People v. Wertz CA1/2

CourtListener 9509116CalctappMay 30, 2024

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Filed 5/30/24 P. v. Wertz CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A167930
v. (Lake County Super. Ct.
JEREMIAH WERTZ, No. CR963953)
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Jeremiah Wertz appeals from the sentence imposed after he
pleaded no contest to two counts of inflicting corporal injury on a person with
whom he had a dating relationship. He contends the trial court erred in
imposing an upper term and in assessing restitution fines without a showing
of present ability to pay. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plea
In March 2023, defendant entered a plea of no contest to two counts of
willfully inflicting corporal injury upon a person with whom he had a dating
relationship (Pen. Code,1 § 273.5, subd. (a)) in exchange for the dismissal of
other charges (assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury
and battery resulting in serious bodily injury) and various special allegations

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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and with the understanding that he could be sentenced to up to five years in
prison.
Defendant’s attorney stipulated to the following factual basis for the
plea.
“On June 12th in the year 2022 at approximately 04:00 hours, the
alleged victim N.C. and Mr. Wertz were at her residence. At approximately
4:00 hours, for unknown reasons, he spontaneously called her a, quote,
‘f****** n*****,’ unquote, and struck her multiple times in the face with a
closed fist, struck her in the right arm, leaving bruising. He grabbed her
right ring finger and twisted. The alleged victim . . . felt as if he had broken
her finger. The officer who responded . . . observed that she had multiple
bruises on her right arm and a bruise on the back of her left hand the size of
a golf ball. She also reported a loss of hearing. . . . The alleged victim N.C.
and Mr. Wertz had been in a dating relationship for approximately five
months . . . .
“On or about April 11th in the year 2022 at approximately 2200 hours,
Mr. Wertz and the same victim N.C. were at her residence . . . . He began
arguing with her for unknown reason reasons and spontaneously called her a,
quote, ‘n***** lover,’ unquote, along with several other foul names. He
grabbed and twisted her knee with an unknown hand. Afterwards she went
to sleep. And on the following day, he was at the residence and she was on
the phone with a friend. He was upset. He slapped her in the face with his
right hand, climbed on top off her and pinned her to the bed and pulled her
hair while striking her in the face approximately 10 times. The officer
observed bruising on her face, bruising to her right eye, both of her cheeks,
and sides of her neck consistent with someone striking her in a manner
described to the officer.”

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Sentencing
The probation report noted a risk assessment indicated defendant had
a high risk of reoffending, he had a recent record of committing similar
crimes, his prior crimes were numerous, his prior performance on summary
probation and mandatory community supervision was poor, his ability to
comply with reasonable conditions of probation was poor, he had served two
prior state prison terms and two prior county jail terms under section 1170,
subdivision (h), and he was presumptively ineligible for probation except in
an unusual case because he had suffered five prior felony convictions. (See
§ 1203, subd. (e)(4) [probation shall not be granted to any person previously
convicted twice of a felony, except in unusual cases].) Acknowledging these
circumstances and further finding “this is not an unusual case,” the probation
department nonetheless recommended probation, which would include a
residential substance abuse treatment program.
At sentencing, despite the stipulation to the factual basis for the plea,
defendant appeared to deny that he did anything wrong; defendant told the
court that when he was dating the victim, he realized right away that he
“made a mistake” because she drank up to 30 containers of beer a day and
became belligerent, that he did not know how the victim got bruised up and
thought perhaps she got in a fight with someone while she was drunk, and
that the victim had “abandonment issues” or “multiple personality disorder
or something.”
The prosecutor asked for a prison sentence of the middle term and a
consecutive one-third term (for four years), noting that defendant had
multiple prior convictions, including weapons charges and misdemeanor
batteries, and that he had taken no responsibility for his actions in the
current case.

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The trial court denied defendant probation, observing this was not an
unusual case.
The court found aggravating and mitigating factors as follows: “The
defendant has engaged in violent conduct which indicates a serious danger to
society. His prior convictions are numerous and increasing in seriousness.
And for the record, I have certified court records to those priors because
they’re local priors. He has served two prior prison terms in state prison and
two county jail prison terms. His prior performance on summary probation
and mandatory community supervision has been unsatisfactory. I don’t find
any factors in mitigation.”
The court found “the aggravating factors outweigh those in mitigation,
and I have certified records on which I can . . . make that finding,” and
imposed the upper term of four years for the principal term, plus a
consecutive one-third the middle term of one year for a sentence of five years
in state prison.
DISCUSSION
A. Imposition of the Upper Term
Initially, defendant “questions” the trial court’s rejection of the
probation department’s recommendation that he be placed on probation, but
there is no doubt the trial court was free to reject that recommendation.
(People v. Delson (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 56, 63.) To the extent defendant
challenges the denial of probation, we easily conclude the trial court acted
within its discretion in finding this case is not unusual so as to rebut section
1203’s presumption of ineligibility for probation. (See People v. Stuart (2007)
156 Cal.App.4th 165, 178–179 [a trial court’s discretion in determining
whether to grant probation is broad; the standard for reviewing a finding
that a case is unusual is abuse of discretion].)

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Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in imposing
the upper term. He argues the court failed to take account of evidence
submitted in a letter from his wife that he suffered from childhood trauma.
We find no abuse of discretion.
Section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) (§ 1170(b)(6)) provides, “[U]nless the
court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the
interests of justice, the court shall order imposition of the lower term if any of
the following was a contributing factor in the commission of the offense:
[¶] (A) The person has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood
trauma . . . .”
Defendant has forfeited this claim because, at sentencing, he neither
asked for the lower term based on section 1170(b)(6) nor claimed that he
suffered childhood trauma that contributed to the commission of the current
offenses. (See People v. Tilley (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 772, 778 [claim that the
trial court abused its discretion in not applying section 1170(b)(6) forfeited
where the defendant did not seek the lower term based on the statute or
argue he suffered trauma].)
In any event, the record discloses no error in the trial court’s implicit
determination that section 1170(b)(6) did not apply in this case. (See People
v. Achane (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1037, 1044 [a trial court’s decision whether
to apply the lower term under section 1170(b)(6) “depends on both factual
determinations and the exercise of discretion”].) The probation department
reported that defendant denied any abuse or neglect in his childhood home.
Thus, the trial court reasonably could have determined as a factual matter
that defendant did not suffer childhood trauma. The court also could have
found that section 1170(b)(6) did not apply because there was no evidence

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that any childhood trauma contributed to his commission of the current
offenses. Given that defendant denied both that he committed the current
offenses and that he suffered abuse or neglect as a child, the trial court can
hardly be faulted for failing to find that childhood trauma contributed to the
commission of the current offenses.
The trial court properly found as an aggravating factor that defendant’s
prior convictions were numerous; therefore, it could legally impose an upper
term. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2); § 1170, subd. (b)(3).) Defendant
argues his prior crimes (including convictions for a domestic violence
incident, possession of a fixed blade knife, and unlawful possession of
ammunition) should not be held against him because they were likely related
to his substance abuse problem. But the trial court reasonably decided
otherwise. Defendant has not shown abuse of discretion.
B. Restitution
At sentencing in 2023, the trial court imposed the minimum restitution
fine of $300 under section 1202.4, subdivision (b). Defendant did not object
that he was unable to pay under People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th
1157, 1164.
On appeal, defendant claims the restitution fine should not have been
assessed without the prosecution establishing a present ability to pay, citing
Dueñas. This claim is forfeited. (See People v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850,
856, 859 [constitutional claim regarding ability to pay fees is subject to the
forfeiture rule].)
Defendant next argues defense counsel’s failure to raise the issue of
ability to pay at sentencing deprived him of effective assistance of counsel.
“On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective assistance only
if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical

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purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason
and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory
explanation. All other claims of ineffective assistance are more appropriately
resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th
986, 1009.) The record is silent as to why defense counsel chose not to object
to the imposition of fines and fees. It is possible defense counsel did not
object because she knew defendant did have the ability to pay. We cannot
say defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

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_________________________
Miller, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Richman, Acting P. J.

_________________________
Desautels, J.

A167930, People v. Wertz

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