CourtListener 9530806•SMP Construction & Maintenance v. Holsten CA1/5
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Filed 6/11/24 SMP Construction & Maintenance v. Holsten CA1/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
SMP CONSTRUCTION &
MAINTENANCE, INC., A169203
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Contra Costa County Super. Ct.
v. No. C2300943)
DONNA HOLSTEN,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Donna Holsten appeals an order denying in part her special
motion to strike the complaint of SMP Construction & Maintenance, Inc.
(SMP), her former contractor, under the anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit
Against Public Participation) statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.)1 SMP sued
Holsten for libel based on her negative reviews on Yelp and the Better
Business Bureau (BBB) web site as well as posts she made on Facebook
accusing SMP of fraud and a “ ‘bait and switch.’ ” In granting Holsten’s
motion in part, the trial court held that her Yelp and BBB reviews were
protected activity because they were made in connection with an issue of
public interest—providing helpful information to consumers. In denying the
motion in part, the court held that Holsten’s Facebook posts were not
1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure
unless otherwise noted.
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protected activity because their purpose was not to provide information to
consumers but to obtain information for Holsten’s private dispute with SMP.
We agree and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND2
In January 2022, Holsten hired SMP to perform construction and
foundation work at her residence. During the course of this work, “several
disputes arose between [SMP] and [Holsten] regarding the quality of the
work and the payment amount for the contracted work.”
On November 19, 2022, Holsten published a post on Facebook
summarizing her dispute. The post began: “Most recent episode in the saga
of my foundation construction work: ‘Engineering company falsified their
paperwork in collusion with the contractors.’ ” The post then claimed that
“the foundation company [did a] bait and switch, outright lies” but did not
identify SMP (or its dba Foundation Repair of California) by name. The post
ended: “Now I have to decide how far I want to take this. I could nail both
the engineering and foundation companies to the wall for fraud[] over this.”
In the comments to this post, Holsten engaged in a back-and-forth
conversation with another Facebook user who was a state inspector. The two
discussed the specifics of Holsten’s dispute with SMP, including a fraudulent
special inspection report. It is only in one of her comments in response to the
inspector’s query that Holsten identified “Foundation Repair of California” as
the “foundation company.”
On December 9, 2022, Holsten published a second post on Facebook
asking for advice as to which state agencies she could report fraud committed
2 The facts and evidence in this case are taken from the pleadings and
the papers submitted in the trial court in connection with the anti-SLAPP
motion.
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by a contractor and an engineering company. Neither this second post nor
the comments to that post identified SMP.
On January 9, 2023, Holsten published a third post on Facebook which
began with, “Update on the Foundation Saga.” Again, SMP was not named
in this post or in the comments. In the comments to this post, Holsten again
accused her unnamed contractor of “fraud and bait and switch” as well as
“faking a letter from a lawyer.” She then confirmed that she “will trash them
on yelp, bbb, and Google” in response to another Facebook user’s comment.
On February 9, 2023, Holsten posted a lengthy review on Yelp stating
that SMP “lied, did [a] bait-and-switch, committed fraud, [and] damaged my
house.” Specifically, the post stated that SMP billed Holsten “for a ‘special
inspector’ who was never here,” falsified paperwork to the county inspector,
and admitted to violating the building code. The next day, Holsten posted a
review on the BBB web site which similarly stated that SMP “lied, did [a]
bait-and-switch, committed fraud, [and] damaged my house” and that SMP
falsified paperwork and lied about the presence of a special inspector who
was not there.
In April 2023, SMP sued Holsten for libel, breach of contract, and
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.3 The complaint
alleged that Holsten “willfully, knowingly, and maliciously made false
statements” on various social media platforms with the intent to damage
SMP’s reputation. Holsten responded by filing an anti-SLAPP motion. The
motion argued that her online posts constituted protected activity under
3 The causes of action for breach of contract and breach of the implied
covenant involved a release agreement the parties entered into after Holsten
filed a claim against SMP with the California State Licensing Board. These
causes of action were dismissed as part of the order granting and denying in
part Holsten’s anti-SLAPP motion and are not the subject of this appeal.
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section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3) because they were statements “made in a
public forum about matters of public concern.” According to the motion, they
provided information to consumers regarding SMP’s “poor workmanship” and
“fraudulent and deceptive business practices.” The motion further argued
that the posts fell within the catchall provision of section 425.16, subdivision
(e)(4) because they were made “in furtherance of the exercise of the
constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or public
interest.”
The trial court agreed that Holsten’s Yelp and BBB reviews were
protected activity under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3) because they
provided “information to consumers potentially considering dealing with
[SMP’s] business and warning consumers not to use [its] services in choosing
a company to perform foundation work.” Alternatively, the court held that
the catchall provision of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4) applied because
Holsten’s review of SMP’s services was a matter of public interest and
“contribute[d] to the public discourse about the business to select to perform
services.” Accordingly, the court granted the motion with respect to the two
causes of action associated with the Yelp and BBB reviews.
The trial court, however, found that Holsten’s Facebook posts were not
protected activity and denied the motion as to the three causes of action
associated with them. The court reasoned that the posts were
distinguishable from the Yelp and BBB reviews because they were “aimed
more at [Holsten] obtaining information for her private dispute with the
contractor rather than providing a review of the company for consumer
education, information and warning.” The court concluded that the Facebook
posts addressed Holsten’s “private quarrels with [SMP] rather than a review
of a business as an issue of public interest.”
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Holsten timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Anti-SLAPP Law and Standard of Review
The anti-SLAPP statute provides that “[a] cause of action against a
person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right
of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution
. . . in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to
strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that
there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16,
subd. (b)(1).)
The court engages in a two-step process when deciding an anti-SLAPP
motion. First, the moving defendant must show that the challenged claim
arises from constitutionally protected free speech or petition rights. (Baral v.
Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.) If the defendant makes that showing,
then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of
prevailing on the merits of the claim. (Ibid.) In this second step, the plaintiff
“must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported
by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if
the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” (Matson v. Dvorak (1995)
40 Cal.App.4th 539, 548.)
We review de novo a trial court’s ruling denying an anti-SLAPP motion.
(Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 325.) Like the trial court, “we
consider ‘the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the
facts upon which the liability or defense is based.’ [Citation.] However, we
do not weigh credibility or compare the weight of the evidence. [Citation.]
Rather, we accept as true evidence favorable to the plaintiff, determine
whether the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of facts necessary to
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establish its claim at trial, and evaluate the defendant’s evidence only to
determine whether it defeats that submitted by the plaintiff as a matter of
law.” (Tichinin v. City of Morgan Hill (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1061.)
B. Statements Made in Connection With an Issue of Public Interest
Under the First Prong
Section 425.16 identifies four types of acts covered by the anti-SLAPP
statute. As relevant here, subdivision (e)(3) encompasses statements made in
“a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16,
subd. (e)(3).) And subdivision (e)(4), the catchall provision, encompasses “any
other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of
petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public
issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).)
Both categories are “subject to the limitation that the conduct must be
made in connection with an issue of public interest.” (Weinberg v. Feisel
(2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1132.) This means that “there should be some
degree of closeness between the challenged statements and the asserted
public interest [citation]; the assertion of a broad and amorphous public
interest is not sufficient.” (Ibid.) It also means that “the focus of the
speaker’s conduct should be the public interest rather than a mere effort ‘to
gather ammunition for another round of [private] controversy.’ ” (Id. at
pp. 1132–1133.)
Further, the anti-SLAPP statute “defines conduct in furtherance of the
rights of petition and free speech on a public issue not only by its content, but
also by its location, its audience, and its timing.” (FilmOn.com Inc. v.
DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 143 (FilmOn).) In other words,
context matters. Indeed, our Supreme Court held in FilmOn that both the
content and context of a statement must be analyzed under section 425.16,
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subdivision (e)(4), the catchall provision. (Id. at p. 149.) “First, we ask what
‘public issue or [] issue of public interest’ the speech in question implicates—a
question we answer by looking at the content of the speech. [Citation.]
Second, we ask what functional relationship exists between the speech and
the public conversation about some matter of public interest.” (Id. at
pp. 149–150.) Context is important to this second part of the analysis as the
court must consider the “audience, speaker, and purpose” of the statement to
determine whether it furthered the public conversation on the issue. (Id. at
p. 152.) “[I]t is not enough that the statement refer to a subject of widespread
public interest; the statement must in some manner itself contribute to the
public debate.” (Wilbanks v. Wolk (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 883, 898
(Wilbanks), italics added.)
C. The Facebook Posts Do Not Constitute Protected Activity Under the
First Prong of the Anti-SLAPP Analysis
The trial court held that Holsten’s Yelp and BBB posts constituted
protected activity under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis but her
Facebook posts did not. Holsten argues that there is no legal or factual basis
to treat her Facebook posts differently than her Yelp and BBB reviews
because they all contain the same content. We disagree. Although the
content of Holsten’s posts are similar, they are not identical. More notably,
their context is different. As explained below, those differences justify the
distinction made by the court.
First, Holsten’s three Facebook posts detailing “the saga of [Holsten’s]
foundation construction work” were not posted on SMP’s Facebook page and
did not identify SMP by name. Instead, the posts only referenced “the
foundation company” or “Contractor.” Holsten only identified Foundation
Repair of California (SMP’s dba) briefly in in one comment during a
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back-and-forth conversation she had with another Facebook user in the
comments to her first Facebook post. Holsten did not thereafter identify SMP
or its dba in any of her other Facebook posts or comments.
Therefore, unlike Holsten’s Yelp and BBB reviews—which appeared
directly below SMP’s profile and provided helpful information to consumers
about SMP’s services and business practices4—her Facebook posts did no
such thing. Indeed, a consumer perusing Holsten’s three Facebook posts
would have to read through the many comments to those posts to find the one
comment that identified SMP as the problematic foundation company. As a
result, both the content and context of Holsten’s Facebook posts support the
trial court’s conclusion that those posts addressed her “private quarrels with
[SMP] rather than a review of a business as an issue of public interest.”
This conclusion is bolstered by the last sentence of Holsten’s first
Facebook post in which she wrote, “Now I have to decide how far I want to
take this. I could nail both the engineering and foundation companies to the
wall for fraud[] over this.” Rather than warn consumers about SMP, this
statement appears to be an invitation for advice or input about her private
dispute with SMP. And Holsten did, in fact, receive plenty of advice and
input in the comments to this post.
The cases cited by Holsten are distinguishable. In Wilbanks, supra,
121 Cal.App.4th 883, for example, the defendant created a viatical
settlements “ ‘consumer watchdog’ ” web site and posted critical statements
4 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of Foundation Repair of
California’s Yelp and BBB business profile web sites pursuant to Evidence
Code section 452, subdivision (h). (<https://www.yelp.com/biz/foundation-
repair-of-ca-livermore?start=70> [as of June 11, 2024] and
<https://www.bbb.org/us/ca/livermore/profile/foundation-
contractors/foundation-repair-of-ca-1116-437270> [as of June 11, 2024].)
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about the plaintiff (a viatical settlements broker), including that the plaintiff
was unethical and was under investigation by the Department of Insurance.
(Id. at pp. 889–890.) This court concluded that those statements were
protected activity because they were “provided to aid consumers choosing
among brokers” and “were directly connected to an issue of public concern.”
(Id. at p. 900.) Unlike Holsten in her Facebook posts, the defendant in
Wilbanks made his posts on a web site dedicated to advising consumers,
identified the plaintiff by name to educate and warn consumers about doing
business with this broker, and did not explicitly or implicitly solicit advice on
a specific dispute with the plaintiff. (Id. at p. 889.)
Similarly, in Gilbert v. Sykes (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 13, the defendant
created a web site detailing her “nightmare” plastic surgery experience. (Id.
at p. 19.) The site identified the plaintiff as her plastic surgeon and listed
several malpractice suits that were filed or pending against the plaintiff at
the time. (Id. at pp. 19–20.) In finding that the web site concerned a matter
of public interest, the court of appeal held that information regarding the
defendant’s experiences with a prominent plastic surgeon like the plaintiff
(id. at p. 23) and general tips on choosing a plastic surgeon contributed to the
“debate over the pros and cons of undergoing cosmetic surgery” (id. at p. 24).
By contrast, Holsten’s Facebook posts never identified SMP and appeared to
solicit advice or input on her private dispute with SMP.
Finally, in Chaker v. Mateo (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1138, another case
Holsten relies on for support, the court of appeal found that derogatory
statements posted to a social networking site about the plaintiff’s forensics
business concerned a matter of public interest. (Id. at pp. 1146–1147.) The
court, however, highlighted that the plaintiff “became the subject of
statements on the [social media] Web site only after he posted a profile on the
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Web site and it generated responses from other members of the community,
including apparently statements from [the defendant].” (Id. at p. 1146.) The
court therefore concluded that “Chaker himself made his character a matter
of public interest.” (Id. at p. 1147.) By contrast, Holsten made the
statements on her own Facebook page, and not on a page created by SMP.
And there was no way to determine that the Facebook posts concerned SMP
unless you went through the comments to one of the posts.
We agree with Holsten that the facts here are different from those in
Woodhill Ventures, LLC v. Yang (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 624 (Yang), a case the
trial court relied on in finding the Facebook posts not to be protected activity.
But those factual differences do not help Holsten here.
In Yang, the plaintiff ordered a cake from the defendant (a bakery) for
his seven-year-old son’s mad science themed birthday party but was unhappy
with how realistic the pills looked on the cake. (Yang, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 626–627.) The plaintiff, a “[s]elf-proclaimed celebrity jeweler,”
complained about the defendant on social media to his 1.5 million followers.
(Id. at pp. 626–627.) The defendant sued the plaintiff after receiving
negative reviews and death threats from the plaintiff’s followers, and the
plaintiff responded with an anti-SLAPP motion. (Id. at pp. 624, 627.) In
concluding that the plaintiff’s social media posts were not protected activity,
the court of appeal held that although children confusing medication for
candy might be an issue of public interest, the plaintiff’s “statements did not
seek a public discussion of anything. They aimed to whip up a crowd for
vengeful retribution.” (Id. at pp. 632–633.)
Although Holsten’s Facebook posts could not have been “aimed to whip
up a crowd for vengeful retribution” because they did not even name SMP
(Yang, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at pp. 632–633), they, like the plaintiff’s posts
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in Yang, did not contribute to the public debate on a matter of public interest.
For example, they did not warn consumers of SMP’s fraudulent business
practices or advise consumers about choosing a contractor. Instead, they only
discussed the details of Holsten’s own personal dispute with an unnamed
foundation company.
For similar reasons, Holsten’s Facebook posts do not qualify as
protected activity under the catchall provision of section 425.16, subdivision
(e)(4). First, as discussed above and contrary to Holsten’s argument, her
posts do not provide helpful consumer information.
Second, even if the fraudulent business practices of contractors is an
issue of public interest, we must also consider “what functional relationship
exists between the speech and the public conversation” on the issue and
whether the speech furthered that conversation. (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at
pp. 149–150.) “[I]t is not enough that the statement refer to a subject of
widespread public interest.” (Wilbanks, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 898.)
Here, Holsten’s Facebook posts did not further any public conversation about
the fraudulent business practices of contractors. For example, they did not
warn the public about SMP’s practices or any company’s particular practices.
Instead, they only detailed her private dispute with an unnamed contractor.
To the extent Holsten provided more details about that dispute in comments
to her posts, she did so in the context of receiving suggestions or input on the
dispute. Indeed, evidence that Holsten’s posts were not intended to
contribute to the public conversation about an issue of public interest is
apparent from one of her comments to her second Facebook post in which she
wrote, “I will trash them on yelp, bbb, and Google” and “when this is over, I’m
going to ruin them.” Thus, the trial court correctly concluded that Holsten
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posted on Facebook in order to vent about a private dispute and to discuss
that dispute with her social media friends.
Finally, we reject Holsten’s argument that her Facebook posts were
“made in connection with an issue of public interest because they relate to an
industry that is subject to government involvement and oversight on an
ongoing basis.” In Industrial Waste & Debris Box Service, Inc. v. Murphy
(2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1135, this court did hold that the “degree of government
involvement and oversight on an ongoing basis demonstrates widespread
public interest in the subjects of solid waste recycling, diversion and
disposal.” (Id. at p. 1149.) But this holding does not mean that any
statement related to a government-regulated industry is protected by the
anti-SLAPP statute. Rather, it merely established that government
involvement may, but does not necessarily, support a finding that an issue is
of public interest. To the extent there is government involvement in
Holsten’s private dispute with SMP, it is minimal and certainly does not
support a finding that her posts concern an issue of public interest.
In any case, a statement must not only refer to a subject of public
interest; it must also contribute to the public debate in order to qualify as
protected activity under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4). (FilmOn, supra¸ 7
Cal.5th at p. 150.) Holsten has not met this burden here.
Because we find that the Facebook posts are not protected activity
under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, we need not move onto the
second prong.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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CHOU, J.
We concur.
JACKSON, P. J.
BURNS, J.
SMP Construction & Maintenance, Inc. v. Holsten / A169203
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