewed the principles of self-defense, explaining that “[f]or
killing to be in self-defense, the defendant must actually and
reasonably believe in the need to defend. [Citation.] If the belief
subjectively exists but is objectively unreasonable, there is
‘imperfect self-defense,’ i.e., ‘the defendant is deemed to have
acted without malice and cannot be convicted of murder,’ but can
be convicted of manslaughter. [Citation.] [Fn. omitted.] To
constitute ‘perfect self-defense,’ i.e., to exonerate the person
completely, the belief must also be objectively reasonable.” (Id. at
p. 1082.)
The Humphrey court concluded IPB evidence may be
relevant to assist the jury in determining objective
reasonableness, which it must do from the defendant’s
perspective. Thus, an expert might testify that “violence can
escalate and that a battered woman can become increasingly
sensitive to the abuser’s behavior . . . . As violence increases over
time, and threats gain credibility, a battered person might
become sensitized and thus able reasonably to discern when
danger is real and when it is not. ‘[T]he expert’s testimony might
also enable the jury to find that the battered [woman] . . . is
particularly able to predict accurately the likely extent of violence
in any attack on her. That conclusion could significantly affect
the jury’s evaluation of the reasonableness of defendant’s fear for
her life.’ [Citation.]” (Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1086.)
The evidence Mora sought to offer in this case was not an
opinion that, due to Joshua’s past abuse, she was able to
reasonably discern danger to the children, or that she had a
greater ability to accurately predict danger to the children at his
hands. Instead, aside from validating that Mora appears to have

12
been abused, Dr. Kaser-Boyd’s opinion was only that Mora’s
experiences as a domestic violence victim could make her
“histrionic” and “hypervigilant” about her children’s safety. Even
on appeal, Mora focuses on the IPB evidence’s relevance to show
her subjective beliefs, not their objective reasonableness.
Yet, as the Humphrey court explained, “the question is
whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s circumstances
would have perceived a threat of imminent injury or death, and
not whether killing the abuser was reasonable in the sense of
being an understandable response to ongoing abuse . . . in
making that assessment, the jury may not consider evidence
merely showing that an abused person’s use of force against the
abuser is understandable. [Fn. omitted.]” (Humphrey, supra, 13
Cal.4th at p. 1088.)
Mora’s arguments on appeal are that the IPB evidence
would have demonstrated that Mora’s actions in detaining J.M.
were an understandable response to the past abuse she suffered.
Humphrey makes clear that this is insufficient. Even if the
reasonableness of Mora’s beliefs were relevant to section 207,
subdivision (f)(1) in the same way a defendant’s beliefs are
relevant to establish self-defense to murder, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in concluding the IPB evidence would not
assist the jury.
As noted above, in the context of murder, a defendant’s
subjective but objectively unreasonable beliefs may allow the jury
to find imperfect or unreasonable self-defense, which “ ‘is not a
defense but a crime; more precisely, it is a lesser offense included
in the crime of murder.’ [Citation.]” (In re Walker (2007) 147
Cal.App.4th 533, 537.) On appeal, Mora stresses that the IPB
evidence would have helped the jury understand Mora’s

13
subjective beliefs and her reaction, even if her fear was
unrealistic. Yet, she fails to explain why this was relevant to the
defense to kidnapping. While in a murder case, IPB evidence
explaining the defendant’s subjective but objectively
unreasonable beliefs may be relevant to show imperfect self-
defense (People v. Erickson (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1391, 1399–
1400), Mora has identified no similar lesser included offense of
kidnapping.
Section 207, subdivision (f)(1) required evidence that the
children were in danger of imminent harm. The IPB evidence
Mora proffered at trial was not probative of that issue. The trial
court reasonably excluded the evidence.
D. The IPB evidence did not support the
credibility of Mora’s testimony regarding facts
relevant to the case
Finally, Mora contends the IPB evidence could have
“provide[d] the jury with the context it needs to consider the
defendant’s actions and whether ‘her version of events was
sufficiently credible to warrant an acquittal on the facts as she
related them.’ ” In support, Mora relies on cases such as People v.
Day (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 405 (Day), disapproved of on another
ground in People v. Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at page 1089.
However, the rationale explained in Day and similar cases does
not apply here.
In Day, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th 405, the court found the
defendant was prejudiced by her counsel’s failure to submit
evidence of Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS) to support her
theory of self-defense. (Id. at pp. 414–415.) The court relied on
cases finding BWS evidence relevant to rehabilitating a
defendant’s credibility about conduct inconsistent with his or her

14
testimony, such as failing to report or delaying reports of sexual
abuse or sexual assault, striking back at an abuser, or failing to
leave an abuser. (Id. at pp. 415–418.) The court concluded that
the BWS evidence could have “explain[ed] a behavior pattern
that might otherwise appear unreasonable to the average
person,” thus “allow[ing] the jury to question and evaluate the
logic of the prosecutor’s argument” impeaching her on the basis
that her conduct undermined her self-defense claim. (Id. at
pp. 419, 415.)
Mora does not contend the People’s case rested on
discrediting her testimony based on “misconceptions about
battered women,” as the court found true of the prosecution’s case
in Day. (Day, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 420.) Nor was the
proposed IPB evidence directed at countering any “ ‘common
sense’ conclusions” or “[p]opular misconceptions” the jury might
have held about Mora as a domestic violence victim. (Humphrey,
supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1087.) Mora asserts the IPB evidence
could have bolstered her credibility by explaining why she
believed the children were in danger from Joshua, despite the
lack of evidence of imminent harm. Yet, as explained above, her
subjective beliefs could not be properly considered in determining
whether the People proved her guilty of child custody deprivation
or whether the section 207, subdivision (f)(1) defense to
kidnapping was established.6

6 While Mora’s beliefs may have been relevant to the
affirmative defense to child custody deprivation, she does not
contend on appeal that any trial court error affected the jury’s
rejection of that defense. Section 278.7 applies only if the
defendant satisfies the “good faith and reasonable belief”
requirement and complies with the statute’s reporting

15
Finally, Mora contends the exclusion of IPB evidence
deprived her of the constitutional right to present a defense
under the due process clause. Because we find the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence due to the lack
of probative value, we also conclude the trial court’s rulings did
not violate Mora’s constitutional rights. (People v. Snow (2003)
30 Cal.4th 43, 90 [the trial court did not deprive the defendant of
the opportunity to present a defense by applying “the ordinary
rules of evidence” to exclude evidence with “marginal probative
value”].)
II. Mora Fails to Establish the Trial Court Erred in
Excluding M.M.’s Purported Statements
Mora next contends that the trial court erroneously
sustained hearsay objections to her counsel’s questions that
sought to elicit M.M.’s “concerning” statements. We disagree.
In the People’s trial brief, the statement of facts noted that
on September 8, 2020, Mora’s husband at the time, Gary
Coleman, called a Glendora Police Department officer and made
“ambiguous allegations of alleged abuse that had taken place at
Mr. Mora’s home sometime in the past.”7 Coleman also reported

requirements. Specifically, the person invoking the defense must
“make a report to the office of the district attorney of the county
where the child resided before the action” and “commence a
custody proceeding” within a “reasonable time.” (Id., subd. (c)(1),
(2).) Mora does not raise any arguments on appeal related to her
compliance with section 278.7, subdivision (c).

7 The People’s trial brief is the only pretrial document in the
appellate record containing details about M.M.’s statements. It
does not identify the person M.M. was speaking to when she
made the statements.

16
that M.M. was “currently complain[ing] of some pain and redness
around her vagina and that Mr. Mora may have watched
inappropriate content when she was present.” The brief later
refers to M.M.’s alleged statement that “at some [unknown]
time . . . ‘someone touched [her] fluffly [sic] (vagina).’ ”
At trial, Mora testified that M.M. made some “disturbing”
comments on the drive to Arizona and at Mora’s house. When
defense counsel asked Mora to elaborate, the prosecutor asserted
a hearsay objection. Defense counsel offered that she was
eliciting the testimony to show the effect on Mora. The trial court
sustained the objection. During a subsequent line of questioning
about Mora’s conversation with a Chino Valley police officer,
Mora testified she told him about M.M.’s statements, actions,
“and the things leading up to that.” When defense counsel asked
Mora what “things” she was referring to, the prosecutor again
asserted a hearsay objection, which the trial court sustained.
During a sidebar, the prosecutor explained that she had
objected because M.M.’s statements were double hearsay. Citing
Mora’s conversations with law enforcement, the prosecutor
argued Mora had been “consistent that [M.M.] never stated
anything to [Mora],” and that M.M. had told Coleman that she
“saw something, porn, or [‘]boobies[’] ” outside of Mora’s presence,
and Coleman later relayed the comment to Mora. Defense
counsel did not indicate Mora would testify about statements
M.M. made directly to her, or otherwise describe Mora’s
anticipated testimony.
On appeal, Mora asserts the trial court erred in sustaining
the prosecutor’s objections because defense counsel’s questions
elicited statements offered to prove the effect on Mora, and not
for their truth. The People argue there was no error because

17
M.M.’s statements were made to Coleman, not Mora, and thus
were double hearsay. In response, Mora maintains the People’s
appellate briefing, which addresses the double hearsay
implicated by M.M.’s comment about “boobies,” “focuses on the
wrong statement.” She asserts her argument relates to
statements M.M. made directly to Mora.
However, in the trial court, defense counsel did not indicate
Mora would testify to statements M.M. made directly to her and
the record indicates no such statements were identified in any
pretrial proceedings. Under Evidence Code section 354,
subdivision (a), a trial court’s erroneous exclusion of evidence is
not a basis for reversal unless “the proponent [of the evidence
made] known to the [trial] court the ‘substance, purpose, and
relevance of the excluded evidence . . . .’ This requirement
applies equally to establishing a hearsay exception.” (People v.
Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1178.) Mora did not make an
offer of proof “as to the substance of the anticipated testimony,”
and even on appeal fails to identify what Mora’s testimony would
have been. She thus failed to preserve the issue. (Ibid.; People v.
Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 237.)
To the extent Mora contends she should have been allowed
to testify to the statements M.M. made to Coleman, and which
Coleman repeated to her, we find no abuse of discretion in the
trial court’s exclusion of such statements. Mora contends M.M.’s
statements to Coleman were not hearsay if they were offered for
the effect they had on Coleman. Yet, she fails to explain why or
how Coleman’s state of mind was relevant to any issue in dispute
at the trial. (People v. Scalzi (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 901, 907
[error to admit hearsay as relevant to effect on listener where
hearer’s statement of mind did not tend to prove or disprove any

18
issue in the case].) “ ‘[A] hearsay objection to an out-of-court
statement may not be overruled simply by identifying a
nonhearsay purpose for admitting the statement. The trial court
must also find that the nonhearsay purpose is relevant to an
issue in dispute.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Jablonski (2006) 37
Cal.4th 774, 820–821; see People v. Coulthard (2023) 90
Cal.App.5th 743, 768 [father failed to establish an imminent risk
of abuse and harm under § 278 when the offer of evidence “was
based, at least in part, on [child’s] hearsay statements that could
not be offered to prove the truth of the matter”].)
III. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Finally, Mora contends several statements the prosecutor
made in closing argument constituted prosecutorial misconduct.
We find no basis for reversal.8
“A prosecutor engages in misconduct by misstating facts,
but enjoys wide latitude in commenting on the evidence,
including the reasonable inferences and deductions that can be
drawn therefrom.” (People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863,
928.) “ ‘ “A prosecutor’s misconduct violates the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution when it ‘infects
the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial
of due process.’ [Citations.] In other words, the misconduct must
be ‘of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the
defendant’s right to a fair trial.’ [Citation.] A prosecutor’s
misconduct that does not render a trial fundamentally unfair
nevertheless violates California law if it involves ‘the use of
deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either

8 Because we consider Mora’s prosecutorial misconduct
arguments on the merits, we need not address the parties’
arguments regarding forfeiture.

19
the court or the jury.’ ” ’ [Citation.] . . . We consider the
assertedly improper remarks in the context of the argument as a
whole. [Citation.]” (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838,
894.)
A. The prosecutor’s statements regarding
imminent harm were not misconduct
Mora challenges the prosecutor’s statements highlighting
the absence of evidence of imminent harm to either child. For
example, the prosecutor posed rhetorical questions to the jury,
such as, “What is the evidence of imminent harm? Where is the
evidence? Not in this trial.” She also made declarative
statements, such as, “There is no evidence of imminent harm or
injury. None.” Mora contends the prosecutor’s arguments were
improper because there was evidence Mora believed the children
were in danger, namely the IPB evidence and M.M.’s excluded
statements. We disagree.
“Prosecutors should never assert or imply that there is no
evidence on a certain point when they know such evidence exists
but was excluded by the court.” (People v. Castaneda-Prado
(2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1260, 1294; People v. Crew (2003) 31
Cal.4th 822, 839.) But here, the prosecutor’s challenged
statements did not refer to what Mora believed or evidence that
was excluded. Instead, the prosecutor highlighted the absence of
evidence showing imminent harm actually existed. The
prosecutor could permissibly distinguish between actual evidence
of imminent harm and evidence that established only Mora’s
subjective belief that the children were in danger. Further, a
prosecutor may comment on the absence of evidence supporting
the defense theory of the case. (See e.g., People v. Thomas (2012)
54 Cal.4th 908, 945 [no misconduct for prosecutor to argue no

20
witnesses came forward to provide alibi evidence for defendant];
People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 565–566 [no misconduct
for prosecutor to argue defendant did not present any evidence
suggesting anyone else committed the crime]; People v. Carter
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1266–1267 [no misconduct for prosecutor
to argue nothing prevented defendant from offering witnesses to
explain why defendant was in the car with property linking him
to victims].) The prosecutor’s statements were a fair comment on
the evidence and did not constitute misconduct.9
B. The prosecutor’s statements purporting to
quote M.M. and describe her conduct were
improper but not prejudicial
Mora also contends the prosecutor committed misconduct
by fabricating facts or mischaracterizing evidence. During her
rebuttal argument, the prosecutor stated: “The . . . concerning
comments, right? Let’s just straight-up, head-on, what were
they? My daughter had a unicorn head band. Okay. Picture a
unicorn head band. It’s a little, cheap piece of plastic with a
stuffed unicorn horn, right? She’s five, and she put it around her
waist and said, ‘I’ve got a wiener.’ That’s what we’re talking
about here, okay? A five-year-old with a unicorn head band
saying, ‘I’ve got a wiener.’ ” The prosecutor later returned to this
description, arguing: “[Y]ou can use the lies, the exaggerations in
judging her credibility that I thought a kid, a five-year-old
playing around and saying [‘]I got a wiener[’] is imminent
danger.” The prosecutor subsequently returned to the theme: “So

9 To the extent Mora contends the statements were
misconduct because the trial court’s exclusion of the IPB evidence
was error, this argument fails. We have concluded the trial court
did not err by excluding the IPB evidence.

21
[Mora’s] bootstrapping a comment of a five-year-old, one, by the
way, comment of a five-year-old giggling with a head band into
justifying kidnapping and withholding [J.M.] who said
nothing . . . .”
“ ‘ “It is settled that a prosecutor is given wide latitude
during argument. The argument may be vigorous as long as it
amounts to fair comment on the evidence, which can include
reasonable inferences, or deductions to be drawn therefrom.
[Citations.]” ’ ” (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 221,
quoting People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 567.) However,
“mischaracterizing the evidence is misconduct.” (People v. Hill
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823.) “When a claim of misconduct is
based on the prosecutor’s comments before the jury, ‘ “the
question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury
construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an
objectionable fashion.” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Friend (2009) 47
Cal.4th 1, 29.) “ ‘[W]e “do not lightly infer” that the jury drew the
most damaging rather than the least damaging meaning from the
prosecutor’s statements. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Wilson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 309, 338.)
We agree that the prosecutor’s comments about M.M.
“giggling,” or purportedly saying, “I’ve got a wiener,” were
improper. While a prosecutor may permissibly draw inferences
from the evidence, the prosecutor’s suggestion that M.M. made a
particular statement, or engaged in conduct in a specific manner
that was not testified to, was potentially misleading. (People v.
Woods (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 106, 116 [argument of matters
outside the record is misconduct].) This was particularly
questionable since the prosecutor had successfully objected to

22
having any of M.M.’s statements admitted into evidence. (People
v. Roberts (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 469, 481.)
Nonetheless, even improper conduct does not necessarily
mandate reversal. We conclude Mora has not shown it is
reasonably likely she would have obtained a more favorable
verdict or better result absent the challenged statements. We
further conclude the challenged conduct was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. (People v. Reyes (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 62,
78.) The court instructed and admonished the jury repeatedly
that the prosecutor’s arguments were not evidence. We presume
the jury followed the court’s instructions and admonishments.
(Id. at p. 77.) Further, the prosecutor’s comments were a small
part of her overall argument, which focused on Mora’s past
violations of the custody and visitation order; the lack of any
evidence that Mora had reason to be concerned about J.M.; and
Mora’s failure to take actions consistent with a legitimate fear for
the children, such as contacting minors’ counsel or the California
family court.
Moreover, the evidence of guilt as to the kidnapping of
J.M., and the child custody deprivation counts, was extremely
strong. While Mora expressed concern about M.M. based on her
sexualized behavior or conduct, there was no such evidence
relevant to J.M., or any basis for the jury to believe any concerns
about M.M. would apply equally to her older brother. Indeed,
Mora’s testimony mentioned no specific concern that J.M. was in
danger. Further, as to custody deprivation, as noted above, the
evidence was overwhelming that Mora intentionally violated the
custody order. While Mora’s belief that the children were in
danger may have been relevant to the affirmative defense under
section 278.7, the evidence was undisputed that Mora did not

23
comply with the specific requirements of that statute. We
therefore conclude Mora would not have obtained a more
favorable outcome absent the misconduct, nor was it so pervasive
that it deprived her of a fair trial. (People v. Fuiava (2012) 53
Cal.4th 622, 692.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

ADAMS, J.

We concur:

LAVIN, Acting P. J.

EGERTON, J.

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