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Filed 5/30/24 P. v. Aldama CA2/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B323025
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA156576)
v.
JIM ALDAMA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Carol J. Najera, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard B. Lennon and Peter S. Westacott, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Seth P. McCutcheon, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury found defendant Jim Aldama (defendant) guilty of
carrying a concealed dirk or dagger in violation of Penal Code
section 21310 (section 21310). In this appeal from the judgment
of conviction, we consider whether the trial court correctly
granted the prosecution’s for-cause challenge to a prospective
juror who suggested he was “definitely going to be bias[ed]”
against testifying law enforcement officers. We are also asked to
decide whether section 21310 is unconstitutional in light of the
United States Supreme Court’s Second Amendment ruling in
New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen (2022)
597 U.S. 1.
I. BACKGROUND
The Los Angeles District Attorney charged defendant with
one count of carrying a concealed dirk or dagger in violation of
section 21310. The information against defendant additionally
alleged he had two prior serious or violent felony convictions.
At trial on the charge, Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff
Luis Cisneros testified he and his partner were on duty in
January 2022 and saw defendant riding a bicycle that appeared
to have no brakes. The deputies stopped defendant and saw he
was holding an open can of beer. Deputy Cisneros detained
defendant, and defendant told him he had two knives in one of
his pockets. Deputy Cisneros found the two knives in a sheath
“completely concealed” in defendant’s pocket. The knives were
over six inches long.
The jury found defendant guilty of carrying a concealed
dirk or dagger. Defendant admitted one of the prior conviction
allegations, but the trial court dismissed that allegation in
2
furtherance of justice. The court sentenced defendant to two
years in custody.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant advances two arguments for reversal. He
contends, first, that the trial court erroneously granted the
prosecution’s for-cause challenge to a prospective juror who
agreed he would be biased against testifying law enforcement
officers but later said, after further prompting, that he could be
“fair to all the witnesses.” We hold there was no error because
the record adequately supports the trial court’s conclusion that
the prospective juror expressed actual bias and was not
thereafter sufficiently rehabilitated. We also reject the defense’s
related argument that is premised on Code of Civil Procedure
section 231.7, a statute that limits exercise of peremptory
challenges, not challenges for cause like the one at issue in this
appeal. Defendant contends, second, that section 21310’s
prohibition against carrying a concealed dirk or dagger violates
the Second Amendment. Assuming the constitutional right to
bear “Arms” (U.S. Const., 2d Amend.) extends to a dagger, history
and tradition demonstrate concealed weapon regulations like
section 21310 are consistent with that constitutional right.
A. Granting the Prosecution’s For-Cause Challenge Was
Not Error
1. Additional background
Prospective juror number 8456 (Juror 8456) was an
unmarried man with no children who works as a “social
3
worker/counselor.”1 Defendant’s trial attorney described him as a
“Hispanic male.”
During voir dire, the prosecution asked Juror 8456 for his
reaction to the proposition that circumstantial evidence may be
sufficient to find a defendant guilty of a crime. Juror 8456
responded, “I actually have a question. Are we going to have
civilians testify?” The prosecution answered no and asked
whether this would affect Juror 8456. Juror 8456 opined “that
may actually, definitely make a lot [of] people think differently
about . . . the decision making.”
Asked to elaborate, Juror 8456 said, “I would assume that
law enforcement is probably going to accuse [defendant] as being
guilty [sic].” When the prosecution suggested law enforcement
witnesses were simply “going to present facts about the situation
that happened,” Juror 8456 replied, “Right. I don’t know if that’s
fair for him [i.e., defendant].” Asked to clarify, Juror 8456
explained, “I would like to have some civilians that might have
seen the situation that would probably be a little bit fair for this
guy I would think.” The prosecution asked, “What if no civilians
saw the situation?” Juror 8456 replied, “Then we would have to
have very definite evidence to really make a decision.”
The prosecution told Juror 8456 he had her “a little
concerned” because “[i]t sound[ed] to [her] like [he was] saying
because they are police officers [he] might not believe them
regardless of what [he] hear[d] on the stand.” Juror 8456
1
At times, the reporter’s transcript erroneously refers to
Juror 8456 as prospective juror number 9931. Juror 8456
assumed prospective juror number 9931’s seat after the latter
was excused for a hardship.
4
responded, “Not necessarily. It just seems like he [i.e.,
defendant] doesn’t have any other defense than the lady here
[i.e., defense counsel].” The prosecution and the court pointed out
that there was only one prosecutor, and the prosecution followed
up by asking, “if I had a civilian witness or law enforcement, and
both of them testified, who would you be initially without any of
them testifying, more likely to believe[?]” Juror 8456 responded,
“None, I haven’t heard anything.” The prosecution asked, “Then
[w]hy does it matter if it is only law enforcement officers?” Juror
8456 explained, “I don’t know. I just have a feeling they might
just persecute him and find him guilty for some reason.” The
prosecution suggested Juror 8456 was “saying this without any
evidence of that whatsoever,” and the prospective juror said,
“[p]ossibly yes.” The prosecution asked whether Juror 8456 could
“really be fair and impartial in this case,” and Juror 8456
responded, “[y]es, I can.”
At this point, the trial court said, “Okay. I have to interject
myself. I am confused and I have to make decisions. That
doesn’t make sense. [¶] . . . [¶] So, if you can maybe explain it a
little better. You’re saying on the one hand if it is only law
enforcement officer[s] that’s not fair. Meaning that you don’t
trust law enforcement officers. You also are saying I can be fair
because I will treat everybody equally. What are you saying?
Everyone else is nodding.” Juror 8456 responded, “I do have
experience. I have friends that are part of the law enforcement.
I have heard stories. They’re not always the nicest.”
The trial court told Juror 8456 he should have raised this
earlier when the court asked whether any of the prospective
jurors had friends in law enforcement. Juror 8456 apologized
and elaborated, “I do have friends. Yeah, I had heard stories and
5
not happy [sic] about how they carry themselves in some
situations.” The trial court followed up by pointing out that
“[o]ne of the first questions I asked everybody is have you talked
to them [i.e., friends in law enforcement] about their experiences.
You have, is that correct?” Juror 8456 answered in the
affirmative, and the trial court then asked, “[i]s there anything
about what you heard that would make you bias[ed] against one
side or the other? It sounds like you are saying something here.”
Juror 8456 agreed, “It sounds like it.” Asked to explain what he
was saying, Juror 8456 responded, “Sounds like I am definitely
going to be bias[ed].”
The trial court said this was a “very interesting answer.
Definitely, probably going to be bias[ed]. I don’t know what that
means.” Juror 8456 explained, “I guess I would have to hear the
evidence and hear people testify to give a definite answer.” The
trial court said, “That’s a little late though. The definite answer
is I am biased and you’re already sitting on the jury.” Juror 8456
agreed he could “see the problem,” and when asked whether he
could “help [the court] with it,” he responded, “How can I help
you?” The trial court instructed Juror 8456 to “tell[ ] me if you
can’t be—you don’t know where you can be right now [sic], tell
me.” Juror 8456 said, “I can be—I will definitely do my best and I
will be fair to this individual.” The trial court followed up:
“Okay, you will be fair to the defense. Will you be fair to the
prosecution as well?” Juror 8456 said he would. The trial court
asked whether Juror 8456 could “be fair to all the witnesses that
[the prosecution] calls,” and he said he could. The trial court
asked Juror 8456 whether he understood the reason for these
questions, and he said he did.
6
The prosecution again addressed Juror 8456 and said, “It
still seems a little bit to me that you might go into this with some
bias. I understand you not wanting to say that but, again, we do
have to know if that’s going to be the case. It is okay. Everyone
has their own experiences. We just need to know. We’re getting
a lot of back and forth. We totally understand. If you can’t be
fair to both sides, then just let[ ] us know okay. Do you think
that’s going to be an issue?” Juror 8456 responded, “It is not.”
On the next court day, the trial court and counsel discussed
challenges for cause. The prosecution’s first challenge for cause
was directed at Juror 8456.2 The prosecution argued “[h]e made
it very, very clear multiple times that he was going to look
negatively on any law enforcement. In fact, he only changed his
position after the court spoke to him for quite some time, and
then I spoke to him again for quite some time, and then he finally
just said, ‘Yes, I can put it aside,’ but everything he said up to
that point indicated that he would absolutely not look at a police
officer coming in here under the same credibility that he would
give a civilian witness. In fact, he asked, ‘Well, why aren’t there
civilian witnesses. It’s unfair if there are only police officer
witnesses,’ so I think that does rise to the level of for cause
challenge.”
Defendant’s attorney disputed this account. She argued
Juror 8456 “was questioned . . . the same way all the jurors were
questioned, which is they are being given information in a
2
The prosecution’s only other challenge for cause concerned
a juror who spent the weekend with a relative who tested positive
for COVID-19. The trial court ruled the juror was “not being
released for [a] challenge for cause,” but rather “for COVID
safety . . . .”
7
vacuum, and his initial concern was if we are only hearing from
law enforcement witnesses and no civilian witnesses that might
not seem fair. When [the prosecution] clarified what if there are
only law enforcement witnesses, what if there were no civilians,
then he kind of had a different perspective that there may not
always be civilian witnesses, you know, before hearing about the
case. The p[ro]spective jurors have no idea if the People are
choosing not to call certain witnesses or that they just didn’t have
those types of witnesses present, which I think [the prosecution]
addressed. [¶] So based on all of that . . . , once he learns that
would not be civilian witnesses for that reason [sic], he said he
would be fair to both sides and he did clarify that is not an issue
for him, so I believe he did what we can ask jurors to do . . . if
they have concerns, they address it further once. They have more
information, they see if they believe they can be fair or not, and
he said he would, so I don’t believe there is anything that was
expressed that would rise to a challenge for cause based on the
fact once he received more information, understood the situation
better, stated he could be fair to both sides.”
The prosecution replied that, “once [Juror 8456] heard
there might [not] be any civilian witnesses, he didn’t immediately
say then, ‘Oh, okay. Well, I can be fair and impartial.’ He
actually questioned that like, ‘Why aren’t there any civilian
witnesses.’ He didn’t let off of his position that he didn’t trust
law enforcement and that he wouldn’t give law enforcement the
same, I guess, the same blank slate, you know, that he would give
a civilian witness. [¶] He said he would probably . . . have [law
enforcement officers] at a lower starting point in terms of
credibility, and he made that very clear multiple times. Once he
was kind of harangued by the court and by myself, he then—yes,
8
at the last minute—said, ‘Oh, well, I can be fair and impartial,’
but I don’t think that anything he said up to that point would
lead us to believe he can actually be fair and impartial in this
trial.”
The trial court observed that, “[u]nder [Code of Civil
Procedure section 231.73] a presumed [invalid] reason for a
peremptory challenge for cause [sic] is distressed4 or negative
experience with law enforcement. My concern is—and [defense
counsel], you said he might not be fair, and [this] struck me
because that isn’t what he said. What he said is he couldn’t be
fair. He said he couldn’t be fair because if it was—because he
didn’t believe law enforcement. He absolutely did not, and that
just gave me pause for concern. [¶] He said some very, very
disturbing things on the record. It wasn’t just distress or
negative experience with law enforcement. He didn’t—he didn’t
basically say—he said if it’s law enforcement witnesses, then no,
that’s not fair, and finally, we discussed it and discussed it and
finally, he just kind of got—I feel bad because I think we just
kind of browbeat him to saying, ‘I will be fair,’ but it was—what
[the prosecution] saw, and which the court does confirm, is that—
and the court is not saying this. [The prosecution] is saying it
and I am confirming the fact that he clearly—his whole bearing
3
The trial court cited section 231.73, which does not exist.
4
As we shall discuss, Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7
refers to “distrust of or having a negative experience with law
enforcement or the criminal legal system.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 231.7, subd. (e)(1).) The reporter’s transcript occasionally
indicates the parties said “distressed” where it is likely they said
“distrust.”
9
and tone of voice and everything else that he presented in this
courtroom, it was clear that he doesn’t—the police officers
clearly—and I think you saw this yourself—start lower than
everyone else. They do not start on an equal footing. He never
said they did. He said, ‘I can be fair,’ which I am sure he can, but
they are starting off at a lower—they are not starting off on a
level playing field. Police officers are immediately placed lower
than civilian witnesses, and that the court cannot
allow . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] The court feels comfortable stating, yes,
it . . . appears this is a true challenge for cause based on what he
said on the record which was quite extensive, and what [the
prosecution] observed and what the court concurs with, so I am
going to grant that challenge for cause as to [Juror 8456].”
Defendant’s attorney objected to the trial court’s ruling,
citing Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 and arguing, among
other things, that “expressing a distrust or having negative
experience with law enforcement or the criminal justice system is
presumptively invalid.” The trial court explained it was “making
a finding that is absolutely not what this is based on. The court
even put that on record. No. That is not what I am saying. He
actually didn’t say anything bad about law enforcement. It was
that maybe his friends had said something, and these are friends
I might add. What convinces the court is he stated right out the
door that he was placing law enforcement on a lower playing [sic]
than any civilian witness, so that is the court’s ruling. The
court—therefore, the court finds it is not a Batson-Wheeler.
Unless there is a better record, I don’t see how it falls under
Batson-Wheeler.”
Defendant’s attorney again argued Juror 8456’s distrust of
law enforcement was “the only basis for him being kicked. As the
10
court stated, that is one of the bas[e]s that [is] deemed to be
presumptively invalid. . . .” The trial court responded, “Okay.
You keep saying that. I keep clearing up the record. I am not
saying he’s been kicked because of the basis that is invalid under
231.7. Race, ethnicity. It’s not under that one. . . . [I]t is
distressed or negative experience with law enforcement or the
criminal justice system. That is not what he said in this
courtroom. In fact, quite opposite. He said he’s friends with
police. That wasn’t the basis for this granting of the challenge for
cause. It is the fact he cannot put police on the same level as
civilian[s]. He puts them on a lower level. That is my finding, so
with that said, [Juror 8456] will be excused.”
After a discussion concerning another juror, defendant’s
attorney asked to “make one other brief record as to [Juror
8456].” Defendant’s attorney argued, “The court said I did not
make a sufficient record to Batson-Wheeler, so I think I have to
make that record. The final piece I wanted to say, your honor, is
that [Juror 8456] did appear to be a Hispanic male, and on my
prior record, I will submit.” The trial court observed “there
appears to be at least ten individuals in this court that this judge
believes to be Hispanic in some way, shape or form . . . .”
The prosecution did not challenge any other jurors for
cause and did not exercise any peremptory challenges.
2. Legal standards governing challenges for cause
Code of Civil Procedure section 225, subdivision (b)(1)(C)
provides that a party may challenge a prospective juror for cause
if the juror harbors “[a]ctual bias,” meaning “the existence of a
state of mind on the part of the juror in reference to the case, or
to any of the parties, which will prevent the juror from acting
11
with entire impartiality, and without prejudice to the substantial
rights of any party.”
“‘[W]hat constitutes “actual bias” of a juror varies according
to the circumstances of the case. [Citation.] . . . “‘[L]ight
impressions, which may fairly be presumed to yield to the
testimony that may be offered, which may leave the mind open to
a fair consideration of the testimony, constitute no sufficient
objection to a juror; but . . . those strong and deep impressions
which close the mind against the testimony that may be offered
in opposition to them, which will combat that testimony and
resist its force, do constitute a sufficient objection to him [or
her].’”’” (In re Manriquez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 785, 799, quoting
People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 580-581 (plur. opn. of
George, C. J.).)
Because “‘[t]he trial court is in the best position to
determine the [juror’s] true state of mind . . . [having] observed
firsthand [the juror’s] demeanor and verbal responses,’” its
“‘“‘determination of the person’s state of mind is binding’”’” when
“‘“‘the [juror’s] statements are equivocal or conflicting. ’”’” (People
v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1049.) If there is no conflict or
equivocation, reviewing courts must uphold the court’s ruling if
substantial evidence supports it. (Ibid.)
3. Code of Civil Procedure Section 231.7
Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 was enacted to
address “limitations” of the Batson procedure for rooting out
unlawful discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges.
(People v. Jaime (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 941, 943.) The statute
prohibits parties in a criminal case from using “a peremptory
challenge to remove a prospective juror on the basis of the
12
prospective juror’s race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual
orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or the
perceived membership of the prospective juror in any of those
groups.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 231.7, subd. (a), italics added.)
If a party or the court objects on Code of Civil Procedure
section 231.7 grounds to a party’s exercise of a peremptory
challenge, “the party exercising the peremptory challenge shall
state the reasons the peremptory challenge has been exercised.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 231.7, subd. (c).) The statute sets forth a list
of presumptively invalid reasons for a peremptory challenge,
including a prospective juror “[e]xpressing a distrust of or having
a negative experience with law enforcement or the criminal legal
system.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 231.7, subd. (e)(1).) If the party
exercising a peremptory challenge relies on one of these
presumptively invalid reasons, the party must “show by clear and
convincing evidence that an objectively reasonable person would
view the rationale as unrelated to a prospective juror’s”
membership or perceived membership in a protected group.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 231.7, subd. (e).)
Although Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 does not
apply to challenges for cause, the statute underscores that “[i]t is
the intent of the Legislature that enactment of this section shall
not, in purpose or effect, lower the standard for judging
challenges for cause or expand use of challenges for cause.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 231.7, subd. (l).)
4. Analysis
Defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s ruling on the
prosecution’s for-cause challenge to Juror 8456 ultimately boils
down to an argument that the record does not permit a finding
13
that Juror 8456 harbored actual bias. That, however, is incorrect
even if we disregard the trial court’s assessment of Juror 8456’s
demeanor (which we shall do for purposes of our analysis).
Juror 8456 responded to a straightforward question
regarding circumstantial evidence by raising his own question
that implied law enforcement testimony would not be sufficient to
prove guilt. When further colloquy ensued to ferret out Juror
8456’s views on the matter, he initially claimed he would be no
more likely to credit a civilian witness before hearing their
testimony, but he responded to clarifying questions by
emphasizing his disappointment in stories he heard from
acquaintances in law enforcement. When the trial court
expressly asked whether the stories he heard “would make [him]
bias[ed] against one side or the other” and suggested “[i]t
sound[ed] like [he] [was] saying something here,” Juror 8456
agreed, “It sounds like it” and elaborated, “Sounds like I am
definitely going to be bias[ed].”
When the trial court followed up on these remarks, Juror
8456 explained he could only give a “definite answer” regarding
his bias after “hear[ing] the evidence and hear[ing] people
testify.” In context, this answer was not an assurance he would
assess a witness’s credibility based on the witness’s testimony,
but rather that specific testimony might overcome or cause him
to re-assess his preconceived view that law enforcement officer
testimony should be regarded as suspect.5 Although Juror 8456
eventually said he could be fair to all witnesses, the trial court
5
Juror 8456’s agreement that he could “see the [trial court’s]
problem” with the answer he gave confirms our contextual
understanding.
14
was within its province to determine he had been “browbeat[en]”
into the fairness concession and it did not reflect his actual state
of mind.
In reaching this conclusion, we acknowledge “a juror may
properly draw on her or his life experiences when determining
whether a particular witness is credible.” (Manriquez, supra, 5
Cal.5th 785, 812.) The fact that a prospective juror has had a
negative experience with law enforcement does not necessarily
mean they harbor “a general bias against law enforcement
officers.” (Ibid.) Juror 8456’s statements made clear, however,
that his skepticism of law enforcement testimony—though
perhaps surmountable under the right circumstances—made him
“definitely” biased against such witnesses as a class.
In addition to his freestanding challenge to the trial court’s
dismissal of Juror 8456 for cause, defendant also relies on
recently enacted section 231.7 to argue “distrust of law
enforcement can[not] be used as a valid basis for challenges for
cause.” Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 does not, however,
apply to challenges for cause. (People v. Aranda (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 311, 315 [“The language of [Code of Civil Procedure]
section 231.7 is clear: it applies only to peremptory challenges”].)
In fact, the Legislature removed language from an early version
of the bill adding section 231.7 to the Code of Civil Procedure that
did provide it would apply to challenges for cause. (Sen. Amend.
to Assem. Bill No. 3070 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), July 28, 2020.)
Defendant nonetheless protests the trial court’s ruling
impermissibly “expand[ed] [the] use of challenges for cause” in
contravention of Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7,
subdivision (l). As we have discussed, however, substantial
evidence supports the trial court’s finding of actual bias under
15
both Code of Civil Procedure section 225, subdivision (b)(1)(C)
and longstanding case law. Because dismissal of Juror 8456 was
justified on this well-established basis, the trial court’s ruling
cannot be said to have expanded the grounds for accepting a
challenge to a juror for cause.
B. Section 21310 Does Not Run Afoul of the Second
Amendment
Section 21310 provides, subject to exceptions not applicable
here, that “any person in this state who carries concealed upon
the person any dirk or dagger is punishable by imprisonment in a
county jail not exceeding one year or imprisonment pursuant to
subdivision (h) of [Penal Code] Section 1170.” A dirk or dagger is
“a knife or other instrument with or without a handguard that is
capable of ready use as a stabbing weapon that may inflict great
bodily injury or death.” (Pen. Code, § 16470.) Certain folding
knives qualify as dirks or daggers “only if the blade of the knife is
exposed and locked into position.” (Pen. Code, § 16470.) “A knife
carried in a sheath that is worn openly suspended from the waist
of the wearer is not concealed within the meaning of
Section . . . 21310.” (Pen. Code, § 20200.)
Beginning with District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) 554
U.S. 570, the Second Amendment has been understood to “protect
an individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense”
(Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at 17), subject to certain exceptions. This
right applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. (McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill.
(2010) 561 U.S. 742, 750.)
The high court in Heller held the District of Columbia’s
“ban on handgun possession in the home violates the Second
16
Amendment, as does its prohibition against rendering any lawful
firearm in the home operable for the purpose of immediate self-
defense.” (Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at 635.) Reasoning that the
reference to a “well regulated Militia” in the Second
Amendment’s “prefatory clause” does not “limit” the operative
clause and instead “announces a purpose” (id. at 577), the Court
emphasized self-defense is “the central component” of the Second
Amendment right (id. at 599).
The Heller Court was careful to caution, however, that,
“[l]ike most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment
is not unlimited. . . . For example, the majority of the 19th-
century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on
carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second
Amendment or state analogues. [Citations.]” (Heller, supra, 554
U.S. at 626.) The Court also recognized certain other
“presumptively lawful regulatory measures,” but explained its
list “does not purport to be exhaustive.” (Heller, supra, 554 U.S.
at 627, fn. 26.)
Heller did not articulate an analytical framework for
assessing the constitutionality of all laws regulating arms. In
Bruen, however, the Court rejected the means-end scrutiny mode
of analysis adopted by some lower courts. (Bruen, supra, 597
U.S. at 18-19.) Instead, the Court held, “the standard for
applying the Second Amendment is as follows: When the Second
Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the
Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The
government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating
that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of
firearm regulation. Only then may a court conclude that the
individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment's
17
‘unqualified command.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at 24.) To meet its
burden, the government need only “identify a well-established
and representative historical analogue, not a historical twin. So
even if a modern-day regulation is not a dead ringer for historical
precursors, it still may be analogous enough to pass
constitutional muster.” (Id. at 30.)
Bruen involved a challenge to a New York law conditioning
the grant of a license to carry a concealed handgun on a showing
of proper cause, which New York courts construed to mean a
demonstration of the applicant’s special need for self-defense.
(Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at 12.) Under the challenged statute, a
person could not carry a weapon in public (concealed or
otherwise) except for a limited purpose—“such as hunting, target
shooting, or employment”—unless they obtained a concealed
carry permit. (Id. at 12.)
In holding this proper cause requirement unconstitutional,
the high court in Bruen determined that carrying a handgun in
public for self-defense falls within the plain text of the Second
Amendment. (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at 32.) Proceeding to the
second step of its analysis, the Court found no “historical
tradition limiting public carry only to those law-abiding citizens
who demonstrate a special need for self-defense.” (Id. at 38.) The
Court emphasized, however, that “nothing in [its] analysis should
be interpreted to suggest the unconstitutionality of . . . licensing
regimes [that] do not require applicants to show an atypical need
for armed self-defense . . . .” (Id. at 38, fn. 9.) In other words,
although the Court invalidated New York’s proper cause
requirement to obtain the concealed carry permit necessary to
carry a gun in public without restriction, the Court did not
invalidate all concealed carry of firearms regulations. To the
18
contrary, the Court distinguished between laws regulating public
carry generally and concealed carry laws in particular: “The
historical evidence from antebellum America does demonstrate
that the manner of public carry was subject to reasonable
regulation. . . . States could lawfully eliminate one kind of public
carry—concealed carry—so long as they left open the option to
carry openly.” (Id. at 59; see also id. at 52 [“As we recognized in
Heller, ‘the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the
question held that [these] prohibitions on carrying concealed
weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state
analogues’”].)
Defendant contends section 21310’s prohibition against the
concealed carry of a dirk or dagger is unconstitutional because
there is no historical tradition of prohibiting their concealed
carry. We assume dirks and daggers are Arms to which the
Second Amendment applies but hold section 21310 does not
infringe on Second Amendment rights as construed by the high
court’s recent Second Amendment jurisprudence, including
Bruen. Indeed, both the Heller and Bruen opinions themselves
acknowledge there is a historical tradition of regulating the
concealed carry of weapons generally. (Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at
626 [“the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the
question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons
were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues”];
Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at 59 [“[t]he historical evidence from
antebellum America” shows “[s]tates could lawfully
eliminate . . . concealed carry [of deadly weapons] . . . so long as
they left open the option to carry openly”].)
Defendant, however, suggests the historical tradition of
regulating carrying concealed weapons is insufficient because
19
there are too few examples of such regulations from the era in
which the Second Amendment was ratified. This misunderstands
the high court’s jurisprudence. Although Bruen emphasizes that
“not all history is created equal” and history after the Second
Amendment’s ratification may be less probative of the text’s
original meaning (id. at 34, 36-37), the high court has never held
that founding-era analogues are the sine qua non of a historical
tradition of arms regulation. (See id. at 27 [“Following the course
charted by Heller, we will consider whether ‘historical precedent’
from before, during, and even after the founding evinces a
comparable tradition of regulation”]; id. at 35 [“in Heller we
reiterated that evidence of ‘how the Second Amendment was
interpreted from immediately after its ratification through the
end of the 19th century’ represented a ‘critical tool of
constitutional interpretation’”].)
But even if defendant is right that only history more
contemporaneous with ratification of the Second Amendment
matters, Bruen itself still highlights a tradition of regulating the
concealed carry of weapons from both the colonial era and within
a generation of the founding. For example, Bruen cites a New
Jersey statute dating to 1686 that restricted the concealed carry
of certain weapons—including, expressly, dirks and daggers.
(Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at 47-48 [An Act Against Wearing
Swords, &c., ch. 9, in Grants, Concessions, and Original
Constitutions of the Province of New Jersey 290 (2d ed. 1881)].)
Bruen also explains states began enacting laws regulating the
concealed carry of pistols in the early 19th century. (Bruen,
supra, at 52, fn. 16 [compiling statutes].) In addition, and beyond
the discussion in Bruen, two 1813 statutes (within a generation of
the founding) expressly prohibited the concealed carry of small,
20
bladed weapons like dirks and daggers. (1813 Ky. Acts at 100
[prohibiting the concealed carry of dirks and other weapons];
1813 La. Acts at 172 [prohibiting the concealed carry of dirks,
daggers, and other weapons].)
Defendant does not address these statutes. Instead, he
cites various authorities purporting to show that, “[a]t the time of
the Second Amendment’s ratification, daggers were commonplace
and, in some cases, mandatory to possess.” Putting aside the fact
that the authorities he cites generally refer to swords and
bayonets (see, e.g., Second Militia Act of 1792, § 1, 1 Stat. 271),
defendant points to nothing that contradicts the history and
tradition of regulating the concealed carry of small, bladed
weapons. And as we have already explained, there is ample
jurisprudential and historical support for the proposition that
prohibitions like section 21310 on the concealed carrying of
weapons, including daggers, are not inconsistent with the Second
Amendment.
21
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, Acting P. J.
We concur:
KIM, J.
LEE, J.*
*
Judge of the San Bernardino County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
22
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