People v. Quinnine CA1/5

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Filed 6/24/24 P. v. Quinnine CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for pur-
poses of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A165902
v.
DAVID ANTHONY QUINNINE, (San Mateo County Super. Ct. No.
Defendant and Appellant. 19-NF-015588-A)

David Anthony Quinnine appeals after a jury convicted him
of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c);
count one),1 theft from an elder or dependent adult (§ 368, subd.
(d); count three), and extortion by means of force or threat (§ 520;
count six). Quinnine asserts the trial court committed
instructional error by declining to give a mistake-of-fact or claim-
of-right instruction. We find no error and affirm.

BACKGROUND

A.

In 2017, Lucy M. died, leaving behind, among others, her
husband of almost 40 years, David M., and her nephew,
Quinnine. At the time of her death, Lucy held five Charles
Schwab brokerage accounts. Those accounts were transferred to

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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David’s ownership—who was designated as Lucy’s sole primary
beneficiary—on Lucy’s death.

In late 2018, David broke his hip and had partial hip
replacement surgery. Due to this injury and an earlier traumatic
brain injury, David was in a wheelchair and needed help with
daily activities. In early 2019, he hired Quinnine, who was
trained as a nurse, to act as his caregiver. David paid Quinnine
$500 per week. Initially, all went well. However, within a few
months, Quinnine became aggressive and unkind toward David.

David testified that, on May 10, 2019 (when David was 65
years old), Quinnine stormed into his bedroom, smelling of
alcohol, and with a “really evil” look in his eyes. Quinnine held a
metal “reacher” tool—which David used to pick up objects that he
was otherwise unable to reach—to David’s throat and demanded
to know how much money was in the Charles Schwab accounts
Lucy had left him. Quinnine expressed his belief that the money
in Lucy’s former Charles Schwab accounts was to be split four
ways between himself, his two siblings, and David. David had
never heard Lucy make any such promise.

Fearing for his life, David told Quinnine how much was
then in the accounts. Quinnine then demanded David give him
$700,000—which was more than one quarter of the total amount
in the accounts. Quinnine continued to brandish the reacher,
saying “don’t make me hurt you.” Because David felt unable to
defend himself and was afraid that he “would die or something
terrible would happen” if he did not give Quinnine the money,
David wrote Quinnine a check for $700,000.

Quinnine cashed the check that same day, at first
depositing it into an account at Bank of America but moving most
of it (not long thereafter) to an account at Charles Schwab.
Quinnine continued as David’s caregiver for a few more weeks
and physically abused him on several occasions. Once, Quinnine
demanded David give Quinnine’s siblings $700,000 each, and hit

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David in the face several times when he refused. David did not
fire Quinnine or report his behavior to police because he was
afraid.

Eventually, Quinnine stopped showing up and David hired
a new caregiver, Kevin G. Kevin noticed that David was
depressed, and his physical condition was deteriorating. David
eventually told Kevin about his problems with Quinnine,
including the events of May 10. Later that same day, Kevin (who
believed he was a mandated reporter) and David filed a police
report.

Police officers executed a search warrant at Quinnine’s
apartment, and he was arrested. During an interview with a
police detective, Quinnine admitted depositing the $700,000
check into his account at Bank of America but falsely denied
moving any of it. After his arrest, Quinnine instructed his
girlfriend to gradually transfer the remaining money into an
account in her name.

B.

Quinnine testified that Lucy had practically raised him,
and they remained close in adulthood. Shortly after Lucy’s
death, Quinnine received $46,000 as a primary beneficiary on two
of her Vanguard accounts.

According to Quinnine, he never placed the reacher against
David’s throat or otherwise physically abused David. Quinnine
testified that David had voluntarily written the $700,000 check—
after only a conversation in which Quinnine threatened to quit
and reminded David that Lucy promised that the money in the
Charles Schwab accounts would be divided evenly between
David, Quinnine, and Quinnine’s two siblings. At trial, Quinnine
admitted spending, within 10 days of receiving the money,
$53,150 on dental implants and $64,818 to pay tax bills.

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C.

The jury convicted Quinnine of second degree robbery, theft
from an elder or dependent adult, and extortion by means of force
or threat. The jury could not reach verdicts on two charged
counts of battery on an elder or dependent adult (§ 243.25; counts
four & five) and, on the People’s motion, the court dismissed a
count for criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a); count two). The jury
also could not reach a verdict on an enhancement allegation that
Quinnine had personally used a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd.
(b)(1)) in committing counts one and three. The trial court
sentenced Quinnine to prison for a term of three years for the
robbery and stayed punishment on the other counts.

DISCUSSION

Quinnine argues that the trial court erred by failing to
instruct the jury, with respect to counts one and three, on
mistake-of-fact or claim-of-right defenses. We have reviewed his
claim of instructional error de novo (People v. Guiuan (1998) 18
Cal.4th 558, 569-570), but disagree.

1.

Defense counsel asked the trial court to instruct the jury
with CALCRIM No. 3406, which provides (with respect to specific
intent crimes): “The defendant is not guilty of <insert crime[s]>
if (he/she) did not have the intent or mental state required to
commit the crime because (he/she) did not know a fact or
mistakenly believed a fact. [¶] If the defendant’s conduct would
have been lawful under the facts as (he/she) believed them to be,
(he/she) did not commit <insert crime[s]>. [¶] If you find that the
defendant believed that <insert alleged mistaken facts>, (he/she)
did not have the specific intent or mental state required for
<insert crime[s]>. [¶] If you have a reasonable doubt about
whether the defendant had the specific intent or mental state

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required for <insert crime[s]>, you must find (him/her) not guilty
of (that crime/those crimes).” (Italics added.)

Defense counsel argued “what prompted Mr. Quinnine to go
into the room was a dispute over what he believes is his own
property . . . [a]nd so if when he was talking to [David, Quinnine]
believed . . . that was his property, then that would negate his
specific intent.” The trial court denied defense counsel’s request,
and explained: “To me, that is getting in the claim of right
defense through the back door . . . . He’s saying he is entitled to
the money. In my view, it would make it lawful for him to hold a
metal reacher to [David M.’s] neck and make those threats.”

2.

The trial court was correct in concluding that Quinnine was
asserting a claim-of-right defense. (See People v. Russell (2006)
144 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1429 [“a claim of right may be based on a
mistake of fact regarding the defendant’s right to take property”],
disapproved on other grounds by People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1
Cal.5th 838, 874, & fn. 14.) The claim-of-right doctrine “provides
that a defendant’s good faith belief, even if mistakenly held, that
he has a right or claim to property he takes from another negates
the felonious intent necessary for conviction of theft or robbery.”
(People v. Tufunga (1999) 21 Cal.4th 935, 938 (Tufunga).)

Our Supreme Court, in Tufunga, supra, 21 Cal.4th 935,
affirmed the rule that forcible taking of “specific personal
property in which the defendant in good faith believes he has a
bona fide claim of ownership or title” is not robbery. (Id. at p.
956.) But our high court further held that, because of the strong
public policy considerations disfavoring forcible self-help (id. at
pp. 950, 955), the claim-of-right defense does not extend to
“robberies perpetrated to satisfy, settle or otherwise collect on a
debt, liquidated or unliquidated.” (Id. at p. 956.)

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Here, Quinnine did not forcibly recover specific personal
property from David. Instead Quinnine himself denied using
force but testified that he was accepting fungible money from
David’s account to collect on debts David purportedly owed. (See
Tufunga, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 954 [“ ‘debtor can owe another
$ 150 but the $ 150 in the debtor’s pocket is not the specific
property of the creditor’ ”].) In particular, Quinnine testified that
Lucy had promised that the assets in the Charles Schwab
accounts would be divided evenly between David, Quinnine, and
Quinnine’s two siblings and that “Dave was supposed to handle
it.” Quinnine also testified that the total amount of the check
David made out to him ($700,000) represented a quarter of the
value of the accounts plus an additional $50,000 David owed him
under their employment agreement. Thus, the trial court did not
err in concluding that, with respect to count one, even if Quinnine
believed in good faith that David owed him some sum of money,
that would not absolve him of robbery. (See Tufunga, at pp. 954-
956.)

In addition to robbery, Quinnine was also charged with and
convicted of theft from an elder or dependent adult (§ 368, subd.
(d))—a crime to which a claim-of-right defense could still legally
apply.2 (Tufunga, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 952–953 & fn. 4.)
However, a claim-of-right instruction requires open taking of the
property and that no effort was made to conceal the taking. (See
§ 511 [property must be “appropriated openly and avowedly”];
Tufunga, at p. 952, fn. 4 [claim-of-right negates criminal intent
where “the property was appropriated openly and avowedly”].)

Quinnine’s taking of the $700,000 was not open. In fact,
the record shows he made efforts to conceal the money—by
initially depositing it into one account, transferring most of it to
another account at a different bank and then, when arrested,

2 It is undisputed that a claim-of-right defense does not
apply to extortion. (People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 88.)

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telling police that all the money remained in the first account
while also (undisputedly) instructing his girlfriend to withdraw
funds from the second account. Thus, a claim-of-right defense is
unavailable on this record. The trial court did not err.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:

JACKSON, P.J.
SIMONS, J.

P. v. Quinnine (A165902)

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