People v. Mitchell CA2/6

CourtListener 9567548CalctappJun 17, 2024

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Filed 6/17/24 P. v. Mitchell CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B329199
(Super. Ct. No. SM105565)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)

v.

GREGORY DEAN
MITCHELL,

Defendant and Appellant.

Gregory Dean Mitchell appeals from two postjudgment
orders. The first appeal is from the trial court’s order denying
appellant’s motion to preserve evidence for purposes of a possible
youth offender parole hearing. (Pen. Code, §§ 1203.01, 3051; In
re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439.)1 The second appeal is from the

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
trial court’s order denying appellant’s petition for resentencing.
(§ 1172.6.) We affirm in part and dismiss in part.2
Procedural Background3
In 1999, a jury convicted appellant of murder (§ 187, subd.
(a)), robbery (§ 211), burglary (§ 459), and assault with a firearm
(§ 245, subd. (a)). The jury also found true the special
circumstance allegations that the murder was committed during
a robbery and a burglary. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) Appellant was
sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP).
In 2023, appellant filed a motion in propria persona
requesting a hearing to preserve evidence for a possible youth
offender parole hearing pursuant to section 3051. The trial court
denied the motion because appellant was 18 years old at the time
of the controlling offense, was sentenced to LWOP, and was
therefore statutorily ineligible for a youth offender parole
hearing. (§ 3051, subds. (b)(4), (h).)

2 Appellant did not provide briefing as to the section 1172.6
appeal. We notified appellant’s counsel and invited additional
briefing. After further review of the record, counsel declined to
submit additional briefing addressing the section 1172.6 appeal.
We thus deem the appeal abandoned and dismiss it. (See People
v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 [if a party fails to provide
legal argument and citations to authority on a point, “‘the court
may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration’”]; In re
Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 994 [court may deem appeal
abandoned where appellant does not raise claims of reversible
error or other defect or present argument and authority on each
point made].)

3 We need not provide a recitation of the facts underlying
appellant’s controlling offense because his appeal raises “purely
legal issues.”

2
Discussion
“California’s youth offender parole statute offers
opportunities for early release to certain persons who are
incarcerated for crimes they committed at a young age.
[Citations.] . . . Under the current version of the statute, most
persons incarcerated for a crime committed between ages 18 and
25 are entitled to a parole hearing during the 15th, 20th, or 25th
year of their incarceration. [Citation]. But not all youthful
offenders are eligible for parole hearings. The statute excludes,
among others, offenders who are serving sentences of life in
prison without the possibility of parole for a crime committed
after the age of 18. ([§ 3051,] subd. (h).)” (People v. Hardin
(2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 838-839 (Hardin).)
Appellant contends section 3051, subdivision (h) violates
equal protection under the federal and state constitutions by
denying a parole hearing to youthful offenders, like appellant,
who have been sentenced to LWOP. He makes a number of
arguments in support of this contention, including that relative
culpability is not a rational basis for excluding some youthful
offenders from entitlement to a parole hearing. Appellant relies
on People v. Hardin (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 273, review granted
Jan. 11, 2023, S277487, which held that section 3051’s distinction
between youthful offenders with LWOP sentences and non-
LWOP sentences violates equal protection.
While this appeal was pending, and after briefing was
complete, the California Supreme Court decided Hardin, supra,
15 Cal.5th 834, holding section 3051’s exclusion of youthful
offenders sentenced to LWOP withstands rational basis scrutiny
and does not violate constitutional guarantees of equal
protection. (Id. at pp. 838-839, 866.) Accordingly, appellant’s
equal protection claim fails.

3
Appellant next contends section 3051, subdivision (h)
violates federal and state constitutional bans against cruel and/or
unusual punishment. He contends that a mandatory LWOP
sentence for appellant and other young adults (1) is grossly
disproportionate to the offense because it ignores the hallmark
features of their youth and potential for rehabilitation, (2) fails to
conform to evolving standards of decency, and (3) is statistically
imposed more often on Black young adult offenders, like
appellant.
For support, appellant cites Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567
U.S. 460 and several other judicial decisions. However, those
cases address sentencing issues involving juvenile offenders
under the age of 18 years. For example, Miller held that
“mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at
the time of their crime[] violates the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’” (Id., at p. 465.)
Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, barred capital
punishment for juvenile offenders, and Graham v. Florida (2010)
560 U.S. 48, barred LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders in
nonhomicide offenses.
The California Supreme Court has foreclosed similar
arguments in the context of the death penalty. For example, the
Court has held that adult offenders between the ages of 18 and
25 can constitutionally receive the death penalty. (See People v.
Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 404-405; People v. Tran (2022)
13 Cal.5th 1169, 1234-1235; People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371,
429-430; People v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 191-192.) It
follows that “[i]f the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit a
sentence of death for [18 year olds], then most assuredly, it does

4
not prohibit the lesser LWOP sentence.” (In re Williams (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 427, 439.)
Intermediate appellate courts have also rejected the claims
appellant makes here. (See People v. Acosta (2021) 60
Cal.App.5th 769, 781-782; People v. Windfield (2021) 59
Cal.App.5th 496, 525-527; People v. Montelongo (2020) 55
Cal.App.5th 1016, 1030-1032 [republished at 274 Cal.Rptr.3d
267].) As the court in Montelongo stated, “[u]nless and until the
United States Supreme Court, the California Supreme Court, the
Legislature, or the voters by initiative change the law, we are
bound to apply it.” (Montelongo, at p. 1032.)
We agree with these decisions and reject appellant’s
contentions to the contrary.
Disposition
The trial court’s order denying appellant’s motion for a
youth offender parole hearing is affirmed. The appeal from the
trial court’s order denying appellant’s petition for resentencing is
dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, Acting P. J.
We concur:

BALTODANO, J.

CODY, J.

5
Von N. Deroian, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
_____________________________

Mi Kim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, David E. Madeo, Charles S. Lee,
Michael C. Keller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

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