Baptiste v. Ralphs Grocery Co. CA4/1

CourtListener 9507678CalctappMay 28, 2024

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Filed 5/28/24 Baptiste v. Ralphs Grocery Co. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

OLLIE KATRINA BAPTISTE, D082554

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2022-
00012259-CU-OE-CTL)
RALPHS GROCERY COMPANY,

Defendant and Respondent;

DAVID J. GALLO,

Objector and Appellant.

APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Richard S. Whitney, Judge. Dismissed in part and affirmed in part.
Law Offices of David J. Gallo and David J. Gallo for Plaintiff and
Appellant Ollie Katrina Baptiste and Objector and Appellant David J. Gallo.
Reed Smith, Mara D. Curtis, Kasey J. Curtis, and Rafael N. Tumanyan
for Defendant and Respondent.

The trial court sustained without leave to amend a demurrer to Ollie
Katrina Baptiste’s claims against Ralphs Grocery Company (Ralphs) for
failing to pay her minimum wages for using self-checkout stands at its
grocery stores, but as to other claims it overruled the demurrer or sustained
it with leave to amend. In a separate order on Ralphs’ motion for sanctions,
the court ruled the claims to which it had sustained the demurrer without
leave to amend were frivolous and directed Baptiste’s attorney, David J.
Gallo, to pay Ralphs $35,000. Baptiste purports to appeal the order
sustaining the demurrer and the sanctions order, and Gallo appeals the
sanctions order. We dismiss Baptiste’s appeals because the order on the
demurrer is not appealable and she lacks standing to appeal the order
sanctioning Gallo. We agree with the trial court’s ruling that the claims to
which it had sustained the demurrer without leave to amend were frivolous
and affirm the order imposing sanctions on Gallo for having filed them.
I.
BACKGROUND
A. Facts
Because this case comes to us at the pleading stage, we take as true the
following facts alleged in Baptiste’s operative pleading, the first amended
class action complaint. (See, e.g., Southern California Gas Leak Cases (2019)
7 Cal.5th 391, 395.)
Ralphs operates retail grocery stores in California. To pay for their
groceries, customers may proceed through either a checkout stand staffed by
a cashier employed by Ralphs or a self-checkout stand operated by the
customer. Baptiste shops at Ralphs’ stores in San Diego County and has
often used self-checkout stands. In doing so, she performed many of the same
tasks as those performed by Ralphs’ paid cashiers, but she received no
compensation. Ralphs invites, encourages, and requests customers to use
self-checkout stands, and it schedules fewer hours for cashiers to induce

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customers to use self-checkout stands so that they can avoid longer lines at
staffed checkout stands. Such measures benefit Ralphs by reducing payroll
costs, and harm society by increasing unemployment, exerting downward
pressure on wages in the retail industry, and promoting sociological harms
related to lack of employment.
B. Pleadings
Baptiste, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, filed a class
action against Ralphs to recover minimum wages for all time customers spent
using self-checkout stands. She asserted in her complaint two claims for
relief: (1) recovery of minimum wages as damages under Labor Code
section 1194; and (2) recovery of minimum wages as restitution under the
unfair competition law (UCL; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.).
Ralphs demurred on the ground customers who used self-checkout
stands were not employees entitled to payment of minimum wages, and
therefore the complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action.
Baptiste mooted the demurrer by filing a first amended complaint. She
repeated the claims for unpaid wages based on Labor Code section 1194 and
the UCL, and added a third claim based on the theory of quasi-contract or
unjust enrichment. Baptiste also added claims based on Ralphs’ collection
and sale of customers’ personal information in alleged violation of the
constitutional right of privacy and the UCL. We do not describe those claims
in any detail because they are not relevant to the issues on appeal.
Ralph demurred to the entire first amended complaint. As to the three
claims seeking recovery of minimum wages for time customers spent using
self-checkout stands, Ralphs argued the claims failed as a matter of law
because the customers were not its employees in that they had no reasonable

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expectation of compensation for using self-checkout stands, in doing so they
performed no “work” within the meaning of the applicable regulation
requiring payment of minimum wages, and Ralphs did not “suffer or permit”

them to work within the meaning of the regulation.1
Baptiste opposed the demurrer. She argued the three claims for
recovery of minimum wages sufficiently stated causes of action because
customers who used self-checkout stands did work that benefitted Ralphs at
their expense, and Ralphs suffered or permitted that work by failing to
prevent it even though Ralphs knew the work was being done and could have
stopped it by removing self-checkout stands.
The trial court sustained in part and overruled in part Ralphs’
demurrer. It sustained the demurrer without leave to amend as to the three
claims for recovery of minimum wages, on the ground customers who used
Ralphs’ self-checkout stands were not employees because in using the stands
they performed no work that unjustly benefited Ralphs or for which they had
a reasonable expectation of compensation by Ralphs. The court further noted
that adoption of Baptiste’s theory “would lead to absurd results – consumers
in various contexts could claim an employment relationship based on
voluntary decisions . . . that happen to provide convenience to both the
consumer and the commercial business (e.g., use of self-serve soda machines,

1 The regulation applicable to retailers is wage order No. 7 issued by the
Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC). (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11070,
subds. 1, 2(G); see Frlekin v. Apple Inc. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1038, 1046 & fn. 3
(Frlekin).) “[W]age orders are constitutionally authorized, quasi-legislative
regulations that have the force of law.” (Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v.
Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 903, 914, fn. 3 (Dynamex).) Wage order No. 7
requires payment of minimum wages to employees for all hours worked.
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11070, subd. 4(B).) It defines “ ‘[e]mploy’ ” as “to
engage, suffer, or permit to work.” (Id., subd. 2(D).)
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gas station pumps, self-service airline check-in, and ATMs).” The court
overruled the demurrer or sustained it with leave to amend as to Baptiste’s
other claims.
C. Motions for Sanctions
In connection with each demurrer, Ralphs served a motion seeking
sanctions against Baptiste and Gallo under Code of Civil Procedure

section 128.7 for filing a frivolous pleading.2 The motion related to the
original complaint was never filed because Baptiste amended her complaint
before the motion could be filed. Ralphs filed its motion related to the first
amended complaint when Baptiste did not withdraw it within 21 days of
service of the motion. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7, subd. (c)(1).) Ralphs
sought at least $150,000 in sanctions on the ground that Baptiste’s claims for
recovery of minimum wages were “patently frivolous” and never should have
been filed because no legal authority supported the contention that customers
who used self-checkout stands were employees of Ralphs. In support of the
motion, Ralphs submitted a declaration from one of its attorneys stating
Ralphs had incurred more than $150,000 in attorney fees to defend the action
and itemizing those fees by task, attorney performing the task, attorney
billing rate, and time spent on the task. Ralphs also sought judicial notice of

2 By filing a complaint, an attorney certifies the claims and legal
contentions “are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of
new law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7, subd. (b)(2).) A party may move for
sanctions for a violation of the quoted provision after the party serves the
motion, but may not file it unless within 21 days after service the challenged
claims or contentions are neither withdrawn nor corrected. (Id., subd. (c)(1).)
If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court finds a
violation, it may impose on the attorney an appropriate sanction, including
payment of attorney fees and other expenses the moving party incurred as a
direct result of the violation. (Id., subds. (c), (d).)
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pleadings and other documents filed in three other cases in which Gallo
represented plaintiffs who asserted identical claims against other retailers.
One of the documents was an order, entered two months before Ralphs
demurred to Baptiste’s first amended complaint, in which the San Francisco
County Superior Court sustained without leave to amend a demurrer to a
first amended class action complaint that alleged customers who used
self-checkout stands at Albertsons grocery stores were employees entitled to
payment of minimum wages. After judgment was entered against the
plaintiff, no appeal was taken.
Baptiste opposed the motion for sanctions. She argued sanctions for
filing a frivolous pleading were warranted neither as to the claims seeking
recovery of minimum wages, because a reasonable attorney could conclude
that by using a self-checkout stand a customer did work for Ralphs for which
minimum wages had to be paid, nor as to the claims alleging Ralphs’
unlawful use of customers’ personal information, because the court overruled
the demurrer or sustained it with leave to amend as to those claims. Baptiste
also objected the amount of sanctions Ralphs requested was excessive. She
asked the trial court to award her “$9,600 in compensatory sanctions” for
opposing the motion. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7, subd. (c)(1) [“If
warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the
reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees incurred in presenting or opposing
the motion.”].) Baptiste attached to her opposition several documents,
including an order, entered a week before Ralphs served its sanctions motion
and more than two months before the trial court ruled on its demurrer, in
which another court sustained without leave to amend a demurrer to claims
asserted by another client of Gallo that customers who used self-checkout
stands at Vons grocery stores were employees entitled to payment of

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minimum wages. Baptiste also submitted a declaration from Gallo
authenticating the documents and stating he spent approximately 12 hours,
at an hourly rate of $800, preparing the opposition.
In reply, Ralphs reduced its sanctions request to $35,000, which was
the amount of attorney fees it had incurred for drafting the demurrer to
Baptiste’s claims for recovery of minimum wages. It asked the trial court to
take judicial notice of, among other documents, the registers of actions in
three cases in which Gallo’s clients had sued grocery stores to show that none
of the demurrer rulings rejecting the claims had been challenged in an
appellate court.
The trial court granted the motion for sanctions. The court stated:
“While the [c]ourt could understand why [Baptiste] would believe
it is a matter of opinion as to whether using self-check[ ]out
[stands] is ‘work’ in a general sense, [she] has not shown that any
reasonable attorney would believe that in the context of this case
where there was no promise or expectation of compensation the
actions could constitute ‘work’ in the legal sense. Further,
[Baptiste] does not sufficiently justify how [her] interpretation
would not lead to absurd results. [Her] interpretation would
result in a massive shift that could have enormous consequences
on the California economy. Further, the amount of uncertainty
businesses would face could disrupt future innovations in
technology.”

The court was “bothered by the fact [Baptiste] did not address the case law
establishing there must be a promise or expectation of compensation” for an
employment relationship to exist. The court also noted Baptiste had been
“warned on multiple occasions about the lack of merits of the minimum wage
claims,” including by orders of other courts sustaining without leave to
amend demurrers to identical claims against other grocery stores and by the
court’s statement in a prior order that it “ ‘was extremely likely to sustain
the demurer without leave to amend as to the causes of action that rely

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upon the allegations that [Ralphs] employed customers who elected to use

self-checkout registers.’ ”3 The trial court noted none of Gallo’s clients had
appealed the adverse demurrer rulings and considered that fact an indication
Gallo and his clients “did not believe [they were] going to change existing
law” or were “making a good faith effort to seek a change in the law.” The
court concluded the claims were “clearly frivolous” and directed Gallo to pay
Ralphs $35,000.
D. Notice of Appeal
Baptiste and Gallo filed a notice of appeal from the order awarding
sanctions and from the order sustaining without leave to amend Ralphs’
demurrer to the three claims for recovery of minimum wages by customers
who used self-checkout stands. We invited Baptiste and Gallo to file a letter
explaining why the order on the demurrer was appealable. In their response,
they conceded an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend is not
appealable, but they contended the sanctions order was appealable and it
would be impossible to review the sanctions order without also reviewing the
order on the demurrer. Baptiste and Gallo suggested “whether the order on
demurrer is properly before this [c]ourt should be reserved to the merits
panel.” We issued an order allowing the appeal to proceed as to the sanctions
order.

3 While the demurrer to the original complaint was pending, Ralphs filed
a motion to stay discovery. The motion was still pending after Baptiste
amended the complaint and Ralphs again demurred. In its order granting
the motion, the trial court made the statement quoted in the text.
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II.
DISCUSSION
A. Appellants’ Contentions
Baptiste and Gallo contend the trial court erred by sustaining without
leave to amend Ralphs’ demurrer to the three claims seeking recovery of
minimum wages for customers who used self-checkout stands and then
sanctioning Gallo for having filed the claims. Because Ralphs “suffered” or
“permitted” such customers to “work,” Baptiste and Gallo contend, the
customers were “employees” entitled to payment of minimum wages under
wage order No. 7 and have valid claims to recover those wages under Labor
Code section 1194 and the UCL. They further contend the claim based on
quasi-contract or unjust enrichment was sufficiently stated because
customers who used self-checkout stands are entitled to recover minimum
wages as restitution for the benefit they conferred on Ralphs at their expense.
Baptiste and Gallo go on to argue that even if the trial court correctly
sustained the demurrer to those claims without leave to amend, the court
erred by imposing $35,000 in sanctions because the claims were not
“frivolous” and the amount was excessive and not adequately supported by
the record. They also fault the trial court for failing to rule on Baptiste’s
request for sanctions against Ralphs for fees incurred in opposing its motion
for sanctions. They ask us to reverse the order imposing sanctions on Gallo
and remand the matter to the trial court for entry of an order on Baptiste’s
request for sanctions.
B. Jurisdictional Issues
We first resolve some jurisdictional issues in discharge of our duty to
make sure we have jurisdiction over the appeal. (See Jennings v. Marralle
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126; Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86, 98.) The

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order sustaining without leave to amend Ralphs’ demurrer to Baptiste’s
claims for recovery of minimum wages is not appealable. (I. J. Weinrot &
Son, Inc. v. Jackson (1985) 40 Cal.3d 327, 331; Evans v. Dabney (1951)
37 Cal.2d 758, 759.) The appeal from that order must be dismissed. (Kirk v.
Ratner (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1052, 1066; Woodman v. Ackerman (1967)
249 Cal.App.2d 644, 646.) We also must dismiss Baptiste’s appeal from the
sanctions order because she “has no standing to challenge the order directing
her counsel to pay sanctions.” (McCluskey v. Henry (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th
1197, 1201, fn. 2.) Because “no appeal lies from the denial of her request to
the trial court for sanctions against [Ralphs]” for having filed the motion for
sanctions, we must dismiss that aspect of the appeal as well. (Ibid.; accord,
Wells Properties v. Popkin (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1055–1056.) Finally,
the order imposing sanctions is appealable because the amount imposed
exceeds $5,000; and Gallo, as the person directed to pay the sanctions, has
standing to appeal the order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(12);
Bauguess v. Paine (1978) 22 Cal.3d 626, 634, fn. 3.) The appeal is thus
limited to Gallo’s attack on the sanctions order.
C. Merits Issues
We now turn to the merits of Gallo’s challenge to the order directing
him to pay $35,000 in sanctions to Ralphs for having filed frivolous claims for
recovery of minimum wages by customers who used self-checkout stands to
buy their groceries. The governing statute provides in relevant part that on
motion of a party and after notice and reasonable opportunity to respond, the
court “may . . . impose an appropriate sanction” on an attorney who filed a
pleading that violated the certification that the “claims . . . and other legal
contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the

10
establishment of new law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7, subds. (b)(2), (c), italics
added.) The sanction “may consist of . . . an order directing payment to the
movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses
incurred as a direct result of the violation.” (Id., subd. (d), italics added.) A
monetary sanction for a violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7,
subdivision (b)(2) “may not be awarded against a represented party.”
(Id., subd. (d)(1).) A trial court has broad discretion to impose sanctions
if the statutory requirements are met. (Peake v. Underwood (2014)
227 Cal.App.4th 428, 441 (Peake).) We presume the court’s order is correct
and do not substitute our judgment for the trial court’s; we reverse the order
only if the court abused its discretion by transgressing the applicable legal
principles or exceeding the bounds of reason and thereby caused a manifest
miscarriage of justice. (Kumar v. Ramsey (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1110, 1121,
1125; Peake, at p. 441.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
sanctioning Gallo, as discussed below.
1. Warrantability of Sanctions
Gallo’s main argument is the trial court erred by ruling that Baptiste’s
claims for recovery of minimum wages were legally frivolous and their filing
warranted imposition of sanctions. A claim is legally frivolous “if it is ‘not
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law.’ ” (Bucur v. Ahmad (2016)
244 Cal.App.4th 175, 189; Peake, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 440.) To
obtain sanctions, the moving party must show the opposing party’s conduct in
asserting the claim was objectively unreasonable, i.e., that any reasonable
attorney would agree the claim was totally and completely without merit.
(Bucur, at p. 189; Peake, at p. 440.) Whether a claim is legally frivolous
such as to warrant imposition of sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure

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section 128.7 is a question of law we review de novo. (Ponce v. Wells Fargo
Bank (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 253, 261–262; Optimal Markets, Inc. v. Salant
(2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 912, 921–922.)
a. Merits of Claims
We start by considering the merits of each of Baptiste’s three claims in
turn. As will appear, they all lacked merit.
In her first claim, Baptiste relied on Labor Code section 1194 to recover
minimum wages on behalf of customers who used self-checkout stands to buy
groceries at Ralphs. The statute authorizes an employee who received less
than the legal minimum wage “to recover in a civil action the unpaid balance
of the full amount of this minimum wage.” (Id., subd. (a).) “[I]n actions
under the Labor Code to recover unpaid wages . . . , [the employer’s] liability
turns on whether it employed plaintiffs within the meaning of the applicable
IWC wage order governing the industry.” (Taylor v. Financial Casualty &
Surety, Inc. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 966, 984.) The wage order that applies to
retailers states: “Every employer shall pay to each employee, on the
established payday for the period involved, not less than the applicable
minimum wage for all hours worked in the payroll period, whether the
remuneration is measured by time, piece, commission, or otherwise.” (Cal.
Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11070, subd. 4(B).) An “ ‘[e]mployer’ ” is any person “who
directly or indirectly, or through an agent or any other person, employs or
exercises control over the wages, hours, or working conditions of any person.”
(Id., subd. 2(F).) An “ ‘[e]mployee’ ” is “any person employed by an employer.”
(Id., subd. 2(E).) “ ‘Employ’ means to engage, suffer, or permit to work.” (Id.,
subd. 2(D).) Gallo contends that by allowing customers to use self-checkout
stands, Ralphs “suffer[ed]” or “permit[ed]” them to “work” within the
meaning of the wage order (ibid.) and thereby created an employment

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relationship obligating Ralphs to pay the customers minimum wages. We
disagree. As we shall explain, customers who use self-checkout stands are
not doing “work” for Ralphs within the meaning of the wage order.
The term “work” is not defined by the wage order. We thus give the
term the usual and ordinary meaning it would have in the employment
context, and to do so we may refer to dictionaries. (See Wendz v. State Dept.
of Education (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 607, 626–627 [using dictionaries to
interpret undefined term in statute]; Ngu v. City Bail Bonds (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 644, 649 (Ngu) [statutory construction rules apply to
regulations].) A legal dictionary defines “work” as “[p]hysical and mental
exertion to attain an end, esp. as controlled by and for the benefit of an

employer; labor.” (Black’s Law Dict. (11th ed. 219) p. 1923.)4 That dictionary

4 This definition is identical to the one the United States Supreme Court
gave to “work” as used in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA; 29 U.S.C.
§ 201 et seq.). Like wage order No. 7, the FLSA defines “ ‘[e]mploy’ ” to
include “suffer or permit to work” but does not define “work.” (29 U.S.C.
§ 203(g).) The Supreme Court identified three “essential elements of
work”: (1) “[p]hysical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not)”;
(2) “[e]xertion controlled or required by the employer”; and (3) “[e]xertion
pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his
business.” (Jewell Ridge Corp. v. Local (1945) 325 U.S. 161, 163–165, italics
omitted.) Federal court decisions construing provisions of the FLSA or other
federal labor laws with language and underlying interests similar to those of
state labor laws provide persuasive and reliable guidance to state courts
construing state laws. (Building Material & Construction Teamsters’ Union
v. Farrell (1986) 41 Cal.3d 651, 658; Monzon v. Schaefer Ambulance Service,
Inc. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 16, 31.) But federal court interpretations of
federal law do not bind state courts as to construction of state law, which
sometimes differs substantially from federal law in language and intent and
provides employees greater protection. (Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th
35, 68 (Martinez); Morillion v. Royal Packing Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 575, 592
(Morillion).) Hence, “[c]ourts must give the IWC’s wage orders independent
effect in order to protect the commission’s delegated authority to enforce the
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states, “The term [labor] usu. refers to work for wages as opposed to profits.”
(Black’s Law Dict., p. 1045.) A general dictionary defines “work” as “the
labor, task, or duty that affords one his accustomed means of livelihood.”
(Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (2002) p. 2634.) Another defines “work” as
“employment, as in some form of industry, esp. as a means of earning one’s
livelihood.” (Random House Dict. (2d ed. 1987) p. 2188.) Yet another defines
“work” as “[e]mployment; job” and “[t]he means by which one earns one’s
livelihood.” (American Heritage Dict. (2d coll. ed. 1985) p. 1390.) These
definitions suggest performance of a task constitutes “work” if the person
performing the task (the employee) does so subject to the control of, for the
benefit of, and with the reasonable expectation of payment by another (the
employer).
Legal authorities also support an interpretation of “work” as used in
the wage order as performance of a task for the employer for which the
employee has a reasonable expectation of payment. A provision of the Labor
Code concerning payment of wages defines “ ‘[l]abor’ ” to include “labor, work,
or service whether rendered or performed under contract, subcontract,
partnership, station plan, or other agreement if the labor to be paid for is
performed personally by the person demanding payment.” (Lab. Code, § 200,
subd. (b), italics added; see id., § 1171 [“The provisions of this chapter shall
apply to and include men, women and minors employed in any occupation,
trade, or industry, whether compensation is measured by time, piece, or
otherwise”].) Our Supreme Court has stated: “The promise to pay money in
return for services rendered lies at the heart of [the employment]
relationship. . . . Even in the absence of an explicit promise for payment, the

state’s wage laws and, as appropriate, to provide greater protection to
workers than federal law affords.” (Martinez, at p. 68.)
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law will imply one, and thus authorize recovery, when circumstances indicate
that the parties understood the employee was not volunteering his or her
services free of charge.” (Voris v. Lampert (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1141, 1148, italics
added (Voris); see Walling v. Portland Terminal Co. (1947) 330 U.S. 148, 152
[“The definition ‘suffer or permit to work’ [in the FLSA] was obviously not
intended to stamp all persons as employees who, without any express or
implied compensation agreement, might work for their own advantage on the
premises of another.” (Italics added.)].)
The wage order itself states that, with specified exceptions, it “shall
apply to all persons employed in the mercantile industry whether paid on a
time, piece rate, commission, or other basis.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11070,
subd. 1.) When considering a different wage order that uses the same
definitions, the Court of Appeal stated: “[T]he history of the definitions of
‘employ,’ ‘employee,’ and ‘employer’ in the [w]age [o]rder suggests that the
[w]age [o]rder was meant to apply to persons who are working for pay in
commercial businesses. The ‘suffer or permit to work’ and ‘exercises control’
standards extend responsibility to businesses who benefit from and have the
power to prevent exploitation of workers who are working for compensation.
And the term ‘engage’ reaches businesses that form an express or implied
contractual relationship to compensate persons whom they hire.” (Woods v.
American Film Institute (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1037, italics added
(Woods).) The court also stated: “The reference [in the wage order] to the
mode of payment suggests an assumption that the workers subject to the
[w]age [o]rder are working for pay.” (Id. at p. 1038.)
Based on the dictionary definitions and legal authorities discussed
above, we conclude that for a person’s performance of a task to constitute
“work” within the meaning of wage order No. 7, the task must be something

15
that is: (1) subject to the control of another as to whether, when, and how it
is done; (2) done primarily for the benefit of the other; and (3) done with a

reasonable expectation of compensation by the other.5
Those factors are absent from this case. A customer like Baptiste who
goes to a Ralphs grocery store when she wants, selects the items she wants to
buy, chooses to pay for the items by using a self-checkout stand rather than a
cashier-staffed one, and then leaves the store with the items, is not subject
to Ralphs’ control. (See Bono Enterprises, Inc. v. Bradshaw (1995)
32 Cal.App.4th 968, 975 [an employee is subject to an employer’s control
when the employer “directs, commands, or restrains” the employee and
“prevents the employee from using the time effectively for his or her own
purposes”].) The choices of whether to shop at Ralphs, when to shop, how

5 All three factors need not concur for an employee to be entitled to
compensation by an employer. For example, an employee who is subject to
the control of an employer, such as while riding a bus to and from a worksite
as required by the employer or waiting for and undergoing required exit
searches, need not be performing tasks that benefit the employer during that
time to be compensated under the applicable wage order. (Huerta v. CSI
Electrical Contractors (2024) 15 Cal.5th 908, 920–921 (Huerta); Frlekin,
supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 1046, 1056–157; Morillion, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp.
582, 587.) An employee who is suffered or permitted to work, such as while
performing duties related to closing a store after clocking out or performing
unauthorized overtime after the end of a shift, need not be under the
employer’s control to be compensated, provided the employer knows or should
know the employee is working and the employer can prevent any undesired
work from being done. (Troester v. Starbucks Corp. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 829, 840,
843; Morillion, at pp. 584–585.) The question here is not whether one who is
indisputably an employee must be paid for time spent under an employer’s
control or performing tasks for the employer while not under its control. The
question is whether a person’s performance of a task constitutes “work” such
that she is an employee under the wage order. The three factors we listed in
the text must concur for the answer to be “yes.”

16
long to shop, what items to buy, and which type of checkout stand to use are
all made by the customer at her pleasure, not by Ralphs. A customer who
chooses a self-checkout stand rather than a cashier-staffed stand to pay for
her groceries performs tasks primarily for her own convenience, not primarily
for Ralphs’ benefit. And such a customer has no reasonable expectation of
payment for the time spent on checking out. Ralphs promised no payment,
and the customer’s voluntary choice to check herself out does not “indicate
that the parties understood the [customer] was not volunteering . . . her

services free of charge.” (Voris, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1148.)6 A customer
who uses a self-checkout stand at a Ralphs grocery store is not doing a job by
which she earns a living and so is not performing “work” for Ralphs within
the meaning of the wage order. (See Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict., supra,
p. 2634 [“work” is “the labor, task, or duty that affords one his accustomed
means of livelihood”]; American Heritage Dict., supra, p. 1390 [“work” is
“[t]he means by which one earns one’s livelihood”]; Woods, supra,
72 Cal.App.5th at p. 1037 [wage order “was meant to apply to persons who

are working for pay in commercial businesses”].)7 Such a customer thus has

6 Gallo objects to reliance on this portion of Voris on the ground that the
Supreme Court “h[e]ld only that a conversion claim is not an appropriate
remedy” for nonpaymnent of wages. (Voris, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1163.) The
Supreme Court so held, in part, because “a claim for unpaid wages resembles
other actions for a particular amount of money owed in exchange for
contractual performance—a type of claim that has long been understood to
sound in contract, rather than as the tort of conversion.” (Id. at p. 1156.)
That reasoning was supported by the Supreme Court’s earlier recognition
that an express or implied promise to pay money in exchange for performance
of services “lies at the heart of [the employment] relationship.” (Id. at
p. 1148.) That recognition supports our reasoning as well.

7 Gallo aserts, “Woods has no application to for-profit businesses such as
[Ralphs].” The Woods court held that persons who volunteered to work at an
17
no claim for payment of minimum wages under Labor Code section 1194.
(See Gunawan v. Howroyd-Wright Employment Agency (C.D.Cal. 2014)
997 F.Supp.2d 1058, 1062–1066 [person who performed no work for alleged
employer was not employee entitled to recover minimum wages under Lab.
Code, § 1194].)
We also note that “[t]he IWC’s power to define employment is . . . not
expressly granted in the act creating the commission but merely implied, and
thus extends only so far as necessary to permit the commission effectively to
exercise its expressly granted powers to regulate wages, hours and working
conditions.” (Martinez, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 70–71.) Wage orders issued
by the IWC “must be reasonably necessary to effectuate the purposes of the
statute.” (Id. at p. 71.) Defining employment to include a customer’s use of a
self-checkout stand at a grocery store, it seems to us, would not be reasonably
necessary to regulate the wages, hours, and working conditions of persons
who, for the benefit of the store, subject to the control of its management, and
for pay, regularly perform the many tasks required for successful operation of
the store. Baptiste and other customers who used self-checkout stands, we
conclude, were not performing “work” for, and so were not employees of,
Ralphs within the meaning of wage order No. 7.
In urging us to reach the opposite conclusion, Gallo advances several
arguments. None is persuasive.

annual film festival put on by a nonprofit organization and did not expect
compensation were not employees. (Woods, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1034–1041.) As part of the rationale for that holding, the court explained
the applicable wage order “was meant to apply to persons who are working
for pay in commercial businesses.” (Id. at p. 1037.) Although Woods involved
alleged employment by a nonprofit organization, the court’s rationale is not
limited to that context and supports our analysis.
18
Gallo argues customers who used self-checkout stands at Ralphs
grocery stores were employees, because “the operation of a checkout stand
obviously constitutes ‘work,’ ” and Ralphs’ “managers obviously recognize the
cashier function as work, because they hire people to perform that exact
function.” Gallo quotes an online dictionary that defines “work” to mean
“ ‘exertion of effort directed to produce or accomplish something; labor; toil’ ”
and “ ‘productive or operative activity.’ ” He also cites Hernandez v. Pacific
Bell Telephone Co. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 131, 142 (Hernandez), for the
proposition that “ ‘the standard of “suffered or permitted to work” is met
when an employee is engaged in certain tasks or exertion that a manager
would recognize as work.’ ” Gallo goes on to argue that we must interpret
that standard broadly to include persons who have not been formally hired
but whom the employer allows to perform tasks in the employer’s line of
business for the benefit of the employer, such as customers who use
self-checkout stands at grocery stores. We are not persuaded.
Gallo’s proposed interpretation of the wage order is too broad and fails
to take into account the context in which it applies. We agree customers who
use self-checkout stands perform “work” in a literal sense: They exert
themselves to accomplish a goal and do something productive by scanning
and bagging the items they are buying. We also agree Ralphs hires cashiers
to do those same tasks and “permits” customers to do them. We disagree,
however, that such considerations transform customers who voluntarily use
self-checkout stands into employees who work for Ralphs. As we explained
above, Ralphs does not exercise control over its customers as to when and
how they do their shopping or whether they use self-checkout stands or
cashier-staffed stands. The choice of which type of checkout stand to use is
left to the preference and convenience of the customer and primarily benefits

19
her. And, importantly, customers who decide to use self-checkout stands
have no reasonable expectation they will be compensated for doing so. The
wage order “was meant to apply to persons who are working for pay in
commercial businesses” (Woods, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 1037) and “to
bring within the ‘employee’ category all individuals who can reasonably be
viewed as working ‘in the [hiring entity’s] business” [citation], that is, all
individuals who are reasonably viewed as providing services to the business
in a role comparable to that of an employee” (Dynamex, supra, 4 Cal.5th at
p. 959, italics omitted; see Huerta, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 931 [“Courts have
explained that ‘ “the standard of ‘suffered or permitted to work’ is met when
an employee is engaged in certain tasks or exertion that a manager would
recognize as work.” ’ ”]). In our view, customers who come and go to a Ralphs
grocery store as they please, choose to use self-checkout stands to ring up
their own groceries, and provide no services to other customers are not within
the scope of the wage order.
We also reject the broad and literal interpretation of “work” in the wage
order that Gallo proposes because its adoption would produce absurd results.
As a federal district court stated in rejecting the same interpretation as that
urged by Gallo in this case:
“ ‘Plaintiff’s construction [of the [w]age [o]rder] would lead to
customers becoming employees of all sorts of commercial
enterprises, e.g., customers who pump their own gas, use an
ATM, fill their soda cup at restaurant[s], use self-service airline
check-in, operate credit card machines at restaurant[s] when
purchasing take-out, etc.’ [Citation.] To [this] list, the Court
could add an endless number of additional examples: the child
who selects and pays for a pumpkin at a pick-your-own
Halloween pumpkin patch; the customer who buses their own
table at a restaurant; the customer who retrieves online
purchases from a package locker or other pick-up point; the
farmer’s market customer who places produce into their own

20
reusable bag; and so forth. It strains credulity past its breaking
point to categorize these persons as employees.” (Russell v.
Walmart Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2023) 655 F.Supp.3d 937, 941.)

We agree with the district court. Where, as here, “the interpretation claimed
leads to injustice, oppression or to absurd consequences, the general terms
used in a statute will be limited in their scope so as to avoid such a result.”
(People v. Ventura Refining Co. (1928) 204 Cal. 286, 290; see San Diegans for
Open Government v. City of San Diego (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 416, 429
[literal meaning of words may be disregarded to avoid absurd results];
Salazar v. McDonald’s Corp. (9th Cir. 2019) 944 F.3d 1024, 1032 [“California
follows the rule—including in the context of labor law—that courts may not

interpret a statute so as to produce ‘absurd consequences.’ ”].)8 We thus
reject Gallo’s proposed interpretation and limit the scope of the term “work”
as used in the wage order to the performance of tasks for the benefit of the
employer, subject to the employer’s control, and with a reasonable
expectation of compensation by the employer.
Gallo also argues that Ralphs “is intentionally manufacturing
‘inconvenience’ to induce its customers to provide free labor” by using
self-checkout stands. According to Gallo, Ralphs “deliberately and
intentionally makes it very inconvenient to use a checkout stand operated by
a regularly-employed, paid cashier, by scheduling fewer paid cashiers.” He

8 We reject Gallo’s suggestion the rule requiring courts to avoid
interpretations that produce absurd results is limited to cases in which the
law being interpreted is ambiguous. “Although ambiguity is generally a
condition precedent to interpretation, ‘ “[t]he literal meaning of the words of a
statute may be disregarded to avoid absurd results or to give effect to
manifest purposes that, in the light of the statute’s legislative history, appear
from its provisions considered as a whole.” ’ ” (Stokes v. Baker (2019)
35 Cal.App.5th 946, 957; see Ngu, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 649 [statutory
construction rules apply to regulations].)
21
contends Ralphs should have “to discount purchase totals according to the
time expended performing the checkout function” or “revert to [the]
traditional business model of having paid cashiers do all the cashier work.”
“Such a result,” says Gallo, “would further California’s public policy of
spreading employment opportunities among the populace.”
This is not a persuasive legal argument that customers who use
self-checkout stands are doing work for Ralphs and therefore are employees
entitled to recover minimum wages. It is, rather, an expression of Gallo’s
opinion that Ralphs should not be using self-checkout stands and instead
should employ cashiers to check out all customers to create more employment
opportunities for Californians. Opinions on whether use of technology to
replace human labor is economically or socially beneficial or desirable are
proper considerations for a legislative body making policy choices, but not for
courts charged with interpreting and applying the law to the facts of cases
that come before them. (See, e.g., Max Factor & Co. v. Kunsman (1936)
5 Cal.2d 446, 454; California School Employees Assn. v. Governing Bd. of
South Orange County Community College Dist. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th
574, 589.)
In sum, we conclude Baptiste did not perform for Ralphs any “work”
within the meaning of the wage order by using a self-checkout stand and was
not entitled to payment of minimum wages for the time she spent doing so.
The claim under Labor Code section 1194 had no merit.
We reach the same conclusion as to the UCL claim. The UCL
authorizes an action for relief by a person who lost money as a result of any
unlawful business act or practice. (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17200, 17204.) It
borrows violations of other laws, including regulations, and makes them
independently actionable under the UCL. (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v.

22
Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180; Smith v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1481.) In particular, an
employee who has not been paid wages as required by a wage order may
recover the unpaid wages as restitution under the UCL. (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 17203; Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th
163, 169, 177.) Baptiste’s UCL claim to recover minimum wages was based
on the same alleged violations of the wage order as was her claim under
Labor Code section 1194; she merely recast a legal claim for damages as an
equitable claim for restitution. Gallo concedes in his opening brief that “[t]he
legal analysis is the same for both claims.” The UCL claim therefore lacks
merit for the same reasons the Labor Code claim does. (See, e.g., AMN
Healthcare, Inc. v. Aya Healthcare Services, Inc. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th
923, 950 [“when the underlying legal claim fails, so too will a derivative UCL
claim”].)
By her third claim, Baptiste sought to recover minimum wages on a
theory of quasi-contract or unjust enrichment. She alleged that by using
self-checkout stands, she and other customers conferred a benefit on Ralphs
“by providing their own labor as a substitute for labor which traditionally has
been provided by, and which otherwise would have been provided by,
[Ralphs’] regularly-employed, paid cashiers.” Baptiste further alleged Ralphs
“knowingly accepted the benefits” and “[i]t would be inequitable for [Ralphs]
to retain the benefit . . . without paying for its value.” Like the other two
claims, this one is meritless.
“ ‘The right to restitution or quasi-contractual recovery is based upon
unjust enrichment. Where a person obtains a benefit that he or she may not
justly retain, the person is unjustly enriched. The quasi-contract, or contract
“implied in law,” is an obligation . . . created by the law without regard to the

23
intention of the parties, and is designed to restore the aggrieved party to his
or her former position by return of the thing or its equivalent in money.’ ”
(Unilab Corp. v. Angeles-IPA (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 622, 639, italics
omitted.) That one person benefits another is insufficient by itself to require
restitution; the recipient of the benefit must make restitution only if under
the circumstances it would be unjust for the recipient to retain it. (Hartford
Casualty Ins. Co. v. J.R. Marketing, L.L.C. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 988, 998
(Hartford); Welborne v. Ryman-Carroll Foundation (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th
719, 725.) “ ‘It must ordinarily appear that the benefits were conferred by
mistake, fraud, coercion or request; otherwise, though there is enrichment, it
is not unjust.’ ” (Dinosaur Development, Inc. v. White (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d
1310, 1316, italics omitted (Dinosaur).)
Baptiste did not allege that she and other customers who used
self-checkout stands at Ralphs grocery stores did so by mistake, fraud, or
coercion. As Gallo points out in his opening brief, she did allege that Ralphs
“invites, encourages, and requests its customers” to use self-checkout stands
by scheduling fewer cashiers so that customers will be induced to use those
stands to avoid the long lines at cashier-staffed stands. (Italics added.)
Baptiste also alleged that she “anticipate[d] that evidence obtained on
discovery [would] confirm that [Ralphs] trains its employees to steer its
customers toward its customer-operated checkout stands so that [it] will
derive even more unpaid cashier work from its customers.” Such allegations
do not show a “direct request” from Ralphs for performance of services
that would require it to make restitution to customers. (Dinosaur, supra,
216 Cal.App.3d at p. 1316; see Russell v. Walmart, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2023)
680 F.Supp.3d 1130, 1133 [self-checkout stand attendant’s encouragement of
customers to use stands “does not constitute a request of the sort that can

24
provide a basis for unjust enrichment”].) In any event, the choice of whether
to proceed through a cashier-staffed checkout stand or a self-checkout stand
lies entirely with the customer and primarily benefits her. “When a person
acts simply as she would have done in any event, out of duty or self-interest,
she cannot equitably claim compensation from anyone who merely happens
to benefit as a result.” (Hartford, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1000.)
b. Objective Unreasonableness of Assertion of Claims
Having determined the three claims to which the trial court sustained
Ralphs’ demurrer without leave to amend lacked merit, we now must decide
whether the filing of those claims warranted imposition of sanctions on Gallo.
“[W]hen determining whether sanctions should be imposed, the issue is not
merely whether the party would prevail on the underlying factual or legal
argument. Instead, courts should apply an objective test of reasonableness,
including whether ‘any reasonable attorney would agree that [the claim] is
totally and completely without merit.’ ” (Peake, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at
p. 448.) Even when an attorney’s filing of claims is objectively unreasonable
and thereby subject to sanctions, their imposition is discretionary, not
mandatory. (Ibid.; Kojababian v. Genuine Home Loans, Inc. (2009)
174 Cal.App.4th 408, 422 (Kojababian).) Several reasons support the trial
court’s decision to exercise its discretion to sanction Gallo.
First, the claims for recovery of minimum wages clearly lacked merit
under existing law. Although when Gallo filed the first amended complaint
no published appellate opinion had rejected the theory that a customer who
used a self-checkout stand at a grocery store performed “work” for which the
store had to pay minimum wages, the theory was inconsistent with the
applicable wage order and pertinent case law. As we explained earlier, under
the language of the wage order and case law, payment of minimum wages is

25
required when a person performs tasks subject to control by another, for the
other’s benefit, and with reasonable expectation of payment by the other.
And as we also explained earlier, customers who use self-checkout stands at
grocery stores do not meet those requirements.
Second, Gallo presented no colorable legal argument to the trial court
that would have supported the theory that a customer’s use of a self-checkout
stand at a grocery store constitutes performance of “work” for the store that
entitles the customer to payment of minimum wages for the time spent on
checking out. (See Peake, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at pp. 448–449 [appellants’
failure to present colorable legal or factual argument to trial court for
extension of law to support liability supported sanctions].) Rather,
acceptance of that theory would lead to absurd results, as discussed above.
Third, Gallo was put on notice that the claims he filed lacked merit in
time to withdraw them before he became subject to sanctions. He concedes
that before the time to withdraw expired (i.e., 21 days after Ralphs served the
motion for sanctions (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7, subd. (c)(1)), two other courts
had sustained without leave to amend demurrers to identical claims Gallo’s
clients asserted against other grocery stores. Also before expiration of the
withdrawal period, Ralphs had explained in its demurrer and motion for
sanctions why the claims lacked merit. (See Peake, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at
p. 449 [similar circumstances supported sanctions].)
Fourth, Gallo’s client could have appealed the judgment of dismissal
entered in the case concerning Albertsons grocery stores but did not. This
suggests Gallo and his client lacked a good faith belief in the merits of the
claims. Although subjective bad faith is not a requirement for imposition of
sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7, “the fact that a party
[or an attorney] does not actually believe in the merits of [the] claim is

26
relevant to the issue whether sanctions are warranted in the particular case.”

(Peake, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 449.)9
For these reasons, the trial court’s decision to sanction Gallo for filing
frivolous claims did not “exceed[ ] the bounds of reason” and was not an abuse
of discretion. (West Coast Development v. Reed (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 693, 698
(West Coast); see Peake, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at pp. 448–450.)
Gallo’s arguments for reversal of the sanctions order are meritless. We
consider and reject each in turn.
Gallo starts off by claiming a constitutional right to file litigation;
proceeding to commend “ ‘[f]orceful representation,’ ” such as that by “the
brave attorney” who convinced the United States Supreme Court in Brown v.
Board of Education (1954) 347 U.S. 483 to overrule the separate-but-equal
principle of Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) 163 U.S. 537; and then asking this
court “to take a strong stand against the threat that multi-tens-of-billion-
dollar conglomerates can, through intimidation, dissuade litigants and their
counsel from bringing important first-impression[ ] [cases] before this
[c]ourt.” We agree the right to petition the government for redress of
grievances includes the right to file a lawsuit. (U.S. Const., 1st Amend.;
Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, subd. (a); California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited (1972) 404 U.S. 508, 510; Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021)
11 Cal.5th 995, 1024.) We also agree sanctions may not be imposed when to
do so would stifle an attorney’s zealous representation of a client, which may

9 Ralphs argues Baptiste’s pursuit of discovery on the claims for payment
of minimum wages is another indicator that the litigation was conducted in
bad faith. Gallo disagrees. We need not decide the point. Sanctions for
discovery misconduct are unavailable under Code of Civil Procedure
section 128.7, which “shall not apply to disclosures and discovery requests,
responses, objections, and motions.” (Id., subd. (g).)
27
require the attorney to take a novel position on a legal issue. (Guillemin v.
Stein (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 156, 167–168.) But we emphatically disagree
that by filing the claims at issue in this appeal Gallo was acting anything like
the attorney who persuaded the Supreme Court in Brown to overrule Plessy.
Unlike the significant constitutional claim involved in Brown, the claims at
issue here are frivolous. The right to petition does not include a right to file
baseless litigation. (Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. (1983)
461 U.S. 731, 743; Rental Housing Assn. of Northern Alameda County v.
City of Oakland (2009) 171 Cal.Ap.4th 741, 768.) Code of Civil Procedure
section 128.7 “enables courts to deter or punish frivolous filings which disrupt
matters, waste time, and burden courts’ and parties’ resources” by imposing
sanctions on attorneys like Gallo who present such filings. (In re Mark B.
(2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 61, 76.)
Gallo goes on to challenge the trial court’s stated reasons for imposing
sanctions. He faults the court for inferring a lack of belief in the merits of the
claims from the fact that Gallo’s clients had taken no appeals from the orders
sustaining without leave to amend demurrers to similar claims against other
grocery stores. Gallo correctly asserts those orders were not appealable
(Evans v. Dabney, supra, 37 Cal.2d at p. 759), but he concedes an appealable
judgment was entered in one of the other cases and no appeal was taken
before the trial court sanctioned him in this case. That failure to appeal
supported the trial court’s inference.
Gallo next faults the trial court for stating he cited no “analogous and
helpful” case to support the claims for recovery of minimum wages. He
contends the wage order and the cases he cited support the claims. We agree
with the trial court. Gallo has never cited any legal authority that supports
his theory that a customer’s use of a self-checkout stand at a grocery store

28
makes the customer an employee entitled to payment of minimum wages for
the time spent on checking out.
Gallo objects to the trial court’s citation of Hernandez, supra,
29 Cal.App.5th 131, as support for the court’s assertion that he failed to
address case law establishing that a promise or expectation of compensation
is required for there to be an employment relationship. The objection is a
mere quibble. Although Hernandez did not discuss whether a promise or
expectation of compensation was needed for an employment relationship, the
other three cases the court cited did. The inclusion of Hernandez in the
string citation was inconsequential.
Gallo also objects to the trial court’s consideration of its statement in
the order staying discovery that the court was extremely likely to sustain the
then-pending demurrer as one of the occasions on which he was warned the
claims for recovery of minimum wages lacked merit. Gallo contends that if
he and Baptiste “had abandoned the subject claims in response to the
[court’s] comments, this [c]ourt would have never acquired jurisdiction over
the important first-impression issue presented by the instant [a]ppeal.” We
disagree with Gallo’s characterization of this appeal. It presents no
significant question of first impression. The claims to which the trial court
sustained the demurrer without leave to amend are frivolous. Gallo should
have heeded the trial court’s warning, reexamined his position and
authorities, and dismissed the claims before it was too late to avoid sanctions.
Finally, Gallo faults the trial court for finding the claims for recovery of
minimum wages frivolous based in part on the absurd results that would
follow acceptance of his construction of the wage order, including “a massive
shift that could have enormous consequences on the California economy” and

29
“could disrupt future innovations in technology.”10 Gallo contends a court
may consider the absurd results of a particular construction of a law only if
the law is ambiguous. We have already rejected this contention and
concluded Gallo’s proposed construction of the wage order, if adopted, would
produce absurd results. Gallo also accuses Ralphs and its competitors of
causing the “ ‘massive shift’ ” to the economy through “morally-repugnant
labor practices” that “upended over a century of settled practice under which
regularly-employed, paid cashiers performed the work of cashier” and
deliberately increased unemployment. We disregard such invective, which
has no place in briefs filed in this court. (Britts v. Superior Court (2006)
145 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1121, fn. 3; Thompson v. Friendly Hills Regional
Medical Center (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 544, 551.)
2. Amount of Sanctions
Gallo finally challenges the amount of sanctions imposed as excessive
and inadequately documented. We reject the challenge.
The “primary purpose” of Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 “is to
deter filing abuses, not to compensate those affected by them.” (Musaelian v.
Adams (2009) 45 Cal.4th 512, 519.) The statute expressly authorizes the
court to issue an order directing payment of some or all of the moving party’s
attorney fees and other expenses in an amount “limited to what is sufficient
to deter repetition of this conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly
situated.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7, subd. (d).) We review a trial court’s

10 As “an example of how judicial action may be disruptive of
long-standing practices,” Gallo filed in this court a motion to take judicial
notice of the verdict in a federal court action in which a jury awarded
approximately $1.8 billion in damages against real estate brokerages for
conspiring to inflate commissions. We deny the motion because the verdict is
not relevant to any issue on appeal. (Voris, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1147, fn. 5;
Johnston-Rossi v. Rossi (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1081, 1089.)
30
decision on the amount of sanctions for abuse of discretion. (Kojababian,
supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 422; Eichenbaum v. Alon (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th
967, 977; Dwyer v. Crocker National Bank (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1418, 1437.)
The party claiming abuse of discretion has the burden to show the decision
was “ ‘ “ ‘arbitrary, capricious or whimsical.’ ” ’ ” (Sinaiko Healthcare
Consulting, Inc., v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th
390, 401 (Sinaiko).)
Gallo has not met his burden. As a sanction, the trial court ordered
him to pay Ralphs $35,000, which was the amount of attorney fees it incurred
in preparing the demurrer to the frivolous claims for recovery of minimum
wages. Ralphs submitted a declaration from one of its attorneys that
identified the attorneys who worked on the demurrer, the amount of time
each attorney worked, and each attorney’s hourly rate. No more was
required to prove the amount of fees incurred. (Olson Partnership v. Gaylord
Plating Lab, Inc. (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 235, 242–243; McFarland v. City of
Sausalito (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 909, 913.) Because substantial evidence
supports the amount of fees Ralphs incurred to dispose of the frivolous claims
and the law expressly authorizes an award of those fees as sanctions (Code
Civ. Proc., § 128.7, subd. (d)), the trial court’s decision to sanction Gallo in
that amount was not “ ‘ “ ‘arbitrary, capricious or whimsical’ ” ’ ” (Sinaiko,
supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 401) and did not “exceed[ ] the bound of reason”
(West Coast, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 698). Gallo has shown no abuse of
discretion.

31
III.
DISPOSITION
The appeal of the order sustaining the demurrer without leave to
amend is dismissed. Baptiste’s appeal of the order awarding sanctions
against Gallo and denying her request for sanctions against Ralphs is
dismissed. The order awarding sanctions against Gallo is affirmed.

IRION, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DO, J.

CASTILLO, J.

32

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