CourtListener 9508791•People v. Hernandez CA5
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Filed 5/29/24 P. v. Hernandez CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F086983
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. CF04906535-0)
v.
RICHARD DANIEL HERNANDEZ, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Houry A.
Sanderson, Judge.
Laura Arnold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Office of the State Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Hill, P. J., Meehan, J. and Snauffer, J.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Richard Daniel Hernandez (appellant) was convicted of two counts of
first degree murder with firearm enhancements, and sentenced to two consecutive terms
of life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP) plus 50 years to life. In 2023,
the trial court denied his motion for a youthful offender hearing.
On appeal from denial of the motion, appellate counsel filed a brief that
summarized the facts with citations to the record, raised no issues, acknowledged the trial
court’s order was correct, and asked this court to otherwise independently review the
record. (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d
436.) Appellant did not file a supplemental brief on his own behalf. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2006, appellant was convicted after a jury trial of counts 1 and 2, first degree
murders of America Gonzalez and Baby Boy Gonzalez (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)),
with the multiple murder special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)), and that he
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm that proximately caused the victims’
deaths (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)).
Appellant was sentenced to LWOP for both counts 1 and 2, plus 50 years to life
for the firearm enhancements. On appeal, this court ordered the parole revocation fine
stricken and affirmed the judgment as modified. (People v. Hernandez (Oct. 23, 2008,
F050502) [nonpub. opn.].)
On August 14, 2023, appellant filed, in propria persona, a motion for the trial court
to conduct a youthful offender hearing pursuant to section 3051,2 People v. Franklin
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, and In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, and alleged he was 21 years
old at the time of his conviction. Appellant’s motion acknowledged that inmates
1 All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
2 Appellant’s motion erroneously stated “section 1203.01.”
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sentenced to LWOP terms were statutorily excluded from receiving Franklin hearings,
but relied on People v. Hardin (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 273, review granted
January 11, 2023, S277487, that held the statutory exclusion was unconstitutional.
On September 18, 2023, the trial court denied appellant’s motion and held LWOP
inmates were statutorily excluded from receiving Franklin hearings and rejected
appellant’s constitutional argument.
DISCUSSION
As noted above, appellate counsel filed a Wende and Delgadillo brief with this
court. The brief also includes counsel’s declaration that appellant was advised he could
file his own brief with this court. This court advised appellant by letter that he could file
a supplemental letter or brief raising any arguable issues. Appellant failed to do so.
“California’s youth offender parole statute offers opportunities for early release to
certain persons who are incarcerated for crimes they committed at a young age.
[Citations.] When it was first enacted in 2013, the statute applied only to individuals who
committed their crimes before the age of 18; the purpose of the statute was to align
California law with then-recent court decisions identifying Eighth Amendment
limitations on life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders. In more recent years,
however, the Legislature has expanded the statute to include certain young adult
offenders as well. Under the current version of the statute, most persons incarcerated for
a crime committed between ages 18 and 25 are entitled to a parole hearing during the
15th, 20th, or 25th year of their incarceration.” (People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834,
838 (Hardin).)
In Franklin, the court interpreted section 3051 to require a youth offender have a
“sufficient opportunity to make a record of information relevant to his eventual youth
offender parole hearing.” (People v. Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284.) At a
Franklin hearing, the offender and the People have the opportunity to “put on the record
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any evidence that demonstrates the juvenile offender’s culpability or cognitive maturity,
or otherwise bears on the influence of youth-related factors” at the time of the offense.
(Ibid.) “[A]n offender entitled to a hearing under section[] 3051 … may seek the remedy
of a Franklin proceeding even though the offender’s sentence is otherwise final.”
(In re Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 451.)
However, “not all youthful offenders are eligible for parole hearings.
[Section 3051] excludes, among others, offenders who are serving sentences of life in
prison without the possibility of parole for a crime committed after the age of 18.”
(Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 838–839.)
As noted in appellant’s motion, the appellate court in Hardin held the exclusion of
LWOP inmates from youthful offender hearings was invalid for lack of a rational basis.
(Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 839.) The Supreme Court granted review in Hardin,
reversed that ruling, and held the statutory exclusion of young adult offenders sentenced
to LWOP is not constitutionally invalid under a rational basis standard, either on its face,
or as applied to the defendant in that case and other individuals serving LWOP terms for
special circumstance murder. (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 839.)
“Under California law, special circumstance murder is a uniquely serious offense,
punishable only by death or life without possibility of parole. When it was considering
whether to expand the youth offender parole system to include not only juvenile
offenders but also certain young adults, the Legislature could rationally balance the
seriousness of the offender’s crimes against the capacity of all young adults for growth,
and determine that young adults who have committed certain very serious crimes should
remain ineligible for release from prison. [The defendant] has not demonstrated that the
Legislature acted irrationally in declining to grant the possibility of parole to young adult
offenders convicted of special circumstance murder, even as it has granted youth offender
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hearings to young adults convicted of other offenses.” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 839.)
Appellate counsel’s brief concedes this issue has been settled by Hardin, and
appellant did not file a supplemental brief. After independent review of the record, we
find no reasonably arguable factual or legal issues exist.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order of September 18, 2023, denying appellant’s motion for a
youthful offender hearing, is affirmed.
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