In re M.C. CA4/1

CourtListener 9716527CalctappJun 21, 2024

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Filed 6/21/24 In re M.C. CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re M.C., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
D083633
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES
AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. J521046)

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Kirsten D.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Alexander Calero, Judge. Conditionally reversed and remanded with
directions.
Shobita Misra, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, and Lisa Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Kirsten D. (Mother) is the mother of daughter M.C. (born June 2022)
who is the subject of this dependency case. Mother challenges the juvenile
court’s February 13, 2024 order, made at the contested Welfare and

Institutions Code1 section 366.26 hearing, terminating parental rights. She
contends the court and the San Diego County Health and Human Services
Agency (Agency) failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act
(25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and related California law. Agency
concedes that, with respect to certain relatives of Mother and presumed
father Aaron C. (Father) (Mother and Father are sometimes collectively
referred to as Parents), it failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into the
potential Native American ancestry of M.C. Agency therefore does not
oppose remand for the limited purpose of allowing it to conduct further ICWA
inquiry.
We agree with the parties that the juvenile court and Agency failed to
ensure compliance with ICWA. We therefore conditionally reverse the court’s
order terminating parental rights and on remand, direct the court to ensure
Agency fulfills its duty of inquiry under ICWA and California law. In so
doing, we invite the parties to stipulate to an immediate remittitur to

expedite the proceedings. (See California Rules of Court,2 rule 8.272(c)(1) [“A
Court of Appeal may direct immediate issuance of a remittitur only on the

parties’ stipulation or on dismissal of the appeal under rule 8.244(c)(2).”].)3

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code unless otherwise noted.

2 All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.

3 Although the parties agree that a conditional reversal is necessary to
ensure compliance with ICWA and California law, they disagree on the scope
of Agency’s inquiry duty. Given our decision in this case, we conclude on this
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At birth, M.C. tested positive for amphetamines, methamphetamine,
and opiates, and showed signs of withdrawal from these controlled
substances including high-pitched crying, poor feeding, and “tremors.” M.C.
spent more than two weeks in intensive care. When discharged, Agency

placed her in a licensed foster home.4
On June 10, 2022, Agency separately inquired of Parents whether
either of them had any Native American heritage. Both responded no. On
June 27, Agency filed a petition under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) on
behalf of M.C., alleging she was at substantial risk of harm because Mother
abused “dangerous” drugs and Father knew of Mother’s drug use but failed to
intervene. Attached to the petition was an ICWA-010(A) form signed by an

limited record that it is unnecessary for us to resolve whether certain family
members Mother identifies in her brief (i.e., maternal great-grandmother,
paternal step-grandfather, and paternal step-aunts among other relatives)
qualify as either “extended family member[s]” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2) [defining
extended family member]; § 224.1, subd. (c) [adopting federal definition]) or
“others who have an interest in the child” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)).

4 In its letter brief, Agency notes there currently is a split of authority
over whether the duty of inquiry under ICWA applies only to children who
are removed without a protective custody warrant. (See e.g., In re Delila D.
(2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 953 (review granted Sept. 27, 2023, S281447)
[concluding there is only one duty of inquiry by a social services agency as to
whether a dependent child is an Indian child under ICWA, which extends to
available extended family members no matter how the child is initially
removed from the home]; but see In re Robert F. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 492
(review granted, July 26, 2023, S279743) [duty of inquiry applies only when
the social services agency takes temporary custody of the child without a
warrant under exigent circumstances].) Agency notes it disagrees with the
logic of In re Robert F. and related cases. Because M.C. was not taken into
protective custody in this case, Agency had a duty to inquire with M.C.’s
extended family members regardless of this split of authority.
3
Agency social worker stating both Mother and Father “gave no reason to
believe [M.C.] is or may be an Indian child.”
During an Agency interview prior to the detention hearing, Mother
reported her “safety network” included maternal great-grandparents Rita D.

and Brian D.,5 who had raised her since she was little; and an older brother,
Ryan M., and his wife Lisa. Mother also reported her mother (maternal
grandmother) had passed away; and Mother had “siblings on her father’s
side,” but was not in contact with them.
Father reported his safety network included his mother, Dawn P.
(paternal grandmother), who at the time was unaware of M.C.; paternal
grandmother’s family; and a cousin, whom Father did not name. Father also
reported he had stepsisters that he had not seen “for years”; and a maternal
great-grandparent.
Agency’s detention report shows it interviewed and/or had meetings
with various relatives of Parents, including maternal great-grandmother,
maternal aunt and uncle, and paternal grandmother and paternal
step-grandfather, regarding, among other subject matters, M.C.’s placement
and development of a safety plan for the child. Despite these interactions
with M.C.’s relatives, it does not appear Agency inquired of them whether the

child might have Native American ancestry.6

5 Brian D., who was like a father to Mother, died around December 2022.
Agency reported maternal great-grandmother was about 90 years old when
M.C. went into dependency.

6 As we noted in footnote 2, on remand it is up to the juvenile court and
the parties to determine, on a more developed record, whether Agency’s duty
of inquiry under ICWA and California law extends to these relatives, other
family members, or any others who have an interest in M.C.
4
At the detention hearing held in late June 2022, Father filed the
required ICWA-020 form stating under penalty of perjury that, as far as he
knew, he had no Native American ancestry. During that hearing, Mother’s
counsel stated Mother also had filled out an ICWA-020 form, also indicating

no such ancestry.7 The juvenile court acknowledged Parents’ respective
denials of Native American ancestry and found ICWA did not apply.
However, the court added that Agency had a continuing obligation to inquire
with Parents’ family members whether they were aware of any Native
American ancestry; that if such information became available, Agency would
act “accordingly”; and that its ruling ICWA did not apply was therefore
“without prejudice.”
Agency’s July 2022 jurisdiction and disposition report repeated the
juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did not apply in this case. During the
contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing in late August, the court also
repeated its previous ruling that ICWA was inapplicable.
In its February 2023 status review report, Agency again referenced the
juvenile court’s previous finding that ICWA did not apply. In this report,
Agency recommended termination of reunification services for Parents and
that the court set a section 366.26 hearing to assess a permanent plan for
M.C. In support of its recommendation, Agency noted that Parents had failed
to make minimal progress in their respective case plans, including enrolling
in drug treatment, taking any of the myriad random drug tests scheduled by
Agency, consistently visiting M.C., and remaining in contact with Agency.
At a hearing in late May 2023, the juvenile court terminated Parents’
reunification services. During that hearing the court also found that “[n]otice
pursuant to [ICWA was] not required because the court has reason to know

7 Mother’s ICWA-020 form is not part of the record.
5
the child is not an Indian child. Reasonable inquiry has been made to
determine whether the child is or may be an Indian child.”
At the contested section 366.26 hearing in February 2024, the juvenile
court terminated parental rights and found by clear and convincing evidence
that adoption was in M.C.’s best interest, a finding Mother does not challenge
on appeal. In so ruling, the court found ICWA did not apply in this case, a
finding it made “without prejudice”; and that M.C.’s current caregivers
qualified as prospective adoptive parents as to the child.
DISCUSSION
A. Guiding Principles
ICWA reflects a congressional determination to “protect the best
interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of
Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum Federal
standards for the removal of Indian children from their families and the
placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the
unique values of Indian culture.” (25 U.S.C. § 1902; see In re Isaiah W.
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 7 (Isaiah W.) [“Congress enacted ICWA in 1978 in
response to ‘rising concern in the mid-1970’s over the consequences to Indian
children, Indian families, and Indian tribes of abusive child welfare practices
that resulted in the separation of large numbers of Indian children from their
families and tribes through adoption or foster care placement, usually in non-
Indian homes.’ ”].) ICWA defines an “ ‘Indian child’ ” as an “unmarried
person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian
tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological
child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); see § 224.1,
subd. (a) [adopting federal definition].)

6
In every dependency proceeding, the juvenile court and social services
agency have an “affirmative and continuing duty” to inquire whether a child
for whom a section 300 petition is or may be filed “is or may be an Indian
Child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a); accord, In re W.B. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 30, 53.)
This continuing duty “can be divided into three phases: the initial duty to
inquire, the duty of further inquiry, and the duty to provide formal ICWA
notice.” (In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566.) In the instant case, we
are concerned with the initial duty to inquire.
This duty arises at the referral stage when the reporting party is asked
whether it has “any information that the child may be an Indian child.”
(§ 224.2, subd. (a).) Once a child is received into temporary custody, the
initial duty to inquire includes asking the child, parents, legal guardian,

extended family members,8 and others who have an interest in the child
whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (b); see rule
5.481 [implementing § 224.2].) The juvenile court has a duty at the first
appearance of each parent to ask whether he or she “knows or has reason to
know that the child is an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (c).) The court must
also require each parent to complete form ICWA-020. (Rule 5.481(a)(2)(C).)
The juvenile court “ ‘has a responsibility to ascertain that the agency
has conducted an adequate investigation and cannot simply sign off on the
notices as legally adequate without doing so.’ ” (In re N.G. (2018)
27 Cal.App.5th 474, 484.) “If the court makes a finding that proper and

8 An “extended family member” is defined “by the law or custom of the
Indian child’s tribe or, in the absence of such law or custom, shall be a person
who has reached the age of eighteen and who is the Indian child’s
grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law,
niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2);
§ 224.1, subd. (c) [adopting federal definition].)
7
adequate further inquiry and due diligence . . . have been conducted and
there is no reason to know whether the child is an Indian child, the court may
make a finding that [ICWA] does not apply to the proceedings, subject to
reversal based on sufficiency of the evidence. The court shall reverse its
determination if it subsequently receives information providing reason to
believe that the child is an Indian child and order the social worker or
probation officer to conduct further inquiry pursuant to Section 224.3.”
(§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)
We review the juvenile court’s ICWA findings for substantial evidence.
(In re Hunter W. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1467.) We must uphold the
court’s orders and findings if any substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, supports them, and we resolve all conflicts in favor of
affirmance. (In re Alexzander C. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 438, 446 (Alexzander
C.).) The appellant “has the burden to show that the evidence was not
sufficient to support the findings and orders.” (Ibid.)
B. Analysis
Pursuant to its duty under section 224.2, Agency acted properly when,
at the commencement of dependency, it asked Parents whether they had any
Native American ancestry. They each denied having any knowledge of such
ancestry in their respective families. However, as Agency concedes, there is
no evidence that it made this same inquiry with paternal grandmother or
maternal uncle, despite the fact Agency was in contact with each, including
discussing placement of, and a safety plan for, M.C. The paternal
grandmother and maternal uncle both qualify as an “extended family
member” of M.C., and therefore Agency had a duty of inquiry as to them that
was unmet. (See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c).)

8
We therefore conclude the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did not
apply was not supported by substantial evidence that Agency conducted an
adequate, proper, and diligent inquiry, and its contrary conclusion was an
abuse of discretion. (See § 224.2, subd. (a); accord, Isaiah W., supra,
1 Cal.5th at p. 12 [juvenile court has ongoing obligation to ensure the social
services agency fulfills its continuing inquiry duties]; In re K.R. (2018)
20 Cal.App.5th 701, 709 [“a social services agency has the obligation to make
a meaningful effort to locate and interview extended family members to
obtain whatever information they may have as to the child’s possible Indian
status”]; see also Alexzander C., supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 446 [a finding
that ICWA does not apply must be supported by substantial evidence].)
We further conclude this error was prejudicial. “[W]here the
opportunity to gather the relevant information critical to determining
whether the child is or may be an Indian child is lost because there has not
been adequate inquiry and due diligence, reversal for correction is generally
the only effective safeguard.” (In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566, 610.)
Here, Agency admitted its inquiry fell “short of that required to gather the
information needed to meaningfully safeguard the rights of the tribes, as
intended under ICWA and California law.” (See id. at p. 620.) “Where a
record is silent or nearly silent with respect to an ICWA inquiry at the first
step, a finding of harmlessness necessarily rests on speculation” and “is at
odds with the statutory protections that ICWA and California law intend to
afford Indian children and Indian tribes.” (Id. at p. 611.)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s February 13, 2024 order terminating parental
rights is conditionally reversed, and the matter is remanded with directions
that Agency comply with the inquiry and documentation provisions under

9
ICWA and California law. The court shall order that, within 30 days of the
remittitur, Agency shall perform its inquiry of M.C.’s potential Native
American ancestry. If, after completing the initial inquiry, there is no reason
to believe that M.C. is an Indian child, the court shall reinstate its order
terminating parental rights. If the inquiry produces information
substantiating Native American ancestry, the court shall vacate the order
and proceed in compliance with ICWA and related California law.

McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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