Doskocz v. ALS Lien Services

CourtListener 9505515CalctappMay 20, 2024

Full text

Filed 5/20/24
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION *

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

TERESA DOSKOCZ et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents, A166299

v. (Contra Costa County
ALS LIEN SERVICES et al., Super. Ct. No. MSC17–01486)
Defendants and Appellants.

Plaintiff Teresa Doskocz originally filed a class action in federal court
against defendant ALS Lien Services (ALS) alleging violations of the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.; FDCPA) and
California’s unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.; UCL)
related to ALS’s collection of unpaid assessments on behalf of homeowner
associations (HOAs).
After the parties stipulated that the federal case would be dismissed
and refiled in state court, Doskocz was granted leave to amend her complaint
to add allegations that law firm SwedelsonGottlieb and individuals Sandra
Gottlieb and David Swedelson (collectively, SG defendants) were alter egos of
ALS. The state court also granted Doskocz’s motion to bifurcate trial and
proceed first on her equitable UCL cause of action. At the conclusion of the

* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, this

opinion is certified for publication with the exception of parts II.C., D., E.,
and F. of the Discussion.
bench trial, the court found that ALS had violated the FDCPA and entered
judgment in favor of Doskocz on her UCL cause of action. It also found the
SG defendants jointly and severally liable for restitution and class counsel
fees as alter egos of ALS.
ALS now seeks reversal of the judgment by arguing that the trial court
(1) erred in adopting a ruling by the federal judge in the original action,
(2) erred in ruling that ALS violated the FDCPA, and (3) abused its discretion
in granting Doskocz’s motion to bifurcate. The SG defendants also challenge
the judgment, arguing that the trial court (1) lacked substantial evidence on
its alter ego findings, (2) abused its discretion in granting Doskocz leave to
amend her complaint, and (3) abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees
to class counsel.
We disagree and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. ALS Collection from Doskocz
Doskocz owns a townhouse in Danville, California that is part of
Danville Green Homeowners Association, Inc. (Danville Green). Danville
Green hired ALS to collect unpaid HOA assessments from Doskocz. At the
time of trial, ALS was working with approximately 100 HOAs throughout the
state.
ALS uses the nonjudicial foreclosure process to collect assessments and
other charges. In November 2013, ALS sent Doskocz its standardized “pre-
lien letter,” which stated that Doskocz was delinquent in the payment of
assessments and owed Danville Green $1,239.08. It also stated that Doskocz
could request a payment plan for the debt. The next month, ALS recorded a
delinquent assessment lien against Doskocz’s townhouse.

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Doskocz agreed to a payment plan. The plan included a waiver of Civil
Code section 5655, subdivision (a) (section 5655(a)), 1 which requires
payments “first be applied to the assessments owed, and, only after the
assessments owed are paid in full shall the payments be applied to the fees
and costs of collection, attorney’s fees, late charges, or interest.” ALS’s
standard payment plan includes this waiver, and its standard collection
contract terms require HOAs to agree to payment plans with this waiver.
During Doskocz’s payment plan period, ALS applied only a portion of her
payment towards unpaid assessments, applying the rest to ALS’s collection
fees and costs.
Doskocz made five of the six payments in the plan, but was unable to
make the final payment. Doskocz requested a second payment plan. ALS
responded that her total balance was $1,074.90, but proposed a plan for three
monthly payments totaling $2,033.19. Instead of accepting this proposal,
Doskocz sent in two monthly payments of $537.45, intended to satisfy the
total balance.
The next month, in October 2014, ALS sent Doskocz its standardized
pre-notice of default letter (pre-NOD letter). The letter stated that Doskocz
owed $830.73, and that if payment was not received, ALS “will record a
Notice of Default.” ALS eventually closed the collection account and billed
Danville Green for $425 in collection fees and costs, which Danville Green
paid.

1 Section 5655(a) is a provision of the Davis-Stirling Common Interest

Development Act (Civ. Code, § 4000 et seq.; Davis-Stirling Act). The Davis-
Stirling Act “set[s] forth comprehensive rules, restrictions, and procedures for
imposing, paying, collecting, and enforcing regular and special [homeowner]
assessments.” (Huntingon Continental Townhouse Assn., Inc. v. Miner (2014)
230 Cal.App.4th 590, 599.)

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B. Filing in Federal Court
Doskocz filed a class action in federal court against ALS in 2015,
alleging its collection practices violate the FDCPA and thus constitute
unlawful business practices under the UCL. ALS moved for summary
judgment on various grounds, including that it had complied with the
FDCPA because Doskocz waived section 5655(a). The federal court rejected
that argument, concluding the waiver was void as a matter of public policy.
Several months after that ruling, the parties stipulated that the federal case
would be dismissed and refiled in state court, but subject to the federal
judge’s summary judgment ruling.
C. Refiling in State Court
Doskocz filed her state court complaint in 2017, and the court granted
her motion for class certification in 2018. Then, in 2020, the court granted
Doskocz’s request for leave to file a first amended complaint to add alter ego
allegations against the SG defendants. ALS moved for summary judgment
shortly thereafter, renewing its argument that Doskocz had waived
section 5655(a). The court declined to reconsider the federal judge’s ruling
and denied the motion.
D. Bench Trial
In 2022, the court granted Doskocz’s motion to bifurcate and proceed
first by bench trial on her equitable UCL cause of action. At trial, Doskocz
presented two underlying violations of the FDCPA to support her UCL cause
of action: (1) ALS’s application of homeowner payments contrary to
section 5655(a); and (2) ALS’s pre-lien and pre-NOD letters as improper
threats of foreclosure contrary to Civil Code 2 section 5720, which limits

2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Civil Code.

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collection of delinquent assessments through foreclosure until the amount
owed is at least $1,800 or more than 12 months delinquent.
E. Judgment
In its statement of decision, the court concluded that ALS had violated
the FDCPA in both respects and found the SG defendants were alter egos of
ALS. After the court entered its statement of decision, Doskocz elected not to
proceed with the scheduled jury trial on her FDCPA cause of action and that
cause of action was dismissed.
Judgment was entered in favor of Doskocz on her UCL cause of action.
ALS and the SG defendants were jointly and severally liable for $156,753 in
restitution to the class (calculated as fees and costs charged by ALS after
homeowner account balances would have been zero if their payments had
been applied to unpaid assessments instead of other charges). The judgment
also included injunctive relief against ALS related to application of
homeowner payments, recalculation of class member accounts,
communication with homeowners, and charging of late fees and interest.
ALS and the SG defendants each filed timely notices of appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
ALS raises three issues on appeal. First, it argues that the trial court
erred in adopting the federal judge’s ruling that the section 5655(a) waiver
was void as a matter of public policy. Second, it argues that the court erred
in ruling that ALS violated the FDCPA through its pre-lien and pre-NOD
letters. Third, ALS argues that the court abused its discretion in granting
Doskocz’s motion to bifurcate and proceed first with a bench trial on her UCL
cause of action.
The SG defendants also raise three issues on appeal. First, they argue
that the trial court lacked substantial evidence on its alter ego findings.

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Second, they argue that the court abused its discretion in granting Doskocz
leave to amend her state court complaint. Third, the SG defendants argue
that the court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees to class
counsel.
We address, and reject, each argument in turn.
A. No Error on Section 5655 Waiver Rulings
1. Additional Background
When ALS moved for summary judgment in the federal action, it
argued that it had complied with the FDCPA because Doskocz had waived
her rights under section 5655(a) to prioritize application of her payments to
unpaid assessments first, before ALS’s collection fees and costs. Doskocz
opposed the motion, arguing that the waiver was void as a matter of public
policy under section 3513. 3
The federal court recognized that “[t]he California Supreme Court does
not appear to have addressed this issue, and neither party has identified a
case directly on point.” Citing DeBerard Properties, Ltd. v. Lim (1999)
20 Cal.4th 659, it explained that section 3513 bars the waiver of a statutory
right when the “ ‘ “public benefit [of the statute] is one of the primary
purposes.” ’ ” (DeBerard, at p. 669.)
The federal court determined that the “public purpose and benefit
inherent in the Davis-Stirling Act and section 5655(a)” had been established,
and there “can be no serious doubt that the Legislature adopted the Act for
the primary purpose of protecting homeowner rights—a quintessential public
benefit.” It pointed to legislative history material that the provision now

3 Section 3513 provides: “Any one may waive the advantage of a law
intended solely for his benefit. But a law established for a public reason
cannot be contravened by a private agreement.”

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found in section 5655(a) “ ‘goes to the heart of home owner rights, touching
upon the key issue of when, if ever, a homeowners’ association should have
the right to force the sale of a member’s home when the home owner falls
behind on paying overdue assessments or dues.’ ”
The federal court thus concluded that section 5655(a) “serves the
important public purpose of protecting homeowner equity and rights by
ensuring that a delinquent assessment, which is the original debt that opens
the door to collection costs and ultimately foreclosure, is paid down as a first
priority. This allocation clearly serves the legislative goal of preventing
foreclosure over small delinquencies, and operates to cut off a cascade of late
fees and collection costs likely to lead to defaults and foreclosures. To allow a
waiver of this provision by contract would flout the very purpose of the
section and the Davis-Stirling Act generally, and so the contract clause must
be voided as against public policy.” The parties’ subsequent stipulation for
dismissal of the federal case and refiling in state court provided that the “new
state court action will be subject to this Court’s Order Re Summary
Judgment.”
When ALS moved for summary judgment in the state court action, it
renewed its argument that Doskocz’s claims failed as a matter of law because
she had waived section 5655(a). The state court rejected this argument and
denied the motion. It explained: “ALS’[s] motion for summary judgment is
either a motion for reconsideration or a motion for summary judgment on an
issue already decided against the moving party. . . . ALS has made no
showing of new facts or law and it appears that the majority of ALS’[s]
waiver argument is identical to the argument it made in federal court.” The
state court declined to reconsider ALS’s waiver argument. It found that the

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federal court ruling “stands and thus, the waiver of Civil Code section 5655(a)
is invalid.”
2. Analysis
ALS appears to challenge the section 5655(a) waiver ruling in two
respects, arguing that (1) the federal judge was “wrong” in finding the waiver
void as a matter of public policy, and (2) the state court erred in “adopting”
the federal court’s ruling.
As for the federal judge’s interpretation of section 5655, our review is
de novo. (Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 527.) “ ‘ “The
fundamental rule of statutory construction is that a court should ascertain
the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.” ’ ”
(Pacific Fertility Cases (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 568, 575.) “ ‘[W]e first examine
the words themselves, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning and
construing them in context.’ ” (Id. at p. 576.) “ ‘If the words in the statute do
not, by themselves, provide a reliable indicator of legislative intent,’ ” we look
“ ‘ “ ‘to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be
achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy,
contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of
which the statute is a part.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) If the meaning is still unclear, we
follow the “ ‘ “more reasonable result.” ’ ” (Ibid., italics added by Pacific
Fertility Cases.)
Section 3513 bars waiver of a statutory right when the “ ‘public
benefit’ ” of a statute is “ ‘one of its primary purposes.’ ” (Azteca Construction,
Inc. v. ADR Consulting, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1166.) Such
prohibitions on waiver can be express or implied. (Compare § 1751 [“Any
waiver by a consumer of the provisions of this title is contrary to public policy
and shall be unenforceable and void.”] with Armendariz v. Foundation Health

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Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 100 [concluding waiver of rights
under Fair Employment and Housing Act contrary to public policy based on
broad goal of statutory scheme to protect employees from discrimination and
harassment].)
ALS contends that section 5655 cannot be interpreted to contain an
implied prohibition on waiver because it was adopted for a “narrow, very
private interest.” We disagree. In 1996, the concept of prioritizing
application of payments to unpaid assessments was codified in section 1367,
requiring that “any payments toward such a debt shall first be applied to the
principal owed, and only after the principal owed is paid in full shall such
payments be applied to interest or collection expenses.” (Stats. 1996,
ch. 1101, § 4, capitalization omitted.) In 2002, section 1367.1 was added to
the statutory scheme to clarify and expand pre-lien notice requirements.
(Stats. 2002, ch. 1111, § 8.) Section 1367.1, subdivision (b) included a similar
sentence with broader language regarding the priority of applying payments
to assessments owed before “fees and costs of collection, attorney’s fees, late
charges, or interest.” Ten years later, sections 1367 and 1367.1 were
repealed and that sentence from section 1367.1, subdivision (b) was recodified
in section 5655(a). (Stats. 2012, ch. 180, § 2.) In every formulation, the
requirement has been mandatory—it affords no discretion to HOAs to decline
prioritization. (California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State
Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1143 [recognizing “presumption that
the word ‘shall’ in a statute is ordinarily deemed mandatory”].)
But as the purpose of the requirement is not evident from the statutory
text alone, we find the legislative history from both sections 1367 and 1367.1

9
instructive. 4 The materials from section 1367 show that the Legislature
viewed this prioritization requirement as an important public benefit. Under
existing law, HOAs had the power to impose interest, charges, and costs
related to the collection of unpaid assessments, all of which created a lien
enforceable by nonjudicial foreclosure. (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor
Analyses, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1317 (1995–1996 Reg. Sess.) as
amended Sept. 6, 1995, p. 3.) The author of the bill explained that the
current law “invites overreaching by collection firms,” applying payments to
collection costs rather than the principal balance and creating a “treadmill
wherein the collection costs continue to accrue despite the good faith efforts of
the homeowner to cure any back debts.” (Assem. Mem. Jackie Speier author
of Assem. Bill No. 1317 (1995–1996 Reg. Sess.), letter to Gov. Wilson,
Sept. 10, 1996, pp. 2–3.)
The prioritization requirement was thus intended to protect
homeowners from abuses by collection firms and “insensitive and overzealous
associations who adopt unnecessarily adversarial tactics in collecting past
due assessments.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1317
(1995–1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 21, 1995, p. 7.) Concern about these
abuses outweighed arguments in opposition that the statute would interfere
with private agreements between homeowners and HOAs. (Sen. Housing &
Land Use Com., com. on Assem. Bill No. 1317 (1995–1996 Reg. Sess.) as
amended June 13, 1995, p. 3.) These materials also make clear that the

4
We grant Doskocz’s unopposed request to take judicial notice of three
legislative analyses of the bill enacting section 1367.1 that were presented to
the federal court on summary judgment. We deny Doskocz’s opposed
supplemental request to take judicial notice of the timing of text included in
that bill as not necessary or helpful to our analysis. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.252; Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998)
18 Cal.4th 739, 748, fn. 6.)

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Legislature considered these protections applicable to a significant
percentage of its populace: at the time, approximately five million
homeowners lived in the state’s 30,000 common interest developments.
(Assem. Mem. Jackie Speier author of Assem. Bill No. 1317 (1995–1996 Reg.
Sess.), letter to Gov. Wilson, supra, at p. 1; Assem. Mem. Dan Hauser, letter
to Gov. Wilson, Sept. 10, 1996.)
The legislative history from section 1367.1 is consistent with this
purpose, explaining that the statute was “primarily designed” to address the
same concerns regarding the nonjudicial foreclosure process for delinquent
payments. (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Bill No. 2289 (2001–2002
Reg. Sess.) as amended June 19, 2002, p. 5; see also Diamond v. Superior
Court (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1172, 1190 [finding intent regarding public
purpose of section 1367.1 in legislative history].) Contrary to ALS’s
suggestion, the lack of explicit references to the prioritization requirement in
these materials does not suggest some other private or narrow purpose. Nor
is it particularly surprising, given that the requirement was similar to the
one already in section 1367.
ALS’s remaining arguments do not alter our view. First, ALS suggests
that section 5665 limits a homeowner’s rights under 5655. Section 5665
requires an HOA to provide any “standards” it has for payment plans to an
owner requesting such a plan. (Id., subd. (a).) This provision was originally
added as part of section 1367.1, subdivision (c)(2). (Stats. 2002, ch. 1111, § 8.)
Given the prioritization requirement in section 1367.1, subdivision (b), we
adopt a construction that “ ‘ “best serves to harmonize the statute
internally.” ’ ” (Pacific Fertility Cases, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 576.) We
thus interpret section 5665 to contemplate optional HOA standards for

11
payment plans, but not to allow standards that contravene the prioritization
requirement in the preceding section 5655(a).
Second, ALS argues that section 5655 does not confer a public benefit
because without waiver of the prioritization requirement, there is “evidence”
that HOAs are less likely to agree to payment plans. ALS does not offer or
explain this “evidence.” We find the argument dubious, as HOAs would still
be incentivized to enter into payment plans to recover the principal balance of
assessments owed, resolve collection accounts as quickly as possible, and
avoid foreclosure processes.
Finally, at oral argument on appeal, counsel for ALS argued the
company acted merely as an agent of the HOA and therefore is not, itself,
subject to the provisions of the Davis-Stirling Act; rather, only the HOA is,
and therefore any liability under the Act lies only against the HOA. While
ALS’s appellate briefing made passing reference to its agency status, ALS
never made any argument in its briefing that, as an agent of the HOA, the
provisions of the Act did not apply to its actions, let alone provide authority
supporting such an argument. It therefore forfeited the argument. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [requiring briefs to state each point under
a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point and to provide
argument and, if possible, supporting authority]; Jones v. Superior Court
(1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 92, 99 [“Issues do not have a life of their own: if they
are not raised or supported by argument or citation to authority, we consider
the issues waived.”].)
In sum, we conclude the federal court did not err in ruling that the
waiver was void as against public policy. 5

5
Given our de novo review of this issue and the parties’ stipulation that
the state action was “subject to” the federal court’s ruling, we need not

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B. No Error on FDCPA Rulings
1. Additional Background
When ALS moved for summary judgment in this state court action, it
argued that Doskocz’s claims failed as a matter of law because ALS’s pre-lien
letter did not improperly threaten foreclosure. The court rejected the
argument. It first quoted a boldface, capitalized statement in the letter:
“IMPORTANT NOTICE: IF YOUR SEPARATE INTEREST IS PLACED IN
FORECLOSURE BECAUSE YOU ARE BEHIND IN YOUR ASSESSMENTS,
IT MAY BE SOLD WITHOUT COURT ACTION.” (Boldface omitted.) The
court then referenced the next portion of the letter, which stated: “If the
foreclosure process begins, you are legally obligated to pay all fees and costs
associated with that process. Should you fail to pay all delinquent
assessments, late charges, costs of collection, including all lien and
foreclosure process costs and fees, attorneys’ fees and interest, you may lose
your property.” The court concluded that this letter, reviewed under the least
sophisticated consumer standard, threatened foreclosure and thus violated
the FDCPA.
In its statement of decision after trial, the court reached the same
conclusion about not only the pre-lien letter but also the pre-NOD letter. On
the pre-lien letter, the court explained that the boldface, capitalized language
was required by law. 6 The language below that statement, however, was not
required by law and “[t]he least sophisticated debtor would reasonably
understand the unbolded language as threatening a foreclosure sale.” On the

address ALS’s procedural argument that the state court erred in “adopting”
the ruling and declining to reconsider it.
6 Section 5660, subdivision (a) requires that the boldface, capitalized

statement set forth above be included in the notice sent to an owner prior to
recording a lien to collect a debt from delinquent assessments.

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pre-NOD letter, the court quoted the following statement: “If payment is not
received within ten (10) days, then Association Lien Services will record a
Notice of Default. Copies of the Notice of Default will be provided to your
mortgage company and to anyone else having a legal interest in your
property and entitled to notice under the Civil Code. Please note that if
Association Lien Services is required to record the Notice of Default, you will
also be responsible for paying an additional fee of approximately $995.00 for
preparing and serving the Notice of Default, acquiring a Trustee’s Sale
Guarantee along with any applicable recording, mail and related costs.”
The court explained that recording a notice of default is “a necessary
step in perfecting the right to hold a foreclosure sale” and that section 5720’s
prohibition on collection through foreclosure of delinquent assessments that
are less than $1,800 or more than 12 months old “means not only a
foreclosure sale but also the commencement and perfection of the foreclosure
process leading up to a sale, including recording a Notice of Default.” The
court then concluded that the “least sophisticated debtor would reasonably
understand recording a Notice of Default, notifying mortgage lenders, and
obtaining a Trustee’s Sale Guarantee as indicating an intention to conduct a
foreclosure sale.”
2. Analysis
The FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from engaging in certain
practices to collect or attempt to collect a debt, including threatening to take
action that cannot be legally taken and threatening to effect dispossession of
property where there is no present right to possession of the property.
(15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(5), 1692f(6)(A).) “[A] threat need not be express: it can
be implied.” (Gonzalez v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC (9th Cir. 2011)
660 F.3d 1055, 1064.) To determine whether conduct violates the FDCPA,

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courts employ the “ ‘least sophisticated debtor’ ” standard. (Gonzalez, at
p. 1061, fn. 2 [discussing adoption by Ninth Circuit and majority of other
courts].) This standard “ ‘preserv[es] a quotient of reasonableness and
presum[es] a basic level of understanding and willingness to read with care,’ ”
but is “ ‘designed to protect consumers of below average sophistication or
intelligence,’ or those who are ‘uninformed or naive,’ particularly when those
individuals are targeted by debt collectors.” (Id. at p. 1062.)
Here, Doskocz claimed that ALS’s pre-lien and pre-NOD letters
violated these provisions of the FDCPA because the letters threatened
foreclosure when foreclosure was not permitted under section 5720.
Section 5720, subdivision (b) provides that an HOA “may not collect” a
delinquent assessment less than $1,800 or more than 12 months old “through
judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure,” but may “attempt to collect or secure that
debt” through a civil action in small claims court, recording a lien that the
HOA may not foreclose upon until the delinquent assessment reaches $1,800
or more than 12 months, or “[a]ny other manner provided by law, except for
judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure.” When ALS sent its pre-lien and pre-NOD
letters, Doskocz’s delinquent assessment had not met this $1,800 or 12-
month threshold.
We have some doubt as to whether ALS’s pre-lien letter can reasonably
be characterized as threatening foreclosure before the delinquent assessment
reached this statutory threshold. Nor do we need to make this
determination. As counsel for Doskocz acknowledged at oral argument, if we
conclude ALS’s pre-NOD letter can properly be so characterized, that suffices

15
to uphold the judgment. 7 Our review is de novo. (Gonzalez v. Arrow
Financial Services, LLC, supra, 660 F.3d at p. 1060.)
ALS argues that the least sophisticated debtor would not read the pre-
NOD letter as a threat of foreclosure because it only tells the homeowner that
a notice of default will be recorded if payment is not received. ALS contends
that this does not violate section 5720 because the term “foreclosure” in that
provision means only a foreclosure sale, not steps in the foreclosure process
(e.g., recording a notice of default) leading up to the sale.
Such a constrained reading of section 5720 is not supported by its plain
language or legislative history. Section 5720, subdivision (b) imposes
constraints on an HOA that “seeks to collect” or “attempt[s] to collect or
secure [a] debt” below the $1,800 or 12-month threshold. Recording a notice
of default starts the foreclosure process: it is the initial step, followed by a
notice of sale and then sale. (§ 2924, subd. (a)(1).) The phrasing “seeks to
collect” or “attempt[s] to collect” suggests an intent to cover these steps to
commence and perfect the foreclosure process, not just the final step of a
completed sale.
The legislative history of section 5720 supports this interpretation. The
provision was originally added to the statutory scheme in section 1367.4,
subdivision (b) and then reorganized and recodified as section 5720,
subdivision (b). (Stats. 2005, ch. 452, § 4; Stats. 2012, ch. 180, § 2.) The
Legislative Counsel’s Digest stated that section 1367.4 “would revise and

7
The judgment enjoins ALS from (1) engaging in communications
“indicating that any step in the non-judicial foreclosure process may be
initiated or pursued, including that a Notice of Default may be recorded” and
(2) recording any notice of default before the $1,800 or more than 12 months
old threshold is met. ALS is also required to rescind notices of default or
trustee’s sale where the threshold had not been met.

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recast the procedures for collecting delinquent assessments for certain debts.”
(Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 137 (Stats. 2005 (2005–2006 Reg. Sess.)
Summary Dig.) Interpreting the term “foreclosure” from section 5720 to
include the procedural step for initiating foreclosure is consistent with this
legislative goal. We thus agree with the trial court that the least
sophisticated debtor would reasonably understand this language in ALS’s
pre-NOD letter as threatening foreclosure in violation of section 5720.
In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that
ALS’s pre-NOD letter violated the FDCPA.
C. No Abuse of Discretion on Motion to Bifurcate
1. Additional Background
Doskocz moved to bifurcate trial and proceed first on her equitable
UCL cause of action. ALS opposed the motion on the ground that the UCL
cause of action (for unlawful business practices) was predicated on violations
of the FDCPA. ALS argued that it was entitled to a jury trial to determine
its liability under the FDCPA, including whether the waiver of homeowner
rights under section 5655(a) was a “bona fide error” under the FDCPA. 8
The court granted the motion. In so doing, it explicitly declined to rule
on the parties’ dispute regarding what issues under the FDCPA cause of
action required a jury trial. The trial court stated it need not decide that now
because even “assuming these are issues for the jury the Court would still
decide to hear the UCL claim first.” In its statement of decision after trial,
the court concluded that the bona fide error defense did not apply to

8
Title 15 United States Code section 1692k(c) provides: “A debt
collector may not be held liable in any action brought under this subchapter if
the debt collector shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation
was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the
maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.”

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Doskocz’s UCL cause of action and even if it did, “ALS did not act
unintentionally, based on a bona fide error, and maintain procedures
reasonably adapted to avoid the violation in using waivers of § 5655(a) in
payment plans.”
2. Analysis
We review a trial court’s decision to bifurcate for abuse of discretion.
(Hoopes v. Dolan (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 146, 163.) While courts retain broad
discretion on the sequencing of trial, this discretion is not unlimited. (Ibid.)
“ ‘The scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being
applied’ . . . . ‘Action that transgresses the confines of the applicable
principles of law is outside the scope of discretion and we call such action an
“abuse” of discretion.’ ” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State
University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 393.) ALS bears the burden to show
the trial court abused its discretion here. (Property California SCJLW One
Corp. v. Leamy (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1155, 1163.)
To satisfy this burden, ALS repeats its argument that the motion to
bifurcate “completely ignored the fact that in order to establish a claim under
the UCL, [Doskocz] would need to establish a violation of the FDCPA as the
predicate statute for finding a violation of the UCL” and that ALS was
entitled to a jury trial on the issue of liability under the FDCPA. ALS
contends that the trial court’s ruling is “inherently contradictory” because it
acknowledged that issues of liability under the FDCPA would be
encompassed in the UCL cause of action but “assumed, rightly or wrongly,”
that ALS had some right to a jury trial on the FDCPA cause of action.
We begin with the principle that the right to a jury trial in civil cases is
generally limited to legal causes of action, not equitable ones. (Hoopes v.
Dolan, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 155.) “Over the more than 80-year

18
history of the UCL, scores of decisions of both this court and the Courts of
Appeal have uniformly recognized that the cause of action established by this
statute is equitable in nature.” (Nationwide Biweekly Administration, Inc. v.
Superior Court (2020) 9 Cal.5th 279, 301.) The California Supreme Court has
made clear that “there is no right to a jury trial in a cause of action under the
UCL.” (Id. at p. 327.) Courts have declined to depart from this rule where a
defendant raises the argument ALS makes here: that the predicate law for
establishing a UCL cause of action for unlawful business practices entitles it
to a jury trial.
In Hodge v. Superior Court (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 278 (Hodge), for
example, employees asserted a UCL cause of action premised on violations of
the Labor Code regarding overtime wages. (Hodge, at p. 282.) The employer
contended it was entitled to a jury trial because the cause of action was
predicated on a legal question regarding a breach of contract and its
affirmative defense required adjudication of legal claims. (Id. at pp. 283–
284.) Hodge reasoned that “[a]lthough the unlawful prong of the UCL
borrows from other laws, it is not a substitute for those laws.” (Hodge, at
p. 284.) The UCL makes this explicit: “Unless otherwise expressly provided,
the remedies or penalties provided by this chapter are cumulative to each
other and to the remedies or penalties available under all other laws of this
state.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17205.)
Moreover, “ ‘the overarching legislative concern’ ” in enacting the UCL
was “ ‘to provide a streamlined procedure for the prevention of ongoing or
threatened acts of unfair competition’ ” and “[c]onsistent with this objective,
the UCL provides only for equitable remedies. . . . Damages are not
available.” (Hodge, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 284.) Accordingly, the UCL
“is not simply a legislative conversion of a legal right into an equitable one”

19
but a different and separate equitable cause of action. (Hodge, at p. 284.)
Hodge thus concluded that the presence of legal issues did not “transform”
the employees’ equitable UCL cause of action into one of law. (Hodge, at
p. 285.)
The same reasoning applies here: the fact that the UCL cause of action
required determination of ALS’s liability under the FDCPA did not transform
Doskocz’s equitable UCL cause of action into a legal one. 9 Indeed, “[s]uits
under [the UCL] are often combined with causes of action that entitle the
plaintiff to a jury trial (e.g., fraud, breach of contract)” and issues decided
first “in a UCL bench trial (which may include determination of predicate
claims such as fraud, etc.) may make a jury trial unnecessary.” (Weil &
Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group
2023) ¶ 14:230.1, citing Rincon EV Realty LLC v. CP III Rincon Towers, Inc.
(2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 988, 995, 1005 [court addressed six legal claims in
ruling on equitable UCL cause of action].) We thus conclude that ALS has
not met its burden to show the trial court abused its discretion in granting
Doskocz’s motion to bifurcate.
D. Substantial Evidence on Alter Ego Findings
1. Additional Background
In its statement of decision after trial, the court concluded that the SG
defendants were alter egos of ALS. Quoting Associated Vendors, Inc. v.
Oakland Meat Co. (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 825, 837 (Associated Vendors), the
court described the two-part test for applying the alter ego doctrine:
“ ‘(1) that there be such unity of interest and ownership that the separate
personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist, and

Given this conclusion, we need not address the parties’ arguments on
9

the merits of any bona fide error defense.

20
(2) that, if the acts are treated as those of the corporation alone, an
inequitable result will follow.’ ”
On the first part of the test, the trial court found there was such a
unity of interest and ownership. Swedelson and Gottlieb are husband and
wife, and have always been the sole shareholders and directors of ALS.
Gottlieb is the chief executive officer and president of ALS. Swedelson and
Gottlieb started their assessment collection business, Association Lien
Services, in 1987. Swedelson and Gottlieb are also the sole general partners
of their law firm, which is a general partnership between them. The law firm
was formed in 1987, the same year as Association Lien Services.
From 1987 to 2005, Swedelson and Gottlieb operated both businesses
as a single entity. In 2005, Swedelson and Gottlieb incorporated Association
Lien Services (as “ALS Lien Services” because the original name was not
available) based on personal tax advantages. Upon incorporation, the law
firm entered into a sublease with ALS to continue to operate out of the suite
immediately adjacent to the law firm office, as well as a management
agreement to continue the shared administrative services, access, and use of
facilities from the law firm that ALS had before.
ALS and the law firm shared common personnel, and law firm
employees routinely provided services (like letter reviews) to ALS. As of
December 2013, ALS was in default on payments under the sublease and
management agreement. Gottlieb agreed to forego her ALS salary, and the
law firm, in violation of ALS’s rights under the sublease, subleased portions
of ALS’s space to other subtenants. The court found Swedelson and Gottlieb
had used ALS to procure legal work for the law firm. ALS’s standard
collection contract terms provided for use of the law firm’s legal services.

21
ALS advertised the law firm’s legal services on its website and in other
marketing materials.
On the second part of the test, the court found that failure to apply the
alter ego doctrine would lead to an inequitable result. When ALS was
incorporated in 2005, Swedelson and Gottlieb contributed $28,000 total in
capital. They also obtained an insurance policy with a $1 million limit and a
$250,000 class action sublimit.
The court found that Swedelson and Gottlieb “failed to provide ALS
with sufficient unencumbered capital and/or insurance to cover its reasonably
foreseeable liabilities” related to “unfair debt collection litigation.” It found
they were aware of these risks at the time of incorporation because they had
previously defended Association Lien Services in another FDCPA class action
in which they had charged $1,076,227.14 for legal fees. ALS educational
materials showed Swedelson and Gottlieb were “sophisticated” in their
knowledge of FDCPA liability. Between 2012 and 2020, ALS was sued at
least 12 times for debt collection activities.
As described above, ALS was in default on payments under the
sublease and management agreement by the end of 2013. When ALS was
collecting Doskocz’s account in 2013 and 2014, it had no significant
unencumbered capital. ALS’s default on its payments under the sublease
and management agreement continued to grow.
ALS had around $100,000 in total income from 2015 to 2021, but had
$825,000 in delinquencies. During that period, ALS paid the law firm
approximately $1.4 million in rent, management fees, legal services, and
compensation to Gottlieb. This included $300,000 in attorney fees billed as
outside counsel in this litigation (beyond fees paid to insurance defense
counsel after exhaustion of the insurance policy). The court found that this

22
$300,000 in payments had a “significant adverse financial impact on ALS,”
and that Swedelson understood bankruptcy would stay the litigation and stop
“financial drains,” but neither Swedelson nor Gottlieb ever considered it. The
court also found it was reasonable to infer that Swedelson and Gottlieb
“tolerated” ALS’s defaults because, given its public identification with the law
firm, ALS’s bankruptcy or “financial failure” would be damaging to the law
firm.
By the time of trial, ALS had been insolvent for several years and was
unable to pay a class judgment. ALS’s approximate net worth was negative
$1.1 million. The court found that the SG defendants’ (1) failure to
“adequately capitalize ALS to respond to reasonably expected unfair debt
collection class action litigation,” (2) continuation of ALS’s business since
2013 without “adequate capital or insurance to respond to a Judgment in this
case,” and (3) diversion of ALS funds to themselves was “in bad faith and
intentional, for the wrongful and intentional purposes of circumventing the
requirements of the FDCPA and Davis-Stirling Act and of avoiding ALS’s
liability to the Class in this case.”
The trial court noted that the SG defendants had presented testimony
from an “expert on alter ego,” including opinions regarding the observance of
corporate formalities and the separateness of entities. The trial court
concluded, however, that the expert had “testified about his opinion based on
incomplete facts provided to him. As a result that opinion was not helpful to
the Court. Also the legal conclusion reached by him, even [if] it was on
complete facts, invades the discretion of the court under the law.”

23
2. Analysis
The SG defendants challenge the trial court’s findings on both parts of
alter ego test. At oral argument on appeal, the SG defendants conceded that
the proper standard of review is whether there is “substantial evidence
contained in the record to uphold the findings of the trial court.” (Associated
Vendors, supra, 210 Cal.App.2d at p. 835.)
Associated Vendors identifies various factors to consider in the alter ego
test, including identical equitable ownership, use of the same office and
employees, use of a corporation to procure services or serve as an
“instrumentality” or a “conduit” for the business of another entity, and failure
to maintain an arm’s-length relationship. (Associated Vendors, supra,
210 Cal.App.2d at pp. 838–840.)
There was ample evidence to support the court’s finding on unity of
ownership and interest under these factors. Swedelson and Gottlieb were the
sole shareholders, officers, and directors of ALS, as well as the sole general
partners of SwedelsonGottlieb. ALS used the administrative services and
facilities of the law firm office. ALS and the law firm shared common
personnel, and law firm employees performed work for ALS. The agreements
with HOAs and marketing by ALS show it was used as an instrumentality or
a conduit for law firm business. And the law firm’s failure to act on ALS’s
defaults and its improper sublease of the ALS space show they did not
maintain an arm’s-length relationship.
The SG defendants cite evidence and expert testimony regarding
certain corporate formalities to suggest otherwise, including the sublease
agreement and separateness of various accounts and policies. But these
formalities do not overcome the substantial evidence on the other factors,
particularly given that the law firm subsequently violated this sublease

24
agreement. (See Associated Vendors, supra, 210 Cal.App.2d at p. 840
[consideration of presence or absence of various factors “within the province
of the trial court” and any conflict is for trier of fact to resolve].) The SG
defendants also suggest that Gottlieb’s forfeiture of her ALS salary weighed
against any unity of ownership or interest, citing Sonora Diamond Corp. v.
Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 529. That case is entirely inapposite,
as it analyzed only the second part of the alter ego test and concluded that a
parent company’s advance of funds to a subsidiary does not alone prove
injustice. (Id. at p. 539.) Even accepting the analogy between an advance
and salary forfeiture, Sonora Diamond says nothing about how it factors into
unity of ownership or interest.
Turning to the second part of the test, the SG defendants contend that
the trial court “made no finding of any injustice.” In so doing, the SG
defendants appear to suggest there was no evidence of actual fraud or
fraudulent intent necessary for such a finding. But the alter ego doctrine
“does not depend on the presence of actual fraud.” (Associated Vendors,
supra, 210 Cal.App.2d at p. 838.) Instead, “it is designed to prevent what
would be fraud or injustice, if accomplished. Accordingly, bad faith in one
form or another is an underlying consideration and will be found in some
form or another in those cases wherein the trial court was justified in
disregarding the corporate entity.” (Ibid.) Here, the trial court concluded
that the SG defendants acted intentionally and “in bad faith” by failing to
adequately capitalize ALS, continuing ALS’s business without adequate
capital or insurance, and diverting ALS funds to themselves.
Failure to adequately capitalize, absence of corporate assets, and
undercapitalization are all factors that can be considered in applying the
alter ego doctrine. (Associated Vendors, supra, 210 Cal.App.2d at p. 839.)

25
When ALS was incorporated, Swedelson and Gottlieb contributed only
$28,000 in capital, and obtained an insurance policy with a $1 million limit
and a $250,000 class action sublimit despite having previously defended
Association Lien Services in a FDCPA class action and charging over a
million dollars for legal services. Swedelson and Gottlieb proceeded with
ALS’s business despite the risks reasonably foreseeable after this litigation.
Over the next several years, they continued ALS’s business despite growing
delinquencies and additional lawsuits. Then they charged ALS legal fees as
outside counsel in this action. The SG defendants argue that those fees
should not be considered because they reflect legal services rendered. But
that misses the point. Swedelson and Gottlieb never considered options for
ALS that would have mitigated or at least suspended these costs (e.g.,
bankruptcy), instead charging $300,000 in fees above and beyond those paid
to insurance defense counsel. The evidence on each of these points supported
the court’s finding that failure to apply the alter ego doctrine would lead to
an inequitable result here.
We conclude that the trial court’s alter ego findings were supported by
substantial evidence.
E. No Abuse of Discretion on Leave to Amend Complaint
1. Additional Background
In 2020, the court granted Doskocz’s request for leave to file a first
amended complaint to add alter ego allegations against the SG defendants.
Neither the motion nor the court’s ruling are included in the record here.
ALS subsequently filed a petition for writ of mandate to vacate the order.
This court denied the petition based on failure to demonstrate with reference
to facts that ALS would suffer irreparable harm absent review by
extraordinary writ.

26
In 2021, the SG defendants filed a demurrer to the first amended
complaint, arguing that the claims against them were barred by the
stipulation between Doskocz and ALS in the original federal action. The
stipulation read, in relevant part: “In the state court complaint, Plaintiff
may, consistent with this Stipulation, delete claims from the Complaint in
this action, but may not add any new claims. Plaintiff waives any right to
amend causes of action in the state court action under California law, except
as allowed by the Superior Court in ruling on any Demurrer or other motion
filed by Defendant.” The SG defendants argued that the first amended
complaint improperly alleged “new claims” against them based upon alter ego
theories of liability.
While the same argument had been made by ALS in opposition to the
motion for leave to amend, the trial court concluded collateral estoppel did
not apply because the SG defendants were not parties at that time. Citing
Hennessey’s Tavern, Inc. v. American Air Filter Co. (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d
1351, however, the court explained that “alter ego allegations provide a
theory of recovery, but not a new cause of action.” It thus found that adding
the SG defendants “did not violate the stipulation as no new claims were
added.” The court overruled the demurrer.
2. Analysis
Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a)(1) provides that a
trial court “may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be
proper, allow a party to amend any pleading.” We review the court’s ruling
on Doskocz’s motion to amend the complaint for abuse of discretion. (Branick
v. Downey Savings & Loan Assn. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 235, 242.)
We conclude that the SG defendants have forfeited their challenge to
this ruling because they did not provide it in the appellate record. (Cal. Rules

27
of Court, rule 8.124(b)(1)(B) [appendix must include items “necessary for
proper consideration of issues”]; Mountain Lion Coalition v. Fish & Game
Com. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1043, 1051, fn. 9 [“if the record is inadequate for
meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court
should be affirmed”].)
Even if not forfeited, we see no basis to conclude that the court abused
its discretion in granting the motion. The SG defendants renew their
argument that the amendment added “new claims” in violation of the
stipulation from the federal action. But alter ego allegations do not create a
new claim or cause of action, they are instead a “procedural device” used to
hold the alter ego liable. (Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399, 419
[explaining alter ego liability is “not a substantive claim”]; Hennessey’s
Tavern, Inc. v. American Air Filter Co., supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at p. 1359
[same].)
To the extent the SG defendants challenge the trial court’s ruling on
demurrer, our review is de novo but reaches the same result. (San
Bernardino County v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 679, 683.) On
demurrer, the SG defendants repeated the argument (previously made by
ALS in opposing the motion to amend) that the new alter ego allegations
were barred by the stipulation. But the SG defendants show no basis to
enforce that agreement between Doskocz and ALS. Third parties may have
such a basis where (1) the third party benefits from the agreement, (2) the
provision of such a benefit was the “motivating purpose” of the contracting
parties, and (3) permitting enforcement “is consistent with the objectives of
the contract and the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties.”
(Goonewardene v. ADP, LLC (2019) 6 Cal.5th 817, 830.) Here, the SG
defendants assert—without any supporting facts or law—that they were

28
intended third party beneficiaries of the stipulation because Doskocz “used
the language therein” to add them into the state action. This unsupported
assertion does not persuade us that the requirements for third party
enforcement are satisfied here. Even if it did, we agree with the trial court
that the amendment did not run afoul of the stipulation because, as
explained above, the alter ego allegations did not add any “new claims.”
In short, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
granting Doskocz’s motion to amend the complaint and did not err in
overruling the SG defendants’ demurrer.
F. No Abuse of Discretion on Attorney Fees Award
1. Additional Background
After the statement of decision was issued, class counsel moved for
attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 on the grounds
that the litigation had conferred a substantial benefit on the public and a
large class of Californians. They requested a total $1,173,816 award:
$939,053 in fees with a 1.25 multiplier that included time spent by lead
counsel and attorneys from both Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP (Cotchett)
and Housing and Economic Rights Advocates (HERA). The motion included
declarations from lead counsel, Cotchett, and HERA describing work
performed in the action. Declarations from lead counsel and HERA also
included time records. ALS and the SG defendants opposed the motion.
Among other things, the SG defendants argued that the requested fee award
was not reasonable or properly apportioned to them.
The court granted class counsel’s motion and awarded $1,173,816 in
fees. It found that the litigation “conferred a significant benefit on a
substantial number of people, including the Class Members in this case and
the General Public” and the subject matter “implicated the public interest

29
because it vindicated and enforced important assessment collection
provisions of the Davis-Stirling Act,” including sections 5655(a) and 5720.
The court found that the hours spent by class counsel were “reasonable,
taking into account the history, duration, and context of this litigation,
including the issues presented, motions practice, Defendants’ opposition, and
the extent of litigation.” It exercised its discretion to apply the 1.25
multiplier upon considering the factors from Serrano v. Priest (1977)
20 Cal.3d 25, including “novelty and difficulty of the questions and skill
displayed by Class Counsel in presenting them, and the contingent nature of
the fee award.”
2. Analysis
Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 provides that a court may award
attorney fees to the prevailing party “in any action which has resulted in the
enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a
significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred
on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and
financial burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement by one public
entity against another public entity, are such as to make the award
appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be
paid out of the recovery, if any.”
Here, the SG defendants challenge the trial court’s finding on the first
prong of this provision: that the action conferred a significant benefit on the
general public or a large class of persons. We review this finding for abuse of
discretion. (See Conservatorship of Whitley (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1206, 1213
[determination to award fees under Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5 reviewed for
abuse of discretion where appeal turns on factual findings or exercise of
discretion rather than questions of law].)

30
We find no such abuse of discretion here. The SG defendants focus on
the minimal financial gain from dividing the restitution award of $156,783
over 6,000 class members, but ignore the other benefits achieved by the
action. (See City of Oakland v. Oakland Police & Fire Retirement System
(2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 688, 700 [explaining that considerations beyond
prevailing party financial benefit may be relevant].) The judgment included
not only restitution, but injunctive relief prohibiting ALS from certain
practices and requiring it to recalculate balances on all open accounts. More
importantly, the action conferred a significant public benefit because, as
detailed above, it vindicated important homeowner rights under
sections 5655(a) and 5720.
Nor are we persuaded by the SG defendants’ arguments challenging
the amount of attorney fees awarded here. (Robles v. Employment
Development Dept. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 191, 199 [amount of fees awarded
under Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5 reviewed for abuse of discretion].) First, the
SG defendants argue that Cotchett and HERA did not provide “detailed
billing” in support of their request. “ ‘California courts do not require
detailed time records, and trial courts have discretion to award fees based on
declarations of counsel describing the work they have done and the court’s
own view of the number of hours reasonably spent.’ ” (Syers Properties III,
Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 698.) Here, Cotchett and HERA
provided declarations describing the type of work performed by their
attorneys and the hours spent on such work. HERA also attached time
entries with a general description of the category of work performed. This
was sufficient for the court to determine that the hours requested by class
counsel were reasonable.

31
Second, the SG defendants argue that the amount was unreasonable
because multiple attorneys attended hearings and depositions in this action.
We agree with the general principle that a trial court can exercise its
discretion to limit an award of fees for “ ‘unjustified duplication of work’ ”
across different counsel or law firms. (Donahue v. Donahue (2010)
182 Cal.App.4th 259, 271.) But the SG defendants do not detail how any
particular time incurred by class counsel was unjustified. On the contrary,
lead counsel, Cotchett, and HERA all provided declarations stating they had
reduced or removed entries for duplicative efforts and written off at least 496
hours spent in this litigation.
Third, the SG defendants argue that there was no basis for the hourly
rates claimed by class counsel or the 1.25 multiplier applied here. “In
determining hourly rates, the court must look to the ‘prevailing market rates
in the relevant community’ ” and “should also consider the experience, skill,
and reputation of the attorney requesting fees.” (Heritage Pacific Financial,
LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009.) “ ‘Affidavits of the
plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the
community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting
a rate for the plaintiffs’ attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing
market rate.’ ” (Ibid.) Here, lead counsel, Cotchett, and HERA provided
declarations detailing their hourly rates and stating that such rates were at
or below market rates for attorneys with comparable experience and skill.
Lead counsel also provided examples of his hourly rates determined in
previous fee awards. Moreover, a trial court “may rely on its own knowledge
and familiarity with the legal market in setting a reasonable hourly rate.”
(Ibid.; see also PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1096
[“ ‘The value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in which the

32
trial court has its own expertise.’ ”].) The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in finding class counsel’s requested rates to be reasonable. As for
the multiplier, courts have the discretion to apply such a multiplier based on
a variety of factors, including novelty and difficulty of the questions
presented in the action. (Serrano v. Priest, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 49.) The
trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying the 1.25 multiplier
requested here based on novel and difficult legal issues in this litigation,
including whether waiver of section 5655 was void as against public policy.
Finally, the SG defendants argue that the attorney fees should have
been apportioned, with ALS being solely responsible for fees incurred before
the alter ego allegations were added to the first amended complaint in 2020.
“[T]rial courts have discretion not only in setting the amount of an award of
attorney fees, but in allocating the award among various defendants based on
their relative culpability.” (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2009)
178 Cal.App.4th 44, 97–98.) Here, however, the SG defendants were
determined to be the alter egos of ALS and thus held liable for its obligations.
(Leek v. Cooper, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 419.) Accordingly, there was no
distinction between the liability of the defendant entities here, and work
performed to pursue and prove ALS’s liability was common to the SG
defendants.
In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding $1,173,816 in fees to class counsel against ALS and the SG
defendants jointly and severally.

33
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Doskocz is entitled to her costs on appeal.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)

CASTRO, J. *

WE CONCUR:

HUMES, P. J.

BANKE, J.

A166299
Doskocz v. ALS Lien Services

* Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

34
Trial Court: Contra Costa County Superior court

Trial Judge: Hon. Barry Baskin

Counsel:

Soltman, Levitt, Flaherty & Wattles LLP, Steven B. Soltman and Steven S.
Nimoy for Defendant and Appellant ALS Lien Services.

Murchison & Cumming, LLP, Dan L. Longo and Matthew E. Voss
for Defendants and Appellants SwedelsonGottlieb, David Swedelson, and
Sandra Gottlieb.

Housing and Economic Rights Advocates, Arthur D. Levy, Gina di Giusto and
Daniel F. Alper; and Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP, Justin T. Berger for
Plaintiffs and Respondents.

35

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