In re I.G. CA2/8

CourtListener 9505421CalctappMay 20, 2024

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Filed 5/20/24 In re I.G. CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re I.G., et al., B326405
Persons Coming Under
Juvenile Court Law (Los Angeles County
_______________________________ S. Ct. No. 22CCJP04059A, B)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent

v.

V.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Lisa A. Brackelmanns, Commissioner. Affirmed
and remanded with directions.
Benjamin Ekenes, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy
County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
The juvenile court found on January 10, 2023 that a mother
and father had physically abused their minor children Isaiah,
then 5, and Isabella, then 8, by striking them with belts and
sandals. Only the mother appeals.
The court removed the children from the father’s custody
and ordered them placed with the mother. The court found that
the Department of Children and Family Services had not met its
burden to show that the mother currently abused drugs and
alcohol. On the record and in the order appealed from, the court
struck an allegation that the mother had failed to protect the
children from domestic violence by the father. The court,
however, did not fully strike this allegation from the amended
petition, and so we remand to correct this omission. We
otherwise affirm.
I
The mother and father did not get along. The court
thought this was a “high conflict” case, which it certainly was.
The court found the father to be the aggressor when it came to
domestic violence, and on January 10, 2023, the court issued an
order restraining the father from approaching the mother. The
children were afraid of the father because of his temper. They
felt differently about the mother, even though she too struck
Isaiah and Isabella from time to time.
The Department received a report about the mother driving
under the influence with children in the car. It assigned the case

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to Christina Keyes, who interviewed Isaiah and Isabella at their
elementary school.
Keyes observed that Isaiah did not have any visible marks
or bruises, and he told her he gets plenty of food and clean
clothes. But Isaiah stated when in trouble “[t]hey [the parents]
give us the belt.” “He stated both parents do so.” According to
Isaiah, they are spanked with the leather end, not the buckle,
and they are spanked on their arms and legs. This happens
when they get in “big, big trouble” and not all the time.
Isabella also did not have any visible bruises. She stated
that she gets plenty of food, clean clothes and bedding, and she
showers daily. According to Isabella, the mother takes care of
her. When asked about marks and bruises from belt lashings,
she replied that “Mom gets the belt” and “Legs leaves little
bumps that get itchy.” The last time she was hit with the belt
was a couple of months ago for not listening. This does not
happen all the time and only when their parents get really angry.
The mother told Isabella that she wouldn’t save her anymore and
was going to let the father “do what he does best,” which is
hitting her with the belt. According to Isabella, the “skinny belt
is super strong and sparkly. It doesn’t leave marks, only the big
belt does. It leaves some red spots and bruises on my legs.”
II
On October 3, 2023, the juvenile court terminated
jurisdiction, granting the mother sole legal and physical custody
and the father supervised visitation. We grant the mother’s
request for judicial notice of these orders.
The Department contends the mother’s appeal is moot and
should be dismissed. According to the Department, the mother
has failed to show how the court’s jurisdictional finding would

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prejudice her in a future dependency proceeding, and she merely
“speculates that she might be prejudiced in a future proceeding.”
A case is not moot if its finding “could be prejudicial to the
appellant or could potentially impact the current or future
dependency proceedings.” (In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th
754, 762, cited with approval but disapproved on other grounds in
In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 282–283; accord In re D.C.
(2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1015 [case is not moot where
mother contends the ruling would prejudice her in future
proceedings].)
The father in this case has shown himself to be combative
and ready to engage in abuse of his wife and children. It appears
the mother has also had problems with alcohol and drugs. The
minors are young and have many years until they reach
adulthood. There may very well be future dependency
proceedings in which the mother’s history would be relevant.
This is not speculation but, in light of the history of the mother’s
and father’s relationship, a plausible eventuality.
In any event, we have inherent discretion to address an
appeal even where the case is moot. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 282.) This is so when there may be a recurrence of the
controversy between the parties (ibid.), which is certainly a
possibility in this case.
III
“The standard of review in juvenile dependency cases is the
same as in other appeals on grounds of insufficiency of the
evidence. We review the record to determine whether there is
any substantial evidence, contradicted or not, which supports the
court’s conclusions. ‘All conflicts must be resolved in favor of the
respondent and all legitimate inferences indulged in to uphold

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the verdict, if possible.’ ” (In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th
1635, 1649 [citation omitted].) “The sum total of the above
definitions is that, if the word ‘substantial’ means anything at all,
it clearly implies that such evidence must be of ponderable legal
significance. Obviously the word cannot be deemed synonymous
with ‘any’ evidence. It must be reasonable in nature, credible,
and of solid value; it must actually be ‘substantial’ proof of the
essentials which the law requires in a particular case.” (Estate of
Teed (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 638, 644.)
There is substantial evidence the mother struck the
children. Isaiah told Keyes that both parents struck him with a
belt, and Isabella described the injuries she sustained from being
struck. Using a belt on a child can cause serious physical harm.
(In re Mariah T. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 428, 438–439.) The
children gave their account at the initial interview when they
spoke freely, as the court observed. Their statements to Keyes
were internally consistent, and the dependency court found them
credible.
The mother’s contentions to the contrary are without merit.
The mother characterizes the court’s finding about disciplining
the children as based on her denial that she did so. This is not
accurate. The court’s finding was based on Keyes’ initial
interview with the children. “I think those statements were more
reliable than the statements they made later. They do describe
the physical abuse by both parents using objects such as belts
and sandals, leaving marks. This rises to the level of physical
abuse, and I am sustaining those allegations.”
The mother contends that the Department “did not provide
substantial evidence the children suffered serious physical injury
as a result of mother’s discipline.” (Italics in original.) The statute

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does not require the infliction of serious harm but rather the
“substantial risk” of serious future injury: “The child has
suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer,
serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by
the child’s parent or guardian. For purposes of this subdivision, a
court may find there is a substantial risk of serious future injury
based on the manner in which a less serious injury was inflicted,
a history of repeated inflictions of injuries on the child or the
child’s siblings, or a combination of these and other actions by the
parent or guardian that indicate the child is at risk of serious
physical harm.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (a), italics
added.) In this case, the “manner in which a less serious injury
was inflicted” was, in the mother’s instance, recourse to a belt.
“Small children are not to be hit with hard objects, especially to
the point of leaving black and blue bruises.” (In re A.E. (2008)
168 Cal.App.4th 1, 4.) The mother’s past use of a belt suffices to
show her children faced the requisite risk at her hands.
Citing Welfare and Institutions Code section 300.2, the
mother contends there is no substantial evidence that there was
a “current” risk of harm to the children. During later interviews,
the children retracted to some extent their earlier statements
that the mother had struck them with a belt. However, on appeal
we disregard conflicting testimony and look only to the evidence
supporting judgment. (Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. McHugh (1913)
166 Cal. 140, 142.) Substantial evidence shows the mother’s
actions created a risk of harm that was current as of the
challenged rulings.
IV
The juvenile court denied the request to order the father to
move out of the house as part of the restraining order, leaving it

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to the family court to address this issue. However, the family
court apparently took no action on this subject. The mother asks
that we resolve this matter.
The restraining order can include an order directing the
father to move out of the house, but we are not in a position to
enter this order. The determination of the father’s residence
requires familiarity with recent developments and the parties
involved: the father, the mother, and the children. We will not
disturb the court’s order at this point, but the mother is free to
renew her request to the juvenile court if she still seeks this relief
and has not yet received it.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order. We remand to direct the juvenile
court to strike from the amended petition the phrase “and the
mother’s failure to protect the children” in line seven of the b-2
count, thus bringing this petition into conformity with the
findings made on the record.

WILEY, J.
We concur:

STRATTON, P. J.

VIRAMONTES, J.

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