CourtListener 9511028•People v. Cole CA2/2
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Filed 6/4/24 P. v. Cole CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B327549
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A711436)
v.
STEPHEN FREDERICK COLE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. David Walgren, Judge. Affirmed.
Cuauhtemoc Ortega, Federal Public Defender, Laura
Schaefer and Saivandana Peterson, Deputy Federal Public
Defenders, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
George Gascon, District Attorney (Los Angeles) and Tracey
Whitney, Deputy District Attorney as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, James William Bilderback II,
Assistant Attorney General, Shira Seigle Markovich and Stacy S.
Schwartz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
______________________________
In 1992, a jury found defendant and appellant Stephen
Frederick Cole guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187,
subd. (a); count 1)1 and arson (§ 451, subd. (b); count 2). As to
count 1, the jury sustained a special circumstance allegation that
the murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture.
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18).) Defendant was sentenced to death. In
2004, the California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of
conviction and sentence of death. (People v. Cole (2004)
33 Cal.4th 1158 (Cole).)
In 2022, the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office
(LADA) filed a recommendation for resentencing pursuant to
section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1), recommending that defendant’s
death sentence be recalled and that he be resentenced to a term
of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). The trial court
denied the motion, and defendant appeals.2
We affirm.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2 The LADA filed a letter brief of amicus curiae in support of
defendant’s appeal. On May 22, 2024, the People filed a motion
for judicial notice. We hereby grant their request.
2
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I. Guilt Phase
A. Prosecution evidence
The facts of this case are set forth in detail in Cole, supra,
33 Cal.4th 1158. Briefly, Mary Ann Mahoney (Mahoney) and
defendant were involved in an on-again/off-again tumultuous and
volatile relationship. In fact, during their relationship, defendant
was twice convicted of cohabitant abuse based on his conduct
towards Mahoney. (Id. at p. 1171.)
In 1987, they rented a home from William Gornik (Gornik)
on North Whitnall Highway in North Hollywood. (Cole, supra,
33 Cal.4th at p. 1171.)
On August 14, 1988, “[a]t approximately 9:00 p.m., the
Los Angeles Fire Department received a report of a fire at the
North Whitnall Highway residence. Los Angeles Firefighter
Zane Testerman and Chief Wilford Bisson were the first to arrive
on the scene. Soon after Testerman parked the fire department’s
sedan in front of the house, defendant knocked on the driver’s
side window. When Testerman rolled down the window,
defendant said, ‘I’m the one you’re looking for. I lit the house on
fire.’ Bisson radioed for the police, and Testerman got out of the
car to detain defendant.” (Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1171–
1172.)
Defendant repeatedly admitted that he set the house on
fire and that he tried to kill Mahoney. He repeatedly said that he
was angry at Gornik because he was planning to build a new
apartment building at the site, and he was angry at Mahoney
and wanted to kill her. (Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1172.)
When asked how he had lit the fire, defendant stated, “‘Well, I
poured gasoline on [Mahoney] and in the house and lit her and
3
the house on fire.’ Defendant appeared to be coherent, did not
seem to be excited or injured, and did not smell of alcohol. The
police arrived shortly thereafter and took custody of defendant.”
(Ibid.)
Mahoney suffered severe burns and injuries. After 10 days
of extreme suffering, Mahoney passed away as a result of smoke
inhalation and burns. (Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1174.)
B. Defense evidence
“The defense endeavored to show that defendant was guilty
of only second degree murder by presenting evidence that he was
reacting to Mary Ann’s burst of anger [prior to him setting the
fire] and was under the influence of alcohol when he ignited the
fire. The defense also endeavored to show that defendant
intended solely to kill Mary Ann, not to commit arson.” (Cole,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1174.)
In particular, defendant testified that when he arrived
home that evening, he and Mahoney argued. According to
defendant, she said “that if he fell asleep on the couch she would
‘cut [his] damn balls off with a butcher knife.’ Defendant yelled
in reply” and “then picked up a plastic container of gasoline,”
threw the container at Mahoney, said “something to the effect of
‘you f***ing b****, I hope you burn in hell,’ lit a Bic brand
cigarette lighter, and threw it.” (Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at
p. 1176.)
The defense also presented the testimony of Dr. Bruce T.
Sutkus, a psychologist, who opined defendant had no brain
dysfunction, but was egocentric, immature, impulsive, childish,
and demanding. (See Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1176–1177.)
According to Dr. Sutkus, persons with defendant’s profile tended
to have “a non-integrated conscience,” “a history of aggression
4
and assaultive behavior,” and “may be seen as destructive,
provocative and irritable[.]” Dr. Sutkus further opined that,
“[b]ecause of the threat of his bad temper, any tension he might
have usually results in an immediate discharge to aggression and
even destructive reactions.” And, a criminalist with the Los
Angeles Sheriff’s Department testified about the effect of alcohol
on the central nervous system and opined on defendant’s alcohol
abuse and impairment on the night he murdered Mahoney.
(Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1177.)
II. Penalty Phase
Neither the People nor the defense introduced any
additional evidence at the penalty phase. (Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th
at p. 1179.) At an ex parte hearing, defense counsel explained his
tactical reasons for declining to present additional evidence at the
penalty phase, and the trial court found that counsel’s decision
not to present any mitigating evidence “was made for sound
tactical reasons for the benefit of his client—for the benefit of
Mr. Cole.”
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In its recommendation for resentencing, the LADA set forth
the statutory presumption in favor of recall and resentencing,
and asked the trial court to recall defendant’s death sentence and
resentence him to a term of LWOP. The LADA noted that
defendant was 71 years old and suffered from numerous medical
infirmities, including lung cancer, hepatitis C, cirrhosis of the
liver, hypertension, lumbar problems, and a detached retina. The
recommendation further explained, without providing evidence of
defendant’s prison record, that defendant had been a “model
prisoner” with no rules violations of any kind. The LADA argued
that defendant suffered from brain damage and had been
5
neglected and abused as a child. The People also argued that it
was “compelling” that neither the prosecution nor the defense
presented any evidence during the penalty phase of defendant’s
trial.
Several supporting exhibits provided to the LADA by
defense counsel were attached to the request, including a 2004
declaration from a mental health expert, a 2004 declaration from
a psychologist, newspaper clippings, declarations executed in
2004 and 2006 from three of defendant’s family members, and a
2006 declaration from the victim’s employer.
The trial court held a hearing on the recommendation. At
the outset of the hearing, the LADA set forth the presumption for
recall and resentencing noting that “[t]he presumption can only
be overcome if the court finds the defendant is an unreasonable
risk of danger to the public safety pursuant to 1172.1(b)(2).” The
LADA argued that there was “no threat to public safety as the
defense is not requesting that the inmate be released,” noting
defendant would be sentenced to LWOP. The LADA asserted
that there was “no evidence to overcome the presumption” and
argued, as it did in its motion, that defendant should be
resentenced based on his advanced age, medical infirmities,
“exemplary” conduct while incarcerated, and the failure of
defense counsel to present a penalty phase defense.
Defense counsel echoed the LADA’s argument regarding
alleged ineffectiveness on the part of trial counsel, and reiterated
that there was no evidence to overcome the statutory
presumption in favor of resentencing. Defense counsel explained:
“[W]hat needs to be looked at to rebut the presumption of any
potential risk of future danger to the public or risk of a super
strike that, especially in this case, there is no evidence to show
6
that [defendant] would present such a risk. Not only is he 71
years old and medically infirm[,] he also has, as the [LADA] ha[s]
stated, an exemplary record and more than 30 years of
incarceration. He has the lowest risk assessment score possible
in terms of looking at his potential recidivism.
“So, on the basis of this record, your Honor, we would
reiterate that the presumption in favor of resentencing has not
been rebutted, and we do not believe it can be rebutted on the
basis of his prison behavior.”
Following argument, the trial court stated that it had spent
a “great deal of time” going through the motion and examining
the People’s exhibits, that it had reviewed Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th
1158, and that it “also took the time to go through the trial
testimony in this case.”
Turning to the LADA’s arguments concerning defendant’s
age, mental condition, and disciplinary record in prison, the trial
court noted that it had “considered all the factors raised by the
[LADA].” It acknowledged that defendant was 71 years old and
had “medical conditions,” although ones not unique to an older
man with a history of extreme alcohol abuse like defendant. The
trial court accepted the LADA’s representation that defendant
had no disciplinary history in prison, but explained that that fact
was not particularly compelling given “the bulk of his prison term
has been served on death row, . . . probably the most secure
building in the state penal system typically characterized by
single man cells, multiple armed guards, very limited
movement.” The trial court reasoned: “[A]lthough I recognize
certainly you can still have disciplinary problems in that
environment, also one cannot ignore the fact that it is an
extremely, extremely controlled environment.”
7
The trial court acknowledged the declarations from
defendant’s postconviction mental health experts, but explained
that the jury heard from two defense experts and a prosecution
expert who testified about defendant’s “brain profile” and “severe
alcohol abuse.” It concluded that, contrary to counsels’
representations, defendant had been “vigorously represented” at
trial. After all, there was extensive mitigating evidence,
including defendant’s mental state and purported brain damage,
presented to the jury during the guilt phase. Specifically, defense
counsel presented a clinical psychologist who testified at the guilt
phase, among other things, that defendant’s profile matched
someone who was “egocentric, immature, impulsive, childish,
demanding, had a nonintegrated [conscience], tended to have a
history of aggression and assaultive behavior, high frequency of
problems with alcohol, can be manipulative to get out of stressful
situations, may be seen as destructive, provocative and irritable,
and any tension usually results in immediate discharge to
aggression and even destructive reactions.” The trial court noted
that the same clinical psychologist and a forensic analyst testified
about defendant’s alcohol abuse and his blood alcohol level from
the night of the murder and how it impacted his cognitive
abilities.
The trial court continued by highlighting the fact that
defendant testified at trial about “taking the can of gasoline,
pouring it on [Mahoney], throwing a lighter and setting her
aflame” while saying, “‘You f***ing b****. I hope you burn in
hell.’” He offered no assistance to Mahoney as she ran past him
while on fire, and he expressed no remorse while testifying four
years later that he “‘wanted her to die’” and hated her “to this
day.” The trial court noted that defendant was a serial domestic
8
abuser and had testified that hitting Mahoney “made him feel
good by releasing pent up anger[.]” And, the trial court reminded
counsel that trial counsel had made a record of his tactical
decision not to call penalty phase witnesses.
The trial court went on to note that “[t]he facts of this case
are barbaric to the extreme,” and, quoting from Cole, supra,
33 Cal.4th 1158, noted that defendant “‘was not an immature
child at the time of the offense. Rather he was a 37-year-old man
who had some college education and had been steadily employed
in the past.’” It emphasized that after hearing all of the evidence
at trial, a jury determined that death was the appropriate
sentence, and the trial judge ruling on the motion to vacate the
death sentence determined, based on “the heinous, barbaric and
brutal nature of the murder, and even after considering mental
health issues and alcohol abuse issues and a lack of criminal
record, that the death verdict was appropriate.” The trial court
also recognized that the California Supreme Court affirmed that
judgment on direct appeal.
The trial court advised the parties that it was “quite
familiar with Penal Code section 1172.1” and had granted such
motions in “appropriate cases.” It explained that it was “also
quite familiar with the presumption that exists in a case such as
this where the [LADA is] filing the motion.” After “considering
all the factors raised by the [LADA],” the trial court declined to
recall and resentence defendant to the recommended reduced
sentence. It concluded: “I think [defendant] has demonstrated
not only by the absolutely brutal, premeditated murder of Mary
Ann as she lay in bed and was tortured and took 11 days to die,
but the fact that four years later he testified he had hate for her
and offered no remorse and testified to various things that it felt
9
good to beat her on previous occasions because it helped him
release his pent up rage. [¶] When the court determines if he’s
an unreasonable risk, what can the court look to other than has
he ever demonstrated the willingness or ability to commit a
tortuous murder? Yes, he has. So if I look to the general
population, who poses an unreasonable risk of committing a
homicide or attempted homicide? Someone who clearly has
demonstrated they in fact did commit a homicide and expressed
no remorse for committing such a homicide. [¶] I think the
presumption is overcome. I think [defendant] is an unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety. And I feel that he could commit a
super strike, a homicide or attempted homicide. Other than no
disciplinary actions, I have no evidence before me of regret,
remorse, reform. Nothing whatsoever. The court specifically
finds [that] defendant is an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety, and the court specifically finds that the presumption is
overcome even after considering all the factors raised by the
[LADA].
“As an additional note, over and above the presumption,
however, the court must individually find that this is in the
interest of justice. Even if that presumption was to survive,
which the court has specifically ruled it does not, it has to be in
the interest of justice. [¶] Based on this court’s review of the
totality of the evidence including all the transcript testimony, the
brutal and vicious torture murder committed by the defendant, a
repeated and serial domestic abuser, after considering all the
testimony, all the evidence, the jury findings, the trial court’s
findings, California Supreme Court findings, and all the
submissions presented by the defendant via the [LADA], after
totality, a review of the totality of the evidence in this case and
10
the court’s own independent analysis, I specifically find that it is
not in the interest of justice to resentence defendant and
specifically find it would in fact be contrary to the interest of
justice.
“Based on all of that, at this time the motion to resentence
. . . defendant pursuant to 1172.1 is denied.”
DISCUSSION
I. Relevant law
Section 1172.13 provides “that a trial court may recall and
resentence a defendant at any time upon the recommendation of
. . . [a] specified public official. [Citations.]” (People v. Braggs
(2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 809, 818.) Section 1172.1 also provides
that if the “resentencing request . . . is from . . . a district
attorney,” then “[t]here shall be a presumption favoring recall
and resentencing of the defendant, which may only be overcome if
a court finds the defendant currently poses an unreasonable risk
of danger to public safety, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section
1170.18.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (b)(2).) “Subdivision (c) of section
1170.18 in turn defines an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety as ‘an unreasonable risk that the [defendant] will commit a
new violent felony within the meaning of [section 667,
subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv)].’ This ‘subdivision of section 667
identifies eight types of particularly serious or violent felonies,
known colloquially as “super strikes.”’ [Citation.]” (Braggs,
supra, at p. 818.)
3 Section 1172.1 was amended effective January 1, 2024. We
reach our conclusion under the current statute. Defendant
directs us to nothing in the new language that requires
remanding this matter back to the trial court for another hearing.
11
“In recalling and resentencing pursuant to this provision,
the court shall consider postconviction factors, including, but not
limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of
the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether
age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have
reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence
that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original
sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the
interest of justice. . . . The court shall consider if the defendant
has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma,
including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or
sexual violence, if the defendant was a victim of intimate partner
violence or human trafficking prior to or at the time of the
commission of the offense, or if the defendant is a youth or was a
youth as defined under subdivision (b) of Section 1016.7 at the
time of the commission of the offense, and whether those
circumstances were a contributing factor in the commission of the
offense.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(5).)
Furthermore, “[t]he court shall state on the record the
reasons for its decision to grant or deny recall and resentencing.”
(§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(7).) In addition, “[r]esentencing shall not be
denied . . . without a hearing where the parties have an
opportunity to address the basis for the intended denial or
rejection.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(9).)
Section 1172.1 does not specifically address whether a trial
court may reduce a defendant’s death sentence to a sentence of
LWOP. That said, legislative history indicates that the trial
court does have this authority. (See Legis. Assem. Bill No. 200
(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) § 7.)
12
II. Standards of review
We review the trial court’s denial of recall and resentencing
for abuse of discretion. (People v. Mendez (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th
347, 353; People v. E.M. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1075, 1082.) “‘In
reviewing for abuse of discretion, we are guided by two
fundamental precepts. First, “‘[t]he burden is on the party
attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing
decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of
such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to
achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary
determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set
aside on review.’” [Citations.] Second, a “‘decision will not be
reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. “An
appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in
substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.”’”
[Citation.] Taken together, these precepts establish that a trial
court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so
irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with
it.’” (People v. Strother (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 563, 571.)
“We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.”
(People v. E.M., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 1082.)
III. Analysis
Applying these legal principles, we conclude that the trial
court did not err in denying the recommendation to recall and
resentence defendant from death to LWOP. It spent a “great deal
of time” going through the People’s motion and exhibits, read
Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th 1158, and reviewed the testimony
presented at defendant’s trial. It also carefully considered all the
factors presented by the LADA and addressed the arguments
raised by counsel. And, the trial court specifically expressed its
13
familiarity with section 1172.1 and the statute’s presumption.
Under these circumstances, we do not find any abuse of
discretion. (People v. Buford (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 886, 899;
People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 890 [we do not
reweigh the evidence].)
Urging us to conclude otherwise, defendant argues that the
trial court failed in several ways to engage in the proper analysis
under section 1172.1 and failed to follow the procedure mandated
by the statute. We address each in turn.
A. Forward-thinking analysis
Defendant argues that the trial court failed to engage in a
forward-thinking analysis in concluding that he poses an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. We disagree.
After it expressly acknowledged the presumption in favor of
recall and resentencing, it found that defendant presented an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety because he
demonstrated the willingness or ability to commit a tortuous
murder and expressed no remorse; thus, “he could commit a
super strike, a homicide or attempted homicide.”
Relying on People v. Williams (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1057,
defendant asserts that the fact that he would be resentenced to
LWOP and never be released from prison necessarily precluded a
finding that he poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety. Williams is readily distinguishable. As defendant
concedes, Williams is premised on a completely different
sentencing statute (§ 1170.126)4 that is inapplicable to the facts
4 Section 1170.126, subdivision (a), applies only to persons
serving an indeterminate life sentence pursuant to section 667,
subdivision (e)(2), or section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(2).
Defendant does not fall into either category.
14
presented here. Moreover, even if we adopted defendant’s
proposition that the presumption in favor of recall and
resentencing can never be overcome in cases where the defendant
will be resentenced from death to LWOP, that interpretation
would transform the statute into a mandate that all capital
judgments be recalled and resentenced to LWOP at a minimum.
Nothing in the language or legislative history of section 1172.1
indicates that that is what our Legislature intended. (People v.
Walker (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 386, 396.)
Moreover, as defendant acknowledges, “danger to public
safety” encompasses an unreasonable risk of danger to any other
persons, including the nurses, doctors, correctional officers, and
other prison personnel who interact with inmates every day, in
addition to the other inmates. Although the trial court did not
explicitly identify the precise people to whom he poses an
unreasonable risk of danger, it expressly found that defendant
was a danger to other persons in that there was an unreasonable
risk that he would commit another homicide or attempted
homicide. That is all that is required under the statute.5 (See
§ 1172.1, subd. (b)(2).)
5 It follows that we reject defendant’s contention that he was
not a danger to public safety because his crime was “personal and
unique,” not “random.” Aside from the fact that the trial court
was not obligated to adopt defendant’s characterization of his
crime, it certainly was entitled to conclude that a person who
committed the heinous crime here would pose a danger to public
safety.
15
B. Statutory factors considered by the trial court
Defendant argues that the trial court did not properly
consider the appropriate factors in determining whether he poses
a danger to public safety. We are not convinced.
The trial court properly considered defendant’s prison
behavior, age, and medical ailments,6 and nevertheless concluded
that the totality of the evidence weighed in favor of a finding that
he is a danger to public safety. (See § 1172.1, subds. (a)(5),
(b)(2).) With respect to his age (71 years old at the time of the
hearing) and medical diagnoses (lung cancer, hepatitis C,
cirrhosis of the liver, hypertension, lumbar problems, and a
detached retina), the trial court reasonably deemed those factors
unpersuasive given that defendant proved himself (1) willing to
attack someone with whom he lived, (2) while she was asleep,
(3) in a manner that did not require physical exertion, and
(4) causing great suffering and death. Taken together, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in weighing these factors in its
conclusion that defendant creates an unreasonable risk of danger
to others.
Pointing us to the LADA’s assertion that he did not have
any disciplinary violations and that the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) had classified him as a
low risk for recidivism, defendant contends that the trial court’s
finding that he is an unreasonable risk of danger is not supported
6 While the trial court may not have specifically mentioned
defendant’s psychological and childhood trauma, that does not
compel the conclusion that it did not consider such evidence. As
set forth above, the trial court specifically stated that it
considered all arguments raised by the LADA and defense
counsel.
16
by the record. But, there are no CDCR reports or documents in
the record on appeal,7 and espousals from attorneys are not
evidence. (People v. Neilson (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1534;
People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 845.)
Setting that aside, defendant’s prison behavior and
classification score do not definitely prove that he is not an
unreasonable danger to public safety. As the trial court
recognized, because defendant has been on death row, “probably
the most secure building in the state penal system typically
characterized by single man cells, multiple armed guards, very
limited movement,” the fact that he had no rules violations and
maintained a classification score of 60 was of limited value in
determining his future risk of danger.8 (See People v. Hall (2016)
247 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1265 [despite no record of prison
misconduct, trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding
that the defendant posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety considering the seriousness of his criminal record].)
It follows that we reject defendant’s assertion that the
“superior court abused its discretion by substituting its own
7 We note that the People assume, as did the trial court, that
these representations are accurate despite the absence of
evidence.
8 Defendant suggests that the trial court wrongly concluded
that the CDCR does not keep track of rules violations for those
inmates housed on death row. Defendant is mistaken. As set
forth above, the trial court expressly noted that there could be
disciplinary problems “in that environment” and accepted
counsels’ representations that defendant had none. Furthermore,
the fact that death row inmates can be deemed not a danger to
public safety does not mean that all such inmates must be so
characterized.
17
opinion for the 34 years of CDCR evidence showing [defendant]
posed no risk of future violence.” (Bolding omitted.) At the risk
of sounding redundant, the trial court exercised its discretion by
considering the various relevant factors identified in the statute
and found defendant to be a danger to public safety.
C. Other evidence considered by the trial court
The trial court also considered other evidence in its careful
consideration of the LADA’s recommendation. It highlighted the
psychological testimony presented at trial reflecting that
defendant “tended to have a history of aggression and assaultive
behavior, high frequency of problems with alcohol, can be
manipulative to get out of stressful situations, may be seen as
destructive, provocative and irritable, and any tension usually
results in immediate discharge to aggression and even
destructive reactions.” It also noted that defendant himself
testified at trial that physically assaulting Mahoney “made him
feel good by releasing pent up anger.”
Furthermore, as the trial court indicated, four years after
defendant murdered Mahoney, he expressed a disturbing lack of
remorse as he testified about his actions. Even on appeal, there
is still no evidence that defendant has shown any remorse or
insight into his actions in the 30-plus years he had been
incarcerated.9 The trial court properly considered defendant’s
lack of remorse when rendering its decision. Nothing in the plain
language of the statute precludes consideration of factors other
than those set forth therein. (See People v. Buford, supra,
9 The fact that defendant was “not physically or virtually
present” at the hearing is irrelevant. Defense counsel waived his
presence. And there is no argument on appeal that his presence
would have somehow demonstrated remorse.
18
4 Cal.App.5th at p. 899 [“[t]he reasons a trial court finds
resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk of danger, [and] its
weighing of evidence showing dangerousness versus evidence
showing rehabilitation, lie within the court’s discretion”].) And
the Supreme Court has instructed that “the presence or absence
of insight is a significant factor in determining whether there is a
‘rational nexus’ between the inmate’s dangerous past behavior
and the threat the inmate currently poses to public safety.” (In re
Shaputis (2011) 53 Cal.4th 192, 218.)
D. Alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in considering
whether defense counsel was ineffective as part of its analysis.
Defendant misreads the record. It was the LADA and defense
counsel who raised the subject of trial counsel’s performance.
The trial court simply noted that their criticisms of trial counsel
were not well-founded because the trial court record revealed a
strategic basis for counsel’s decisions regarding the penalty phase
presentation. Regardless, the trial court did not rely upon trial
counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness in denying the motion; the basis
for its decision is set forth in detail above.
E. Defendant’s procedural challenge fails
Defendant argues that the trial court failed to follow the
procedure mandated by section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(9),10 by
failing to give the parties an opportunity to address its reasons
for denying resentencing.
10 The parties briefs refer to “subdivision (a)(8).” As set forth
above, effective January 1, 2024, section 1172.1 was amended;
subdivision (a)(8) is now subdivision (a)(9).
19
1. Forfeiture
Preliminarily, we conclude that defendant forfeited this
claim because he failed to raise this argument or object to the
trial court’s process at any point during the hearing. (See People
v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 356 [“complaints about the manner
in which the trial court exercises its sentencing discretion and
articulates its supporting reasons cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal”]; People v. Garcia (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1203,
1218 (Garcia) [“‘Claims of error relating to sentences “which,
though otherwise permitted by law, were imposed in a
procedurally or factually flawed manner” are waived on appeal if
not first raised in the trial court’”].)
Defendant could have objected to the trial court not giving
a statement of reasons for its intended denial at the beginning of
the hearing when the trial court stated, “Then we’re here for
argument regarding resentencing. At the last court date the
parties had represented that it would just be argument. Is that
still the case?” Instead of objecting, defense counsel agreed with
the proposed procedure, saying, “Yes, your Honor.” Defendant
also could have lodged an objection when the LADA concluded its
argument and the court turned to defense counsel and explained
that it was ready to “hear argument and anything you want to
discuss.” Instead of objecting, defense counsel simply explained
why recall and resentencing should be granted. And, defendant
could have objected that the trial court had not stated the
reasons for the denial before making its final decision when,
immediately before ruling, the trial court asked if both sides
submitted, indicating that it was ready to make a ruling. Again,
defense counsel acquiesced in the trial court’s procedure, saying
only, “I submit.” Finally, defendant could have objected to the
20
trial court denying the request for recall and resentencing
without giving him an opportunity to respond to its reasoning at
the end of the hearing; instead, he remained silent.
Because defendant had multiple opportunities, but did not,
object to the trial court’s procedure in adjudicating the request for
resentencing, any claim of error in that regard is forfeited.
(Garcia, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 1218.)
2. The trial court did not err
Forfeiture aside, the trial court did not err.
As set forth above, section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(9),
provides, in relevant part: “Resentencing shall not be denied, nor
a stipulation rejected, without a hearing where the parties have
an opportunity to address the basis for the intended denial or
rejection.” According to defendant, the trial court was required to
issue a tentative ruling, allow the parties to respond, and then
formally rule. We disagree.
The statute’s requirement that the parties be given the
“opportunity to address the basis for the intended denial” simply
means that the parties must be allowed to address the court at a
hearing before it ultimately rules. (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(9).) We do
not interpret the phrase “to require a tentative ruling in advance
of the actual” decision. (People v. Zuniga (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th
81, 84; see also People v. Bautista (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 865,
870.) Rather, “it refers to procedural due process which, although
not subject to precise definition [citation], requires notice and an
opportunity to be heard.” (Ibid.; see also CREED-21 v. City of
San Diego (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 488, 517 [“‘“[R]easonable notice
and a reasonable opportunity to be heard . . . is all that is
required [for due process]”’”].)
21
Legislative history supports our conclusion. At the time
the Legislature was considering an amendment to the statute, it
was noted that the then-existing statute (former section 1170) did
“‘not provide adequate structure for the resentencing process,
leaving many requests languishing in limbo, or worse—denied
without reason.’” (Assem. Comm. on Public Safety, Analysis of
Assem. Bill No. 1540 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 27, 2021, pp. 3-
4.) Thus, the Legislature added the statutory right to counsel
and a hearing to “‘address equity and due process concerns in
how courts should handle second look sentencing requests.’” (Id.
at p. 4.)
In fact, the Legislature’s stated purpose for adding former
subdivision (a)(8) (now subdivision (a)(9)) was to “prohibit the
court from denying a recall and resentencing motion without a
hearing,” (Sen. Comm. on Public Safety, Hearing on Assem. Bill
No. 1540 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) July 6, 2021, p. 2), ensuring “due
process . . . in these types of resentencing cases” (id. at p. 3). But
there is no indication in the legislative history that section
subdivision (a)(9) was intended to provide a mandatory order of
operations for a court considering a recommendation to recall and
resentence a defendant.
The trial court adhered to proper procedure under section
1172.1. The parties had the opportunity to be heard before the
trial court denied the petition. Specifically, the trial court held a
hearing during which it heard from both the LADA and defense
counsel regarding the statutory presumption, why defendant did
not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, and why
defendant should be resentenced. After hearing these
arguments, along with thoroughly considering the exhibits
attached thereto the motion, the factors identified by the LADA,
22
and the trial record, it concluded that defendant was an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety before denying recall
and resentencing. That is all that was required.
Urging us to conclude otherwise, defendant argues that
“not only did the superior court not provide the parties an
opportunity to address the intended reasons for rejection prior to
asking both parties to submit—but the majority of the court’s oral
ruling focused on issues of apparent concern not contemplated by
the statute, like whether trial counsel was ineffective, or whether
[defendant’s] medical conditions were unique for a 71-year-old
man with a history of alcoholism.” As set forth above, it was
defendant and the LADA who injected these issues into the
discussion by including them in their argument; the trial court
merely addressed them as part of its discussion explaining why
the request for resentencing was being rejected.
Moreover, the trial court’s response to the LADA and
defendant raising those issues was not the “majority” of its
ruling; as detailed above, the trial court considered postconviction
factors, psychological evidence, the trial record, and defendant’s
lack of remorse, in addition to the facts of his heinous crime, to
conclude that the totality of the evidence weighed in favor of a
finding that defendant is a danger to public safety.
Defendant further contends that “[h]ad the superior court
placed these concerns on the record prior to asking both sides to
submit, counsel for [defendant] could have argued that the
question of whether trial counsel was indeed ineffective was
irrelevant to the rebuttal of the presumption created by the
statute.” However, at no point during the trial court’s
engagement with the deputy district attorney and defense
counsel about trial counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness did defendant
23
seek to withdraw that point from the trial court’s consideration,
nor did defendant argue that the issue raised by the LADA and
defense counsel was irrelevant to the decision being made.11
Furthermore, contrary to defendant’s argument on appeal,
there is no indication in the appellate record that the trial court
created some sort of “relationship” between the alleged ineffective
assistance of counsel and defendant’s unreasonable risk to public
safety; rather, the trial court noted that the attempted
relationship that the LADA and defense counsel attempted to
create was not factually well-founded.
Defendant also argues that the trial court’s finding that it
would not be in the interests of justice to resentence him
constitutes error: “By injecting an additional, improper step in
denying resentencing, the superior court abused its discretion
and rewrote the statute.” (Bolding omitted.) Defendant is
mistaken.
The trial court took the “interest of justice” language
directly from the statute itself. Section 1172.1, subdivision
(a)(3)(A), provides, in pertinent part, that a resentencing court
“may, in the interest of justice and regardless of whether the
original sentence was imposed after a trial or plea agreement,”
“[r]educe a defendant’s term of imprisonment by modifying the
sentence.”
And in referencing this statutory language, the trial court
was simply explaining that, even if it did recall the sentence, it
would nevertheless find that it was not in the interest of justice
to reduce defendant’s sentence. In other words, the trial court
11 The People agree that defense counsel’s alleged
ineffectiveness was irrelevant to the issue of dangerousness
under section 1172.1.
24
advised the parties that regardless of any recall of sentence, a
sentence of death was still the appropriate punishment for
defendant’s vicious crime.
Citing People v. Pierce (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1074 (Pierce),
defendant argues that “[t]he court’s role in deciding whether to
resentence is clearly circumscribed, and whether resentencing is
in the interest[] of justice in the court’s view is not a factor to be
considered where there is an explicit presumption in favor.”
Defendant’s reliance on Pierce is misplaced.
In Pierce, the defendant appealed after the trial court
summarily denied the CDCR’s recommendation to recall his
sentence, finding that the defendant had pleaded no contest to
extremely violent and serious crimes and that it did not believe
that the interests of justice would be served by granting the
request. (Pierce, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1077–1078.) After
noting the new requirements of section 1172.1, the appellate
court remanded the matter so that the trial court could consider
the CDCR’s request under the new and clarified procedure and
guidelines of the statute. The court noted, however, that it
“express[ed] no opinion whether appellant’s sentence should be
recalled or, if it is recalled, whether he should be resentenced.”
(Pierce, at p. 1079.) It did not, as defendant suggests, hold that a
court may not consider the interests of justice in resentencing a
defendant. In fact, the contrary is true. The appellate court
specifically explained that “section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(3)(A)
provides that, ‘in the interest of justice and regardless of whether
the original sentence was imposed after a . . . plea agreement,’
the resentencing court may ‘reduce a defendant’s term of
imprisonment by modifying the sentence.’” (Pierce, at p. 1079.)
25
3. No prejudice
Even if the trial court had followed the procedures
defendant proposes, the result would have been the same; thus,
he has not demonstrated prejudice. (People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) On appeal, defendant largely rehashes the
arguments he made to the trial court. For the reasons set forth
above, those arguments fail.
DISPOSITION
The order denying the petition for recall and resentencing
is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
_____________________, J.
ASHMANN-GERST
We concur:
________________________, P. J.
LUI
________________________, J.
HOFFSTADT
26
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