CourtListener 9832176•Luo v. Volokh
Full text
Filed 5/30/24; certified for publication 6/25/24 (order attached)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
XINGFEI LUO, B323878
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22STRO05198)
v.
EUGENE VOLOKH,
Defendant and Respondent.
XINGFEI LUO, B324566
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22STRO04352)
v.
EUGENE VOLOKH,
Defendant and Respondent.
Case No. B323878, on APPEAL from orders of the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, Laura Cohen, Commissioner.
Affirmed in part and dismissed in part.
Case No. B324566 on APPEAL from orders of the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, Hillary Gerber, Commissioner.
Dismissed.
Xingfei Luo, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Schaerr Jaffe, Donald M. Falk, Annika B. Barkdull;
Eugene Volokh for Defendant and Respondent.
____________________________
This is a consolidated appeal in which the parties battle
over the use of pseudonyms in public documents. Appellant
Xingfei Luo, also known as Olivia Luo, twice sought a restraining
order against respondent Professor Eugene Volokh pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure1 section 527.6. Luo sought to prevent
Volokh from identifying her in his writings. After the trial court
discharged the first petition, Luo moved to “strike” exhibits she
filed in support of that failed petition. The trial court denied that
motion and granted Volokh’s motion to preclude her from
proceeding pseudonymously in that case. Luo challenges these
orders on appeal.
The second case before us involves Luo’s second petition for
a restraining order in which the trial court granted Volokh’s anti-
SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motion
(section 425.16) and dismissed Luo’s second petition. On appeal,
Luo argues the trial court erred in ruling she failed to
demonstrate that her petition has minimal merit, an analytic
1Undesignated statutory citations are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2
element in an anti-SLAPP motion. Luo also appeals from a
subsequent order granting Volokh’s motion to preclude Luo from
proceeding pseudonymously in her second petition.
We address on the merits only the trial court’s rulings on
the anti-SLAPP motion. We conclude that Luo failed to identify
evidence of harassment within the purview of section 527.6 and
the relief she requested regarding Volokh’s failure to refer to her
by a pseudonym is not available under that statute. We thus
affirm the order granting Volokh’s anti-SLAPP motion and
dismissing Luo’s second petition.
We dismiss Luo’s appeals as to the trial court’s ruling on
her motion to strike exhibits in her first petition and the court’s
granting of Volokh’s motions in both cases to use her actual
name. We do so because these rulings are based on
nonappealable orders.
BACKGROUND
Our Background is detailed because the procedural events
in these consolidated appeals are relevant to their resolution.
Volokh wrote a law review article about pseudonymous
litigation in which he identified “legal rules (such as they are)
and the key policy arguments, in a way intended to be helpful to
judges, lawyers, pro se litigants, and academics.” (Volokh, The
Law of Pseudonymous Litigation (2022) 73 Hastings L.J. 1353.)
Volokh favors “openness” to allow “the public (usually through
the media) [to] supervise what happens in courtrooms that are
publicly funded and exercise coercive power in the name of the
people.” (Id. at p. 1361.) “The Volokh Conspiracy,” Volokh’s
online blog, contains posts focusing on pseudonymous litigation
including one entry that focuses exclusively on Luo.
3
Volokh describes the writings Luo challenges as “reporting
on the contents of public records.” According to Volokh, he
referred to Luo by her full name in his law review article in the
Hastings Law Journal and by her last name on three blog posts.
The law review article and blog posts refer to Luo as an example
of a litigant whose use of pseudonymity impedes investigation
into the litigant’s trustworthiness and past litigation. (Volokh,
The Law of Pseudonymous Litigation, supra, 73 Hastings L.J. at
p. 1370.)
1. Luo’s first petition for a restraining order (case no.
B324566)
Luo’s July 2022 petition for a section 527.6 civil
harassment restraining order in case B324566 is not included in
the appellate record. Our record contains the following notation:
the “request for civil harassment restraining orders-sealed.”
(Boldface & capitalization omitted.) Luo asserts the appellate
record incorrectly shows that her petition was sealed, but she
does not provide us with a copy of her petition. The parties agree
that Luo filed exhibits in support of her petition, but those
exhibits are not included in the appellate record.
The trial court denied Luo’s civil harassment petition,
concluding in part that the alleged harmful conduct was “likely
protected free speech.” The court also found the alleged facts did
not comprise acts of violence, threats of violence, or a course of
conduct that seriously alarmed, annoyed, or harassed the
petitioner and caused substantial emotional distress.2 On
August 9, 2022, the trial court discharged Luo’s request for a
2 The text of section 527.6 is set forth in our Discussion,
post.
4
restraining order. Luo did not appeal from the order discharging
that petition.
On August 10, 2022, Luo filed an ex parte motion to set
aside the order discharging her petition in which motion she
claimed she was unable to personally serve Volokh. The court
denied the ex parte motion.
On September 1, 2022, Luo filed an “ex parte application
for an order to strike and withdraw improperly filed exhibits.”
(Capitalization omitted.) This motion referred to the exhibits Luo
filed in support of her petition. She sought to strike them
because they were not filed under seal. In a declaration, Luo
averred that “[i]f the improperly filed exhibits remain available to
the public, I will be subject to unwarranted public scrutiny and
harassment.”
On September 2, 2022, Volokh filed an opposition to Luo’s
motion to strike her exhibits. According to Volokh, the exhibits
were relevant to Luo’s petition and contained accurate copies of
public records. Volokh argued Luo failed to follow rules of court
for sealing documents and cannot establish the requisite
standard for sealing under those rules. (See Cal. Rules of Court,
rules 2.550–2.551 [describing criteria for filing documents under
seal]). Volokh also argued Luo’s exhibits were relevant to
assessing whether Luo is a vexatious litigant and that the
exhibits should not be retroactively sealed.3
3 We take judicial notice of the trial court’s order dated
April 8, 2024 in Luo v. Czodor (2023, No. 30-2023-01327847-CU-
FR-CJC). (Evid. Code, § 459, subd. (a) [reviewing court may take
judicial notice of any matter specified in § 452]; Evid. Code, § 452,
subd. (d) [court may take judicial notice of records of any court of
5
On September 6, 2022, the trial court denied Luo’s ex parte
motion to “strike” her exhibits because Luo had not completed the
proper forms for submitting an ex parte motion. Luo filed a new
motion and Volokh again opposed it, and also filed a separate
motion to preclude Luo from proceeding pseudonymously in that
case. Luo opposed Volokh’s motion. She argued Volokh’s motion
was untimely and her need for anonymity outweighed the
public’s interest in knowing her identity. Luo further contended
that privacy interests may trump the public’s right to know a
litigant’s identity and courts should provide a safe space in which
plaintiffs can be heard.
By minute order dated October 31, 2022, the trial court
denied Luo’s motion to strike her exhibits. The court stated the
ruling was without prejudice to Luo filing a motion to seal the
exhibits. Luo, however, never filed a motion to seal the exhibits.
Luo filed a notice of appeal from the minute order denying her
motion to strike her exhibits. The minute order does not require
either party to file a formal order for court approval.
By minute order dated November 7, 2022, the trial court
granted the motion to preclude Luo from proceeding
pseudonymously. The court found Luo did not have a credible
safety concern justifying proceeding pseudonymously. In a
minute order, the court directed Volokh to prepare a written
order. That same day, Luo appealed from the minute order
precluding proceeding pseudonymously. Our record does not
show whether Volokh filed a proposed order or whether the court
signed such an order.
this state].) The order declares Xingfei Luo, also known as
Olivia Luo, a vexatious litigant.
6
2. Second petition for a restraining order (case no.
B323878)
On August 17, 2022 (eight days after the trial court
discharged her first petition for a restraining order), Luo filed
another petition for a civil harassment restraining order. Luo
described the parties’ relationship as follows: “Volokh has
learned my info through litigation.” Luo stated, “Volokh has
published my info online and invited ha[t]ers to stalk, harass,
threaten and commit violence against me. I continue to receive
threatening and harassing phone calls and voice mails calling me
cunt, slut, lying on men and indicating they will rape and kill me.
At the end of July, I was forced to move out of my prior residence
for safety concern.”
Luo requested the trial court order Volokh to “[1] Remove
any remarks, comments, or references from any publicly
available documents or articles authored by [Volokh] that connect
[her] real name with rape or sexual assault; [¶ 2] Remove any
remarks, comments, or references from any publicly available
documents or articles authored by [Volokh] that connect [her]
with the cases in which she has received a protective order to
proceed under a pseudonym; [¶ 3] Cease publishing any
remarks, comments, or references that connect [her] with rape or
sexual assault; [¶ 4] Cease drawing public attention to [her]
name [when] associated with rape or sexual[ ] assault.”
In a declaration filed in support of her petition for a
restraining order, Luo averred that two unidentified persons
telephoned her calling her “cunt, bitch, slut, lying on men” and
threatening to rape and kill her. Luo did not know the callers’
identities but assumed the callers read Volokh’s writings. Luo,
however, provided no evidence linking the callers to Volokh’s
7
writings. Luo averred that although she received court orders
protecting her name because she was a victim of rape, Volokh
published her name. Luo identifies no such court orders. Luo
averred Volokh’s “publication invites worldwide haters to
threaten, stalk, and commit violence against me.” Luo offered no
citation to Volokh’s writings supporting this assertion. Luo
further averred she relocated because of these safety concerns.
On September 2, 2022, Volokh filed a response along with
an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing the First Amendment protected
the writings challenged in Luo’s petition. Specifically, Volokh
argued Luo’s petition was based entirely on his constitutionally
protected speech, which could not be restrained under section
527.6. Among other things, Volokh argued Luo could not
demonstrate minimal merit because his writings are not within
the definition of harassment in section 527.6.
Volokh also filed a motion similar to one he filed in the
earlier case to preclude Luo from proceeding pseudonymously.
Volokh contended that in addition to previously attempting to
obtain a restraining order against him, Luo has filed numerous
cases using a pseudonym, and according to Volokh, has been
unsuccessful in at least four of them. Volokh argued that Luo’s
identity was relevant to assess whether she is a vexatious
litigant.
The trial court held a hearing on September 9, 2022. At
that hearing, the trial court inquired whether Luo wanted to
proceed with the anti-SLAPP motion that day or wait for a
separate hearing. Luo responded, “Whatever the court prefers.”
Luo told the court she would not be calling witnesses or providing
additional evidence. The court, on its own motion, continued the
hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion. Luo filed her opposition to
8
the anti-SLAPP motion on September 19, 2022 in which she
argued the three-week delay (caused by the court’s continuance)
in considering Volokh’s anti-SLAPP motion demonstrated that
the motion was an abuse of process.4 Luo argued her petition for
a restraining order had minimal merit and therefore the court
should deny Volokh’s anti-SLAPP motion. Luo reasserted,
unsupported by citation to evidence, that “Volokh’s massive
publication serves the purpose of incitement to entice haters to
stalk, harass, threaten, and commit violence against Petitioner.”
Luo also stated without citation to evidence that “as a result of
Volokh’s continuing massive publication, Petitioner has been
forced to endure malicious and cruel abuse at the hands of
ruthless and unscrupulous people.”
At a September 30, 2022 hearing, the trial court noted Luo
did not timely file her opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion but
exercised its discretion to consider the opposition nonetheless.
After the hearing, by minute order dated and signed on
September 30, 2022, the court granted Volokh’s anti-SLAPP
motion and dismissed Luo’s petition for a restraining order. On
October 3, 2022, Luo appealed from the order.
On October 10, 2022, Luo filed an opposition to Volokh’s
motion to preclude proceeding pseudonymously. Luo argued that
using her name would “draw” violence and harassment to her.
Luo contended, “[C]ourts must provide a safe space for plaintiffs’
stories to be heard . . . .” Luo cited no evidence supporting the
4 On our own motion we take judicial notice of Luo’s
opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion, which was not included in
the record on appeal, but which Luo provided to us in an
attachment to a brief. (Evid. Code, § 451, subd. (d) [court may
take judicial notice of the record of any court of this state].)
9
conclusion that requiring her to use her name would lead to
violence and harassment against her. Luo also argued she was
not a frequent or vexatious litigant.
On October 25, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the
motion to preclude Luo from proceeding pseudonymously. Luo
argued that if the motion had been heard prior to the anti-SLAPP
motion—a request she never made—she “could have had an
opportunity to . . . withdraw from this lawsuit.” The court asked,
“[B]efore I rule[, ¶] . . . [¶ d]id you want an opportunity to
withdraw . . . ?” Luo indicated that she did not want to
withdraw. The court asked a second time, “[A]re you asking . . .
to have an opportunity to withdraw?” Luo responded, “No, Your
Honor.” After additional discussion, the court asked a third time
whether Luo wanted to withdraw and informed Luo, “I’m giving
you that opportunity now.” Luo responded, “No.” When issuing
its ruling the court stated, “[T]oday, the court gave you [Luo] an
option to dismiss and you are not dismissing this case at this
time, so the court will proceed with this motion.” The court
granted the motion to preclude Luo from proceeding with a
pseudonym, finding that Luo did not show an interest that
overrides the First Amendment right to public access to judicial
proceedings.
By minute order dated October 25, 2022, the court granted
Volokh’s motion to preclude proceeding pseudonymously and
directed Volokh to prepare a proposed order. Our record contains
no further order signed by the court. On November 2, 2022, Luo
filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s October 25, 2022
minute order.
10
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Did Not Err In Granting Volokh’s
Anti-SLAPP Motion5
“The Legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure
section 425.16 to combat ‘a disturbing increase’ in strategic
lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs): ‘lawsuits
brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional
rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of
grievances.’ [Citation.]” (Geiser v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238,
1242 (Geiser).) “[O]ur legal tradition recognizes the importance of
speech and other expressive activity even when—perhaps
especially when—it is uncomfortable or inconvenient. The
Legislature enacted the anti-SLAPP statute to safeguard that
tradition against those who would use the judicial process to chill
speech they oppose.” (Id. At p. 1256.) An anti-SLAPP motion
may be filed to challenge a petition for injunctive relief under
section 527.6. (Thomas v. Quintero (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 635,
641; see Olson v. Doe (2022) 12 Cal.5th 669, 678–679 (Olson).)
Evaluating an anti-SLAPP motion requires a two-pronged
inquiry. The moving party has the initial burden to show that
the opposing party’s claim implicates activity protected by the
anti-SLAPP statute. (Billauer v. Escobar-Eck (2023)
5 An order granting an anti-SLAPP motion is appealable.
(§ 904.1, subd. (a)(13).) An order dismissing a petition for a
restraining order is appealable because it is akin to an order
denying an injunction. (See R.D. v. P.M. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th
181, 187 [holding that civil harassment restraining order is
appealable as an order granting an injunction; § 904.1,
subd. (a)(6) [order granting or refusing to grant an injunction is
appealable].)
11
88 Cal.App.5th 953, 962–963 (Billauer).) The anti-SLAPP statute
encompasses “ ‘any . . . conduct in furtherance of the exercise of
the constitutional right . . . of free speech in connection with a
public issue or an issue of public interest’ [citation]” (Geiser,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1243) and allows a trial court to strike a
claim based on such conduct unless the claim has minimal merit.
If the moving party satisfies that burden, the burden shifts to the
opposing party to demonstrate “the merit of the claim by
establishing a probability of success. . . . [T]his second step [is] a
“summary-judgment-like procedure.” [Citation.] The court does
not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. Its
inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally
sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient
to sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiff’s
evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to
determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.
[Citation.] “[C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may
proceed.” ’ [Citation.]” (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019)
7 Cal.5th 781, 788.)
We review an order granting an anti-SLAPP motion
de novo. (Billauer, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 962.) Even
though our standard of review is de novo, an appellant “still
bears the ‘ “burden of affirmatively demonstrating error.” ’
[Citation.]” (Balla v. Hall (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 652, 671.)
Turning to the first prong of the anti-SLAPP inquiry, Luo
does not dispute Volokh demonstrated that her second petition
for a restraining order arises out of conduct protected by the anti-
SLAPP statute. Luo therefore has demonstrated no error on
appeal with respect to the first prong. In her opposition filed in
12
the trial court, Luo also did not argue her petition falls outside
the ambit of the anti-SLAPP statute.
We therefore focus on the second prong and conclude upon
our review de novo, that Luo failed to demonstrate her petition
for a restraining order has minimal merit. “To succeed in
opposing a special motion to strike, the nonmoving party must
‘demonstrate both that the claim is legally sufficient and that
there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case with
respect to the claim.’ [Citation.]” (Olson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at
p. 679.) As set forth below, Luo presented no evidence Volokh
harassed her within the meaning of section 527.6, and the only
relief Luo seeks is not available under section 527.6.
Section 527.6 provides an expedited procedure to prevent
harassment. (Byers v. Cathcart (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 805, 811.)
By definition, harassment must have “ ‘no legitimate purpose.’ ”
(Id. at p. 807.) “Legitimacy of purpose negates harassment.” (Id.
at p. 812; Yost v. Forestiere (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 509, 521–522
[following Byers].) Constitutionally protected activity also is
excluded from the definition of harassment. (Yost, at p. 522;
§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1).) A court must find harassment by clear and
convincing evidence before issuing an order prohibiting the
harassment. (Yost, at p. 522.)
Section 527.6 defines harassment as “unlawful violence, a
credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of
conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms,
annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate
purpose. The course of conduct must be that which would cause a
reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and
must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the
petitioner.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) A course of conduct is defined
13
as “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period
of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose,
including following or stalking an individual, making harassing
telephone calls to an individual, or sending harassing
correspondence to an individual by any means, including, but not
limited to, the use of public or private mails, interoffice mail,
facsimile, or email.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1).)
Volokh’s conduct is not within the ambit of section 527.6’s
definition of harassment. Volokh’s identification of Luo in a law
review article and on his blog was not unlawful violence or a
credible threat of violence. There was no evidence that Volokh
stalked Luo, made harassing phone calls, or sent her harassing
correspondence. Volokh’s writings served a legitimate purpose—
a discussion on how a litigant’s use of a pseudonym could affect
open access to court proceedings and impede investigations into a
litigant’s credibility. Luo’s failure to cite to any evidence that
Volokh harassed her within the meaning of section 526.7 is fatal
to her argument that she demonstrated her restraining order
petition has minimal merit.
Additionally, Luo fails to offer any theory supporting the
relief her petition seeks. Injunctive relief under section 527.6 is
designed to “prevent threatened future harm” and “ ‘is not
intended to punish the restrained party for past acts of
harassment.’ [Citation.]” (Olson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 673,
678.)
The statute focuses “narrowly” on “interpersonal conflict.”
(Olson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 682.) A section 527.6 restraining
order may enjoin a “party from harassing, intimidating,
molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually
assaulting, battering, abusing, telephoning, including, but not
14
limited to, making annoying telephone calls, as described in
Section 653m of the Penal Code, destroying personal property,
contacting, either directly or indirectly, by mail or otherwise, or
coming within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of,
the petitioner.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(6)(A).) Luo did not request the
trial court enjoin Volokh from any such proscribed activities.
Nothing in the statute precludes Volokh’s identification of Luo by
name. Because the relief Luo seeks is not available under
section 527.6, her petition for a restraining order lacks the
minimal merit necessary to withstand Volokh’s anti-SLAPP
motion.
Luo’s contrary arguments are unpersuasive. She states, “If
the writings, intentionally or inadvertently, embolden others to
engage in harassing behavior towards Luo, they undermine any
claim to legitimacy. Furthermore, if they perpetuate harmful
stereotypes their purported legitimacy diminishes further.”
These arguments rest on incorrect factual premises because the
record does not support Luo’s belief that Volokh encouraged
anyone to harass Luo. Luo provides no citation to any writing
showing Volokh encouraged harassment or violence against her.
Similarly, Luo cites no evidence that Volokh’s writings
“perpetuate harmful stereotypes,” and we find none. (See
Newport Harbor Offices & Marina, LLC. v. Morris Cerullo World
Evangelism (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 28, 50 [party opposing anti-
SLAPP motion has the burden to show how evidence supports
prima facie case].)
Luo states Volokh’s writings are widely available and the
“information, when in the wrong hands, can be weaponized to
incite violence or harassment against a victim, such as Doe
[Luo].” Luo argues Volokh has subjected her to “unnecessary
15
public exposure and incitement.” Again, Luo offers no evidence to
support these assertions. Because there is no evidence Volokh
encouraged others to commit violence or harassment against Luo,
we do not consider whether section 526.7 could support a
restraining order against someone who encourages others to
harass.
Finally, there is no merit to Luo’s contention we should
reverse the trial court’s anti-SLAPP ruling because Volokh’s anti-
SLAPP motion delayed proceedings. Without objection from the
parties, the trial court continued the proceedings from
September 9, 2022 to September 30, 2022, “so that it may
properly address the Anti-SLAPP relief sought by” Volokh. Luo
filed her opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion on September 19,
2022. A three-week delay to give Luo opportunity to file an
opposition and the court time to consider the motion and
opposition is not abusive delay. Although, as Luo points out, it is
possible to abuse the anti-SLAPP procedure by filing a frivolous
appeal (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th
180, 195), Volokh did not file a frivolous appeal. He filed a
meritorious anti-SLAPP motion in the trial court.6
6 Volokh does not request attorney fees and therefore we
do not consider his entitlement to fees. Given our conclusion that
Luo’s petition lacked minimal merit, we do not consider Volokh’s
other arguments supporting the trial court’s ruling. We also
do not address arguments that issuing a restraining order would
violate Volokh’s First and Second Amendment rights. Although
Volokh discusses the tort of invasion of privacy, we do not
consider that argument because Luo’s petition was based on
section 526.7 and not a privacy cause of action.
Luo argues the trial court’s reasons for finding no minimal
merit constituted “plain error.” We do not consider the trial
16
B. We Dismiss Luo’s Remaining Purported Appeals
Because Luo Seeks Review of Nonappealable Orders
The right to appeal is statutory and a purported appeal
from a nonappealable order must be dismissed because appellate
courts have no jurisdiction to consider appeals that are not
statutorily authorized.7 (In re Marriage of Griffin (1993)
court’s rationale because we have independently reviewed
whether Luo’s petition has minimal merit. (See Maleti v. Wickers
(2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 181, 202–202 [we review the trial court’s
decision, not its rationale.)
7 Section 904.1 provides:
“(a) An appeal, other than in a limited civil case, is to the
court of appeal. An appeal, other than in a limited civil case, may
be taken from any of the following:
“(1) From a judgment, except an interlocutory
judgment, other than as provided in paragraphs (8), (9),
and (11), or a judgment of contempt that is made final and
conclusive by Section 1222.
“(2) From an order made after a judgment made
appealable by paragraph (1).
“(3) From an order granting a motion to quash
service of summons or granting a motion to stay the action
on the ground of inconvenient forum, or from a written
order of dismissal under Section 581d following an order
granting a motion to dismiss the action on the ground of
inconvenient forum.
“(4) From an order granting a new trial or denying a
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
“(5) From an order discharging or refusing to
discharge an attachment or granting a right to attach
order.
17
“(6) From an order granting or dissolving an
injunction, or refusing to grant or dissolve an injunction.
“(7) From an order appointing a receiver.
“(8) From an interlocutory judgment, order, or
decree, made or entered in an action to redeem real or
personal property from a mortgage thereof, or a lien
thereon, determining the right to redeem and directing an
accounting.
“(9) From an interlocutory judgment in an action for
partition determining the rights and interests of the
respective parties and directing partition to be made.
“(10) From an order made appealable by the Probate
Code or the Family Code.
“(11) From an interlocutory judgment directing
payment of monetary sanctions by a party or an attorney
for a party if the amount exceeds five thousand dollars
($5,000).
“(12) From an order directing payment of monetary
sanctions by a party or an attorney for a party if the
amount exceeds five thousand dollars ($5,000).
“(13) From an order granting or denying a special
motion to strike under Sections 425.16 and 425.19.
“(14) From a final order or judgment in a bifurcated
proceeding regarding child custody or visitation rights.
“(b) Sanction orders or judgments of five thousand dollars
($5,000) or less against a party or an attorney for a party may be
reviewed on an appeal by that party after entry of final judgment
in the main action, or, at the discretion of the court of appeal,
may be reviewed upon petition for an extraordinary writ.”
(§ 904.1.)
18
15 Cal.App.4th 685, 687.) In her appellate briefing, Luo failed to
follow California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(B), which
requires her to explain why the orders being appealed are
appealable. This court thus requested and received supplemental
briefing in both cases.
1. The minute orders granting Volokh’s motion to
preclude Luo from proceeding pseudonymously are
not appealable
In both cases, Volokh moved to preclude Luo from
proceeding pseudonymously. In case No. B324566, by minute
order dated November 7, 2022, the trial court granted the motion
to preclude Luo from proceeding pseudonymously. The court’s
minute order directed Volokh to prepare a written order. That
same day, Luo appealed from the minute order precluding
proceeding pseudonymously. Our record does not show whether
Volokh filed a proposed order or whether the court signed such an
order.
In case No. B323878, by minute order dated October 25,
2022, the court granted Volokh’s motion to preclude proceeding
pseudonymously and directed Volokh to prepare a proposed
order. Our record contains no further order signed by the court.
On November 2, 2022, Luo filed a notice of appeal from the trial
court’s October 25, 2022 minute order.
“A minute order that directs the preparation of a formal
written order is not itself appealable.” (Estate of Sapp (2019)
36 Cal.App.5th 86, 101; see also Herrscher v. Herrscher (1953)
41 Cal.2d 300, 304–306 [dismissing appeal where minute order
called for preparation of final order and no written order was
filed].) Here Luo’s appeals are from nonappealable minute orders
19
that direct the preparation of formal written orders for signature
by the court.
Volokh argues this court has discretion to treat Luo’s
appeal of his motion as a petition for writ of mandate. Assuming
we would have that discretion, we decline to exercise it.
2. The minute order denying Luo’s motion to strike
exhibits is not appealable
In case No. B324566, Luo noticed an appeal from an order
denying her motion to strike exhibits. That order does not fall
within any of the categories of appealable orders in section 904.1.
(See fn. 6, ante.) In response to our request for supplemental
briefing, Luo does not argue the trial court’s order is an
appealable order. Volokh asserts the order denying Luo’s motion
to strike her exhibits is appealable as a collateral order because it
is “essentially an effort to retroactively seal those documents by
removing them from the public record.”
To be appealable, a collateral order must (1) finally
determine (2) a matter collateral to the litigation and (3) require
the payment of money or the performance of an act. (Longobardo
v. Avco Corp. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 429, 432 (Longobardo).) In
contrast to the federal law on which Volokh relies,8 under
California law, a prerequisite to a collateral order is that the
8 Orders are collateral under federal law if they “ ‘[are]
conclusive, resolve important questions completely separate from
the merits, and render such important questions effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment in the underlying
action.’ [Citation.]” (Longobardo, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at
p. 432; see, e.g., Doe v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(1st Cir. 2022) 46 F.4th 61, 65.)
20
order “direct[s] the payment of money or performance of an act.”
(Longobardo, at p. 434; Sanchez v. Westlake Services, LLC (2022)
73 Cal.App.5th 1100, 1107 [to qualify as collateral order must
direct the payment of money or performance of an act]; see also
Serrano v. Stefan Merli Plastering Co., Inc. (2008) 162
Cal.App.4th 1014, 1026 [“The collateral order doctrine holds that
an order that finally determines a matter that is distinct and
severable from the main issues in the proceeding and that directs
the payment of money or performance of some other act is
appealable.”]; but see Muller v. Fresno Community Hospital &
Medical Center (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 887, 905 [finding an order
denying sanctions appealable as a collateral order].)
We do not agree with Volokh’s description of Luo’s motion.
The trial court’s order denying Luo’s motion to strike exhibits
was without prejudice to Luo filing a motion to seal the exhibits.
Luo never filed a motion to seal. We will not deem Luo’s motion
to strike as a motion to seal when the trial court invited Luo to
file a motion to seal and Luo declined that invitation. Despite
having won below, Volokh contends we should review the court’s
ruling refusing to strike exhibits because the ruling is akin to an
order unsealing documents, which he contends is appealable as a
collateral order (Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein (2007)
158 Cal.App.4th 60, 77; In re Providian Credit Card Cases (2002)
96 Cal.App.4th 292, 297, fn. 2). The trial court, however, never
ordered the exhibits unsealed (or sealed), and the trial court’s
minute order does not direct the performance of any act.
To the extent we have discretion to treat Luo’s appeal as a
petition for writ of mandate, we decline to exercise that
discretion. Our record is inadequate for review because it
21
does not include the exhibits Luo sought to strike from the
record.
DISPOSITION
In case No. B323878, the order granting Eugene Volokh’s
anti-SLAPP motion and dismissing Xingfei Luo’s petition for a
restraining order is affirmed. The purported appeal from the
order precluding Luo from proceeding pseudonymously is
dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
In case No. B324566, the purported appeal from the order
denying Luo’s motion to strike exhibits is dismissed. The
purported appeal from the order precluding Luo from proceeding
pseudonymously is dismissed. The parties shall bear their own
costs on appeal.
BENDIX, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
CHANEY, J.
22
Filed 6/25/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
XINGFEI LUO, B323878
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22STRO05198)
v.
CERTIFICATION AND ORDER
EUGENE VOLOKH, FOR PUBLICATION
Defendant and Respondent. [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
XINGFEI LUO, B324566
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22STRO04352)
v.
CERTIFICATION AND ORDER
EUGENE VOLOKH, FOR PUBLICATION
Defendant and Respondent. [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed
May 30, 2024, was not certified for publication in the
Official Reports. For good cause it now appears that the opinion
should be published in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.
There is no change in the judgment.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.
____________________________________________________________
ROTHSCHILD, P. J. CHANEY, J. BENDIX, J.
2
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