Motorola Solutions v. Pick CA2/5

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Filed 5/28/24 Motorola Solutions v. Pick CA2/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS, INC., B310009 c/w B311772

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super.
Ct. No. SC123039)
v.

HAROLD PICK et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Craig D. Karlan, Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
Lesches Law and Levi Lesches for Defendant and
Appellant Harold Pick.
Law Offices of Robert Mills and Robert Mills for Defendant
and Appellant Ferdinand Aguinaldo.
Jay Francis, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Timothy D. McGonigle, Benedon & Serlin, Judith E.
Posner, and Kelly R. Horwitz for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
In 2014, plaintiff and respondent Motorola Solutions, Inc.
(Motorola) sued defendants and appellants Harold Pick; his
mother, Ann Pick; and his friend Jay Francis under the Uniform
Voidable Transactions Act (Civ. Code, § 3439 et seq.) (UVTA or
Act).1 Motorola claimed the trio had schemed to buy Ann a house
with $250,000 of Harold’s money, thereby preventing Motorola
from seizing those funds to collect on a judgment. At trial, the
jury concluded that although Harold had indeed concealed the
funds, Ann and Francis were good faith transferees for value, and
Motorola could not void the sale. The jury separately found
Harold had committed fraud by concealment, which had not been
separately pled in the complaint, and awarded Motorola $250,504
in damages. At the subsequent bench trial on declaratory and
equitable relief, the trial court reformed the deed to the house to
grant Motorola a share of the property proportionate to the
money Harold had given Ann—namely, the damages the jury had
awarded for the concealment claim.
Although appellants collectively raised more than a dozen
issues on appeal, we find one dispositive: The jury did not reach
a verdict on every element of the concealment claim because it
was not asked to decide whether Harold had a duty of disclosure
to Motorola. Since Motorola used a special verdict form, we
cannot imply the missing finding. Accordingly, we reverse the
judgment as to the concealment claim and the court’s equitable
actions, which were based on the concealment verdict, vacate the
verdict on the concealment claim, and remand with instructions.

1 Because the Picks share a surname, we refer to them by
their first names.

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BACKGROUND
In 2005, Motorola obtained a $1.3 million judgment against
Harold for copyright infringement. Harold has not paid any
funds toward the debt, and until Motorola filed suit in this
matter, it had made no effort to collect on the judgment.
In 2009, Harold inherited a house in San Francisco, which
he sold the same year for $571,639.56. Harold transferred the
funds to his attorney, who deposited them in a client trust
account. In 2012, through a complicated series of financial
transactions, Harold transferred (or caused to be transferred)
approximately $250,000 into an escrow account to be used toward
the purchase of a house for Ann on Bundy Drive in West Los
Angeles.2 Ann bought the house in her name, together with
Francis, who also contributed money toward the purchase. In
exchange for his contribution, Harold was given a lease to reside
at the property. That is, Harold’s contribution was treated as
prepaid rent.
In August 2014, Motorola filed a complaint against Ann,
Harold, Francis, and several defendants who are not parties to
this appeal asserting three causes of action to set aside a
fraudulent transfer under the UVTA (Civ. Code, §§ 3439.04,
subds. (a)(1) & (a)(2)(b), 3439.05), and one cause of action against
Ann and Francis—but not Harold—for declaratory and equitable
relief seeking to reform the deed to the house (Bundy deed).
1. Jury Trial and Verdict
Beginning in August 2019, the case was tried in two parts.
First, a jury trial was held to resolve the complaint’s three causes

2 Ann was 85 years old at the time and had been evicted from
her home, along with her five cats and four dogs.

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of action under the UVTA. Second, the court held a bench trial in
equity to resolve Motorola’s fourth cause of action for declaratory
relief and reformation of the Bundy deed.
Shortly before jury selection, Motorola suggested, for the
first time, that it planned to proceed on the theory of fraud by
concealment against Harold only, explaining that it was
“subsumed, as stated in one of the cases, is—within the
fraudulent conveyance statute is the common law tort of
concealment, and I’ve got a jury instruction on concealment, so
that’s going to . . . be part of the case as well.” There was no
request to amend the complaint to add another cause of action
and Harold did not object. CACI 1901, jury instruction on
concealment, was later given to the jury, but without the duty to
disclose element necessary to find liability on concealment.3
Motorola also confirmed, and the court agreed, that should the
jury find against Motorola on the UVTA claims, the fourth cause
of action on declaratory and equitable relief would be moot.
In the midst of deliberations, the jury was given three
special verdicts to complete: one as to Ann’s liability under the
UVTA, one as to Francis’s liability under the UVTA, and one as
to Harold’s liability for concealment. As to the first two claims,
the jury found Harold had transferred property to Ann and
Francis to hide it from Motorola but also found that Ann and
Francis had received the property in good faith and in exchange

3 At oral argument, counsel for Motorola took the position
that by giving the concealment jury instruction without objection,
the trial court “effectively agree[d] to amend to conform to proof
those jury instructions.” We proceed on that understanding.

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for reasonably equivalent value.4 The jury awarded Motorola $0
in damages.
As to the concealment claim, the jury answered “yes” to
four questions: Did Harold intentionally fail to disclose a fact or
facts that Motorola did not know and could not reasonably have
discovered? Did Harold intend to deceive Motorola by concealing
the fact? Had the omitted information been disclosed, would
Motorola reasonably have behaved differently? Was Harold’s
concealment a substantial factor in causing harm to Motorola?
The jury was not asked to determine whether Harold owed
Motorola a duty of disclosure.5 It awarded Motorola $250,504 in
damages, representing the amount he had contributed to the
purchase of the house.

4 The jury answered “yes” to eight questions: Did Motorola
have a right to payment from Harold? Did Harold transfer
property to Ann/Francis? Did Motorola’s right to payment from
Harold arise before Harold transferred the money? Was Harold
insolvent at the time or did he become insolvent as a result of the
transfer? Did Harold transfer the money with the intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud one or more of his creditors? Did
Harold believe or should he have reasonably believed he would
incur debts beyond his ability to pay as they became due? Was
Harold’s conduct a substantial factor in causing Motorola’s harm?
Did Ann/Francis receive the property from Harold in good faith?
The jury answered “no” to two questions: Did Harold fail to
receive a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the
transfer? Did Motorola exceed the statute of limitations?

5 Nor had Motorola presented evidence or argument on that
point. To the contrary, concealment was mentioned in closing
argument only once, and only in passing.

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2. Equitable Phase
After the jury rendered its verdicts, the court ordered
briefing on the fourth cause of action for declaratory relief and
reformation of the deed. As it had in its complaint, Motorola
argued the court should reform the Bundy deed to reflect that
Francis was not a joint tenant in the property and instead award
him an equitable mortgage of $100,000. Motorola did not ask the
court to modify the deed to grant Motorola an ownership interest
based on Harold’s contribution. Thus, the briefing addressed
only that issue.
Nevertheless, at the subsequent hearing, the court
construed the jury’s concealment verdict as a finding that
Harold’s contribution was a fraudulent conveyance. Harold’s
attorney explained that to the contrary, the jury found that
“there was no fraudulent transfer, but there was concealment,
common law concealment liability.” The court inquired as to
whether there were causes of action for both, and Motorola’s
counsel replied: “fraud is part of a fraudulent conveyance under
the common law[,] so it doesn’t need to be pled[,] it’s part of the
fraudulent conveyance.”
At this point, and without further argument, the court
began calculating the respective shares of Ann, Francis, and
Motorola in the Bundy property, with Motorola’s share based on
the damages amount awarded in the concealment claim. The
court suggested that “the only solution here is to give interests in
the property. Nothing else is equitable or fair.”
Following an additional round of briefing, the court again
expressed its view that Motorola should receive a 44.16 percent
interest in the property based on the money Harold had
concealed from Motorola. Defense counsel stressed the jury’s

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verdict that the funds were not “fraudulently conveyed” because
“the jury found that Ann Pick and Jay Francis took in good faith.
Therefore, there was no fraudulent transfer of that money to the
property” and Ann could not be deprived of the funds. The court
replied: “It’s the same functional equivalent, though.” It
reasoned: “The jury was making a finding that the 250 was
concealed. If I read this verdict the way I’m reading it, it was
fraudulently transferred, albeit without Ms. Ann Pick’s
knowledge, is what the jury found, but that doesn’t mean he gets
to hide it.”
After additional argument, the court summarized its
position: “I mean[,] the jury clearly found that [Harold] concealed
these funds, hid them from [Motorola] so [it] couldn’t collect on
them. But they also found that [Ann], his mother, didn’t know
about it[,] so . . . what does the court do now given that we know
these funds were hidden . . . and now were used to purchase it?
Do you have an equitable lien? . . . It’s certainly a fair remedy. I
don’t have an issue with that.” Ultimately, the court ordered
additional briefing on whether, in fashioning equitable relief, it
was bound by the jury’s findings.
3. Judgment and Appeal
The court eventually concluded the Bundy deed should be
reformed for Francis, Ann, and Motorola to share ownership as
tenants in common in proportion to their financial contributions
to the purchase of the Bundy house, with Motorola’s share
representing Harold’s contribution.
On November 20, 2020, the court entered an amended
judgment incorporating the jury’s findings on the UVTA causes of
action and the concealment claim, as well as its own ruling on the
equitable cause of action. Ann, Harold, and Francis appealed.

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DISCUSSION
Harold contends the judgment must be vacated because the
jury did not render a verdict on every required element of the
concealment claim. Specifically, he asserts the jury did not
determine that he owed Motorola a duty of disclosure. Motorola
does not dispute that there is no jury finding on that element.
Instead, it contends Harold has forfeited the error by failing to
object to the jury instructions below.6
1. The jury did not find Harold had a duty of disclosure.
1.1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
As we have discussed, the jury in this case was asked to
render its verdict on a special verdict form. “Using a special
verdict (rather than a general verdict) can be risky. On the front
end, the plaintiff must be excruciatingly careful to make sure
that the special verdict form contains every finding necessary to
sustain a cause of action [citations] because any missing elements
preclude a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor. The risk of error
falls solely on the plaintiff because it is the plaintiff, as the party
with the burden of proof, who has the ‘responsibility for
submitting a verdict form sufficient to support her causes of
action.’ [Citation.] On the back end, the plaintiff is limited to the

6 Although Motorola correctly identifies Harold’s challenge to
the special verdict in heading II.E of its respondent’s brief, it
treats the argument as an assertion of instructional error; it does
not specifically address either Harold’s challenge to the jury’s
verdict or the special verdict form upon which that verdict was
based. Nor does Motorola acknowledge that the special verdict
form was missing an element of the concealment claim. We
nevertheless construe Motorola’s invited error argument to apply
to this claim as well.

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express findings made by the jury in the special verdict form and,
unlike with a general verdict, courts cannot imply findings to
support a special verdict. [Citations.] If an essential finding is
missing, its ‘absence . . . precludes judgment for the plaintiff on
that claim.’ ” (Drink Tank Ventures LLC v. Real Soda in Real
Bottles, Ltd. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 528, 545.) The correctness of
a special verdict is a matter of law, which we review de novo.
(Zagami, Inc. v. James A. Crone, Inc. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th
1083, 1092.)
1.2. The jury rendered an incomplete verdict on the
concealment claim.
“A cause of action for fraud contains ‘the following
elements: (1) a knowingly false representation by the defendant;
(2) an intent to deceive or induce reliance; (3) justifiable reliance
by the plaintiff; and (4) resulting damages. [Citation.]’
[Citation.] [¶] ‘[T]he elements of an action for fraud . . . based on
concealment are: (1) the defendant must have concealed or
suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been
under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant
must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the
intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been
unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had
known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of
the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must
have sustained damage.’ ” (Hasso v. Hapke (2014)
227 Cal.App.4th 107, 127, italics added.)
Thus, before there can be liability for concealment, there
must be a duty to disclose. (Civ. Code, § 1710, subd. (3) [deceit
includes “suppression of a fact, by one who is bound to disclose it,
or who gives information of other facts which are likely to

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mislead for want of communication of that fact”]; Hoffman v. 162
North Wolfe LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1186–1187.) That
duty usually arises in the context of fiduciary relationships, but
outside of the fiduciary context, a “relationship between the
parties is present if there is ‘some sort of transaction between the
parties. [Citations.] Thus, a duty to disclose may arise from the
relationship between seller and buyer, employer and prospective
employee, doctor and patient, or parties entering into any kind of
contractual agreement.’ ” (Hoffman, at p. 1187.)
Harold contends the jury’s verdict does not encompass
every element of fraud by concealment because the jury was not
asked to determine, and did not find, that he owed Motorola a
duty of disclosure. That is, although he had a duty to refrain
from committing fraud, he had no independent duty to announce
to Motorola that he intended to hide assets by buying his mother
a house. (See Bank of America Corp. v. Superior Court (2011)
198 Cal.App.4th 862, 872–873.)
“When a special verdict is used and there is no general
verdict, we will not imply findings in favor of the prevailing
party. [Citation.] If a fact necessary to support a cause of action
is not included in such a special verdict, judgment on that cause
of action cannot stand.” (Behr v. Redmond (2011)
193 Cal.App.4th 517, 530 (Behr).) The plaintiff “bear[s] the
responsibility for a special verdict submitted to the jury on [his]
own case” and must therefore ensure that a special verdict allows
the jury to “ ‘resolve all of the ultimate facts’ ” so that “ ‘ “nothing
shall remain to the court but to draw from them conclusions of
law.” ’ ” (Myers Building Industries, Ltd. v. Interface Technology,
Inc. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 949, 959–960, 961–962.)

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Here, the jury answered “yes” to four questions: Did
Harold intentionally fail to disclose a fact or facts that Motorola
did not know and could not reasonably have discovered? Did
Harold intend to deceive Motorola by concealing the fact? Had
the omitted information been disclosed, would Motorola
reasonably have behaved differently? Was Harold’s concealment
a substantial factor in causing harm to Motorola? This verdict
does not include a finding that Harold had a duty to disclose his
inheritance to Motorola. As we may not imply the missing
finding, the jury did not return a complete verdict on the
concealment claim.
1.3. Harold did not invite the error.
Although the plaintiff bears the burden of submitting a
special verdict form that obtains a finding on each question
essential to liability (Behr, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at pp. 531–
532.), errors in a special verdict form are not cognizable on appeal
if they were invited by the defendant (Saxena v. Goffney (2008)
159 Cal.App.4th 316, 328–329 (Saxena)). Motorola claims Harold
invited the error by stipulating to the special verdict form below.
We are not persuaded.
First, Harold does not challenge the verdict form as such.
He merely argues the verdict returned by the jury—based on
Motorola’s special verdict form—does not support entry of
judgment on the concealment claim because the jury did not
reach a verdict on every necessary element of that claim. Second,
“courts have declined to apply the waiver rule ‘where the record
indicates that the failure to object was not the result of a desire
to reap a “technical advantage” or engage in a “litigious
strategy.” ’ ” (Saxena, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th 316 at pp. 327–
328) The record before us contains no evidence of such a scheme.

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Motorola, not Harold, submitted the erroneous special
verdict form. And though Harold ultimately acquiesced, there is
no indication that he did so “as part of a litigation strategy or to
gain a technical advantage.” (Saxena, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at
p. 328.) The parties were initially unable to agree on the verdict
forms, and the jury began deliberating without them. Several
hours into deliberations, the court stepped in to discuss finalizing
the verdict forms but as it related to the concealment claim, that
discussion focused on damages and not the substantive elements
of the claim.
Moreover, to the extent a party led the court astray, it was
Motorola, not Harold. Early in deliberations, as the court and the
parties struggled with the verdict forms, the jury sent a question:
“debtor responsibility to disclose when someone has funds.”7
Motorola’s attorney replied that the jury had been properly
instructed on that point. Harold’s attorney disagreed and sought
a clarifying instruction.
“Court [(Ct)]: Four, ‘debtor responsibility to disclose
when someone has funds.’
“[Motorola (M)]: I think there’s a jury instruction, isn’t
there?
“Ct: Should [I] write see CACI?
“[M]: They may not know what CACI is. Just see jury
instructions.
“[Harold (H)]: Your Honor, I think it’s a question of
duty. I don’t think there was any instruction on a

7 The jury note does not appear to be part of the record on
appeal, but it is quoted in the reporter’s transcript.

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legal duty to disclose funds, meaning there’s a
legal duty —
“[Ct]: I’m going to say review jury instruction. If
clarification is needed, please send a standalone
question.
“[M]: Perfect.
“[H]: That’s fine. Thank you, Your Honor. It may be
possible to add that if something is not in the
instructions, it’s not there. I don’t know if they’re
making up their own law.
“[Ct]: The court tends to say less than more. I don’t
want to say if it’s not there, it’s not there. If they
have a legitimate question of the law which I can
answer, I will, but they need to set it out
separately.”
To be sure, Harold could have pressed the point further—
but he was not required to do so, especially given that he already
expressed concern about the missing element and neither
Motorola nor the court seemed to agree with him. Ultimately, it
“was plaintiffs’ responsibility to tender their case to the jury. If
plaintiffs chose to submit a verdict form tendering less than their
full case to the jury, [defendant] had no further incentive to
object.” (Saxena, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 328.) We see no
evidence of invited error on this point.
2. Because we reverse based on the incomplete verdict
form, the remaining issues are moot.
“It is well settled that appellate courts will decide only
actual controversies. We will not opine on moot questions or
abstract propositions, nor declare principles of law that cannot
affect the matter at issue on appeal.” (Shaw v. Los Angeles

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Unified School District (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 740, 772.) As we
have explained, the jury’s special verdict did not include findings
for every element of the concealment claim. We therefore vacate
the verdict on the concealment claim against Harold and remand
with instructions. As such, we need not address Harold’s
remaining challenges to the jury’s verdict.
In addition, without a verdict for Motorola on the
concealment claim, there is no basis for the trial court to reform
the deed to the Bundy property in Motorola’s favor for the fourth
cause of action. Accordingly, we need not address the parties’
challenges to the court’s equitable choices and the resulting
judgment.

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DISPOSITION
The verdicts on the UVTA claims as to Ann Pick and Jay
Francis are affirmed.8 The verdicts on the separate concealment
claim as to Harold Pick and the fourth cause of action for
declaratory relief are vacated and the matter is remanded for
retrial of the concealment claim as against Harold Pick consistent
with the views expressed in this opinion. Upon retrial, if a
verdict in favor of Motorola on the concealment claim against
Harold Pick is rendered, the trial court is to reconsider what
remedy, if any, is to be awarded in connection with fourth cause
of action. All parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.


LEE, J.
WE CONCUR:

BAKER, Acting P. J. KIM. J.

8 We note that page 2 of the amended judgment contains a
clerical error. When reciting the jury’s findings as to Ann Pick,
the amended judgment states: “6. ‘Did Defendant Harold Pick
fail to receive a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the
transfer? Yes.’ ” The jury answered that question “no.” The
court should correct the error upon remand.


Judge of the San Bernardino County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

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