In re H.T. CA3

CourtListener 9541522CalctappJun 12, 2024

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Filed 6/12/24 In re H.T. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----

In re H.T., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court C098794
Law.

THE PEOPLE, (Super. Ct. No. JV140490)

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

H.T.,

Defendant and Appellant.

Minor H.T. admitted to forcibly committing a lewd and lascivious act on a child
under 14 and admitted the enhancement allegation that he personally inflicted great
bodily injury. He was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court and committed to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). After
the Legislature began the process of closing DJJ, the probation department filed a petition

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to set aside H.T.’s DJJ commitment and for a recall disposition hearing. Upon
conducting the hearing, the juvenile court committed H.T. to the Valley Oak Youth
Academy, Sacramento County’s secure youth treatment facility, with a baseline
commitment of two years and a maximum period of confinement of two years. On
appeal, H.T. asserts (1) the juvenile court abused its discretion because less restrictive
dispositional alternatives were available, and (2) predisposition custody credits should
have been applied against the baseline term, not the maximum term of confinement. We
affirm.
BACKGROUND
On November 26, 2019, Sacramento County Sheriff’s Office deputies responding
to a report of sexual abuse of a child spoke with a social worker who indicated the 11-
year-old victim, H.T.’s sister, was pregnant with H.T.’s child. The victim was 10 years
old at the time of conception. The victim told deputies that H.T., who was 17 years old at
the time, would wait until their parents were out of the house and he would hold her
down and force her to have vaginal intercourse with him against her will. This occurred
at least seven times. H.T. acknowledged having intercourse with the victim five to 10
times over the course of seven months. He claimed the intercourse was consensual.
However, he also acknowledged knowing it was wrong.
On June 10, 2021, the Sacramento County District Attorney filed an amended
juvenile wardship petition charging H.T. with one count of lewd and lascivious act on a
child under 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a); count one), one count of lewd and lascivious
act on a child under 14 by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and
unlawful bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1); count two), and seven counts of
rape by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful
bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2); counts three-nine). The petition further
alleged H.T. personally inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of count two.
(Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a).)

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On June 17, 2021, H.T. admitted to count two and admitted the truth of the
personal infliction of great bodily injury enhancement allegation. The juvenile court
dismissed the remaining counts, adjudged H.T. a ward of the court, and ordered him
committed to DJJ with juvenile jurisdiction to extend until the age of 25.
Beginning with Senate Bill No. 823 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), the Legislature began
the process of closing DJJ. (Stats. 2020, ch. 337.) On December 12, 2022, the probation
department filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 731.1 to set
aside H.T.’s DJJ commitment and for a recall disposition hearing.
A probation department memorandum filed on February 21, 2023, stated H.T. had
been participating in a sexual behavior treatment program, and that he was on stage two
of the seven-stage program. He also participated in a skill-of-the-week program and had
graduated from a high school program. He was employed in a youth correctional kitchen
as a crew member and expressed interest in a career in culinary arts. His overall risk was
most recently assessed as low, his overall need was moderate, and his overall strength
was moderate. The overall risk and overall need assessments were both improvements
from an evaluation performed approximately 11 months earlier. H.T. had not received
any level two or level three disciplinary behavior reports since his commitment to DJJ.
Recommendations included that H.T. continue sex offender treatment, “as he did not
complete his mandated Sexual Behavior Treatment Program prior to discharge from
DJJ,” and that he be continued as a ward committed to the Sacramento County secure
youth treatment facility.
On March 23, 2023, the juvenile court granted the petition, recalled H.T.’s
commitment, and scheduled a recall disposition hearing. The probation department filed
an updated memorandum with the court on May 11, 2023. The updated memorandum

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

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contained information consistent with the prior memorandum concerning H.T.’s
programming and assessments. It also contained discussions addressed to each of the
five statutory criteria to be considered by the court, discussed below. (§ 875, subd.
(a)(3)(A)-(E).)
In H.T.’s memorandum of points and authorities, he disagreed with the probation
department’s recommendation, asserting a less restrictive option could provide for his
treatment needs while maintaining public safety. H.T. asserted there was no rehabilitative
need to continue his confinement in a facility away from his family rather than having
him participate in treatment and family counseling in the community. In addition to the
circumstances of his programming, behavior, and compliance, H.T. relied on scientific
data showing that commitment would be contrary to the juvenile court’s rehabilitative
goals and compound the harms caused by confinement, and which supported the position
that noncustodial disposition is preferable wherever available and appropriate.
The district attorney agreed with the probation department’s recommendation.
The district attorney emphasized July 20, 2022 log entries indicating that, while H.T.
acknowledged what he did, he did not believe his offenses were violent. Rather, he only
admitted getting his sister pregnant and he maintained the sexual acts were consensual.
H.T. “demonstrated very little insight.” The district attorney concluded there was no
suitable less restrictive alternative that would meet H.T.’s needs and satisfy the need for
public safety.
At the May 23, 2023 recall disposition hearing, the juvenile court noted it had
reviewed each of these filings. The court noted H.T. had made progress, but stated he
still “need[ed] time.” The court’s tentative ruling was that H.T. would be committed to
the secure youth treatment facility.
In her argument, H.T.’s attorney emphasized the court was required to decide
whether there was no suitable, less restrictive alternative based on the five statutory
criteria. Counsel stated that, other than stating H.T. needed more time, the court had

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failed to identify any factors indicating there was no suitable alternative in the
community. She also emphasized that nothing in the statutes stated an individual must be
fully rehabilitated before being released into the community. Counsel emphasized it was
not H.T.’s position that he should not do the programming; the question was where to do
the programming. Counsel reiterated, “he’s done remarkabl[y] in custody, and so I don’t
think the Court is truly looking at the factors to make the determination that the only
option for [H.T.] to engage in services right now is for him to be in a locked jail.”
The court recited the five statutory criteria to be considered (§ 875, subd.
(a)(3)(A)-(E)), and encouraged H.T.’s appointed counsel to address the factors that
supported her argument. She responded that she had sufficiently addressed the factors in
her brief, asserted the court was “declining to engage in a thorough analysis of these
factors in order to come to its conclusion that [H.T.] needs to be in a locked facility,” and
shifted focus to custody credits.
The court stated it had “considered the severity of the offense, the success of
previous attempts to rehabilitate[,] the programming, treatment, education offered in [the
Sacramento County secure youth treatment facility], the community safety of some less
restrictive disposition and the appropriateness of confinement in” the Sacramento County
secure youth treatment facility. (See § 875 subd. (a)(3)(A)-(E).) The court stated it had
reviewed the report of the probation department, and it adopted the recommendations and
findings in that report. The minute order recited that, upon consideration of the statutory
criteria (see § 875, subd. (a)(3)(A)-(E)), the court determined a less restrictive alternative
was not suitable for H.T.’s rehabilitation, treatment, and education. H.T. was to continue
as a ward of the juvenile court pursuant to section 725, subdivision (b). The court
committed H.T. to the Valley Oak Youth Academy with a baseline commitment of two
years and a maximum term of confinement of two years, noting the maximum exposure
was 11 years. H.T. timely appealed, filing his notice of appeal in May 2023. His opening

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brief was filed in October 2023, and the matter became fully briefed on February 26,
2024.
DISCUSSION
I
Commitment to the Secure Youth Treatment Facility
H.T. asserts the juvenile court abused its discretion because less restrictive
dispositional alternatives were suitable. According to H.T., while there are five statutory
criteria for the juvenile court to consider in deciding on its disposition, the record
demonstrates the court here was focused on the severity of his offense and the fact that he
had not yet completed all seven steps of his DJJ sexual behavior treatment program. We
conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion, as its determination was
supported by substantial evidence.
“ ‘ “We review a juvenile court’s commitment decision for abuse of discretion,
indulging all reasonable inferences to support its decision.” [Citation.] “ ‘[D]iscretion is
abused whenever the court exceeds the bounds of all reason, all of the circumstances
being considered.’ ” [Citation.] We will not disturb the juvenile court’s findings when
there is substantial evidence to support them. [Citation.] “ ‘In determining whether there
was substantial evidence to support the commitment, we must examine the record
presented at the disposition hearing in light of the purposes of the Juvenile Court
Law.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘A trial court abuses its discretion when the factual findings critical
to its decision find no support in the evidence.’ ” (In re Khalid B. (2015)
233 Cal.App.4th 1285, 1288.) “The purpose of the juvenile court is to protect both the
minor under its jurisdiction and the public, and to preserve and strengthen the minor’s
family ties whenever possible.” (In re Walter P. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 95, 99; see
§ 202, subd. (a).) “Central to the juvenile court’s mission are the care, treatment,
guidance, and rehabilitation of the delinquent juvenile.” (In re Walter P., at p. 99; see
§ 202, subd. (b).)

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A juvenile court may order that a minor be committed to a secure youth treatment
facility for a period of confinement if, among other things, the “court has made a finding
on the record that a less restrictive, alternative disposition for the ward is unsuitable.”
(§ 875, subd. (a)(3).) In making such a commitment determination, the juvenile court
must consider: “(A) The severity of the offense or offenses for which the ward has been
most recently adjudicated, including the ward’s role in the offense, the ward’s behavior,
and harm done to victims. [¶] (B) The ward’s previous delinquent history, including the
adequacy and success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the ward.
[¶] (C) Whether the programming, treatment, and education offered and provided in a
secure youth treatment facility is appropriate to meet the treatment and security needs of
the ward. [¶] (D) Whether the goals of rehabilitation and community safety can be met
by assigning the ward to an alternative, less restrictive disposition that is available to the
court. [¶] (E) The ward’s age, developmental maturity, mental and emotional health,
sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, and any disabilities or special needs
affecting the safety or suitability of committing the ward to a term of confinement in a
secure youth treatment facility.” (§ 875, subd. (a)(3)(A)-(E).)
The juvenile court considered the first factor, the severity of the offense. (§ 875,
subd. (a)(3)(A).) In fact, H.T.’s contention is that the court considered that factor to the
exclusion of others, or at least accorded too much weight to it. In any event, H.T.’s
offense was indeed severe. He forcibly committed a lewd and lascivious act on a child
under 14, and, in the commission of the offense, he personally inflicted great bodily
injury on the victim. The victim was his sister and, when she was 10 years old, he forced
her to have intercourse and got her pregnant. According to his own admission, he had
intercourse with her five to 10 times.
H.T. did not have a previous delinquent history. However, the juvenile court did
consider the “adequacy and success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to
rehabilitate” H.T. (§ 875, subd. (a)(3)(B)), in the sense of addressing his time at DJJ since

7
his 2021 commitment. The court noted H.T. had “made progress in his rehabilitation, his
performance at [DJJ] was, I think, very positive. He has begun to make progress towards
rehabilitation, but he’s moving in the direction.” The probation department’s initial
memorandum stated H.T. participated in a skill-of-the-week program and had graduated
high school. He was employed as a kitchen crew member and expressed interest in a
career in culinary arts. H.T.’s overall risk was low, his overall need was moderate, and
his overall strength was moderate, and the former two classifications were improvements
from an earlier evaluation. H.T. had not received any level two or level three disciplinary
reports. Conversely, it was the court’s assessment, at least tentatively, that H.T. “still
does need time.” The probation department’s initial memorandum stated H.T. was on
stage two of the seven-stage sexual behavior treatment program. Additionally, according
to the log entry dated July 20, 2022, more than a year after his commitment, while H.T.
had acknowledged what he did, he did not believe his offense was violent. He only
admitted getting his sister pregnant, and he maintained the sexual acts were consensual.
He had “not yet made the connections of his controlling and manipulative behaviors
towards his victim both before and during the attacks.” He did not admit the violence
and aggressiveness of his offense. The log stated H.T. “demonstrated very little insight.”
The court considered whether “the programming, treatment, and education offered
and provided in a secure youth treatment facility is appropriate to meet the treatment and
security needs of” H.T. (§ 875, subd. (a)(3)(C)), and stated it had “information that would
suggest that it is.” Both of the probation department’s memoranda contained pages-long
discussions of the Sacramento County secure youth treatment facility. These discussions
included an overview and a discussion of the ward’s probable benefit, including
subsections addressing behavior treatment program interventions, mental health treatment
programs, the sexual behavior treatment program, academics, vocational matters, and
reentry.

8
The court stated it had considered whether “the goals of rehabilitation and
community safety can be met by assigning the ward to an alternative, less restrictive
disposition.” (§ 875, subd. (a)(3)(D).) The probation department’s updated
memorandum stated H.T. had not completed the sexual behavior treatment program that
was “geared towards targeting his high area needs.” The memorandum again emphasized
H.T.’s opinions that the offense was consensual and that the victim may be responsible
for her participation. The memorandum continued: H.T. “would benefit from continued
Sexual Behavior Treatment to address these ideations and include further education in
consent and victim empathy. Furthermore, [H.T.] would benefit from individual
counseling services to address his childhood trauma. Therefore, as [H.T.] continues to
have therapeutic needs that have yet to be addressed and/or met, an alternative or less
restrictive disposition for the youth is not appropriate at this time.”
Finally, with regard to the criterion addressed, among other things, to H.T.’s “age,
developmental maturity, [and] mental and emotional health . . . affecting the safety or
suitability of committing the ward to a term of confinement in a secure youth treatment
facility” (§ 875, subd. (a)(3)(E)), the updated memorandum recited facts concerning
H.T.’s upbringing and stated, although H.T. “and his mother denied any history of trauma,
[H.T.’s] therapeutic team at DJJ encouraged him to continue services working on his
childhood trauma and how it may impact his decision making skills and emotional
wellbeing.”
The court stated that it had “reviewed the report and adopt[ed] the
recommendations and finding[s]” in the report. The recommendation in the updated
report stated in part: “The youth has not completed a Sexual Behavior Treatment
Program while in custody. Although the youth has admitted he should not have
committed the offense, he has displayed a lack of understanding of the concept of
‘consent’ and how coercion and manipulation are linked to his level of aggression.
Although the youth has shown significant progress in working on these concepts, he

9
continues to have high risk areas of need that have not yet been met and/or addressed. [¶]
Should the youth be order[ed] to [the secure youth treatment facility], probation will
convene a multidisciplinary team made up of professionals from Probation, Social
Services, Behavioral Health, and the Sacramento County Office of Education . . . to assist
in the development of the youth’s Individual Rehabilitation Plan . . . and to assist in the
youth’s re-entry process or step-down planning.” The report recommended H.T. be
continued a ward of the juvenile court and committed to Sacramento County’s secure
youth treatment facility. Among the findings, which the court adopted, the report stated
the court had “considered all the criteria as to the appropriate disposition for the subject
and has determined a less restrictive alternative is unsuitable for the rehabilitation,
treatment, and education of the subject.”
Based on the foregoing, the record establishes the juvenile court considered the
requisite statutory criteria (§ 875, subd. (a)(3)(A)-(E)) and concluded less restrictive
options were not suitable. Substantial evidence, discussed at length above, supports the
court’s determination.
The fact that the juvenile court addressed specific concerns about the severity of
H.T.’s offense and that H.T. was only on the second stage of his seven-stage sexual
behavior treatment program at DJJ does not establish the court failed to weigh, or accord
sufficient weight to, other criteria, and the record establishes that it did not. The fact that
H.T. has progressed and performed well in some aspects of his programming, while
commendable, does not establish substantial evidence does not otherwise support the
juvenile court’s determination.
H.T. relies on In re Michael R. (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 327, 340, in asserting the
“juvenile court law requires that a minor be given the opportunity to succeed in other,
less imposing programs before being ordered to the most restrictive program.” This was
not the holding of Michael R. That court stated: “[C]amp placement, a less restrictive
alternative, was an appropriate disposition since it fulfilled all the purposes of the

10
Juvenile Court Law. Accordingly, the [California Youth Authority][2] commitment of this
first offender solely on the basis of the seriousness of the offense was an abuse of
discretion. We do not hold that a juvenile court can never send a first offender to the
[California Youth Authority]. All we hold is that the juvenile court must consider each
individual case on its merits without a mechanized approach based solely on the
seriousness of the offense and must evaluate the appropriateness of the available lesser
alternative dispositions in light of the purposes of the Juvenile Court Law.” (Ibid., fn.
omitted, italics added.)
Here, the juvenile court made its individualized determination that less restrictive
alternatives were not suitable in light of the purposes of the juvenile court law. Based on
the record, the court did not abuse its discretion.
II
Application of Custody Credits
As his attorney argued before the juvenile court, H.T. asserts his predisposition
custody credits should have been applied against the baseline term rather than the
maximum term of confinement. He asserts that a consistent reading of section 875, case
law, and the rule of lenity all support the conclusion that his custody credits should be
applied against his baseline term. H.T. also asserts that equal protection principles
demand minors ordered to secure youth treatment facilities must be afforded the same
protections as minors formerly ordered to DJJ. We conclude the plain language of
section 875 requires juvenile courts to apply precommitment custody credits to the
maximum term of confinement, not the baseline term, and further that the statute does not
violate equal protection principles.

2 The California Youth Authority was the predecessor to DJJ. (In re Ernesto L. (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 31, 40 (Ernesto L.).)

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A. Statutory Interpretation of Section 875
We review matters involving statutory interpretation de novo. (In re Antoine D.
(2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1314, 1320.) “ ‘ “Under settled canons of statutory construction,
in construing a statute we ascertain the Legislature’s intent in order to effectuate the law’s
purpose. [Citation.] We must look to the statute’s words and give them their usual and
ordinary meaning. [Citation.] The statute’s plain meaning controls the court’s
interpretation unless its words are ambiguous.” [Citations.] If the words in the statute do
not, by themselves, provide a reliable indicator of legislative intent, “[s]tatutory
ambiguities often may be resolved by examining the context in which the language
appears and adopting the construction which best serves to harmonize the statute
internally and with related statutes.” ’ ” (People v. Lucero (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 370,
394-395.) “ ‘If the statute is ambiguous, we may consider a variety of extrinsic aids,
including legislative history, the statute’s purpose, and public policy.’ ” (Id. at p. 395.)
“In making its order of commitment for a ward, the court shall set a baseline term
of confinement for the ward that is based on the most serious recent offense for which the
ward has been adjudicated. The baseline term of confinement shall represent the time in
custody necessary to meet the developmental and treatment needs of the ward and to
prepare the ward for discharge to a period of probation supervision in the community.”
(§ 875, subd. (b)(1).)
In addition to setting the baseline term, “the court shall additionally set a
maximum term of confinement for the ward based upon the facts and circumstances of
the matter or matters that brought or continued the ward under the jurisdiction of the
court and as deemed appropriate to achieve rehabilitation. The maximum term of
confinement shall represent the longest term of confinement in a facility that the ward
may serve . . . .” (§ 875, subd. (c)(1).)
The plain language of section 875 requires juvenile courts to apply
precommitment custody credits to the maximum term of confinement, not the baseline

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term: “Precommitment credits for time served must be applied against the maximum
term of confinement as set pursuant to this subdivision.” (§ 875, subd. (c)(1)(C); see In
re M.B. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 435, 470 [“we think it is clear the application of
precommitment credits against the baseline term is not intended”].) Where statutory
language is clear, we must follow its plain meaning “ ‘ “ ‘unless a literal interpretation
would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend.’ ” ’ ” (In re N.R.
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 538.) H.T. has not established that following the plain meaning of
section 875 leads to absurd results not intended by the Legislature.
H.T. relies on Ernesto L., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th 31. That court held that “when a
minor is committed to DJJ, a juvenile court must apply the minor’s precommitment
credits against the maximum custodial term.” (Id. at p. 34, fn. omitted.) H.T. asserts that
the secure youth treatment facilities did not merely de facto replace DJJ, but did so
expressly. Thus, provisions pertaining to former DJJ commitments were to be applied
toward commitment to a secure youth treatment facility. And, according to H.T., the
“reasoning of Ernesto L.,” while decided under a different statutory scheme, “is directly
applicable to the question in” this case. We disagree.
Ernesto L. concerned a commitment to the DJJ under section 731, whereas here,
H.T. was committed to a secure youth treatment facility under section 875. Section 731
governs the actual maximum custodial term that a youth committed to DJJ can serve, by
specifically limiting the maximum term to the “middle term of imprisonment that could
be imposed upon an adult convicted of the same offense.” (§ 731, subd. (b).) Unlike
section 731, which is silent as to the application of precommitment custody credits, the
plain language of section 875 makes explicitly clear that the juvenile court must apply
precommitment custody credits against the maximum term of confinement, not the
baseline term. (§ 875, subd. (c)(1)(C).)
Moreover, the juvenile court is required to “schedule and hold a progress review
hearing for the ward not less frequently than once every six months. In the review

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hearing, the court shall evaluate the ward’s progress in relation to the rehabilitation plan
and shall determine whether the baseline term of confinement is to be modified. . . . At
the conclusion of each review hearing, upon making a finding on the record, the court
may order that the ward remain in custody for the remainder of the baseline term or may
order that the ward’s baseline term or previously modified baseline term be modified
downward by a reduction of confinement time not to exceed six months for each review
hearing. The court may additionally order that the ward be assigned to a less restrictive
program, as provided in subdivision (f).” (§ 875, subd. (e)(1)(A).) Thus, the baseline
term is subject to modification at hearings held at least every six months. As such, the
baseline term is not equivalent to the maximum custodial term set under section 731 and
addressed in Ernesto L., and we decline to apply Ernesto L. to baseline terms governed
by section 875.
B. Equal Protection
Both the California and federal Constitutions “extend to persons the equal
protection of law.” (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 287; see U.S. Const., 14th
Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a).) “[W]hen a statute involves neither a suspect
classification nor a fundamental right, the ‘general rule is that legislation is presumed to
be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally
related to a legitimate state interest.’ ” (People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 847.)
We reject H.T.’s equal protection claim because the two groups identified by H.T. are not
treated differently.
For the reasons stated in In re M.B., supra, 99 Cal.App.5th 435, the two statutory
schemes do not treat differently the groups identified by H.T.: juveniles subject to DJJ
commitment under section 731 and juveniles subject to commitment at county secure
youth treatment facilities under section 875. Both limit the maximum exposure in the
same manner. (In re M.B., at pp. 466-467; §§ 726, subd. (d)(1), 875, subds. (c)(1)(B),
(i).) Both afford the juvenile courts discretion to set a maximum term of confinement

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that is lower than the middle term of the sentencing triad that is the statutory maximum.
(In re M.B., at p. 467; §§ 731, subd. (b), 875, subd. (c)(1).) And, under each scheme,
“precommitment credits are to be applied against the potentially lower maximum term set
by the court.” (In re M.B., at p. 467; § 875, subd. (c)(1)(C); see also Ernesto L., supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 41-42.)
Lastly, the People claim the juvenile court failed to calculate H.T.’s custody credits
and therefore remand is warranted. However, the probation department’s updated
memorandum specified H.T. was entitled to 1,270 days of custody credits, the court
adopted the memorandum’s findings and recommendations, and the minute order
confirms the court awarded H.T. 1,270 days of custody credits. Remand is unnecessary.
DISPOSITION
The May 23, 2023 disposition order is affirmed.

/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

We concur:

/s/
DUARTE, Acting P. J.

/s/
RENNER, J.

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