CourtListener 9506100•People v. Carter CA2/5
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Filed 5/21/24 P. v. Carter CA2/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B326137
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. BA477466)
SHARODNEY LASHAWN CARTER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Shelly Torrealba, Judge. Affirmed and
remanded with directions.
Randy S. Kravis, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Rama R.
Maline, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury found Sharodney Lashawn Carter guilty of lewd acts
against a minor 15 years of age. (Pen. Code,1 § 288, subd. (c)(1).)
In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true the
allegation that Carter suffered two prior strike convictions within
the meaning of the Three Strikes law. (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i),
1170.12, subds. (a)–(d).) The trial court denied Carter’s motion
pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th
497 to strike his prior convictions, and sentenced Carter to 25
years to life in prison. Carter was awarded 458 days of
presentence custody credit.
On appeal, Carter contends: (1) the trial court’s admission
of the victim’s preliminary hearing testimony violated his
constitutional right to confront witnesses; (2) the trial court’s
admission of uncharged prior sexual misconduct violated his
right to due process; (3) the prosecutor committed misconduct in
cross-examination and closing argument; (4) the trial court
improperly considered Carter’s decision to proceed to trial when
it denied his Romero motion; and (5) the trial court miscalculated
his conduct credits. The People concede that the trial court erred
in its calculation of conduct credits, but argue that the claim
should be dismissed because Carter failed to move the trial court
to correct the error.
We remand the matter to the trial court for the limited
purpose of recalculating Carter’s conduct credits. In all other
respects the judgment is affirmed.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2
FACTS
Prosecution
Jasmine, the victim, testified that in December of 2018,
when she was 15 years old, she had a sexual relationship with
Carter.2 She met him in 2018 through her mother, Carol
Castillo, with whom Carter also had a sexual relationship.
On New Year’s Eve of 2018, Carter picked Jasmine up from
her house and took her to a hotel. Jasmine told her mother that
she was going to a friend’s house. Carter kissed Jasmine on the
mouth and she kissed him back. Jasmine set up her cell phone to
record and then took a video of herself orally copulating Carter.
Afterwards Jasmine and Carter showered together and had
sexual intercourse. Carter slapped Jasmine twice that night
while they were sitting in bed, which scared her. He took her
home the next morning.
Jasmine’s older sister, Alyssa, testified that she first saw
Carter in 2013, when she was about 16 years old. Several times
when she was walking home from school Carter “cat-called” at
her and gestured to her to come to him. It made Alyssa feel like
she needed to walk faster and get home.
In 2016, after Alyssa had left for college, she returned home
to her mother’s house to find Carter and Castillo watching
television. Alyssa was surprised because her mother knew
2 Jasmine testified at the preliminary hearing. At trial the
court found that she was an unavailable witness and permitted
the prosecution to read the preliminary hearing testimony into
the record.
3
Carter had cat-called at Alyssa and that she did not like him.
Alyssa did not know that Carter and her mother were friends.
After that, Alyssa saw Carter at her mother’s house on a regular
basis, helping as a handyman. Carter also helped them move
into another unit in the apartment complex.
In December 2018, Alyssa noticed a change in Jasmine.
She became distant and antisocial, and started running away
from home. Alyssa tried to talk to Jasmine about it, but Jasmine
would not talk to her. Right before Christmas in 2018, Alyssa
was woken up by a phone call at around 3:00 or 4:00 a.m. When
she answered, she heard Carter’s voice. He sounded very
intoxicated. She heard Jasmine in the background screaming
and crying for help. Jasmine said, “Let me go.” and “Stop. I’m
gonna tell my mom and sister what you’re doing. You can’t do
this.” Alyssa was very upset and went to her mother’s house to
see if she knew anything about Jasmine. Castillo told Alyssa
that Jasmine said she was spending the night at a friend’s house.
Alyssa told her mother about the phone call. Castillo and Alyssa
drove around looking for Jasmine, but could not find her.
Jasmine came home at about 8:00 a.m. Alyssa confronted
Jasmine about the phone call, but Jasmine denied it and told
Alyssa she was crazy.
Alyssa’s friend Brandan, who knew Jasmine well, testified
that he also noticed a dramatic change in Jasmine in December
2018. Jasmine used to be happy, but she became cold and
distant. In January 2019, Brandan called Jasmine and a man
answered. Brandan recognized the man’s voice as Carter’s.
Brandan knew Carter’s voice because he had seen Carter around
the neighborhood and at Castillo’s house. When Brandan asked
4
Carter where Jasmine was, Carter said, “She’s busy right now.
She’s fucking.” Brandan told Alyssa about the phone call.
A few days later, Castillo called Alyssa and told her
Jasmine had run away again. Alyssa looked for Jasmine.
Brandan stayed with Castillo to calm her. Jasmine eventually
came home. Alyssa returned soon afterwards and confronted
Jasmine. Jasmine had “attitude.” Alyssa became frustrated and
left the bedroom where they had been talking. Brandan then
went into the bedroom to talk to Jasmine. Based on what
Jasmine said to him, Brandan looked through Jasmine’s phone
with her permission. Brandan found text messages from an
unsaved number that were “very derogatory” and “very
threatening.” Brandan looked for photos or videos associated
with the text messages. He found photos and videos of Carter
and Jasmine. One video showed Jasmine orally copulating
Carter. Brandan forwarded the video to his own phone and told
Alyssa about it.
Alyssa turned the video over to the police. Afterwards, she
saw Carter outside of her mother’s house, driving up and down
the street and waiting in his truck. He was always smirking.
At trial, both Alyssa and Brandan identified Jasmine and
Carter as the people in the video. The prosecution also
introduced evidence that Carter had suffered convictions for rape
and unlawful intercourse with a minor in 1992.
Defense
Carter testified that he became friends with Castillo and
Alyssa in 2018. He did not meet Alyssa before she left for college,
and had not ever cat-called to her. He and Alyssa kissed, but
5
they never had a romantic relationship. Carter had never met
Brandan.
Carter testified that he did not have a romantic
relationship with Castillo. They were just friends. Carter did
maintenance work at the apartment complex where Castillo and
Jasmine lived. On cross-examination, Carter admitted he had
sexual intercourse with Castillo.
Carter never had a sexual or romantic relationship with
Jasmine. He denied that he was the man with Jasmine in the
cell phone video.
DISCUSSION
Admission of Victim’s Preliminary Hearing Testimony
At trial, the prosecution moved to admit Jasmine’s
preliminary hearing testimony pursuant to Evidence Code
sections 1291 and 240. The trial court admitted the testimony,
after finding that Jasmine was unavailable as a witness and that
the prosecution had exercised due diligence in attempting to
secure her presence at trial. Carter contends the trial court’s
admission of Jasmine’s preliminary hearing testimony was error
and violated his constitutional right to confront witnesses. We
reject the contention.
Legal Principles
“The confrontation clauses of the state and federal
Constitutions guarantee defendants the right to confront the
witnesses against them. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const.,
6
art. 1, § 15.) ‘The right of confrontation “seeks ‘to ensure that the
defendant is able to conduct a “personal examination and cross-
examination of the witness.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] Via the
confrontation right, a defendant is able to compel prosecution
witnesses to appear before the jury so their credibility may be
assessed. [Citation.]” (People v. Wilson (2021) 11 Cal.5th 259,
289–290 (Wilson).)
“Although the constitutional right of confrontation is
important, it is not absolute. [Citation.] If a witness is
unavailable but had previously testified against the defendant
and was subject to cross-examination at that time, that prior
testimony may be admitted. [Citations.] Evidence Code section
1291 codifies this exception to the confrontation clauses, stating,
‘Evidence of former testimony is not made inadmissible by the
hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness
and: [¶] . . . [¶] (2) The party against whom the former testimony
is offered was a party to the action or proceeding in which the
testimony was given and had the right and opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant with an interest and motive similar to that
which he has at the hearing’ (Evid. Code, § 1291, subd. (a)(2).)
[The California Supreme Court has] held this exception permits
an unavailable witness’s preliminary hearing testimony to be
admitted at trial. [Citations.]” (Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 290.)
The United States Supreme Court has held that “ ‘ “[a]
witness is not ‘unavailable’ for purposes of . . . the exception to
the confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial
authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his [or her]
presence at trial.” ’ (Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 74.)
California law is in accord. Evidence Code section 240 includes
7
in its definition of unavailability a witness who is ‘[a]bsent from
the hearing and the proponent of his or her statement has
exercised reasonable diligence but has been unable to procure his
or her attendance by the court’s process.’ (Evid. Code, § 240,
subd. (a)(5).)” (Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 291, fn. omitted.)
“The prosecution must demonstrate that ‘the witness is
unavailable and, additionally, that it made a “good-faith effort”
[citation] or, equivalently, exercised reasonable or due diligence
to obtain the witness’s presence at trial.’ [Citation.] . . . We
evaluate whether the prosecution timely searched for the
unavailable witness, whether the prosecution ‘competently
explored’ leads on the witness’s location, and the overall import of
the unavailable witness’s testimony. [Citation.] We review de
novo the trial court’s unavailability determination, although we
defer to the trial court’s determination of historical facts
supported by substantial evidence.” (Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 291.)
Proceedings
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the
admissibility of Jasmine’s preliminary hearing testimony on the
first day of trial, May 27, 2022, outside of the presence of the
jury.
The prosecutor testified that at the beginning of March
2022, she asked Los Angeles Police Department Officer Lisa
Frias to make efforts to contact Jasmine.
Officer Frias testified that she began looking for Jasmine to
serve her with a subpoena when the prosecutor contacted her.
8
Prior to that, the officer had not been in contact with Jasmine
since the preliminary hearing in 2019.
On March 2, 2022, one of Jasmine’s family members
informed Officer Frias that Jasmine was working at a Domino’s
Pizza shop. Officer Frias requested that a patrol from the 77th
Division of the Los Angeles Police Department conduct regular,
random checks at the Domino’s Pizza where Jasmine worked.
The officer stayed in contact with the 77th Division, but the
patrol did not see Jasmine during its periodic checks.
On March 15, 2022, Officer Frias contacted Jasmine’s sister
Alyssa, who gave the officer Jasmine’s phone number. Officer
Frias called the number, but was unable to reach Jasmine.
On March 28, 2022, Officer Frias attempted to call Jasmine
to inform her that the trial was going to be delayed because the
prosecutor would be trying a different case. A message on the
phone stated that it was not accepting calls. That same day, the
officer witnessed victim advocate Paola Brass send a text to
Jasmine’s phone number requesting that Jasmine contact Brass
regarding an update on the trial. Brass did not receive a
response. Officer Frias confirmed with Alyssa that the phone
number she had for Jasmine was correct. Alyssa said that it was,
but told the officer she had not seen or spoken to Jasmine in
several months. Officer Frias called Jasmine’s number multiple
times without success.
On May 23, 2022, Officer Frias called Jasmine again. The
outgoing message stated that the phone was not in service. In
March, Officer Frias had learned from “Melissa M.” that Jasmine
was living with her mother, so she went to Castillo’s residence to
try to contact Jasmine in person. The apartment complex where
Castillo lived was gated, however, and the officer could not get
9
inside. Officer Frias yelled for someone to let her in but no one
responded. She called Castillo three times but got no answer.
Officer Frias left a message asking Castillo to return her call, and
sent two text messages asking Castillo to contact her regarding
the trial and Jasmine, but Castillo did not respond. Officer Frias
again confirmed Jasmine’s phone number with Alyssa. The
officer went to the Domino’s Pizza where she was told that
Jasmine worked, but did not locate Jasmine there. The officer
then checked with three area hospitals to see if Jasmine had been
admitted, but she had not. Officer Frias called the morgue,
which also had no information regarding Jasmine.
On May 24, 2022, Officer Frias drove to Castillo’s
apartment complex to search for Jasmine again, but could not
enter. The officer called Castillo and left a message asking
Castillo to call her back about Jasmine and the trial, but Castillo
did not respond. Officer Frias then drove to Domino’s Pizza to
look for Jasmine. The only employee present told the officer that
Jasmine was not there.
On May 26, 2022, Jasmine returned Officer Frias’s phone
call. Jasmine’s call originated from a different number than the
one the officer had been given. Jasmine left a voice mail message
stating that she no longer wanted to be involved in the case.
Jasmine said that she wanted to move on with her life and
requested that the video of her not be shown at trial. Jasmine
said she knew what she was doing, and that she had lied on the
witness stand to get her phone back from her sister. Officer Frias
returned the call and Jasmine answered. Officer Frias informed
Jasmine that there was a subpoena issued in her name. Jasmine
stated that she understood that the case was in trial and that she
needed to contact the prosecutor. Jasmine had the prosecutor’s
10
phone number. After that conversation, Officer Frias had no
further contact with Jasmine. The officer gave the phone number
that Jasmine used to contact her to the prosecutor.
The prosecutor testified that, on May 27, 2022, the date of
the hearing, she waited for a call from Jasmine for an hour and a
half. Jasmine did not call her, so the prosecutor attempted to call
Jasmine. She did not get an answer and was unable to leave a
voice mail.
The prosecutor argued that Officer Frias exercised due
diligence in attempting to secure Jasmine’s presence at trial, but
that Jasmine had deliberately absented herself from the
proceeding and was unavailable. She further argued that the
preliminary hearing transcript was only 17 pages long, so it
would not take an undue amount of time to present to the jury.
Defense counsel argued that the search was untimely
because Officer Frias had not stayed in contact with Jasmine
during the pandemic and only began searching for Jasmine in the
three months before trial. Counsel asserted that, although she
was the victim, Jasmine’s testimony was not very important in
light of the fact that there was a video of the offense. The
prosecution could have done more to explore reasonable leads,
such as contacting the manager at Domino’s Pizza or the
manager of Castillo’s apartment complex. When the prosecutor
learned of Jasmine’s voice mail she should have understood that
Jasmine might not appear voluntarily and made greater efforts to
contact her.
The prosecutor emphasized that Jasmine left the voice mail
message stating that she did not want to be involved in the case
on the night before the hearing, so there was not much time for
the prosecutor to act. She believed that, as the victim, Jasmine’s
11
testimony was very important—she could testify to her age and
the acts committed, and identify Carter in the video.
The trial court found that the prosecution exercised due
diligence, and that Jasmine was unavailable as a witness. The
court ruled the preliminary hearing testimony was admissible.
The court found the pandemic had caused significant delay. Over
that time, Jasmine had gone from being a cooperative minor who
came to court to being an uncooperative adult who absented
herself. It was uncontested that Jasmine had been cross-
examined at the preliminary hearing in conformance with the
constitutional guarantee of the right to confront witnesses.
Jasmine made it very clear that she was not going to be available
and did not want to testify. The court had limited power to
compel her appearance as a sexual assault victim. The
prosecution made reasonable efforts to contact Jasmine, which
she thwarted. The prosecution was not required to keep tabs on
Jasmine at all times. It had explored reasonable leads.
Moreover, Jasmine’s testimony was clearly material, as she was
the named victim, so admission of the evidence was appropriate.
Analysis
Carter complains that Detective Frias waited over two
years from the preliminary hearing in December of 2019 until
March of 2022 to begin her efforts at securing Jasmine’s
attendance at trial. Carter acknowledges that the Covid-19
pandemic delayed the start of trial, but argues that the detective
could have checked in with Jasmine periodically during that
time, particularly after the pandemic subsided in 2021. We reject
the argument. The law does not place such an obligation on the
12
prosecution. “The prosecution is not required ‘to keep “periodic
tabs” on every material witness in a criminal case . . . .’
[Citation.] [Nor is it] required, absent knowledge of a ‘substantial
risk that this important witness would flee,’ to ‘take adequate
preventative measures’ to stop the witness from disappearing.”
(People v. Wilson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 309, 342.) Carter asserts that
Jasmine was a minor at the time of the preliminary hearing, and
that the prosecution should have anticipated that she would
absent herself after attaining majority. We are not persuaded.
Jasmine appeared and testified at the preliminary hearing. The
prosecution had no reason to believe that there was a substantial
risk she would flee. The prosecutor acted with due diligence by
initiating her attempts to contact Jasmine nearly three months
before trial, and continuing her efforts until trial commenced.
Carter argues that Detective Frias should have gained
access to Castillo’s gated apartment complex using her authority
as a police detective and “at least . . . have gotten . . . to
[Castillo’s] door,” or made an effort to contact the management at
the apartment complex to gain entry. Carter does not explain
why Castillo, who never responded to Officer Frias’s telephone
calls, would have responded to a knock at her door from someone
that she had not let inside the gate. Regardless, “[s]imply
because [Carter] suggests [that the detective] could have taken
different steps does not mean those [s]he did take lacked
diligence.” (Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 293.) Detective Frias
spoke with Jasmin’s sister who provided the detective with
Jasmine’s phone number; she had officers routinely check for
Jasmine at what was identified as Jasmine’s place of
employment; she attempted to contact Jasmine’s mother; and she
attempted to contact Jasmine at her mother’s home, where
13
Jasmine was believed to reside. Detective Frias made an effort to
find Jasmine over the course of several months, which eventually
led to telephone contact with Jasmine in which Jasmine made it
clear that she did not intend to testify. Our Supreme Court has
explained that “diligence has been found when the prosecution’s
efforts are timely, reasonably extensive and carried out over a
reasonable period[,]” and that cases in which courts have not
found adequate diligence are those where the prosecution’s
efforts “have been perfunctory or obviously negligent.” (People v.
Bunyard (2009) 45 Cal.4th 836, 855–856 (Bunyard.)) In
Bunyard, the court held that efforts similar to those undertaken
here constituted due diligence. (Ibid. [prosecution demonstrated
due diligence by repeatedly seeking the witness out at his last
known address, asking for information regarding his
whereabouts from acquaintances and relatives, and returning to
locations the witness was known to frequent].)
We conclude that the prosecution began its efforts to
contact Jasmine in a sufficiently timely manner and followed up
on leads regarding her whereabouts with due diligence, but were
unable to secure her presence because she absented herself. As
the victim, her testimony was important to the prosecution’s case.
The trial court did not err in finding that Jasmine was an
unavailable witness and admitting her preliminary hearing
testimony at trial.
Admission of Evidence of Prior Sexual Misconduct
Carter contends that the trial court’s admission of evidence
of his prior sexual misconduct pursuant to Evidence Code
sections 1108 and 352 was an abuse of discretion and a violation
14
of his constitutional right to due process. Specifically, he
challenges the admission of his 1992 convictions for forcible rape
and unlawful intercourse with a minor, and Alyssa’s testimony
that Carter “cat-called” at her when she was a minor.
Pre-trial hearing
At a pre-trial hearing, the prosecutor sought to admit five
prior convictions. Two of the convictions were for forcible rape
and unlawful intercourse with a minor, two for kidnapping of the
same victims, and one for sexual battery of one of the victims.
The offenses occurred in 1991.
Defense counsel objected on the ground that in the present
case Jasmine consented to the sexual contact, whereas the
convictions involved violence. The convictions were also remote
in time. Counsel argued that evidence of the convictions would
confuse the jury and show Carter as violent, rather than as
someone with a proclivity for minors.
The prosecutor responded that the victims of the 1992
convictions were minors—12 years old and 17 years old. The
present offense involved uncharged violence; Jasmine reported
the incident because Carter became violent with her on the night
of the charged offense. After the offense occurred, Carter stalked
Jasmine and came to her house. Carter’s behavior was
aggressive in the prior convictions and the current charge. As to
remoteness, Carter was paroled for the prior convictions in 2004,
returned to custody for a drug offense in 2006, paroled in 2007,
returned to custody for assault with a firearm in 2007, paroled in
2008, and discharged from custody in 2011. Carter was accused
15
of rape in 2017. The current offense occurred in 2018. His
criminal activity was continuous.
The trial court ruled that although Carter suffered the
convictions in 1992, he engaged in ongoing criminal activity,
including an alleged sexual assault. The 1992 convictions for
forcible rape, unlawful intercourse with a minor, and sexual
assault were probative and would be admitted.
At the pre-trial hearing, defense counsel also objected to
admission of evidence of Carter’s conduct toward Alyssa under
Evidence Code section 352, arguing that Alyssa’s testimony
would be more prejudicial than probative.
Trial
At trial, Alyssa testified that when she was 16 years old,
Carter “cat-called,” at her and gestured for her to come to him on
more than one occasion. Carter was across the street and down
the block when these incidents occurred. Alyssa felt she needed
to walk faster. The prosecution introduced certified records of
conviction for forcible rape and unlawful intercourse with a
minor.
With respect to the evidence of uncharged sexual offenses,
the jury was instructed that it could consider evidence of an
offense only if the People proved defendant committed the
misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury was
instructed on the elements of annoying or molesting a child
(§ 647.6), rape by force, fear or threats (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)), and
unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor (§ 261.5, subd. (a)).
16
Legal Principles
“As a general rule, ‘propensity evidence is not admissible to
prove a defendant’s conduct on a specific occasion.’ (People v.
Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 299; see Evid. Code, § 1101, subd.
(a).) But Evidence Code section 1108, subdivision (a) provides an
exception to this rule: ‘In a criminal action in which the
defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the
defendant’s commission of another sexual offense or offenses is
not made inadmissible by [s]ection 1101, if the evidence is not
inadmissible pursuant to [s]ection 352.’ Evidence Code section
352, in turn, provides that ‘[t]he court in its discretion may
exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a)
necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial
danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of
misleading the jury.’ ‘In short, if evidence satisfies section 1108,
and is not excluded under section 352, admission of that evidence
to prove propensity is permitted.’ [Citation.] As a reviewing
court, we accord deference to a trial court’s determination that
the probative value of a particular piece of evidence outweighs
any danger of prejudice. (See People v. Miles (2020) 9 Cal.5th
513, 587, 587–588 [‘ “[T]he court has broad discretion under
Evidence Code section 352” ’ and reviewing courts ‘ “ ‘will not
disturb a trial court’s exercise of discretion under Evidence Code
section 352 “ ‘except on a showing that the court exercised its
discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner
17
that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice’ ” ’ ” ’].)” (People
v. Dworak (2021) 11 Cal.5th 881, 899–900.)
“ ‘By reason of [Evidence Code] section 1108, trial courts
may no longer deem ‘propensity’ evidence unduly prejudicial per
se,’ but trial courts ‘must engage in a careful weighing process
under [Evidence Code] section 352.’ (People v. Falsetta (1999) 21
Cal.4th 903, 916, 917 (Falsetta).) . . . The admissibility of such
evidence ‘ “is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial judge
who is in the best position to evaluate the evidence.” ’ (Id. at
pp. 917–918.) [The Supreme Court has] instructed that the trial
court’s determination should be guided by such factors as the
‘nature, relevance, and possible remoteness’ of the evidence, ‘the
degree of certainty of its commission and the likelihood of
confusing, misleading, or distracting the jurors from their main
inquiry, its similarity to the charged offense, its likely prejudicial
impact on the jurors, the burden on the defendant in defending
against the uncharged offense, and the availability of less
prejudicial alternatives to its outright admission, such as
admitting some but not all of the defendant’s other sex offenses,
or excluding irrelevant though inflammatory details surrounding
the offense.’ (Id. at p. 917.)” (People v. Dworak, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 900.) “ ‘ “ ‘As with other forms of relevant evidence that are
not subject to any exclusionary principle, the presumption will be
in favor of admission.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Loy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 46,
62.)
Analysis
With respect to the prior convictions, Carter argues that
they were remote in time. While this would normally weigh
18
against admission, Carter spent the majority of that time in
prison. Under the circumstances, “the timing of the crimes
provided no reason to exclude them.” (People v. Loy, supra, 52
Cal.4th at p. 62 [crimes committed 15 and 21 years before
charged offense not so remote as to require exclusion where
defendant was in prison for much of the intervening time]; accord
People v. Dworak, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 901 [no error in
admitting 15-year-old rape conviction where defendant was
incarcerated for 10 of those years]; People v. Pierce (2002) 104
Cal.App.4th 893, 900 [no error in admitting 23-year-old rape
conviction where defendant was incarcerated for 12 of those
years].) Carter asserts that the crimes he was convicted of
between 1992 and the present case were not of a sexual nature.
The nature of the crimes does not alter the fact that Carter had
little opportunity to commit crimes of a sexual nature while
incarcerated. The lack of opportunity outweighs concerns
regarding the remoteness of the crimes.
Carter further argues that the prior convictions were for
offenses that were more egregious than the present crime. In
particular, he asserts that Jasmine consented to the sexual acts
that he committed, while one of the 1992 convictions was for
forcible rape. The argument lacks merit.
The jury was provided with the fact of each conviction and
instructed on the elements that must be found before the
defendant could be found to have committed each crime. No
further details were presented. With respect to Carter’s
conviction for unlawful intercourse with a minor, the jury had no
reason to believe the offense involved violence or was more
egregious than the current crime. The jury was instructed that
the crime required sexual intercourse between the defendant,
19
who was at least 21 years old at the time, and the victim, who
was under 16 years old, and that the two were not married. The
facts in the instant case satisfy the elements of unlawful
intercourse with a minor. In fact, the current case is more
egregious, as it involved more than one sexual act. Jasmine
performed oral sex on Carter in addition to engaging in sexual
intercourse with him.
With respect to the forcible rape conviction, the jury was
instructed that the intercourse must have been accomplished by
one of a number of means, including “force, violence, duress,
menace or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury to the
woman or to someone else.” There was no requirement that
Carter use physical violence to accomplish the rape to be
convicted, and there were no facts presented to the jury in the
instant case that suggested he was physically violent in the
commission of the prior offense. With respect to the present
crime, Jasmine testified at the preliminary hearing that Carter
slapped her twice while they were on the bed in the hotel, and
that this scared her. Brandan testified that in connection with
the video he found of Jasmine and Carter engaging in oral sex,
there were messages on Jasmine’s phone that were “very
derogatory, and they were very threatening.” Alyssa testified
that in December 2018, before the charged offense took place, she
got a telephone call at 3:00 or 4:00 a.m. in which she heard
Carter’s voice with her sister crying and screaming for help in the
background. The evidence in this case supported the inference
that Jasmine’s participation in the sexual acts with Carter was
not consensual and may have been compelled by threats, duress,
or physical violence. Although the jury was not required to find
that Carter forced or coerced Jasmine to submit to sexual acts,
20
facts were presented that would support such a finding. Nothing
compelled the conclusion that the prior rape conviction was more
egregious than the current offense.
We conclude that the evidence was highly probative and
not unduly prejudicial. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting evidence of the prior convictions.
Alyssa’s testimony that Carter cat-called at her when she
was 16 years old is also more probative than prejudicial. The
testimony demonstrated Carter’s sexual proclivity for minors,
and was therefore relevant, but it was unlikely to rouse a need in
the jury to punish Carter. Distasteful as it may have been,
Carter’s inappropriate communication with Alyssa was
accomplished from a distance and did not result in physical
contact between them. Carter’s contacts with Alyssa pale in
comparison with his lewd acts against Jasmine, and it is highly
improbable that the jury was concerned with them in light of the
much more serious charge before it. The testimony was
probative, but it was not unfairly prejudicial. The trial court did
not err in admitting Alyssa’s testimony.
Finally, the trial court’s admission of evidence of Carter’s
prior misconduct did not violate his constitutional right to due
process. Our Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected that
contention because Evidence Code section 1108 preserves the
court’s discretion to exclude propensity evidence under Evidence
Code section 352. (People v. Dworak, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 900.)
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Carter next contends that the prosecutor committed
misconduct in cross-examination by asking Carter if other
21
witnesses had lied in their testimony, and then compounded the
misconduct by amplifying this line of inquiry in closing
argument. We agree with the People that the issue was forfeited
because counsel did not object at trial to any of the questions that
Carter now challenges, and Carter does not argue that an
objection would have been futile or that an admonition would
have been ineffective. (People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147,
210.)
Anticipating forfeiture, Carter further contends that
counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the
prosecutor’s argumentative questions. “ ‘Generally, a conviction
will not be reversed based on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel unless the defendant establishes both of the following:
(1) that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness; and (2) that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, a determination
more favorable to defendant would have resulted. [Citations.] If
the defendant makes an insufficient showing on either one of
these components, the ineffective assistance claim fails.’
[Citations.]” (People v. Foster (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 379, 383.)
“ ‘A defendant whose counsel did not object at trial to
alleged prosecutorial misconduct can argue on appeal that
counsel’s inaction violated the defendant’s constitutional right to
the effective assistance of counsel,’ but the appellate record rarely
demonstrates ‘that the failure to object was the result of counsel’s
incompetence; generally, such claims are more appropriately
litigated on habeas corpus, which allows for an evidentiary
hearing where the reasons for defense counsel’s actions or
omissions can be explored.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Salcido (2008)
44 Cal.4th 93, 152.) “ ‘[D]eciding whether to object is inherently
22
tactical, and the failure to object will rarely establish ineffective
assistance.’ ” (People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 384.)
Here, the record is silent as to why defense counsel did not
object to the alleged misconduct during cross-examination or
during closing argument. Contrary to Carter’s assertion, we
cannot conclude that the record “affirmatively discloses counsel
had no rational tactical purpose” for not objecting. (People v. Mai
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) Carter’s trial counsel may have
believed that Carter’s responses to the allegedly improper
questions were helpful to his defense, or that objecting would
have only highlighted the issue for the jury. Because the
appellate record does not demonstrate that counsel was
incompetent for not objecting, Carter’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claim necessarily fails.
Denial of Romero Motion
Carter contends that the trial court violated his Fifth
Amendment right to due process and his Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial because the court allegedly considered the fact that
Carter exercised his right to a jury trial when it denied his
motion to strike his prior strike convictions under Romero, supra,
13 Cal.4th 497. We reject the contention.
23
Proceedings
Just prior to trial, defense counsel informed the court that
the prosecutor made a plea offer of 14 years in prison, which
Carter declined.3 No counteroffer was conveyed.
After hearing the prosecution’s Evidence Code section 1108
evidence, the trial court permitted Carter additional time to
speak with his attorney about the plea offer, and observed that
the offer was “extremely reasonable” in light of what the court
knew about the evidence. The court told Carter that for purposes
of the conversation, it was presuming that all of the evidence was
true, but that the court had not viewed the video, or heard the
testimony of witnesses, or read the preliminary hearing
transcript. The court encouraged Carter to “consider the offer of
14 years [because] you are facing life.” The court emphasized
that if Carter did not wish to take the deal, it was Carter’s
decision, and the case would proceed to trial in accordance with
his wishes.
Later, defense counsel informed the trial court that he
advised Carter that in his opinion the People could prove their
case beyond a reasonable doubt and that “[Carter] is facing a
minimum sentence of 25 years to life in the department of
corrections.” The court afforded Carter additional time to
consider the People’s offer. The court informed Carter that the
People did not have to keep the offer open once the jurors were
present, and advised him that “it would be a legal impossibility
for the court to get to that kind of a disposition if you are
3 The record does not include further details of the offer.
24
convicted as charged.” Carter again declined the plea offer. The
court stated, “So Mr. Carter has made his decision, and I respect
that he wants to go forward with his trial despite the
overwhelming nature of the evidence, so you will proceed with
the trial.”
Carter was convicted as charged, and the allegation that he
suffered two prior strike convictions was found true. Defense
counsel filed a motion to strike one of the prior strikes in the
interests of justice under section 1385, arguing that several of the
mitigating circumstances to which a court must give great weight
were present in this case, including that: Carter suffered
childhood trauma connected to his commission of the crime;
multiple enhancements were alleged; the combined sentence for
the enhancements was greater than 20 years; and Carter’s prior
convictions were over five years old.4
At a hearing on the matter, defense counsel argued that the
above factors favored striking one of Carter’s strike convictions.
Counsel then stated: “The sentencing scheme in this case I wish
was different. I wish the case was filed different. The court’s
options now are a determinate sentence of four to six years at
half or 25 years to life. I would just note that that presents quite
a difficult challenge for the court and I recognize that. I do wish
there was something in the middle. And that is why I urged the
case to resolve.”
The trial court responded, “Mr. Carter, I am—I whole
heartedly agree with what [defense counsel] said in terms of prior
discussions and trying to have this case resolved prior to going to
a trial. There was a lot of time and effort over multiple occasions,
4 Only a single enhancement was alleged under the Three
Strikes law.
25
even just with this court, for that effort was made on your behalf.
And despite all of the discussions with [defense counsel] in
private and with the court, you chose this path, which is
consistent with your behavior of how you deal with or approach
anything that happens in your life.”
The court then discussed the factors relevant to Carter’s
strike convictions—a psychiatric evaluation that concluded
Carter suffered from antisocial personality disorder, and Carter’s
prior convictions, which were remote in time. The court opined
that under different circumstances these factors would be more
persuasive. In this case, however, the factors in mitigation were
outweighed by the danger Carter posed to society. The court
noted that Carter demonstrated “over and over again that you
are a danger to the community and that your behavior puts other
people at risk all the time.” The court cited Carter’s continued
criminal behavior; his choice to take advantage of a position of
trust to engage in sexual acts with a 15-year-old child while he
was a registered sex offender; the strength of the evidence
against Carter—including a video of him engaging in a criminal
sexual act with the victim; and the multiple psychiatric
evaluations indicating that Carter was at an above-average risk
of re-offending. “After reading and considering all of those
documents [offered in mitigation] and also taking into
consideration the facts that were elicited during the trial”, the
court concluded that Carter was a danger to society and
presented an “above average risk of re-offend[ing] as a sexual
predator.” The court denied Carter’s Romero motion and
sentenced him to 25 years to life in prison.
26
Legal Principles
Section 1385 permits a trial court to dismiss an
enhancement in the furtherance of justice. (§ 1385, subd. (a).)
“In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court
shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the
defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in
subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of one
or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of
dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that
dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.
‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the
dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or
other serious danger to others.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) As
relevant here, mitigating circumstances include: “[¶] (B)
Multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case. . . . [¶] (C)
The application of an enhancement could result in a sentence of
over 20 years. . . . (D) The current offense is connected to mental
illness. [¶] (E) The current offense is connected to prior
victimization or childhood trauma. [¶] . . . [¶] [or] (H) The
enhancement is based on a prior conviction that is over five years
old.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).)
A trial court may not penalize a defendant for exercising
his right to a jury trial, nor may it promise leniency if a
defendant refrains from exercising that right. (In re Lewallen
(1979) 23 Cal.3d 274, 278–281.) The right to a jury trial in a
criminal prosecution is a fundamental right under both the state
and federal Constitutions. (People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th
297, 304.) “It is well settled that to punish a person for exercising
27
a constitutional right is ‘a due process violation of the most basic
sort.’ [Citation.]” (Lewallen, supra, at p. 278.) A court may not
offer any inducement in return for a plea of guilty or treat a
defendant more harshly because he or she exercises the right to a
jury trial. (Id. at pp. 278–279.) But, “a trial court’s discretion in
imposing sentence is in no way limited by the terms of any
negotiated pleas or sentences offered the defendant by the
prosecution. The imposition of sentence within the legislatively
prescribed limits is exclusively a judicial function. [Citation.] . . .
Legitimate facts may come to the court’s attention either through
the personal observations of the judge during trial [citation], or
through the presentence report by the probation department, to
induce the court to impose a sentence in excess of any
recommended by the prosecution.” (Id. at p. 281, fn. omitted.)
Vindictiveness in sentencing is not presumed from the
mere fact the defendant received a harsher sentence after trial
than he or she would have received prior to trial upon entry of a
guilty plea. (People v. Szeto (1981) 29 Cal.3d 20, 35.) The
defendant has the burden of proving the trial court imposed a
harsher sentence as a punishment for his election to go to trial.
(Ibid.)
Analysis
We agree with the People that the trial court’s comments to
Carter concerning the efforts at plea negotiation were made in
response to Carter’s attorney’s statement, and not part of the
court’s consideration of Carter’s Romero motion. The trial court
made clear that the reason it was not affording great weight to
the mitigating factors that would militate in favor of striking one
28
of Carter’s prior strikes was its conclusion that Carter posed a
danger to society and was a “sexual predator,” who was likely to
reoffend, a conclusion that has ample record support. Carter does
not challenge this finding on appeal.
At the time of sentencing, given the crime of conviction, the
trial court did not have the authority to sentence Carter to a
determinate term of 14 years. The court’s options under the
sentencing laws were to sentence Carter to a significantly lower
term of 4 or 6 years if it dismissed one of the strike convictions as
requested, or to impose a term of 25 years to life if it did not.
Prior to hearing the evidence, the court deemed the People’s offer
of 14 years “extremely reasonable.” In ruling on Carter’s Romero
motion, however, the court repeatedly emphasized that the
evidence presented at trial was overwhelming, at one point
stating that “It’s probably one of the most impactful, and not in a
positive way cases, that I’ve had to preside over.” The court
stated that it made its decision based on “all of those documents
[offered in mitigation] and also taking into consideration the facts
that were elicited during trial[.]” Having determined that Carter
was a sexual predator who was likely to re-offend, the court was
free to exercise its discretion to decline to give great weight to
mitigating factors as a basis to strike one of Carter’s prior
convictions. (People v. Lipscomb (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 9, 18.)
The court did not violate Carter’s constitutional rights by
imposing a greater sentence than he had been offered prior to
trial.
29
Conduct Credits
Finally, Carter contends, and the People concede, that the
trial court miscalculated his conduct credits.
At sentencing, the court, based on defense counsel’s
representations, awarded 458 days of presentence custody credit,
comprised of 399 days of actual credit for pretrial confinement
plus 59 days of conduct credit. In light of the fact that the
number of conduct credits awarded was approximately 15 percent
of Carter’s actual custody credits, the parties posit, and we agree,
that the conduct credits were likely calculated pursuant to
section 2933.1, which limits conduct credits to 15 percent of
custody credits for any person convicted of a felony offense listed
under section 667.5. Carter’s conviction of violating section 288,
subdivision (c) is not among the crimes listed. It appears that
Carter’s conduct credits should instead have been calculated
pursuant to section 4019, which governs conduct credits
generally. Doing so requires the trial court to determine whether
“it appears by the record that the prisoner has not satisfactorily
complied with the reasonable rules and regulations established
by the sheriff, chief of police, or superintendent of an industrial
farm or road camp,” which could reduce the conduct credits
awarded. (§ 4019, subd. (c).)
The People assert that, because there may be a factual
dispute as to how many credits should be awarded and because
Carter failed to file a motion in the trial court seeking relief, we
should dismiss the claim. Although the People do not explicitly
state the basis for dismissal, we presume that the authority upon
which the People rely is section 1237.1. The statute provides in
30
pertinent part: “No appeal shall be taken by the defendant from
a judgment of conviction on the ground of an error in the
calculation of presentence custody credits, unless the defendant
first presents the claim in the trial court at the time of
sentencing, or if the error is not discovered until after sentencing,
the defendant first makes a motion for correction of the record in
the trial court, which may be made informally in writing.”
(§ 1237.1.) Section 1237.1 requires dismissal when the sole issue
raised on appeal involves an issue of presentence custody credits;
however, where, as in the present case, there are other issues
presented on appeal, we may consider the matter in the interests
of judicial economy. (People v. Acosta (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 411,
426–428.) We therefore decline to dismiss the claim, and we
remand the matter to the trial court for the limited purpose of
making any necessary factual determinations and recalculating
Carter’s conduct credits under section 4019.
DISPOSITION
We remand the matter to the trial court for the limited
purpose of recalculating Carter’s conduct credits. In all other
respects the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
We concur:
BAKER, Acting P. J. KIM, J.
31
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