Valdez v. Rick Hamm Construction, Inc. CA4/3

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Filed 6/7/24 Valdez v. Rick Hamm Construction, Inc. CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

ENRIQUE VALADEZ,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G062523

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2021-01234887)

RICK HAMM CONSTRUCTION, INC., OPINION
et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Peter J.
Wilson, Judge. Affirmed.
Clark Hill, Rafael G. Nendel-Flores and Jessica Soriano for Defendants and
Appellants.
Guerra & Casillas, Ruben Guerra and Tizoc Perez-Casillas for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Defendants Rick Hamm Construction, Inc. (RHC), Rick Hamm, Eric
Dexter, Carlos Landin and Rick Sanchez (collectively, defendants) moved to compel
arbitration based on an arbitration agreement purportedly signed by plaintiff Enrique
Valadez. Valadez, however, opposed the motion and denied his signature was on the
arbitration agreement. The trial court denied the motion, finding defendants failed to
meet their burden of proving Valadez signed the arbitration agreement.
On appeal, defendants argue the trial court erred because their evidence was
sufficient to establish Valadez signed the arbitration agreement. In determining whether
an arbitration agreement exists, a shifting three-step burden of production applies, but the
ultimate burden of proof remains with defendants as the ones moving to compel
arbitration. On the first step, there is no dispute defendants met their burden of producing
prima facie evidence of an arbitration agreement purportedly signed by Valadez. On the
second step, Valadez met his burden of producing evidence that created a factual dispute
as to whether he signed the arbitration agreement. Thus, we must move to the third step,
in which the trial court found defendants failed to meet their burden of proving Valadez
signed the arbitration agreement. Under the applicable standard of review, we conclude
the evidence does not compel finding as a matter of law that Valadez signed the
arbitration agreement, and thus, the trial court did not err. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
After Valadez, who previously worked at RHC, filed a complaint against
defendants asserting multiple causes of action, defendants moved to compel arbitration.
Defendants argued Valadez was provided, in December 2013, with a new employee
onboarding packet, which included a document titled “Applicant’s Statement and
Agreement” that contained an arbitration agreement. According to defendants, Valadez

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signed this document. Defendants also submitted declarations from Taylor Polis and
Llana Hamm, as well as exhibits.
1

According to Polis’ declaration, she was an administrative assistant for
RHC from approximately September 2012 through June 2016. Polis said she was
“familiar with Rick Hamm’s new employee onboarding process, including providing new
hires with an onboarding packet to review and sign.” Polis declared, “[d]uring [her]
employment with Rick Hamm, it was [her] custom and practice to ask new hires to come
into the office; ask them to sit in the conference room; for [her] to go over the initial
onboarding packet with them (including [RHC’s] Applicant’s Statement and Agreement
which, in turn, contains an arbitration provision); and witness the new hire employees
sign these onboarding documents.” Polis further stated, “[o]n or around December 12,
2013, consistent with [her] custom and practice, [she] provided . . . Valadez . . . with the
new employee onboarding packet (including [RHC’s] Applicant’s Statement and
Agreement which, in turn, contains [the] arbitration provision).” Polis attached an
exhibit, which she said was “[a] true and correct copy of the Applicant’s Statement and
Agreement signed by” Valadez. This exhibit is a one-page document containing multiple
paragraphs, including an arbitration provision, and appears to show a hand-written
signature dated December 12, 2013.
According to Llana’s declaration, she is currently the treasurer and chief
financial officer of RHC, held similar positions when Valadez was hired in December
2013, and is “familiar with how RHC stores employee personnel related documents and
information.” Llana stated, “[d]uring the relevant time period, RHC had a custom and
practice of taking a photograph of new employees while they reviewed and signed new
employee onboarding documents (including the Applicant’s Statement and Agreement
which, in turn, contained[] an arbitration provision . . . ).” Attached as an exhibit was a

1
As this opinion refers to Llana Hamm multiple times, and she shares the same last name with one
of the defendants, this opinion refers to Llana by her first name to avoid confusion.

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photograph, which Llana said showed Valadez “signing new employee onboarding
documents with a date stamp of December 12, 2013 – the same date that [Valadez] signed
his [a]rbitration [a]greement.” (Italics omitted.) Also attached as an exhibit was,
according to Llana, “a true and correct copy of [Valadez’s] signed [a]rbitration
[a]greement dated December 12, 2013 which is contained in [Valadez’s] personnel file.”
This exhibit appears to be the same document as that attached to Polis’ declaration.
Valadez opposed the motion, denying he signed the arbitration agreement
and saying defendants failed to meet their burden of establishing a valid arbitration
agreement. In a declaration, Valadez stated he had never seen the document containing
the arbitration agreement that was attached to Polis’ and Llana’s declarations before his
counsel showed it to him. Moreover, Valadez declared “[t]he signature on that document
is not my signature, and it is not my handwriting.” According to Valadez, if he “had seen
the alleged arbitration agreement back when [he] was hired, [he] would have never
signed it as is.” Valadez further said he “never received a copy of this so-called
arbitration agreement” and does not have one in his records. Valadez also attached to his
declaration three documents: (1) a “Notice to Employee as to Change in Relationship,”
(2) his driver’s license, and (3) his social security card. Using these three documents as
examples of his signature, his opposition argued “[a] comparison of [his] actual signature
(e.g., on his driver’s license and on his social security card) with that of the signature on
the alleged agreement reveals that they are so dissimilar that any layperson, without the
need for a handwriting expert, can easily see they do not match.”
In addition to his declaration, Valadez filed evidentiary objections. Among
other things, Valadez asserted authentication objections to the document containing the
arbitration agreement that was attached to Polis’ and Llana’s declarations.
In their reply, defendants argued they met their burden to establish the
existence of a valid arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence given the

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evidence they previously submitted. Defendants also filed evidentiary objections to
Valadez’s declaration and responses to Valadez’s evidentiary objections.
After hearing oral argument, the trial court adopted its tentative ruling as its
final ruling and denied the motion because defendants had failed to meet their burden of
proving Valadez signed the arbitration agreement. Applying a shifting three-step burden
of production, the trial court found defendants had met their initial burden of presenting
prima facie evidence by submitting the arbitration agreement purportedly signed by
Valadez, but Valadez then shifted the burden back to defendants by challenging the
authenticity of that document. Ultimately, as the trial court explained, “[d]efendants bear
the burden of proving the fundamental, threshold[] issue[] that [Valadez] actually signed
the arbitration provision,” and “given [his] express denial that he signed the [a]rbitration
[a]greement, the [trial] [c]ourt conclude[d] that [defendants] ha[d] not met their burden of
proof.” 2
The trial court detailed in its order why defendants’ evidence did not
convince it otherwise.3 It found Llana’s and Polis’ declarations were conclusory and
failed to authenticate Valadez’s signature. For Llana’s declaration, the trial court stated
“[t]here are no facts in [it] to establish she has any personal knowledge of the facts
asserted, particularly that the signature on the Applicant’s Statement is that of [Valadez].”
For Polis’ declaration, the trial court noted “Polis does not state that she followed her

2
In determining defendants had failed to meet their burden, the trial court did not rely on a
comparison of Valadez’s three sample signatures with the signature on the arbitration agreement. The trial court
noted the signature samples were dated January 24, 2014, May 10, 2021, and May 20, 2021, and Valadez’s
“signature since 2014 has clearly changed so the two later samples are not helpful.” While the trial court recognized
“[t]he 2014 signature is the closest in time to when the [a]rbitration [a]greement was signed,” it found “[t]here are
similarities and differences in the signatures that could be due to a variety of reasons, and without expert analysis,
[it] cannot determine whether [Valadez] signed the [a]rbitration [a]greement based simply on the written signature.”
3
The parties also highlight comments made by the trial court at the oral argument hearing. There,
the trial court commented, among other things, about the competing declarations, including “[t]he burden here in
some ways resolves the question for the [trial] [c]ourt, because if [the trial court] can’t pick between those two, then
the party with the burden loses.” The trial court further commented at the hearing “the pendulum is also affected
somewhat by the fact that it isn’t a declaration saying I saw him sign, faced by a declaration saying I did not sign[,]”
and the “declaration by the moving parties is more attenuated.”

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custom and practice in going over the onboarding documents with [Valadez] and
watching him sign the onboarding documents, including the [a]rbitration [a]greement, nor
does she attest that she has no reason to believe she did not follow her custom and
practice.” The trial court further explained Polis “does not indicate whether she has a
specific recollection of actually going over and/or checking the Applicant’s Statement for
[Valadez’s] signature;” “does not indicate that she has any familiarity with [Valadez’s]
signature, and based on that knowledge, that the signature on the [a]rbitration
[a]greement looks like [Valadez’s] signature;” and “does not testify she is the custodian
of records.” Thus, the trial court determined Polis “fails to state, based on personal
knowledge, that [Valadez] signed the Applicant’s Statement” and “[h]er statement instead
in effect moves from providing the onboarding packet to [Valadez] to there being a
signed Applicant’s Statement in his file.” And for the photograph of Valadez, the trial
court found it “confirms his presence, but not what was actually presented to him and/or
signed by him.” 4
DISCUSSION
On appeal, defendants argue the trial court erred in finding they failed to
meet their burden of proving that Valadez signed the arbitration agreement. As the parties
dispute the standard of review, we first address the shifting three-step burden of
production and the applicable standards of review. Then, applying the proper standards
of review, we conclude the trial court did not err.
A. Legal Principles and Standards of Review
On a motion to compel arbitration, a “threshold question . . . is whether an
agreement to arbitrate exists.” (Trinity v. Life Ins. Co. of North America (2022) 78

4
The trial court also overruled defendants’ evidentiary objections and certain of Valadez’s
evidentiary objections, but it sustained Valadez’s evidentiary objections to the document containing the arbitration
agreement purportedly signed by him and certain statements in Llana’s and Polis’ declarations that he signed the
agreement. During the oral argument hearing, the trial court noted sustaining the objections did not mean any
reference to the document was excluded; instead, the trial court “simply sustained objections to those portions where
the agreement as a signed document has purportedly been attached or identified.”

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Cal.App.5th 1111, 1120 (Trinity).) “The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence an agreement to arbitrate a dispute
exists.” (Ibid.) For this inquiry, courts apply a shifting three-step burden of production.
(Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165 (Gamboa).)
On the first step, “the moving party bears the burden of producing ‘prima
facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.’ [Citation.]”
(Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) To meet this burden, the moving party can
“‘attach[] to the [motion or] petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to
bear the [opposing party’s] signature.’ [Citation.] Alternatively, the moving party can
meet its burden by setting forth the agreement’s provisions in the motion. [Citations.]”
(Ibid.; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.) The moving party does not need to
follow the normal procedures for authenticating the document on this step. (Iyere v. Wise
Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 755 (Iyere).)
On the second step, “[i]f the movant bears its initial burden, the burden
shifts to the party opposing arbitration to identify a factual dispute as to the agreement’s
existence – in this instance, by disputing the authenticity of [his] signature[].” (Iyere,
supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 755.) To meet this burden of production, the opposing party
“must offer admissible evidence creating a factual dispute as to the authenticity of” the
opposing party’s signature. (Ibid.)
On the third step, “[i]f the opposing party meets its burden of producing
evidence, . . . the moving party must establish with admissible evidence a valid
arbitration agreement between the parties.” (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.)
Importantly, “[t]he burden of proving the agreement by a preponderance of the evidence
remains with the moving party.” (Id. at pp. 165-166; see also Iyere, supra, 87
Cal.App.5th at p. 755 [moving party “retains the ultimate burden of proving, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the authenticity of the signature”].)

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For the standard of review on appeal, the parties agree “‘“‘“‘[t]here is no
uniform standard of review for evaluating an order denying a [motion] to compel
arbitration.’”’”’ [Citation.]” (Kinder v. Capistrano Beach Care Center, LLC (2023) 91
Cal.App.5th 804, 811 (Kinder).) “‘“‘“‘[I]f the court’s denial rests solely on a decision of
law, then a de novo standard of review is employed.’”’”’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.) “‘If the
court’s order is based on a decision of fact, then we adopt a substantial evidence
standard.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Here, the second and third steps are at issue on this appeal
and, notably, have differing standards of review under these circumstances.
On the second step, “we review de novo the trial court’s ruling that
[Valadez’s] evidence was sufficient to create a factual dispute shifting the burden of
production back to [defendants].” (Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 756.)
On the third step, defendants assert the substantial evidence standard of
review applies because this appeal concerns factual disputes – here, whether Valadez
signed the agreement. Valadez, however, cites to Fabian v. Renovate America, Inc.
(2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1066-1067 (Fabian), and asserts the inquiry is whether the
trial court’s finding was erroneous as a matter of law given the trial court found
defendants failed to meet their burden. Although defendants are generally correct that the
substantial evidence standard applies to the trial court’s resolution of factual disputes,
“[t]he substantial evidence standard of review takes on a unique formulation where, as
here, ‘the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded that the party with the burden
of proof did not carry the burden and that party appeals.’ [Citation.]” (In re S.G. (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 654, 671.) In this context, “‘“‘the question for a reviewing court
becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of
law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant’s evidence
was (1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a character and weight as to
leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.”’”’
[Citation.]” (Garcia v. KND Development 52, LLC (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 736, 744-745

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(Garcia); see also, e.g., Fabian, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1066-1067.) Defendants
criticize Valadez for relying “solely” on Fabian for the standard of review, but multiple
cases have used this formulation when the trial court found a party moving to compel
arbitration failed to carry its burden of proof. (See, e.g., Trinity, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1121; Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.)
Indeed, defendants cite Kinder as one of the cases supposedly supporting
their position, but that case recognizes the inquiry is whether the evidence compels a
finding as a matter of law when a trial court found an appellant failed to meet its burden.
(Kinder, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 811.)
Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 544-548
& fn. 1, another case cited by defendants, applied the typical substantial evidence
standard when the trial court found appellants had failed to meet their burden on a motion
to compel arbitration, but it recognized some cases have applied the formulation
described in Fabian and noted it did not need to address the appropriateness of that
unique formulation because it reached the same result. The other cases cited by
defendants for their argument that this unique formulation is wrong do not directly
address the formulation of the substantial evidence standard when a trial court found a
party failed to meet its burden of proof. (See The McCaffrey Group, Inc. v. Superior
Court (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1347-1355; Toal v. Tardif (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th
1208, 1217, 1222-1223; Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 77, 88-92.)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err
The parties do not dispute defendants met the first step of producing prima
facie evidence of an arbitration agreement. Thus, the burden of production shifted to
Valadez on the second step to produce evidence creating a factual dispute as to the
existence of the arbitration agreement. On this step, Valadez met his burden to create a
factual dispute as to the existence of the arbitration agreement by denying the signature
on the document was his.

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Defendants assert Valadez “never disputed that the [a]rbitration [a]greement
produced as part of . . . Polis[’] and [Llana’s] declarations was not a true and correct copy
of the [a]greement.” This is incorrect as Valadez made authentication objections to that
document in the trial court and has argued he did not sign that document. Additionally,
Valadez submitted a declaration expressly stating “[t]he signature on that document is not
[his] signature, and it is not [his] handwriting.” Valadez’s denial that it was his signature
created a factual dispute as to whether Valadez signed the agreement. Defendants try to
fault Valadez for not expressly denying that the arbitration agreement was part of the
onboarding documents provided to him, but whether the arbitration agreement was part
of the onboarding documents does not negate the factual dispute created by his denial of
signing the agreement.
Moreover, defendants contend the trial court should have followed Iyere,
but their reliance on Iyere is misplaced. In Iyere, the court held the plaintiffs failed to
meet their burden of creating a factual dispute as to the authenticity of their signatures on
an arbitration agreement, reversing the trial court’s decision. (Iyere, supra, 87
Cal.App.5th at pp. 756-759.) While the plaintiffs asserted they did not recall signing the
arbitration agreement, the court underscored “no plaintiff declared that he had not signed
the agreement, or that his physical signature was forged or inauthentic.” (Id. at p. 756.)
Further, the plaintiffs’ declarations “explicitly acknowledge[d] that plaintiffs signed a
‘stack of documents’ and d[id] not deny that the stack included the agreement.” (Ibid.)
The court reasoned, “[i]f a party confronted with his or her handwritten signature on an
arbitration agreement is unable to allege that the signature is inauthentic or forged, the
fact that that person does not recall signing the agreement neither creates a factual dispute
as to the signature’s authenticity nor affords an independent basis to find that a contract
was not formed.” (Id. at p. 758.) Here, Valadez did what the plaintiffs in Iyere did not:
he declared the signature on the document was not his. Iyere does not help defendants.

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Turning to the third step, defendants focus on the supposedly substantial
evidence they produced, arguing “the [t]rial [c]ourt erred when it discounted
[defendants’] substantial evidence and, instead, accepted [Valadez’s] self-serving
declaration.” As an initial matter, this argument reverses the standard of review. If
defendants had prevailed in the trial court, the inquiry would look to whether substantial
evidence supported that finding. But defendants lost in the trial court, and “[w]e must not
review the evidence to determine whether substantial evidence supports the losing party’s
version of the evidence.” (Nissan Motor Acceptance Cases (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 793,
818.) Instead, as discussed above, the inquiry on this appeal is whether the evidence
compels a finding in favor of defendants as a matter of law. We conclude it does not.
Defendants point to Polis’ declaration, Llana’s declaration, and the
photograph of Valadez. This evidence, however, is not uncontradicted evidence “‘“‘“of
such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was
insufficient to support a finding.”’”’ [Citation.]” (Garcia, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at pp.
744-745.) Valadez declared the signature on the arbitration agreement is not his
signature nor his handwriting, which contradicts defendants’ evidence as to whether
Valadez signed the agreement.5 Moreover, defendants’ evidence is not as definitive as
they suggest. As the trial court correctly noted, “[t]he photograph of [Valadez] confirms
his presence, but not what was actually presented to him and/or signed by him,” and
Llana’s declaration failed to establish facts that she has personal knowledge the signature
on the arbitration agreement is Valadez’s. While Polis’ declaration described her custom
and practice and said she provided to Valadez the new employee onboarding packet
including the arbitration agreement, the trial court correctly noted Polis’ declaration did

5
As discussed above, the trial court did not rely on a comparison, without expert analysis, of the
signature on the arbitration agreement to the three signature examples submitted by Valadez in determining whether
Valadez signed the agreement. Given the trial court’s analysis regarding the signature examples, we similarly do not
rely on the signature examples in affirming the trial court.

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not state she, consistent with her custom and practice, went over the onboarding packet
with Valadez and witnessed him sign the documents.
6

Finally, defendants contend the trial court’s decision was inconsistent with
public policy favoring arbitration by purportedly disregarding their substantial evidence
and accepting Valadez’s “self-serving” evidence. “Although ‘[p]ublic policy favors
contractual arbitration as a means of resolving disputes . . . that policy “‘“does not extend
to those who are not parties to an arbitration agreement, and a party cannot be compelled
to arbitrate a dispute that he has not agreed to resolve by arbitration.”’”’ [Citation.]”
(Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.) Put another way, on the threshold question
of whether Valadez signed the agreement, public policy does not require the trial court to
give greater weight to defendants’ evidence over Valadez’s evidence.7

6
Defendants also argue the only additional evidence they could have provided would be a witness
who saw Valadez sign the document but case law does not require such evidence. To be clear, we are not opining a
party moving to compel arbitration must present such evidence to prevail when a plaintiff denies signing the
agreement, nor do we need to speculate under what circumstances a court should grant a motion to compel without
such evidence.
7
In the trial court, Valadez also argued the arbitration agreement was procedurally and substantively
unconscionable. The trial court did not reach this argument, and Valadez does not raise it on appeal. However, we
note this argument because defendants contend Valadez’s “procedural unconscionability argument is an admission
that he did in fact receive and review the [a]greement.” We disagree. Valadez argued in the trial court, “even if [the
trial] [c]ourt were to somehow find [Valadez] did sign the agreement, [d]efendants’ motion must still be denied
because the agreement is unconscionable[.]” Valadez’s unconscionability argument was not an admission to signing
the agreement; it was a fallback position, an alternative argument if the trial court found against Valadez on the
threshold signature issue. It did not, so the argument is simply irrelevant to our holding.

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DISPOSITION
The order denying defendants’ motion to compel arbitration is affirmed.
Respondent shall recover his costs on appeal.

BEDSWORTH, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

SANCHEZ, J.

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