People v. Byrd CA1/5

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Filed 6/26/24 P. v. Byrd CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for pur-
poses of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A169474
v.
LEONARD BYRD, (Solano County Super. Ct. No.
Defendant and Appellant. FCR247165)

Leonard Byrd appeals after the trial court resentenced him
pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75.1 His appointed counsel
on appeal filed a brief raising no issues, but seeking our
independent review of the record, citing People v. Wende (1979)
25 Cal.3d 436. Wende does not apply to a defendant’s appeal
from the denial of postconviction relief. (People v. Delgadillo
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 221-222, 226-227, 231 (Delgadillo).)
However, we have exercised our discretion to independently
review the record (id. at p. 232), and we affirm.

BACKGROUND

A.

Before January 1, 2020, section 667.5, former subdivision
(b), required trial courts to impose a one-year sentence

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal

Code.
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enhancement for each true finding on an allegation the defendant
had served a prior prison term and not remained free of custody
for at least five years. (§ 667.5, former subd. (b), as amended by
Stats. 2018, ch. 423, § 65; People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th
375, 379–380 (Burgess).) Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill
No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) amended section 667.5 by limiting
the enhancement to only prior prison terms served for sexually
violent offenses. (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1; Burgess, at pp. 379-
380.)

As a result of later legislation, section 1172.75 now
invalidates all other prior prison term enhancements—imposed
under section 667.5, former subdivision (b), before January 1,
2020 (§ 1172.75, subd. (a))—and provides a mechanism for courts
to resentence defendants serving terms which include such
enhancements. (Id., subds. (b)-(d); People v. Carter (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 960, 966; Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 380.)
In doing so, courts “shall apply . . . any other changes in law that
reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to
eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of
sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) “By its plain terms, section
1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely that the trial
court strike the newly ‘invalid’ enhancements.” (People v. Monroe
(2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402.)

B.

In 2007, Byrd was serving a prison term at the California
Medical Facility, in Vacaville. When he was scheduled to attend
a vocational class, Byrd entered the office next door to the
classroom—where a staff member was working. When asked
why he was there, Byrd falsely stated that he had been sent by
the ward lieutenant and produced a stamped work card. The
staff member pulled up a chair and motioned for Byrd to have a
seat to start working. Byrd then went behind her, grabbed her

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around the throat with his right arm, and choked her. He only
released her when the staff member pushed her personal alarm.

In exchange for dismissal of two other charged counts and
imposition of the low term (doubled), Byrd pled no contest to
battery of a non-confined person by a prisoner (§ 4501.5) and
admitted this was a serious felony (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(1)). He
also admitted serving three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, former
subd. (b)) and that he had suffered two prior serious felony
convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and a strike prior (§ 667, subds.
(b)—(i)). The parties stipulated to a 17-year aggregate sentence
under the plea agreement, calculated as follows: the low term of
two years, doubled to four years due to Byrd’s strike prior; a
consecutive five-year term for each of the prior serious felony
conviction enhancements (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)); and three
consecutive terms of one year for the three prior prison term
enhancements (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)). In 2007, the trial court
accepted and imposed the stipulated sentence (consecutive to an
indeterminate life term Byrd was already serving for a separate
offense).

In 2022, the trial court received notice from the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation that Byrd qualified
for relief under former section 1171.1, which is now section
1172.75. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, §§ 1, 3; Renumbered by Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 12.) The court appointed counsel to represent
Byrd and defense counsel filed a “Petition to Resentence and
Strike Legally Invalid Enhancements,” pursuant to section
1172.75. In a supplemental brief, Byrd argued that a full
resentencing was required. He asked the court to strike not only
his prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)),
but also the two five-year prior serious felony conviction
enhancements (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) pursuant to section 1385. He
also asked that his sentence be imposed concurrent to the life
sentence he was already serving.

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The People conceded that, even though his sentence was
originally stipulated as part of a plea bargain, Byrd was entitled
to a full resentencing and that the court had discretion to strike
the five-year prior serious felony enhancements. (§§ 1172.75,
subds. (c), (d), 1385; People v. Carter, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp.
964, 977; People v. Monroe, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 398-400.)
But the People argued that a consecutive sentence remained
mandatory under section 4501.5 and that dismissal of the two
five-year enhancements was not in the interests of justice and
would endanger public safety.

The trial court recalled the sentence and resentenced Byrd.
Pursuant to section 1172.75, it struck the three one-year
enhancements imposed under section 667.5, former subdivision
(b). The court acknowledged that it had discretion to strike the
prior serious felony enhancements. However, based on its
findings that doing so would endanger public safety and conflict
with the interests of justice, the court left the remainder of Byrd’s
sentence intact, and sentenced him to 14 years in state prison.
As mandated by section 4501.5, the sentence was imposed
consecutively to the term Byrd was already serving.

DISCUSSION

Byrd was advised by his appellate counsel of the right to
file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing the
opening brief. But after more than 30 days, we have received no
letter or brief from Byrd. Because the instant appeal is from an
order denying postjudgment relief rather than a first appeal as of
right from a criminal conviction, we are not required to
undertake an independent review of the record in search of
arguable issues. (See Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 226.)
Nonetheless, because Byrd’s counsel failed to mention Delgadillo,
or that Byrd could abandon his appeal by failing to file a
supplemental brief (id. at p. 233), we have conducted a
discretionary independent review of the record. (Id. at pp. 226,

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232.) After independently reviewing the record, we conclude
there are no arguable errors that would result in a disposition
more favorable to Byrd.

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s resentencing order, dated December 20,
2023, is affirmed.

BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:

SIMONS, ACTING P. J.
CHOU, J.

P. v. Byrd (A169474)

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