CourtListener 9623267•People v. Wong CA1/1
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Filed 6/20/24 P. v. Wong CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A168706
v.
ANDREW WONG, (Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. 163657)
Defendant and Appellant.
Andrew Wong appeals from an order denying his motion for a hearing
to preserve evidence for a future youth offender parole hearing. Wong is
serving a sentence of life without parole, plus 50 years, for murders he
committed when he was 19 and 20 years old. He contends that excluding
youthful offenders who are serving life without parole sentences from youth
offender parole hearings, while providing those hearings to other youthful
offenders who were between 18 and 25 years old when they committed their
crime, violates the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment.
Alternatively, he contends the denial of such hearings for youthful offender
life without parole prisoners violates federal and state constitutional
prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. Applying recent and
well-established precedent, we disagree and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2008, Wong, then 19 years old, shot and killed his bookie. The next
year, Wong shot and killed his coworker, who acted as a go-between for him
with another bookie. In 2012, a jury convicted Wong of two counts of murder
(Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)) with a multiple murder special circumstance
finding (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)). He was sentenced to life without the possibility
of parole, plus 50 years. In 2015, we affirmed the judgment. (People v. Wong
(June 16, 2015, A137584) [nonpub. opn.].)
In July 2023, Wong moved for a hearing to preserve evidence for use at
a future youth offender parole hearing pursuant to section 1203.01. (People
v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261; In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439.) The trial
court denied the motion, finding he was ineligible for a youth offender parole
hearing under section 3051, subdivision (h) because he was older than 18
when he committed the crimes.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Youth Offender Parole Statute
“California’s youth offender parole statute offers opportunities for early
release to certain persons who are incarcerated for crimes they committed at
a young age. (Pen. Code, §§ 3051, 4801.) When it was first enacted in 2013,
the statute applied only to individuals who committed their crimes before the
age of 18; the purpose of the statute was to align California law with then-
recent court decisions identifying Eighth Amendment limitations on life
without parole sentences for juvenile offenders. In more recent years,
however, the Legislature has expanded the statute to include certain young
adult offenders as well. Under the current version of the statute, most
persons incarcerated for a crime committed between ages 18 and 25 are
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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entitled to a parole hearing during the 15th, 20th, or 25th year of their
incarceration. (Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (b).) But not all youthful offenders
are eligible for parole hearings. The statute excludes, among others,
offenders who are serving sentences of life in prison without the possibility of
parole for a crime committed after the age of 18. (Id., subd. (h).)” (People v.
Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 838–839.)
1. Equal Protection
Wong first argues section 3051, subdivision (h) violates the federal
constitutional guarantee of equal protection by excluding youthful offenders
serving life without parole sentences from being eligible for a youth offender
parole hearing. After he filed his opening brief, however, the California
Supreme Court held section 3051’s exclusion of youthful offenders serving life
without parole from the youthful offender parole scheme does not violate
equal protection. (People v. Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 839.) In his reply
brief, Wong acknowledges this court is bound by Hardin. (Auto Equity Sales,
Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455–456.) Therefore, we reject
Wong’s equal protection challenge to section 3051.
2. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Wong also argues that imposing life without parole sentences on
youthful offenders without considering mitigating youth-related factors
violates federal and state proscriptions against cruel and unusual
punishment. This argument has been rejected by both state and federal
courts.
“The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution ‘guarantees
individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions’ and ‘flows
from the basic “ ‘precept of justice that punishment for crime should be
graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.’ ” ’ [Citation.] To determine
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whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, ‘courts must look beyond
historical conceptions to “ ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘This is because “[t]he standard
of extreme cruelty is not merely descriptive, but necessarily embodies a moral
judgment. The standard itself remains the same, but its applicability must
change as the basic mores of society change.” ’ ” (People v. Montelongo (2020)
55 Cal.App.5th 1016, 1030 (Montelongo).) The “Eighth Amendment ‘forbids
only extreme sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime.’ ”
(People v. Edwards (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 183, 190 (Edwards).)
“ ‘ “Article I, section 17, of the California Constitution separately and
independently lays down the same prohibition.” ’ ” (Edwards, supra,
34 Cal.App.5th at p. 191.) “California’s prohibition on ‘cruel or unusual
punishment’ [citation] has been read to bar any sentence ‘ “so
disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the
conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” ’ ” (People v.
Brewer (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 199, 213.) The federal and state approaches to
cruel and unusual punishment claims largely “overlap,” both using “ ‘gross
proportionality’ ” as their “ ‘touchstone.’ ” (People v. Baker (2018)
20 Cal.App.5th 711, 733.)
Whether a punishment is cruel or unusual is a question of law, which
we review de novo. (Edwards, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 190.) “Whether a
particular punishment is disproportionate to the offense is, of course, a
question of degree. The choice of fitting and proper penalties is not an exact
science, but a legislative skill involving an appraisal of the evils to be
corrected, the weighing of practical alternatives, consideration of relevant
policy factors, and responsiveness to the public will; in appropriate cases,
some leeway for experimentation may also be permissible. The judiciary,
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accordingly, should not interfere in this process unless a statute prescribes a
penalty ‘out of all proportion to the offense’ [citations], i.e., so severe in
relation to the crime as to violate the prohibition against cruel or unusual
punishment.” (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 423–424.)
Whether a sentence is “grossly disproportionate” to an offense is
measured by the “ ‘circumstances existing at the time of the offense.’ ” (In re
Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427, 437.) “ ‘ “[A] petitioner attacking his
sentence as cruel or unusual must demonstrate his punishment is
disproportionate in light of (1) the nature of the offense and defendant's
background, (2) the punishment for more serious offenses, or (3) punishment
for similar offenses in other jurisdictions.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “In examining the
nature of the offender, we consider ‘ “whether ‘the punishment is grossly
disproportionate to the defendant’s individual culpability as shown by such
factors as his age, prior criminality, personal characteristics, and state of
mind.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Gomez (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 493, 500.) Wong contends
that his life without parole sentence is cruel and unusual because he was
only 19 and 20 years old at the time he committed the murders.
California statutory and case law establish a bright-line rule that
18 year olds are treated as adults, not juveniles. Section 3051 was enacted by
California’s Legislature in 2013 to align with the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460. (Stats. 2013,
ch. 312, § 1.) The Miller court held “the Eighth Amendment forbids a
sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole
for juvenile offenders.” (Id. at p. 479.) In doing so, Miller observed that
“ ‘developments in psychology and brain science continue to show
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds’ ” and that “those
findings—of transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess
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consequences—both lessened a child’s ‘moral culpability’ and enhanced the
prospect that, as the years go by and neurological development occurs, [his or
her] ‘ “deficiencies will be reformed.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 471–472.)
Shortly after Miller, the California Supreme Court held that sentencing
a juvenile to a term functionally equivalent to life without parole for a
nonhomicide crime also violated the Eighth Amendment. (People v. Caballero
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 267–268.) But more broadly, California courts have
not extended Miller’s rationale to cases involving youthful offenders.
(Montelongo, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1031–1032 [collecting cases].)
Wong’s reliance on cases from other jurisdictions does not persuade us
to do so. For example, in People v. Wilder (Colo. Ct.App. 2016) 371 P.3d 727,
the Colorado Court of Appeal held that a sentence of life without the
possibility of parole for a 17-year-old juvenile violated the Eighth
Amendment, and it vacated the sentence and remanded the case to the trial
court for proper consideration of the defendant’s “ ‘youth and attendant
characteristics.’ ” (Wilder, at p. 729.)
Similarly, in People v. Parks (Mich. 2022) 987 N.W.2d 161, the
Michigan Supreme Court held that the state “Constitution requires that 18-
year-olds convicted of first-degree murder receive the same individualized
sentencing procedure . . . as juveniles who have committed first-degree
murder, instead of being subjected to a mandatory life-without-parole
sentence like other older adults.” (Id. at p. 171.) In reaching its holding, the
Parks court conducted a proportionality analysis under the state’s cruel and
unusual punishment clause that was interpreted to provide broader
protection than the federal Eighth Amendment. (Parks, at pp. 176–182.)
Moreover, Parks is limited to 18 year olds based on the fact that “their
neurological characteristics are identical to those of juveniles.” (Id. at
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pp. 182–183.) Wilder and Parks do not help Wong. They apply only to
juveniles and 18 year olds, whereas Wong was 19 and 20 at the time of his
offenses.
Lastly, in Commonwealth v. Mattis (Mass. 2024) 224 N.E.3d 410, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court held that “a sentence of life without the
possibility of parole for emerging adult offenders,” meaning those who are 18,
19, and 20 years old, violates article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights. (Mattis, at pp. 415, 428.) The Mattis court based its decision on
precedent and its perception of contemporary standards of decency. (Id. at
p. 415.) Like Michigan, the Massachusetts Supreme Court had interpreted
its constitutional prohibition of cruel or unusual punishment more broadly
than the federal Eighth Amendment, and following its precedent held that
“sentencing a juvenile to life without parole in any circumstance would
violate art. 26.” (Mattis, at p. 415.)
While evolving standards of decency—in California and elsewhere—
may lead to a change that forbids sentencing youthful offenders to life terms
without parole, it is not our role to do so. (See In re Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at
pp. 423–424.) “Our nation’s, and our state’s, highest court have concluded 18
years old is the bright-line rule and we are bound by their holdings.” (People
v. Perez (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 612, 617.) “Unless and until the United States
Supreme Court, the California Supreme Court, the Legislature, or the voters
by initiative change the law, we are bound to apply it.” (Montelongo, supra,
55 Cal.App.5th at p. 1032.)
The weight of California and Untied States Supreme Court authority
requires that we reject Wong’s challenge to section 3051’s exclusion of
youthful offenders as violative of the cruel and unusual punishments clauses
of the federal and state Constitutions.
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III. DISPOSITION
The order denying Wong’s motion pursuant to section 1203.01 to
preserve evidence for a youth offender parole hearing is affirmed.
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SIGGINS, J.*
WE CONCUR:
HUMES, P. J.
LANGHORNE WILSON, J.
A168706
People v. Wong
* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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