CourtListener 9567226•People v. Martinez CA2/5
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Filed 6/14/24 P. v. Martinez CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B332648
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA053146)
v.
ARMANDO MARTINEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Rogelio G. Delgado, Judge. Affirmed.
William G. Holzer, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
___________________________
In 2003, following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty
of one count of attempted premeditated murder. (Pen. Code,
§§ 664, 187, subd. (a).)1 The jury found true the allegation that
he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing
great bodily injury. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).) He was sentenced to
prison for life plus 25 years to life.2
In October 2022, defendant filed a petition for resentencing
pursuant to former section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6). The
trial court appointed counsel, who briefed the issue of defendant’s
eligibility for relief; the prosecution opposed the petition. The
prosecution’s opposition included as an exhibit the full set of jury
instructions given at defendant’s trial. These instructions
included CALJIC No. 8.66 (requiring the jury to find, for
attempted murder, that the person committing the attempt
“harbored express malice aforethought, namely a specific intent
to kill unlawfully a human being”); CALJIC No. 8.67 (requiring
the jury to find, for premeditation, that mental state on the part
of the “would-be slayer”); and CALJIC No. 8.40 (permitting the
jury to find defendant guilty of the lesser offense of attempted
voluntary manslaughter if there was an absence of malice). No
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2 At his trial, the jury also found true an allegation that
defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury within the
meaning of section 12022.7, and he was sentenced to an
additional term for this enhancement. On direct appeal, that
enhancement was stricken.
2
instructions on natural and probable consequences or aiding and
abetting were given.3
The trial court denied the resentencing petition on the
basis that the jury instructions and verdict forms established
that defendant had not established a prima facie case for
eligibility for resentencing.
Defendant appealed, and this court appointed counsel to
represent him. After examining the record, defendant’s attorney
filed an opening brief raising no issues and asking that we follow
the procedures set forth in People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th
216 (Delgadillo). We invited defendant to submit a supplemental
brief, which he did.
The bulk of the arguments raised in defendant’s
supplemental brief do not address his eligibility for resentencing
under section 1172.6 or have any bearing on whether he could
“presently be convicted of . . . attempted murder because of
changes to . . . section 188 or 189 made effective January 1,
3 Defendant argues that, in the prosecution’s opposition to
his resentencing petition, the prosecution acknowledged aiding
and abetting instructions were given. Defendant is mistaken.
He is relying on page 6 of the prosecution’s opposition, in which
the prosecution is quoting from People v. Coley (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548. The quote contains language in which
the Coley court notes aiding and abetting instructions had been
given in that case, and found those instructions insufficient to
justify resentencing. In any event, the prosecution was simply
quoting Coley, in which aiding and abetting instructions had been
given, not suggesting those instructions had been given in
defendant’s case.
3
2019.”4 (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) Rather, he raises arguments that
were raised, and rejected, in his initial appeal of his conviction.
Section 1172.6 provides no relief for trial error. (See, e.g., People
v. DeHuff (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 428, 438 [section 1172.6 ‘does not
permit a petitioner to establish eligibility on the basis of alleged
trial error’].) Accordingly, these arguments provide no basis for
reversal.
The few arguments defendant raises which directly
challenge the procedure on his section 1172.6 petition fare no
better. He suggests the trial court erred by not allowing him to
be present at the hearing, but his petition was denied as a matter
of law at the prima facie stage, where he had no right to be
present. (See People v. Simms (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 987, 998.)
He raises several other challenges – the failure to hold an
evidentiary hearing, the failure to allow him to submit a
statement in mitigation, ineffective assistance of counsel by not
raising additional facts – but none of these arguments defeat the
determination, as a matter of law, that defendant was convicted
on the basis that he personally committed the attempted murder
and acted with the mental state of express malice. As he could
not establish that he was convicted under the natural and
4 In fact, defendant attached to his supplemental brief a
declaration in support of his petition for resentencing, in which
he sets forth the facts of the offense and admits being the actual
shooter. While defendant argues that he did not possess the
intent to kill, and questions the evidence against him at trial, at
no point does he suggest that malice was imputed to him on a
natural and probable consequences theory.
4
probable consequences doctrine, his resentencing conviction was
properly denied.5
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s resentencing petition is
affirmed.
LEE, J.*
WE CONCUR:
MOOR, Acting P. J.
KIM, J.
5 Defendant highlights language in CALJIC No. 17.19.5, the
jury instruction given for the firearm enhancement, which states,
“A proximate cause of great bodily injury or death is an act or
omission that sets in motion a chain of events that produces as a
direct, natural and probable consequence of the act or omission
the great bodily injury or death.” (Brackets omitted.) The use of
“natural and probable consequence” language when discussing
the proximate cause of great bodily injury is not the same as the
“natural and probable consequences” doctrine which imputes
malice to the defendant based on his aiding and abetting a crime.
Only use of the latter is a basis for resentencing under section
1172.6.
* Judge of the San Bernardino County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
5
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