People v. Hunter CA4/1

CourtListener 9508737CalctappMay 29, 2024

Full text

Filed 5/29/24 P. v. Hunter CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D082143

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE404034)

NORVEL HUNTER,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Daniel L. Lamborn, Judge. Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Charles Thomas Anderson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
A. Natasha Cortina and Liz Sulaiman, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
Norvel Hunter led California Highway Patrol (CHP) officers on a high-
speed chase during which he drove his vehicle recklessly and while under
the influence of alcohol. He pleaded guilty to four criminal charges in
connection with the chase: evading a peace officer with reckless driving

(Veh. Code,1 § 2800.2, subd. (a); count 1); driving while under the influence
of alcohol (§ 23152, subd. (a); count 2); driving while having a blood alcohol
level of 0.08 or higher (id., subd. (b); count 3); and driving with a suspended
or revoked driving privilege (§ 14601.1, subd. (a); count 4). The trial court
sentenced Hunter to eight months in prison for count 1, ordered the
sentence for count 1 to run consecutive to a 32-month sentence imposed in a
prior criminal case, and imposed concurrent one-year sentences for counts 2
through 4 with credit for time served.
On appeal, Hunter contends the court should have stayed punishment
for either count 2 or count 3 under Penal Code section 654 because both
charges arose from the same act of driving after excessive drinking. He also
claims the abstract of judgment does not accurately reflect the number of
credits to which he is entitled. The People concede these errors and we
accept this well-taken concession. Thus, we reverse the judgment and
remand the matter with instructions that the trial court resentence Hunter
and prepare a corrected abstract of judgment accurately reflecting the
number of credits he will have earned as of the date of the corrected abstract
of judgment.

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Vehicle Code.

2
II
BACKGROUND
On January 1, 2021, at about 1:55 a.m., uniformed CHP officers in a
marked patrol vehicle observed an SUV weaving dramatically within its
lane of traffic on the freeway. The officers positioned their vehicle behind
the SUV and activated the vehicle’s patrol lights to effectuate a traffic stop.
The driver of the SUV, later identified as Hunter, slowed down and exited
the freeway. Instead of stopping, however, he drove the SUV through a red
light at a traffic intersection, got back on the freeway, and tried to evade the
pursuing officers while driving at speeds exceeding 100 miles per hour.
During the ensuing chase, which took place over multiple freeways and side
streets, Hunter drove the wrong way down one street and ran through
several stop signs and red lights.
After about 40 minutes, Hunter abandoned his SUV and fled on foot.
Law enforcement officers apprehended him shortly thereafter. At the
preliminary hearing, the parties stipulated that Hunter had a blood alcohol
concentration of between 0.10 and 0.15 percent while he was driving. They
also stipulated that Hunter’s driving privilege was suspended or revoked
while he was driving and he knew his driving privilege was suspended or
revoked.
On October 14, 2021, the district attorney filed an information
charging Hunter with evading a peace officer with reckless driving (count 1),
driving while under the influence of alcohol (count 2), driving while having a
blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more (count 3), and driving with a
suspended or revoked driving privilege (count 4). The information alleged
Hunter committed count 1 while he was released from custody on bail for an
earlier felony offense in case number SCS313955. It also alleged he

3
committed counts 2 and 3 while driving at an excessive speed (§ 23582,
subd. (a)).
On August 11, 2022, Hunter pleaded guilty to all counts and admitted
all allegations pursuant to an indicated sentence of eight months.
On April 27, 2023, the trial court struck the on-bail enhancement for
count 1, imposed a prison sentence of eight months for count 1 (one-third the
midterm), and ran the eight-month sentence consecutive to a separate 32-
month sentence that was previously imposed in case number SCS313955.
For counts 2–4, the court imposed concurrent 1-year sentences with credit
for time served. Therefore, Hunter’s total sentence was three years four
months.
Hunter obtained a certificate of probable cause and timely appealed
the judgment of conviction.
III
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Erred by Imposing Separate Punishments for
Counts 2 and 3
Hunter contends the trial court erred by imposing multiple sentences
for counts 2 and 3. Specifically, he claims Penal Code section 654 barred the
court from imposing separate punishments for counts 2 and 3 because both
charges were based on the same act of driving after having engaged in
excessive drinking. The People concede error. We agree with the parties
that Penal Code section 654 prohibited the imposition of separate
punishments for counts 2 and 3.
Penal Code section 654 states, in relevant part, “An act or omission
that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be
punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or

4
omission be punished under more than one provision.” (Pen. Code, § 654,
subd. (a).) Penal Code section 654 “precludes multiple punishments for a
single act or indivisible course of conduct.” (People v. Hester (2000)
22 Cal.4th 290, 294.) “[T]he purpose of [Penal Code] section 654 is to ensure
that a defendant’s punishment will be commensurate with his culpability.”
(People v. Correa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 331, 341.) “ ‘Whether [Penal Code]
section 654 applies in a given case is a question of fact for the trial court,
which is vested with broad latitude in making its determination.’ [Citation.]
The court’s express or implied findings in support of its determination that
[Penal Code] section 654 does not apply will be upheld on appeal if
substantial evidence supports them.” (People v. Cruz (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th
715, 737.)
Here, the trial court’s imposition of separate concurrent one-year
terms for counts 2 and 3 reflect an implied factual finding that the charges
were not based on a single act or indivisible course of conduct. Like the
parties, we believe substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s
implied factual finding on this issue. “[I]t is well settled that a defendant
may be convicted of both driving under the influence of alcohol and driving
with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more” under section 23152,
subdivisions (a) and (b). (People v. Toure (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1106
(Toure).) “Although he may be convicted on both, a defendant may not be
sentenced under both subdivisions where both charges relate to the same act
of driving . . . .” (Ibid., italics added; see also People v. Subramani (1985)
173 Cal.App.3d 1106, 1108–1109 [“a driver can be charged and convicted
under both subdivision[s] (a) and (b) of section 23153 [a statutory provision
prohibiting a person from driving while intoxicated and causing bodily
injury to a person other than the driver], but he or she may not be punished

5
for both.”]; People v. Duarte (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 438, 447 [“defendant was
convicted of two offenses arising from one prohibited activity, driving after
excessive drinking. Although the activity became criminal in two ways . . .
it took place in only one way.”].)
In short, count 2 (driving while under the influence of alcohol) and
count 3 (driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 or higher) were both based
on Hunter’s single act of driving after having engaged in excessive drinking.
Thus, the court violated Penal Code section 654 when it imposed separate
punishments for both charges. (Toure, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 1106.)
In light of this error, the parties jointly urge us to remand the matter
for the trial court to resentence Hunter. We agree with the parties that a
remand is appropriate solely for resentencing purposes. (See People v.
Washington (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 776, 799 [vacating sentence and
remanding matter for resentencing due to Penal Code section 654
violation].) Thus, we reverse the judgment and remand the matter to the
trial court with instructions to resentence Hunter in a manner consistent
with Penal Code section 654. We do not constrain the court’s discretion in
fashioning an appropriate sentence during the resentencing, except to
observe that Penal Code section 654 prohibits the imposition of multiple
punishments for both counts 2 and 3.
B. The Abstract of Judgment Must be Corrected to Reflect the Accurate
Number of Credits
Hunter also argues the abstract of judgment does not accurately
reflect the number of credits for his consolidated sentence in case number
SCS313955 and the current case. Once more, the People agree with Hunter,
and so do we.

6
On August 25, 2022, Hunter was sentenced to prison for 32 months in
case number SCS313955, and he began serving his sentence immediately.
The abstract of judgment for case number SCS313955 states that he had
134 credits, consisting of 117 actual custody credits and 17 good conduct

credits.2
Hunter pleaded guilty to the charges at issue here while he was in
custody. On April 27, 2023, the court sentenced him to an eight-month term
for count 1 to run consecutive to his 32-month sentence from case number
SCS313955. Where, as here, a determinate sentence is imposed consecutive
to a previously imposed determinate sentence, the court “must pronounce a
single aggregate term . . . stating the result of combining the previous and
current sentences. In those situations: [¶] (1) The sentences on all
determinately sentenced counts in all the cases on which a sentence was or
is being imposed must be combined as though they were all counts in the
current case.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.452(a)(1).) Further, when a court
modifies a sentence that is in progress—for example, when a court
resentences a defendant to a single aggregate term under California Rules
of Court, rule 4.452—the “court should, ‘in its new abstract of judgment, . . .
credit him with all actual days he had spent in custody, whether in jail or
prison, up to that time[.]’ ” (People v. Saibu (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1005,
1012.)

2 Hunter filed a motion to augment the record with the abstract of
judgment from case number SCS313955. We construe the motion as a
request for judicial notice and, so construed, grant the request. (Evid. Code,
§ 452, subd. (d).)

7
The abstract of judgment prepared below accurately shows that
Hunter is serving a total prison sentence of three years four months
(32 months for the convictions in case number SCS313955 and eight months
for his count 1 conviction in the current case). However, it shows that he
was awarded a mere four days of actual custody credits in total (apparently
for the time he spent in custody from January 1 to January 4, 2021). Thus,
the abstract of judgment for the aggregate sentence improperly omits the
presentence custody credits Hunter previously earned in case number
SCS313955, as well as the actual days he spent in custody between August
25, 2022 (the date of his sentencing in case number SCS313955) and April
27, 2023 (the date of his sentencing in the present case).
When the trial court resentences Hunter, it is instructed to prepare a
corrected abstract of judgment that accurately reflects the number of credits
to which Hunter will be entitled as of the date of the corrected abstract of
judgment, including the presentence credits he previously earned in case
number SCS313955 and the actual days he will have served in custody as of
the date of the corrected abstract of judgment.
IV
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial
court solely for purposes of resentencing. During resentencing, the trial
court shall refrain from imposing multiple punishments for counts 2 and 3
pursuant to Penal Code section 654. The trial court shall also prepare and
forward to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation a corrected
abstract of judgment accurately reflecting the credits to which Hunter is
entitled, including the presentence credits he previously earned in case

8
number SCS313955 and the actual days he will have served in custody as of
the date of the corrected abstract of judgment.

MCCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, J.

DATO, J.

9

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.