People v. Lopez CA2/1

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Filed 5/30/24 P. v. Lopez CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B323742
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. LA090054)
v.

NICK VEDOL LOPEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Richard H. Kirschner, Judge. Affirmed.
Janyce Keiko Imata Blair, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Viet H. Nguyen, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________
A jury convicted defendant and appellant Nick Vedol Lopez
of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))1 for killing his
wife, Tanya Menchaca, by stabbing her 32 times. After a
separate trial on prior convictions and sentencing factors in
aggravation, the court sentenced Lopez to 85 years to life in
prison. Lopez represented himself for almost all proceedings in
the guilt phase of the trial, and he now contends the trial court
erred by allowing him to do so despite doubts as to his
competency. In addition, Lopez argues the trial court erred by
failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of
voluntary manslaughter, by instructing the jury incorrectly
regarding factors in aggravation, and by failing to determine his
ability to pay before imposing fines, fees, and assessments. In
addition, Lopez contends the prosecutor committed misconduct in
a question she asked during voir dire. We affirm, as we explain
below.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In January 2019, Lopez moved into a home in North
Hollywood where Menchaca lived with two adult daughters from
a prior relationship, Selina and Ariana, and Selina’s three young
children. Lopez and Menchaca shared the master bedroom
upstairs. Ariana slept in another bedroom down the hall, and
Selina and her children shared a third bedroom. Selina testified
that she did not know Lopez well, but that after he moved into
the house, he and Menchaca spent almost all their time together.

1 Unless otherwise specified, subsequent statutory
references are to the Penal Code.

2
Selina believed Lopez had some kind of control over Menchaca,
and for that reason Selina preferred not to speak with Lopez.
At around 10:00 p.m. on the evening of February 22, 2019,
Selina knocked on the door of her mother’s bedroom, and her
mother answered. Selina saw Lopez sitting at the edge of the
bed, and nothing seemed out of the ordinary. Selina said that she
had put her children to bed and that she was heading out and
would be back home later. Menchaca told her to have a good
night. Ariana was not at home that night, so when Selina left,
Lopez and Menchaca were the only adults remaining in the
house.
Records recovered from Lopez’s phone showed that he
attempted to call his son at 1:42 a.m. the following morning, and
again at 1:43 a.m., but his son apparently did not answer.
Surveillance footage from an apartment building next door
captured a figure getting into Menchaca’s silver Honda Civic and
leaving the driveway of the home at 1:44 a.m. but showed no one
else entering or leaving the house at around this time. Lopez
made three more unsuccessful calls to his son between 1:46 and
1:47 a.m. At 1:51 a.m., Lopez called 911 from Menchaca’s cell
phone and told the dispatcher that someone had been stabbed at
the address of the house where he lived with Menchaca.
Within five minutes of the 911 call, first responders from
the fire department and Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)
arrived on the scene. Police officers found the security gate of the
building open, and the front door unlocked. They saw no signs of
forced entry. When the officers entered, they saw a substantial
amount of blood in the kitchen and on the stairway leading
upstairs. Officers entered Lopez and Menchaca’s bedroom and
discovered Menchaca’s naked body upside down in a closet,

3
covered in blood. They found Selina’s three children, still in bed,
and escorted them out of the house. Paramedics attempted to
render aid, but they almost immediately declared Menchaca
dead.
Officers investigating the crime scene found the blade of an
eight-inch butcher knife that had broken off its handle in the
closet where Menchaca’s body was discovered, along with a bent
knife underneath Menchaca’s body, and two more knives in the
sink in the adjoining bathroom. On the kitchen counter
downstairs they found two knife blocks, one with no knives in it,
the other with a few knives missing.
A police officer called Selina the night of the murder to tell
her that something had happened at her home. She returned
home to find yellow crime-scene tape surrounding the house.
Officers told Selina to go to the police station, where she was
reunited with her children and learned that her mother was
dead. She told a detective that her mother’s car was missing, and
that Lopez had likely gone to Las Vegas, where his adult son
lived.
At around 8:30 a.m. the following morning, an off-duty
sheriff’s deputy saw Lopez walking on an on-ramp of the 210
Freeway in Azusa, which is in the direction one would head from
the crime scene towards Las Vegas, with blood covering his
hands and his clothing. The deputy made a U-turn to approach
Lopez and tried to get his attention, but Lopez ran away. The
deputy called 911. A California Highway Patrol (CHP) officer
responded to the call and found Menchaca’s vehicle parked
nearby on the shoulder of the freeway, apparently abandoned.
The CHP officer exited the freeway and encountered Lopez,
walking on the street with blood covering his clothes and hands.

4
The officer asked Lopez what happened, and he said he had been
jumped. The officer asked him if he knew where he was, and he
said no.
The officer notified dispatch, and additional law
enforcement personnel and paramedics arrived on the scene.
Paramedics assessed Lopez but did not find any injuries apart
from some cuts on his hands. Azusa police officers placed Lopez
in handcuffs and accompanied him to a hospital.
The CHP officer returned to the abandoned vehicle and
discovered a large amount of blood on the driver’s side door and
near the trunk. The officer ran the license plate and found it was
registered to Menchaca.
An autopsy showed Menchaca suffered 32 stab wounds,
including 30 on her back and two on her sides. Two of the
wounds were fatal, and six more were potentially fatal. The
nature of several of the wounds suggested they had been caused
by a kitchen knife. Menchaca had also suffered a blunt-force
injury to her head consistent with being slammed down on the
ground or against a bed frame. The medical examiner who
conducted the autopsy also found an abrasion on Menchaca’s
finger and a cut on her hand, both of which were consistent with
defensive wounds. Criminalists tested the blood recovered from
the knives they found in the bedroom and determined it
contained DNA from both Menchaca and Lopez. They also
conducted DNA tests on fingernail clippings from Menchaca’s
right hand, which showed DNA from both Lopez and Menchaca.
This suggested Menchaca clawed at Lopez in self-defense.
Investigators administered a sexual assault kit and recovered
Lopez’s semen from Menchaca’s vagina and anus. The examiner
who conducted the autopsy discovered a tear on Menchaca’s anus.

5
There was no blood surrounding the injury, however, nor was it
red, suggesting that it was the result of postmortem anal sex.
An LAPD detective concluded Menchaca had been killed in
“a multi-phase attack,” in which her attacker first struck in the
bedroom, then went to the kitchen to retrieve additional knives,
leaving a trail of blood up and down the stairs as he went. The
attacker then returned to the bedroom and stabbed Menchaca
again. Menchaca either went in the closet trying to flee her
attacker, or the attacker moved her there.
PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
An information charged Lopez with one count of murder
(§ 187, subd. (a)) and alleged that he had suffered two prior
serious or violent felony convictions for purposes of the Three
Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(j), 1170.12). The information also
alleged several aggravating factors, including that the crime
involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily
harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty,
viciousness, or callousness, that Lopez was armed with or used a
weapon, that the victim was particularly vulnerable, that Lopez
took advantage of a position of trust and confidence to commit the
offense, that Lopez had prior convictions that were numerous and
of increasing seriousness, and that he showed a lack of remorse
and committed a post-mortem sexual assault.
On May 22, 2019, prior to his preliminary hearing, Lopez
completed a Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [95 S.Ct.
2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562] (Faretta) waiver form and asserted his
right to self-representation. The trial court appointed stand-by
counsel to assist Lopez with jury selection and to be prepared to
take over the case if Lopez’s self-representation was revoked. On
April 15, 2021, Lopez voluntarily relinquished his pro per status,

6
and his attorney filed a motion to suppress statements Lopez
made during a police interrogation the day after the murder in
which he admitted that he stabbed Menchaca. The trial court
granted the motion on the ground that the detective violated
Lopez’s Miranda2 rights by continuing to question Lopez after he
requested an attorney.
In August 2021, shortly after the court granted the
suppression motion, Lopez filed a Marsden3 motion seeking to
replace his appointed attorney. During the hearing on the
motion, Lopez informed the court that he disagreed with his
attorney’s plan to defend him on the basis that he was under the
influence4 when he stabbed Menchaca, which Lopez described as
a “guilty defense” that would “be admitting that I committed the
crime.” Lopez preferred to argue that the crime scene had been
staged, and that Menchaca was still alive when the police
arrived. Lopez also believed that the video of his interrogation
the day after the murder had been “switched” from an original
video where he “was barely speaking” to a new video showing a
“total confession,” which Lopez denied he made. Lopez
complained that his attorney refused to submit reports from
experts that, according to Lopez, showed the crime scene had
been staged and that photographs of Menchaca’s body showed

2 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [86 S.Ct. 1602, 16
L.Ed.2d 694].
3 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.

4 The doctor who treated Lopez at the hospital the morning
after the murder found that he was intoxicated and had an
altered psychiatric state. Lopez did not introduce this evidence
during the trial.

7
she did not have rigor mortis, indicating that she did not die at
the time the prosecution alleged. Lopez’s attorney stated that his
strategy would not require admitting that Lopez was guilty,
because he would deny that Lopez formed the specific intent to
kill, which is required for first degree murder. The trial court
denied the Marsden motion, and Lopez once again asserted his
right to represent himself.
After accepting Lopez’s Faretta waiver, the court asked
Lopez if he planned to proceed with a defense that he did not stab
Menchaca, and that the police were responsible for killing her
and staging the crime scene. Lopez confirmed that his defense
was indeed that “I did not do that to my wife and . . . that she was
alive at the crime scene.” On the basis of this statement, the
court declared a doubt as to Lopez’s competency to proceed, and
his stand-by attorney concurred. The mental health division of
the superior court found Lopez competent to stand trial and
returned him to the trial court, where proceedings resumed.
After a trial in which Lopez represented himself, made
objections, cross-examined the prosecution’s witnesses, called a
witness of his own, and made a closing argument, the jury found
Lopez guilty of first degree murder. Prior to the second phase of
the trial, on aggravating factors and Lopez’s prior convictions,
Lopez again relinquished his self-represented status. The jury
found the allegations true.
The trial court sentenced Lopez to an aggregate sentence of
85 years to life in prison. The sentence consisted of 25 years to
life multiplied by three pursuant to the Three Strikes law (see
§§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(A)(i), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A)(i)), plus five
years for each of his two prior serious felony convictions (see
§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).

8
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Failing to Instruct
the Jury on Voluntary Manslaughter
Lopez contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct
the jury on voluntary manslaughter on the theories of heat of
passion and imperfect self-defense. We disagree, as there was no
substantial evidence to support an instruction on either of these
theories.
“ ‘Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with
malice aforethought. (§ 187, subd. (a).) A defendant who
commits an intentional and unlawful killing but who lacks malice
is guilty of . . . voluntary manslaughter. (§ 192.)’ [Citation.]
Generally, the intent to unlawfully kill constitutes malice.
[Citations.] ‘But a defendant who intentionally and unlawfully
kills lacks malice . . . in limited, explicitly defined circumstances:
either when the defendant acts in a “sudden quarrel or heat of
passion” (§ 192, subd. (a)), or when the defendant kills in
“unreasonable self-defense”—the unreasonable but good faith
belief in having to act in self-defense [citations].’ [Citation.]
Because heat of passion and unreasonable self-defense reduce an
intentional, unlawful killing from murder to voluntary
manslaughter by negating the element of malice that otherwise
inheres in such a homicide [citation], voluntary manslaughter of
these two forms is considered a lesser necessarily included
offense of intentional murder [citation].” (People v. Breverman
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 153–154, fn. omitted, disapproved on
another ground in People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 260,
fn. 7.)
“In a murder case, trial courts are obligated to instruct the
jury on defenses supported by substantial evidence that could

9
lead to conviction of the lesser included offense of voluntary
manslaughter, even where the defendant objects, or is not, as a
matter of trial strategy, relying on such a defense.” (People v.
Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 541.) “ ‘Substantial evidence’ in this
context is ‘ “evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable
[persons] could . . . conclude[ ]” ’ that the lesser offense, but not
the greater, was committed. [Citations.]” (People v. Breverman,
supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 162.)
In this case, there was no substantial evidence that Lopez
killed either in a heat of passion or in imperfect self-defense.
Lopez argues that the jury could “reasonably infer[ ] from the
infliction of 32 wounds upon Menchaca that [Lopez]’s actions
were the product of a volatile, frenzied, uncalculated attack
produced in the heat of passion,” but to reduce murder to
manslaughter on the basis of heat of passion, it is not enough
that the defendant acted in an extreme mental state. In addition,
the “ ‘ “heat of passion must be due to ‘sufficient provocation’ ” ’ ”
(People v. Moye, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 549) on the part of the
victim “that . . . would cause an ordinary person of average
disposition to act rashly or without due deliberation and
reflection.” (Id. at p. 550.) There was no evidence at trial that
Menchaca did anything to provoke Lopez.
Nor was there substantial evidence that Lopez acted in
imperfect self-defense, that is, on the theory “ ‘ “ ‘that a defendant
killed another person because the defendant actually, but
unreasonably, believed he was in imminent danger of death or
great bodily injury.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192,
1226.) All of Menchaca’s stab wounds were on her back and
sides, not on the front of her body, as would be expected if Lopez
stabbed her in self-defense. Lopez, for his part, suffered no

10
injuries in the attack other than relatively small cuts on his
hands. Furthermore, the “multi-phase” nature of the attack, in
which Lopez apparently went downstairs to the kitchen to get
more knives before returning to stab Menchaca, was inconsistent
with even an unreasonable belief that he was in imminent danger
from his physically much smaller wife.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by
Allowing Lopez to Represent Himself
With the exception of a short period before trial, Lopez
represented himself in all proceedings in this case through the
end of the guilt phase of the trial. He now contends that he was
not competent to do so, and that the trial court erred by failing to
revoke his self-represented status. He points to statements he
made prior to trial that, he claims, show he did not understand
“that a crime comprises actus reus and mens rea components and
that the prosecution must prove their joint operation beyond a
reasonable doubt.” We are not persuaded. A trial court may not
terminate a defendant’s self-representation for lack of knowledge
of legal doctrine. (People v. Best (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 747, 758.)
Instead, a trial court may overrule a defendant’s decision to act
as his own attorney only where “severe mental illness” renders
the defendant incompetent. (Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S.
164, 178 [128 S.Ct. 2379, 171 L.Ed.2d 345] (Edwards).)
Neither the California Constitution nor the Penal Code
includes a right to self-representation (People v. Johnson (2012)
53 Cal.4th 519, 526 (Johnson); People v. Taylor (2009) 47 Cal.4th
850, 872, fn. 8), but the United States Supreme Court in Faretta
held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees “the right of an
accused to conduct his own defense.” (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at
p. 832.) “[T]he right of self-representation is not absolute,”

11
however. (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 206.) In
Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. 164, the Supreme Court recognized
that a “gray area” (id. at p. 172) exists in which a criminal
defendant meets the minimal requirements for competence to
stand trial—that is, “ ‘a rational as well as factual understanding
of the proceedings against him’ and . . . ‘. . . sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding’ ” (id. at p. 170, quoting Dusky v. United
States (1960) 362 U.S. 402 [80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824])—but is
not competent to act as his own attorney at trial. The court
declined to adopt a specific standard a defendant must meet to
assert his right to self-representation, concluding only “that the
Constitution permits judges to take realistic account of the
particular defendant’s mental capacities” (Edwards, supra, at
p. 177), and that “the Constitution permits [s]tates to insist upon
representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand
trial . . . but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the
point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings
by themselves.” (Id. at p. 178.)
In Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th 519, our Supreme Court
“accept[ed] the Edwards invitation” and held that California
“trial courts may deny self-representation in those cases where
Edwards permits such denial.” (Id. at p. 528.) The court
reasoned that state law already authorized courts to deny
incompetent defendants self-representation, and “California
courts should give effect to this California law when [they] can.”
(Id. at p. 526.)
The Johnson court considered several possible standards
courts might apply in deciding whether a defendant was
competent to represent himself. One group of amici curiae

12
“urge[d] th[e] court to return to what they view as the pre-Faretta
standard in California ‘requiring that a defendant who wishes to
represent himself demonstrate an understanding of the charges,
defenses and punishments, and an ability to rationally
communicate.’ ” (Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 529.) Another
amicus brief proposed “ ‘a test for the “cognitive and
communicative skills” involved in competently representing
oneself: “Such skills are present where the accused: (1) possesses
a reasonably accurate awareness of his situation, including not
simply an appreciation of the charges against him and the range
and nature of possible penalties, but also his own physical or
mental infirmities, if any; (2) is able to understand and use
relevant information rationally in order to fashion a response to
the charges; and (3) can coherently communicate that response to
the trier of fact.” [Citation.]’ ” (Ibid., quoting People v. Taylor,
supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 873.) The court described these proposals,
among others, as “plausible,” but rejected them because “we are
constrained by the circumstance that what is permissible is only
what Edwards permits, not what pre-Faretta California law
permitted. In other words, because of federal constitutional
constraints, in considering the defendant’s mental state as a
reason to deny self-representation, a California court may not
exercise the discretion permitted under California law but solely
that permitted in Edwards.” (Johnson, supra, at p. 530.)
The court in Johnson then summarized the Edwards
standard, instructing trial courts to consider “simply whether the
defendant suffers from a severe mental illness to the point where
he or she cannot carry out the basic tasks needed to present the
defense without the help of counsel.” (Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th
at p. 530.) The court instructed trial courts to “apply this

13
standard cautiously” because “[c]riminal defendants still
generally have a Sixth Amendment right to represent
themselves.” (Id. at p. 531.) For this reason, a court “may deny
self-representation only in those situations where Edwards
permits it.” (Ibid.)
Subsequent cases have reaffirmed that “ ‘ “[s]evere mental
illness” appears to be a condition precedent. . . . Nothing in the
[Edwards] opinion suggests that a court can deny a request for
self-representation in the absence of this.’ ” (People v. Orosco
(2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 348, 360, quoting U.S. v. Berry (7th Cir.
2009) 565 F.3d 385, 391.) Thus, in Orosco, where the defendant
appeared confused at his Faretta hearing and made errors in
filling out his waiver form, the trial court lacked discretion to find
him incompetent to represent himself because there was no
evidence he suffered from a mental illness. (Orosco, supra, at
pp. 360–361.) Even in People v. Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th 181,
where the “defendant held fringe political beliefs that inspired his
murder of a police officer” (id. at p. 209), this did not justify the
trial court to find him incompetent to represent himself.
To be sure, a defendant may have sufficiently severe
mental illness to warrant denying self-representation even if he
does not engage in “bizarre, noncompliant, and disruptive
behavior.” (Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 525) In People v.
Gardner (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 945, there was no evidence of
bad behavior by the defendant in court, but the trial court
nevertheless denied his Faretta motion on the basis of a doctor’s
report diagnosing him with “an ‘Expressive Language Disorder’
that prevented him from coherently communicating with the
court or a jury. [The doctor] also reported that [the] defendant
did not demonstrate ‘the higher cognitive abilities necessary to

14
litigate his case in court.’ In other words, [the] defendant did not
have the ‘ “ability to play the significantly expanded role required
for self-representation even if he [could] play the lesser role of
represented defendant.” ’ ” (Gardner, supra, at p. 960, quoting
Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 176.) On this basis, the Court of
Appeal “conclude[d] that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying [the] defendant’s motion to represent
himself.” (Gardner, supra, at p. 960.)
In this case, there was no diagnosis of a mental illness that
prevented Lopez from carrying out the basic tasks of self-
representation. Lopez argues that his conduct during the
Marsden hearing shows he was not competent to defend himself.
In the hearing, Lopez objected to his attorney’s plan to concede
that he killed Menchaca, and to argue he was not guilty of first
degree murder on the basis of intoxication. Lopez described his
attorney’s strategy as a “guilty defense,” a statement we read not
as confusion that Lopez thought his counsel was proposing to
concede he committed first degree murder, but rather as
disagreement with any concession that Lopez stabbed his wife
because he insisted she was alive and unharmed when he last
saw her. In any event, a “lack[ ] [of] knowledge of criminal law
and courtroom procedure . . . is not a basis to deny the right to
self-representation.” (People v. Best, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at
p. 758.) A defendant has the “right to control his defense” (People
v. Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 209), even if it means choosing a
poor strategy or presenting no defense at all. (See People v.
Taylor, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 866 [“Nor does the likelihood or

15
actuality of a poor performance by a defendant acting in propria
persona defeat the federal self-representation right”].)5
Finally, Lopez notes that the trial court was concerned
enough about his proposed defense strategy that it suspended
proceedings in the case pending an investigation into his
competency. Lopez does not note, however, that a doctor who
examined him stated that “[h]e appeared very knowledgeable in
courtroom proceedings,” and that he “was clearly advocating for
himself, and stated he would request the assistance of an
attorney if needed, as he had done in the past. He did not display
any overt signs of a mental illness that would impair his ability
to rationally assist in his defense.” Although the doctor was
evaluating Lopez’s competence to stand trial, there is no reason
to believe she would have reached a different conclusion if she

5 In support of his argument, Lopez cites two pre-Faretta
cases, People v. Floyd (1970) 1 Cal.3d 694, 703–704, disapproved
on another ground in People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 287,
fn. 36, and People v. Sharp (1972) 7 Cal.3d 448, 462, where the
Supreme Court affirmed the denial of requests by criminal
defendants to represent themselves in part on the basis of their
level of education and courtroom demeanor. But in People v.
Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th 181, the court stated that “our pre-
Faretta case law cannot be indiscriminately imported into a post-
Faretta world. As we concluded in Johnson, California courts
may only exercise the discretion permitted under Edwards, not
the discretion our pre-Faretta case law reflected.” (Id. at pp. 207–
208.) The court in Johnson cited Floyd and Sharp but did not
imply that these cases accurately reflected the standard for
denying a defendant self-representation. (See Johnson, supra, 53
Cal.4th at p. 528.)

16
had evaluated his competence to represent himself.6 The trial
court did not discuss the possibility of evaluating Lopez’s
competence to represent himself rather than his competence to
stand trial, but “we cannot presume error where the record does
not establish on its face that the trial court misunderstood the
scope of [its] discretion.” (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 174
Cal.App.4th 515, 527.)
When reviewing a trial court’s decision regarding whether
to revoke a defendant’s self-representation, “we must defer
largely to the trial court’s discretion. [Citations.] The trial
court’s determination regarding a defendant’s competence must
be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] Such
deference is especially appropriate when . . . the same judge has
observed the defendant on numerous occasions.” (Johnson,
supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 531.) The court in Johnson also cautioned
that under the Sixth Amendment, “[s]elf-representation by
defendants who wish it and validly waive counsel remains the
norm and may not be denied lightly. A court may not deny self-
representation merely because it believes the matter could be
tried more efficiently, or even more fairly, with attorneys on both
sides.” (Id. at p. 531.)
In this case, the trial court observed Lopez for three years
of litigation and described him as “a very intelligent man” who
was “articulate, . . . reasonably well-versed in the law, and . . .
always highly, highly prepared.” The court described an incident
during cross-examination of a witness when Lopez “was so

6 A trial court may order a psychological examination of a
defendant’s mental competence to represent himself, but need not
do so routinely. (Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 530.)

17
familiar with the record as it was contained in the discovery, that
he was able to correct the police officer on the brand and the type
of the camera that that police officer had used years ago.” We see
no basis for calling into question the court’s decision to allow
Lopez to continue representing himself.
C. The Prosecutor’s Statement During Voir Dire Was
Not Prejudicial Misconduct
Lopez contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by
commenting during jury selection on differences between the
judicial systems of the United States and Iran. We conclude that
Lopez forfeited the argument by failing to raise it before the trial
court. The argument also fails on the merits because, even
assuming the statement was improper, there is no reasonable
probability it affected the jury’s verdict.
During voir dire, the court asked a prospective juror about
his response to one of the questions on the jury selection
questionnaire regarding past experience with the criminal justice
system, and the prospective juror described an incident during
his childhood in Iran when a friend had been unjustly convicted
of murder. The court responded, “We have a different system
than the system in Iran.” The prospective juror said he believed
law enforcement dealt with DNA evidence similarly in the United
States.
Later, the prosecutor questioned the prospective juror
about this incident. The prosecutor said, “So you said the
incident involving your friend happened in Iran, is that fair? I
also grew up in Iran. [That’s] part of why I’m a [district attorney]
in America. Would you agree with me that law enforcement in
Iran is very different than the laws in America?” The juror
responded he believed that “police officer[s] and law enforcement

18
work the same” in both nations, and believed his prior experience
would make him biased against the prosecution. The prosecutor
moved to dismiss the prospective juror from the panel for cause,
and the trial court granted the motion.
Lopez argues that the prosecutor’s question, in contrasting
the law enforcement and judicial systems in the United States
and Iran, “amounted to an endorsement for the integrity of her
office and the police investigation upon which its prosecutions
rely.” In Lopez’s view, the prosecutor’s question represented
misconduct because it impermissibly referred to facts outside the
record (see People v. Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 213) and
“attempt[ed] to precondition the prospective jurors” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 223, subd. (b)(3)) to find him guilty by inflating the
prestige of the prosecutor’s office.
The People argue that Lopez forfeited this argument by
failing to object before the trial court, and we agree. “ ‘ “ ‘To
preserve a misconduct claim for review on appeal, a defendant
must make a timely objection and ask the trial court to admonish
the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s improper remarks or
conduct, unless an admonition would not have cured the harm.’ ” ’
[Citation.]” (People v. Dworak (2021) 11 Cal.5th 881, 909.) We
see no reason that an admonition would have been insufficient in
this case.
Lopez’s claim also fails on the merits. “ ‘ “ ‘Under the
federal Constitution, a prosecutor commits reversible misconduct
only if the conduct infects the trial with such “ ‘unfairness as to
make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’ ” ’ ” ’
[Citation.] Misconduct that falls short of a federal due process
violation may nevertheless violate state law if it ‘involves the use
of deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the court or

19
jury.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Dworak, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 909–910.) “Reversal of a judgment of conviction based on
prosecutorial misconduct is called for only when, after reviewing
the totality of the evidence, we can determine it is reasonably
probable that a result more favorable to [the] defendant would
have occurred absent the misconduct.” (People v. Castillo (2008)
168 Cal.App.4th 364, 386.)
At issue is a single statement by the prosecutor to
prospective jurors that did not refer to Lopez personally or to the
murder of Menchaca. Even if we assume without deciding that
the comparison of the justice systems of Iran and the United
States was improper, it was an isolated comment made before the
trial began, and it was of no significance in comparison with the
vast amount of evidence produced at trial establishing Lopez’s
guilt. The prosecutor’s statement did not infect the trial with
unfairness, and there is no reasonable probability that Lopez
would have obtained a more favorable result in its absence.
D. Any Error in the Jury Instructions on Aggravating
Factors Was Harmless
Lopez contends the trial court instructed the jury
incorrectly in the second phase of the trial. In its instruction on
how the jury should interpret the allegations on aggravating
factors, the court stated that “[w]ords and phrases not specifically
defined in this instruction are to be applied using their ordinary,
everyday meaning.” In Lopez’s view, the aggravating factors
alleged in this case involved fine distinctions that the jury might
not understand from ordinary use, such as the difference between
violence and viciousness. (See People v. Reed (1984) 157
Cal.App.3d 489, 492.) Lopez argues that the instructions were
also defective because the court did not inform the jury that “[t]he

20
essence of ‘aggravation’ relates to the effect of a particular fact in
making the offense distinctively worse than the ordinary.”
(People v. Moreno (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 103, 110.) Lopez’s
attorney, who represented him for this portion of the trial, did not
object to the instructions on these grounds. In March 2023, after
Lopez’s trial concluded, the Judicial Council of California issued
new CALCRIM pattern jury instructions addressing the issues
Lopez raises here. (See CALCRIM Nos. 3224, 3225, 3233.)
We need not decide whether the trial court erred by failing
to instruct the jury in the manner Lopez proposes, nor whether
Lopez forfeited the argument by failing to object to the
instructions before the trial court (see People v. Lewis (2001) 26
Cal.4th 334, 380 [where a defendant fails to request further
amplification or explanation of a jury instruction, the claim is
forfeited on appeal]) because any error was harmless under any
standard of review. As the People point out, this case did not
involve a determinate sentence, where a jury finding of at least
one aggravating factor is required for the court to impose a high-
term sentence. (See § 1170, subd. (b)(2).) Instead, the jury
convicted Lopez of first degree murder, which (in the absence of a
special-circumstance finding) allows for only one sentence, 25
years to life, regardless of whether the jury found any
aggravating factors. (See § 190, subd. (a).)
Lopez argues the aggravating factors were nonetheless
relevant because the trial court relied on them as justification for
denying his motion pursuant to People v. Superior Court
(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 to strike one of the prior offenses
for purposes of sentencing. But “a Romero motion . . . requires
the sentencing court to utilize a different legal standard with a
different presumption than . . . applie[s] under . . . section

21
1170. . . . In ruling on a Romero motion, the court must consider
whether ‘the defendant may be deemed outside the [Three
Strikes] scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be
treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or
more serious and/or violent felonies.’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 428.) The consideration of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, which is mandatory
for choosing a determinate sentence, is not directly relevant to a
Romero motion, and the trial court’s decision on a Romero motion
“tells us little about what it would have done if given the
opportunity to exercise its discretion on another sentencing issue
under . . . section 1170.” (Salazar, supra, at p. 429.)
In this case, although the trial court cited the aggravating
factors found by the jury, it is clear from the transcript that the
court based its decision to deny the Romero motion on its own
evaluation of Lopez’s conduct, not the jury’s findings. The court
noted that Lopez “has shown absolutely no remorse, no
acceptance of responsibility,” that he and Menchaca “were
basically alone in the house at the time of the murder,” and that
“[t]his victim was particularly vulnerable. She was a slightly
built woman. [Lopez] outweighed her by close to 100 pounds.”
The court concluded that “there is absolutely nothing in the
record pertaining to [Lopez]’s background and character or
prospects that would militate against the application of the Three
Strikes law in this case. The Three Strikes law is appropriate in
this case.” The court decided to impose “the maximum sentence
permitted under the law,” and nothing about the jury
instructions relating to aggravating factors made any difference
to that determination.

22
E. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Failing to Determine
Lopez’s Ability to Pay before Imposing Fines
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a $30
criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373), a $40 court
operations assessment (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)), and a $10,000
restitution fine (§ 1202.4). Lopez contends under People v.
Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, 1168–1172 that the trial
court violated his due process rights by imposing the fines and
fees without considering whether he would be able to pay them.
In Dueñas, the court held that “imposing these assessments
upon indigent defendants without a determination that they have
the present ability to pay violates due process under both the
United States Constitution and the California Constitution.”
(People v. Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1168, fn. omitted.)
In addition, to avoid constitutional questions regarding the
propriety of imposing restitution fines that might place a much
greater burden on indigent defendants than on others, the court
held that when a trial court sentences an indigent defendant,
“the court must stay the execution of the fine until and unless the
People demonstrate that the defendant has the ability to pay the
fine.” (Id. at p. 1172.) Subsequent cases have diverged on
whether the court’s analysis in Dueñas was correct (compare
People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, 95 [agreeing in part
with the Dueñas analysis], review granted Nov. 13, 2019,
S257844, with People v. Petri (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 82, 90–92
[rejecting Dueñas]), “and the issue is currently before the
California Supreme Court” (Petri, supra, at p. 90).
We conclude that Lopez forfeited his challenge to the fines
by failing to object before the trial court. In cases where a
sentencing hearing took place before Dueñas, some courts have

23
held that a defendant’s failure to object to the imposition of fines
and assessments is excused because Dueñas was not foreseeable,
and it would have appeared futile to make an objection. (See,
e.g., People v. Jones (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 1028, 1033, People v.
Johnson (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 134, 138; but see People v.
Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1126, 1154 [forfeiture doctrine
applied].) In this case, however, the sentencing hearing took
place three years after Dueñas, and there was no reason for
Lopez to believe it would have been futile to challenge the
imposition of the fines. Furthermore, the trial court imposed a
restitution fine of $10,000, the maximum allowed by law. (See
§ 1202.4, subd. (b)(1).) Although section 1202.4 bars trial courts
from waiving the restitution fine on the basis of the defendant’s
inability to pay, it allows courts to consider ability to pay as a
reason to reduce the fine below the maximum. (See Frandsen,
supra, at pp. 1153–1154.) Thus, if Lopez believed he could not
pay the restitution fine, he did not need Dueñas to give him
permission to challenge it.
Even if we were to overlook Lopez’s forfeiture of this issue,
we disagree with Lopez on the merits. As we explained in detail
in People v. Caceres (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 917, 926–929, the
imposition of fees and restitution fines does not ordinarily
implicate due process or require trial courts in all cases to
determine a defendant’s ability to pay before imposing them.
Nothing about Lopez’s case suggests that it involves the “extreme
facts” (see id. at p. 923) in which due process claims might be
involved.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

WEINGART, J.

We concur:

CHANEY, J.

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

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