People v. Wright CA4/1

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Filed 6/25/24 P. v. Wright CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D083781

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. 22AD29000202)

TRAVIS MARTIN WRIGHT,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Steve Malone, Judge. Affirmed.
Elisa A. Brandes, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Collette C. Cavalier and James Spradley, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Travis Martin Wright appeals an order denying his petition under

Penal Code1 section 290.5 to terminate his obligation to register as a sexual
offender. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s order and
therefore affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 22, 1992, Wright was convicted of indecent exposure in Los
Angeles under section 314, subdivision (1). Because of this conviction, Wright
received 60 days in jail and was required to register as a sex offender for life
pursuant to section 290. The facts of the registerable offense are not in the
record.
On December 22, 2021, Wright was notified by the California
Department of Justice that, under new section 290.5, he was classified as a
“Tier 1” sex offender. As such, Wright became subject to a minimum
registration requirement of 10 years and then could petition for termination
of his registration requirement. On August 3, 2022, Wright filed a petition to
terminate his sex offender registration pursuant to section 290.5.
At the hearing on the petition, the prosecution produced a
computerized rap sheet detailing Wright’s criminal history occurring both
before and after his 1992 registerable offense. Wright’s criminal history is as
follows:
In 1982, Wright was arrested for indecent exposure (§ 314.1) and
convicted of participating in obscene live conduct (§ 311.6). In 1983, Wright
was arrested for soliciting a lewd act (§ 647, subd. (a)) and convicted of
improper disposal of a dead animal (§ 374). In 1986, Wright was convicted of
indecent exposure (§ 314.1). In 1988, Wright was arrested on two separate

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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occasions for indecent exposure (§ 314.1). In 1989, Wright was convicted of
committing public acts against public peace (§§ 6501, 6502). In 1991, Wright
was convicted of indecent exposure and put on probation for three years
(§ 314.1). In 1992, Wright was arrested for indecent exposure (§ 314.1) and
later arrested and convicted of soliciting a lewd act (§ 647, subd. (a)). In
1993, probation was revoked, and Wright was sentenced to two years in
prison. In 1994, Wright was arrested for indecent exposure after being
released from prison (§ 314.1). In 1999, Wright was arrested for soliciting a
lewd act (§ 647, subd. (a)). In 2002, Wright successfully petitioned to have his
1992 conviction for soliciting a lewd act set aside under section 1203.4.
In 2004, Wright was arrested for failing to register as a sex offender (§ 290
subd. (g)(2)). In 2016, Wright was arrested for indecent exposure (§ 314.1).
In 2017, Wright was arrested and convicted for soliciting a lewd act (§ 647,
subd. (a)).
Upon weighing the evidence presented by both parties, considering the
petition and opposition, and entertaining oral argument, the trial court
denied Wright’s petition and set a period of five years before Wright could file
a new termination petition.
Wright filed a timely notice of appeal on April 10, 2023.
DISCUSSION
Wright contends the court abused its discretion by denying his petition,
which he claims violated his federal constitutional right to due process. He
argues the statutory factors favored termination of registration and the
prosecution did not meet its burden of proving community safety would be
significantly enhanced by his continued registration. As we explain post, we
disagree and affirm.

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Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Beginning in 2021, the Legislature provided a statutory procedure for
qualifying sexual offender registrants to petition the superior court to
terminate their registration requirement. (§ 290.5; see People v. Thai (2023)
90 Cal.App.5th 427, 432 (Thai).) Certain requirements must be met,
including minimum registration periods. (§ 290.5, subds. (a)-(b).) Wright’s
“Tier 1 - Adult” designation following a Department of Justice review meant
that his minimum registration period was 10 years. (See §§ 290,
subd. (d)(1)(A) [Tier 1 offenders include those convicted of misdemeanors and
non-violent felonies]; 314, subd. (1) [the first violation of § 314 is a
misdemeanor, all subsequent convictions are a felony].)
When, as here, the district attorney’s office opposes termination of
registration on the grounds of community safety (§ 290.5, subds. (a)(2), (3)),
the prosecution bears the burden of “establishing that requiring continued
registration appreciably increase[s] society’s safety.” (Thai, supra, 90
Cal.App.5th at p. 432.) The preponderance of the evidence standard applies.
(Evid. Code, § 115.)
Section 290.5 identifies factors for the trial court to consider in
determining whether “community safety would be significantly enhanced by
requiring continued registration.” (§ 290.5, subd. (a)(3).) These factors
include: (1) “the nature and facts of the registerable offenses”; (2) “the age
and number of victims”; (3) “whether any victim was a stranger at the time of
the offense (known to the offender for less than 24 hours)”; (4) “criminal and
relevant noncriminal behavior before and after conviction for the registerable
offense”; (5) “the time period during which the person has not reoffended”;
(6) “successful completion, if any, of a Sex Offender Management Board-
certified sex offender treatment program”; and (7) “the person’s current risk

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of sexual or violent reoffense, including the person’s risk levels on SARASTO

static, dynamic, and violence risk assessment instruments, if available.[2]
Any judicial determination made pursuant to this section may be heard and
determined upon declarations, affidavits, police reports, or any other evidence
submitted by the parties which is reliable, material, and relevant.” (Ibid.)
We review the trial court’s ruling granting or denying a registration
termination petition under the abuse of discretion standard. (Thai, supra, 90
Cal.App.5th at p. 433.) “To establish an abuse of discretion, a defendant
must demonstrate the trial court’s decision fell outside the bounds of reason
i.e., was arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd.” (Ibid. [noting that a
“debatable ruling is not an abuse of discretion”].)
Analysis
Wright relies on three reasons to support terminating his registration.
First, Wright contends that the 30-year period since his last registerable
conviction demonstrates that he does not pose a current risk to public safety.
Second, Wright argues his lack of arrests or convictions for any type of
violence or aggression shows that he is not a threat to public safety. Third,
Wright asserts the absence of facts of the registerable offenses establishes
that the prosecution failed to meet their burden of proof in opposing the
petition.
The parties agreed that Wright’s crime under section 314,
subdivision (1) made him a Tier-1 offender subject to the ten-year
registration requirement, which he had served when the new law went into
effect (§ 290, subd. (d)(1)). Contrary to Wright’s claims, however, his history
of numerous sexual misconduct offenses, which spanned 45 years and

2 SARASTO stands for “State-Authorized Risk Assessment Tool for Sex
Offenders.” (§ 290.04 subd. (a)(1).)
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occurred as recently as 2016 and 2017, demonstrated that community safety
would be significantly enhanced by his continued registration for five years.
Wright’s extensive criminal history thus remains a valid cause for concern,
including numerous arrests, convictions, probation violations, and a state
prison commitment.
Even if some of the factors were in Wright’s favor, such as the absence
of facts regarding his registerable offense, victims, and treatment programs,
the trial court was justified by relying on Wright’s extensive history of sexual
misconduct. The totality of Wright’s relevant criminal history shows that,
after a series of six arrests or convictions for sexual criminal conduct from
1982 to 1993, Wright was not deterred from engaging in further untoward
acts as he violated his probation resulting in a two-year prison sentence. The
trial court also noted two additional arrests for sexual misconduct from
1994 to 1999. The trial court highlighted that Wright had previously
expunged his 2002 registerable offense pursuant to section 1203.4 by
presumably representing that he had become a law-abiding citizen. After a
break from sexual misconduct from 1999 to 2016, Wright was again arrested
for sexual misconduct in 2016 and 2017. The trial court was correct to
conclude that Wright’s criminal history pointed to a continuing risk.
Wright attempts to minimize his criminal history by arguing that his
most recent registerable offense occurred 30 years ago, which does not prove
a current risk. But a lifelong habit of criminal sexual misconduct, occurring
as recently as 2017, is overwhelming and substantial evidence that
community safety would be significantly enhanced by Wright’s continued
registration. To find an abuse of discretion, we have to find no reasonable
judge would have relied on this information to deny the petition. (See e.g.,

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Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. Univ. of So. Cal. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773.)
We cannot find that here.
Thai, on which Wright relies, is instructive. There, “[o]ther than
evidence of the 24-year-old underlying offense, the prosecution offered no
evidence Thai presents a danger today. Indeed, the evidence demonstrates
the opposite. For almost 24 years, Thai had not suffered any conviction.”
(Thai, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 434.) Here, in contrast, Wright was
arrested nine times between 1982 and 2017 for sexual misconduct, which
resulted in several convictions both before and after his registerable offense.
Wright’s misconduct continued for decades and demonstrated a continual
proclivity to commit sexual offenses. Wright’s criminal history establishes
with reasonable, credible, and solid evidence that community safety would be
significantly enhanced by requiring Wright’s continued registration. Thus,
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that continued
registration and a set period of five years before Wright can file a new
termination petition served ongoing community safety interests.
Finally, Wright contends that the trial court’s abuse of discretion
violated his federal due process rights. When an appellant receives a fair
determination by the trial court for their claim for relief, no due process
violation occurs. (See e.g., People v. Vera (1997) 15 Cal.4th 269, 280.) Here,
the trial court exercised informed discretion when it evaluated the proper
factors and evidence in deciding to deny Wright’s petition. Thus, the trial
court’s reasoning was not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, no due process
violation occurred.

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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed.

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, J.

RUBIN, J.

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