CourtListener 9502970•People v. Womack CA5
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Filed 5/16/24 P. v. Womack CA5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F084424
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. CR-20-011719)
v.
DARREN JOSEPH LEE WOMACK, JR., OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Ricardo
Cordova, Judge.
Valerie G. Wass, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and
Catherine Tennant Nieto, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
On March 24, 2022, a jury convicted defendant Darren Joseph Lee Womack, Jr.,
of first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189; count I) and first degree
burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a); count II). (Undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.) Enhancement allegations, which will be discussed later, were also found
true. Subsequently, as to count I, defendant was sentenced to a total indeterminate term
of 75 years to life, and as to count II, he was sentenced to a total determinate term of 12
years, to run concurrent with count I.
On appeal, defendant contends: (1) his first degree murder conviction must be
dismissed because there lacks substantial evidence “he [was] the individual who shot and
killed the victim” and alternatively, “the prosecution failed to prove that he was not
acting in lawful self-defense”; (2) he was deprived of his constitutional rights to a jury
trial and due process when the trial court improperly instructed the jury with CALCRIM
No. 521, which “provided an inaccurate definition of premeditation,” and CALCRIM
No. 571, which, based on the evidence, inaccurately informed the jury that “‘[i]mperfect
self-defense does not apply when the defendant, through his own wrongful conduct, has
created circumstances that justify his adversary’s use of force’” (italics omitted); (3) he
was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel when his trial
counsel failed to “request the court to instruct the jury that provocation can reduce first
degree murder to second degree murder, and that a subjective test for provocation applies
to murder, which is different than the objective test for provocation that applies to
voluntary manslaughter” and failed to object to several instances of prosecutorial
misconduct when the prosecutor, during her closing and rebuttal arguments, improperly
commented on the law of provocation, CALCRIM No. 3472, and imperfect self-defense;
(4) these several instances of error constituted cumulative prejudice; and (5) “the trial
court imposed an unauthorized sentence by failing to stay the sentence on either count [I]
or [II] pursuant to section 654 because based on the verdicts and the prosecutor’s theory
of the case, it is evident the jury found the murder was the intended offense underlying
the burglary, and thus both offenses were committed pursuant to a single intent and
objective.”
2.
Although we conclude the prosecutor misstated the law as to imperfect self-
defense, we conclude defendant was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to object
to this misstatement of law. As to defendant’s remaining claims, we conclude they lack
merit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 22, 2022, the Stanislaus County District Attorney filed a first amended
information charging defendant with premeditated first degree murder (§§ 187, subd. (a),
189; count I), with the enhancement he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm
and proximately caused great bodily injury or death to Lisandro Mendez (§ 12022.53,
subd. (d)); and first degree burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a); count II), along with a
nonparticipant present allegation (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21)), and firearm use enhancement
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The first amended information also alleged defendant suffered a
prior strike offense (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d), 211) and a prior
serious felony offense (§ 667, subd. (a)).
On March 24, 2022, a jury found defendant guilty on both counts and found true
all enhancements and allegations. Subsequently, as to count I, the trial court sentenced
defendant to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life, doubled to 50 years to life because
of the prior strike, plus an additional indeterminate term of 25 years to life for the gun
enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), for a total indeterminate term of 75 years to life.
As to count II, the trial court sentenced defendant to the middle term of four years,
doubled to eight years because of the prior strike, plus an additional four-year term for
the gun enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), doubled to eight years for the prior strike, for
a total determinate term of 16 years to run concurrent with count I.
Subsequently, on July 11, 2022, the trial court conducted a resentencing hearing
based on an error it realized after the fact. As to count II, the trial court resentenced
defendant to the middle term of four years, doubled to eight years because of the prior
strike, plus an additional four-year term for the gun enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)),
3.
but chose not to double this term, for a total determinate term of 12 years to run
concurrent with count I.
FACTS
The Prosecution Case-in-Chief
Background
Mendez lived at a residence on Larkin Avenue in Modesto with his mother, his
three brothers, and his sister. Mendez slept in the garage, which had been converted into
a bedroom. The bedroom was enclosed with four walls and two doors—one interior and
one exterior; neither door was secure. The interior door was broken and items were
placed on one side of the door to block access to the other side. The exterior door’s lock
had “broken off” and it did not have a functioning doorknob.
The property had a metal chain-link fence with two gates. One gate was at the end
of the walkway leading to the residence; the second gate was at the entry of the driveway
and “when you pushed it open, you could hear [it] scrape on the [ground].” Further, there
was an alleyway just west of the residence, running north and south from Larkin Avenue
to Oregon Drive. Oregon Drive “is the street to the north of Larkin” Avenue and is just
south of Oregon Park.
The Murder
On December 14, 2020, at approximately 10:00 p.m., the two youngest brothers of
Mendez were in his bedroom playing video games when Mendez and his friend
Thomas S.1 entered the room. Mendez told both his brothers to go inside the house, and
one brother, C.R., responded he would “go in a bit.” A couple of seconds later, C.R.
heard the second gate scraping on the ground. At this point, Mendez “told [C.R.] just to
go like get down.” Subsequently, an individual banged on the exterior entry door and
1Thomas was called to testify as a witness for the prosecution. However, Thomas
invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and refused to testify.
4.
tried to get into the bedroom. Mendez attempted to hold the door shut “[w]ith his hands
and his … body.” He told the intruder “that [his two brothers] were in there, and that [the
intruder] wasn’t going to be able to get in.”
Thereafter, C.R. saw “a [hand]gun in the person’s hand, and the gun looked black
and had a red laser on it.” At this point, C.R. recognized the intruder as defendant, who
was wearing a black shirt. Defendant was able to enter the room and he and Mendez then
“started … struggling like over the gun, and [Mendez] was trying to take it away ….”
Subsequently, C.R. heard “one bullet misfire[],” but he was unsure “where it went.” C.R.
was scared and “started like covering [his] head ….” Eventually, he looked over and saw
“[Mendez] … on the floor.” While Mendez was on the floor, defendant stood “over
[Mendez’s] body, and then shot him once in the back.” C.R. testified the handgun was
“[l]ike three or four feet” away from Mendez’s back when it was fired. (C.R. testified he
heard “[j]ust two” gunshots.)
Defendant “tried to open the door and he tried to run away, but he really couldn’t
because the way [Mendez’s] head was—like body was, it was kind of like blocking it, but
he ended up getting away.” According to C.R., the whole incident lasted less than a
minute. C.R. further testified defendant and Mendez were friends, and he had seen
defendant on five prior occasions—the last being “[a] couple months” before the murder.
C.R. knew that defendant drove a dark blue “family car.”
Mendez’s sister heard “gunshots really close by, and [she] ran to [her] brother’s
room.” She then observed defendant “trying to come out of [Mendez’s] room.”
Defendant “ha[d] a gun in his hand, and all [she saw] was the red light [of the laser] on
[her] stomach.” Defendant then ran to the front gate and “[h]e tripped over the mailbox
and dropped the gun, and he got up and r[an] towards the alley.” Later, emergency
personnel arrived on scene and transported Mendez to the hospital where he was later
pronounced dead.
5.
The Crash
Subsequently, at or around 10:20 p.m., Modesto Police Department (MPD) Officer
Felix Carrillo was enroute to the Larkin Avenue address when he was “notified of a
vehicle that collided around the corner from the address.” He arrived on scene and
noticed a blue Volvo station wagon2 had crashed into a short fence in front of a residence
at Oregon Avenue. Officer Carrillo looked inside the Volvo and noticed “there was
blood inside of the vehicle” and the vehicle “was still running.” A detective searched the
vehicle, collected blood samples,3 and seized a cell phone located in the center console
area.
At approximately 11:00 p.m., a hospital security guard was informed a “gunshot
wound patient [was] coming in to the ER.” The security guard told officers she then
observed “a gold or beige color Suburban pull into the entrance of the emergency drop
off” and defendant walk into the hospital for treatment. MPD Officer John Carrico
arrived at the hospital, contacted defendant, and noticed his clothing “consisted of a black
shirt [¶] … [¶] [and] [b]lack shorts with a white stripe.” He then noticed defendant had
small scratches on his left shoulder blade and left lower back, along with a “hole in his
right hip area, and then one on his left chest about three inches below his left nipple area
was another small hole.” Defendant also had an injury to the inside part of his left
thumb,4 and his back was covered in dirt. Officer Carrico spoke with defendant, who
told him “he had been in some type of vehicle collision or car accident.” Officer Carrico
2Officer Carrillo incorrectly identified the vehicle as “a blue Volkswagen.” However,
another MPD officer correctly identified the crashed vehicle as “[a] blue Volvo station wagon”
(People’s exhibit 50).
3Both parties stipulated to the following: “The blood samples were then submitted for
DNA analysis and subsequently completed by Senior Criminalist Steven Cavanaugh. Steven
Cavanaugh determined the DNA associated with the human blood collected from the Volvo
driver’s door handle belong[ed] to … defendant.”
4An MPD detective testified this injury “would be consistent … [with] the finger being
close to the barrel of the gun at the time the gun is fired ….”
6.
testified that during this interview defendant “seemed to be evasive and didn’t want to
answer [his] question[s].”
Subsequent Law Enforcement Investigation
At 11:36 p.m., investigators arrived at the Larkin Avenue address. Investigators
entered the converted garage/bedroom and noticed a cell phone on top of the bed. They
began searching for bullets and “did not find or locate any expended bullets, [but] did
find shell casings.” There were “two .40-caliber expended shell casings behind the door
[¶] [a]nd then when [they] were examining the clothing that had been cut off from
[Mendez] …, [they] located an expended nine-millimeter [shell casing].” Further, a live
.40-caliber round was found underneath the vehicle on the driveway, as well as “blood
droplets and … additional clothing from [Mendez].” In the street there “were three
expended .40-caliber shell casings.” Investigators also located an empty Glock pistol
case inside the bottom drawer of a nightstand located next to Mendez’s bed.
Officers obtained surveillance footage from the night of the murder. The
surveillance footage showed “a [Volvo] crash through the fence into a parked vehicle at
[the] Oregon” address. Subsequently, “a human subject gets out of the driver’s side of
the car, appears to shut the door behind or shut the door as the person is leaving the
vehicle.” The individual then ran in the direction towards Oregon Park.
MPD Detective Philip Weber, an expert in cell phone data extraction, analyzed an
Alcatel cell phone belonging to defendant and an iPhone XR that belonged to Mendez.
On December 14, 2020, at 9:10 p.m., there was a call from defendant’s phone to
Mendez’s phone that lasted one minute and 52 seconds. Subsequently, at 9:13 p.m.,
another call was made from defendant’s phone to Mendez’s phone that lasted eight
minutes and 52 seconds. Defendant and Mendez also exchanged messages via Facebook
Messenger chat. On December 6, 2020, defendant sent Mendez a Facebook Messenger
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chat stating, “‘[S]hoot your number’”[;] Mendez then responded with his cell phone
number.
Detective Weber also reviewed defendant’s cell phone web history. On
December 7, 2020, at 5:22 p.m., defendant searched the web for “‘ghost gun laws in
CA.’” At 5:23 p.m., defendant searched, “‘Ghost Guns in California[,]’” and at 5:24
p.m., he searched, “‘Are guns legal in California.’” At 5:25 p.m., defendant again viewed
the article titled, “‘Ghost Guns in California’” and subsequently refreshed or reopened
this article.
On cross-examination, Detective Weber acknowledged the presence of Snapchat5
conversations on Mendez’s phone indicating he was upset with his friends over a gun.
Specifically, Mendez was “upset with some of his friends related to a gun that he gave his
friend … that was taken from [his friend] because of a debt that [Mendez] owed [to
another individual] because of a gun that was lost before.” There were additional
conversations where Mendez indicated he wanted a gun. There were also several
photographs of Mendez holding “various different guns” and some of these photographs
were taken within 10 days of the murder.
Autopsy and Ballistics Evidence
Forensic pathologist Dr. Sung-Ook Baik performed an autopsy on Mendez.
Dr. Baik discovered “a bullet wound located on the back of the right shoulder.” “The
bullet penetrate[d] the right third rib, and the right lung, and aorta, esophagus, left lung,
and the stomach.” Dr. Baik located the bullet inside Mendez’s stomach and determined
Mendez “died of blood loss due to [a] gunshot wound to the back.”
5“Snapchat is a phone application that, among other things, allows users to post
‘stories.’” (In re A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 647, 650.) “A story is a photograph or video
posted by a Snapchat user. The user can add captions and other effects to the photographs and
videos.” (Id. at pp. 650–651.)
8.
Firearms expert Anthony Sutter testified he received four fragments of the bullet
removed from Mendez’s body and analyzed these fragments to determine the bullet’s
caliber. He determined the bullet was “likely a nine-millimeter Luger” and further
testified “it is possible to fire a nine millimeter Luger in a 40 Smith & Wesson firearm,”
but clarified “it’s extremely unlikely” in this case based on the bullet’s markings.
The Defense
Forensic criminologist Brent Turvey, Ph.D., testified for the defense. Dr. Turvey
examined the evidence in this case and concluded there were five separate events: (1) an
attack in the garage doorway, (2) defendant was shot, (3) Mendez was shot, (4) a shooter
or shooters firing guns in or near the street, and (5) defendant crashing the vehicle.
Specifically, he opined to the following:
“We don’t have—we know there’s at least a .40 caliber firearm
involved in this case and at least a nine-millimeter involved in this case.
Two separate weapons. It is unreasonable to think [defendant] entered like
wild Bill doing two different guns with two sets of ammunition, if you
assume he’s the shooter. But that would be an assumption. There’s no
physical evidence to show any one of the two people shot in this case were
actually the shooter. We don’t have that physical evidence that puts a gun
in any one person’s hands. Again, somebody collected those firearms from
the scene and got rid of them, because they were not found at the scene and
were not collected by the police.
“See we have at least two guns, neither of the victims—neither the
defendant or the homicide victim are associated with those guns that I’m
aware of by physical evidence, and we have evidence of at least one-third
[sic] party shooting at the scene and cleaning and removing the firearms.
“Given the absence of other investigative forensic efforts, we’re left
with a lot of unanswered questions. It’s very possibly a third person could
have come in there and shot both of them, or two people came in and shot
both of them. That possibility has not been eliminated. There’s been no
investigation that shows any forensic effort to lockdown and connect the
victim with the guns or the defendant with the guns. All we know is there’s
no gun in his car. There’s no firearm that he takes with him when he
leaves[.] [¶] … [¶] … There’s so much unknown here, and the physical
9.
evidence does not appear to have been attended to. We can’t use the
physical evidence to answer any of the significant questions in this case.”
DISCUSSION
I. Substantial Evidence Supports Defendant’s First Degree Murder Conviction
Defendant contends his first degree murder conviction must be dismissed because
there lacks substantial evidence “he [was] the individual who shot and killed the victim,”
and alternatively, “the prosecution failed to prove that he was not acting in lawful self-
defense.” As to both claims, we disagree.
A. Applicable Law
“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being … with malice aforethought.”
(§ 187, subd. (a).) “[M]alice may be express or implied.” (§ 188, subd. (a).) “Malice is
express when there is manifested a deliberate intention to unlawfully take away the life of
a fellow creature.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(1).) “‘Intent to unlawfully kill and express malice
are, in essence, “one and the same.” [Citation.]’” (People v. Perez (2010) 50 Cal.4th
222, 233, fn. 7.) “‘A killing with express malice formed willfully, deliberately, and with
premeditation constitutes first degree murder.’ [Citation.] ‘Second degree murder is the
unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought but without the additional
elements, such as willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation, that would support a
conviction of first degree murder.’” (People v. Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, 133.)
The principles governing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying
a first degree murder conviction are well settled. Under the substantial evidence standard
of review, we examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment below
(People v. Becerrada (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1009, 1028), “examin[ing] the record
independently for ‘“substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible,
and of solid value”’ that would support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v.
Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 804.) Reversal on a substantial evidence ground “is
unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
10.
substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th
297, 331.)
B. Analysis
1. Defendant Was the Shooter
Here, substantial evidence exists to support the jury’s finding defendant was the
actual shooter. C.R. testified defendant and Mendez were friends, and C.R. had observed
defendant on five prior occasions. Further, C.R. identified defendant in court as the
individual who broke into Mendez’s bedroom and shot Mendez. Specifically, he testified
that on the night of the murder, defendant wore a black shirt and had “a [hand]gun in
[his] hand, and the gun looked black and had a red laser on it.” C.R. then testified he
observed Mendez on the floor, and at that point defendant stood three or four feet away
from Mendez’s “body, and then shot him once in the back.” C.R.’s testimony by itself
provided substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding that defendant shot Mendez.
(People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 963; see People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th
1149, 1181 [“[U]nless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable,
testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction”].)
Further, additional evidence exists to corroborate C.R.’s testimony. Mendez’s
sister testified she heard “gunshots really close by, and [she] ran to [her] brother’s room”
and observed defendant “trying to come out of [the] room.” She then observed defendant
with “a gun in his hand, and all [she] s[aw] was the red light [of the laser] on [her]
stomach.” Defendant then ran away from the house, “tripped over the mailbox and
dropped the gun, and he got up and r[an] towards the alley.” The sister’s testimony
provided corroborating evidence to support C.R.’s recollection of events.
Nonetheless, defendant argues “[t]he evidence … fails to establish that [he] was
the person who shot [Mendez]” because “[t]hirteen-year-old C.R. was the only
eyewitness to testify about the shooting, but a critical portion of his testimony conflicted
11.
with the physical evidence and much of his testimony was uncorroborated.” Specifically,
defendant points out certain inconsistencies in the evidence in support of his argument
that insufficient evidence exists to support the verdict. First, he points to the fact that two
.40-caliber shell casings were found inside the bedroom, even though a nine-millimeter
shell casing was recovered from Mendez’s pants and a nine-millimeter bullet was found
inside Mendez’s stomach. Second, defendant points to inconsistencies and potential bias
in the testimony of Mendez’s sister, along with the fact that Thomas S. refused to answer
any questions about the incident and thus, “it is reasonable to infer he was more than a
mere bystander.” Irrespective of these inconsistencies, “[w]e do not redetermine the
weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses” (In re M.S. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th
1177, 1185), and “‘[r]esolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is the
exclusive province of the trier of fact.’” (Ibid., quoting People v. Young, supra, 34
Cal.4th at p. 1181.) Overall, “[i]f the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s
findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances
might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.” (People v. Albillar (2010)
51 Cal.4th 47, 60.) Because C.R. testified he observed defendant shoot Mendez in the
back, coupled with the sister’s testimony she observed defendant with a firearm, this
constitutes substantial evidence to support the jury’s conclusion defendant was the actual
shooter.
2. Defendant’s Self-defense Claim
Alternatively, defendant argues, “[e]ven assuming, arguendo, that sufficient
evidence established [he] was the shooter, [his] murder conviction is not supported by
substantial evidence because the prosecution failed to prove that [he] did not act in lawful
self-defense.” “‘To justify an act of self-defense …, the defendant must have an honest
and reasonable belief that bodily injury is about to be inflicted on him. [Citation.]’
[Citation.] The threat of bodily injury must be imminent [citation], and ‘… any right of
12.
self-defense is limited to the use of such force as is reasonable under the circumstances.’”
(People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1064–1065, italics omitted.) The defendant’s
belief in the need to act in self-defense must be objectively reasonable as determined
from the point of view of a reasonable person in the defendant’s position. (Id. at p. 1065;
People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082–1083.) “It is well established that the
ordinary self-defense doctrine—applicable when a defendant reasonably believes that his
safety is endangered—may not be invoked by a defendant who, through his own
wrongful conduct (e.g., the initiation of a physical assault or the commission of a felony),
has created circumstances under which his adversary’s attack or pursuit is legally
justified.” (In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 773, fn. 1, italics omitted; accord,
People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 288.) If the evidence raises the possibility the
defendant acted in self-defense or with another justification, the burden is on the
prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant did not act in self-defense
or with another legal justification. (People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 462.)
As it relates to the self-defense doctrine, we find both People v. Szadziewicz
(2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 823, disapproved on another ground in People v. Dalton (2019) 7
Cal.5th 166, 214, and People v. Hardin (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 625 (Hardin) instructive.
In Szadziewicz, the defendant broke into a sleeping victim’s hotel room armed with a
knife in an attempt to steal drugs. (Szadziewicz, supra, at pp. 829–831.) During his trial
for attempted murder, the defendant testified he knifed the victim in self-defense when
the victim awoke, jumped out of bed, and pushed the defendant up against a wall. (Id. at
pp. 832–833.) The court rejected the defendant’s assertion the trial court erred in not
instructing the jury with the imperfect self-defense instruction because the defendant
“created the circumstances under which his adversary’s attack or pursuit [was] legally
justified [and thus, he could] not invoke unreasonable self-defense.” (Id. at p. 834.)
Further, in Hardin, “[t]he primary issue presented [was] whether a number of
instructions concerning a resident’s right of self-defense impinged on [the] defendant’s
13.
assertion of imperfect self-defense against a charge of murder.” (Hardin, supra, 85
Cal.App.4th at p. 628.) Specifically, the defendant argued that “his entry into [the
victim’s] home was no more than ‘a mere trespass upon [her] property, even though
forcible,’” and he did not “‘initiate a physical assault upon her or commit some other
form of felony.’” (Id. at p. 632.) Thus, “‘the victim ha[d] no right to use deadly or other
excessive force’” and therefore, “he did not, solely by reason of his nonfelonious entry,
forfeit his right to self-defense because the victim was not entitled to respond to his mere
trespass with deadly force.” (Ibid.) However, the court disagreed and stated the
following:
“When [the] defendant burst into her house, [the victim] would be
presumptively justified in fearing that the unlawful entry entailed a threat to
her life and safety. She was thus entitled to use force to evict him, force
which section 198.5[6] would make presumptively reasonable.… [The]
[d]efendant made no effort to retreat, despite the opportunity to do so
offered by [the victim] twice ordering him to leave. At that point, [the
victim] would have been justified in using force (although all she actually
did was threaten that use). Because [the victim] had justification, [the]
defendant was not … ‘defend[ing] himself against a criminal attempt to
take his life.’ The entire situation was created by [the] defendant. [The
victim’s] use of force was privileged; [the] defendant’s was not.” (Hardin,
supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 634, fn. omitted, italics omitted.)
Here, C.R. testified defendant forced himself into Mendez’s bedroom at night
while holding a black handgun with a red laser. Similar to the victim in Hardin, C.R.
testified that Mendez attempted to block the door and told defendant his young brothers
were inside the room “and that he wasn’t going to be able to get in.” Mendez gave
6Section 198.5 states the following: “Any person using force intended or likely to cause
death or great bodily injury within his or her residence shall be presumed to have held a
reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily injury to self, family, or a member of
the household when that force is used against another person, not a member of the family or
household, who unlawfully and forcibly enters or has unlawfully and forcibly entered the
residence and the person using the force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and
forcible entry occurred.”
14.
defendant the opportunity to leave, but “[d]efendant made no effort to retreat.” (Hardin,
supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 634.) Even assuming Mendez shot defendant first, because
“[t]he entire situation was created by defendant[,] [Mendez’s] use of force was
privileged; defendant’s was not.” (Ibid.) Therefore, substantial evidence exists that
defendant was not acting in lawful self-defense when he shot Mendez. Accordingly,
substantial evidence supports defendant’s first degree murder conviction.
II. Instructional Error Claims
Further, defendant makes two instructional error claims. First, he contends “the
[CALCRIM No. 521] instruction provided an inaccurate definition of premeditation
which removed the element from the jury’s consideration, in violation of [his] state and
federal constitutional rights to a jury trial and due process.” Specifically, defendant takes
issue with the portion of the CALCRIM No. 521 instruction stating, “The defendant acted
with premeditation if he decided to kill before completing the acts that caused death.”
(Italics omitted.) Second, he contends “[t]he version of CALCRIM No. 571 given to the
jury … included the following optional sentence, ‘Imperfect self-defense does not apply
when the defendant, through his own wrongful conduct, has created circumstances that
justify his adversary’s use of force[,]’ [which,] [b]ased on the evidence, … resulted in
denying [him] his state and federal constitutional rights to a trial by jury and due process
of law.” (Italics omitted.) As to both claims, we disagree.
As both parties agree, trial counsel did not object either to CALCRIM No. 521 or
CALCRIM No. 571, nor did trial counsel request any modifications to these instructions.
In general, “‘[a] party may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law and
responsive to the evidence was too general or incomplete unless the party has requested
appropriate clarifying or amplifying language’” in the trial court. (People v. Mejia
(2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 586, 617.) “But no forfeiture will be found where … the court’s
instruction was an incorrect statement of the law [citation], or the instructional error
15.
affected the defendant’s substantial rights.” (People v. Mason (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th
818, 823.)
As to the alleged instructional error regarding CALCRIM No. 521, defendant
argues the trial court’s instructions “effectively removed the element of premeditation
from the jury’s consideration, thereby affecting [his] substantial constitutional rights to a
trial by jury and due process of law.” Further, as to the alleged instructional error
regarding CALCRIM No. 571, defendant argues “[s]ince the instructional error affected
[his] substantial rights, his claim of instructional error has not been forfeited.” Because
defendant’s position is the challenged instructions, as given, affected his substantial
rights, we review these claims on their merits.
A. Standard of Review
As noted, defendant did not object to the instructions at trial. Nevertheless, we
review the merits of his claims of error regarding the CALCRIM No. 521 and CALCRIM
No. 571 instructions to determine whether these instructions affected his substantial
rights. (See § 1259 [appellate court may “review any instruction given, refused or
modified, even though no objection was made thereto in the lower court, if the substantial
rights of the defendant were affected thereby”].) “‘“[A] defendant need not assert an
objection to preserve a contention of instructional error when the error affects the
defendant’s ‘substantial rights.’ [Citation.] In this regard, ‘[t]he cases equate
“substantial rights” with reversible error’ under the test stated in People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818. [Citation.]” [Citations.] “Ascertaining whether claimed instructional
error affected the substantial rights of the defendant necessarily requires an examination
of the merits of the claim ….”’” (People v. Jimenez (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 726, 730,
quoting People v. Lawrence (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 547, 553–554, fn. 11.)
“The independent or de novo standard of review is applicable in assessing whether
instructions correctly state the law [citations] and also whether instructions effectively
16.
direct a finding adverse to a defendant by removing an issue from the jury’s consideration
[citations].” (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.) “‘In determining whether
error has been committed in giving or not giving jury instructions, we must consider the
instructions as a whole [and] assume that the jurors are intelligent persons and capable of
understanding and correlating all jury instructions which are given.’” (People v. Yoder
(1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 333, 338.) “Instructions should be interpreted, if possible, so as
to support the judgment rather than defeat it if they are reasonably susceptible to such
interpretation.” (People v. Laskiewicz (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 1254, 1258.)
B. Additional Factual Background
As to CALCRIM No. 521, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
“The defendant is guilty of first degree murder if the People have
proved that he acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation. The
defendant acted willfully if he intended to kill. The defendant acted
deliberately if he carefully weighed the considerations for and against his
choice and, knowing the consequences, decided to kill. The defendant
acted with premeditation if he decided to kill before completing the acts
that caused death.
“The length of time the person spends considering whether to kill
does not alone determine whether the killing is deliberate and premeditated.
The amount of time required for deliberation and premeditation may vary
from person to person and according to the circumstances. A decision to
kill made rashly, impulsively, or without careful consideration is not
deliberate and premeditated. On the other hand, a cold, calculated decision
to kill can be reached quickly. The test is the extent of the reflection, not
the length of time.
“The requirements for second degree murder based on express or
implied malice are explained in CALCRIM No. 520, First or Second
Degree Murder With Malice Aforethought.
“The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that the killing was first degree murder rather than a lesser crime. If the
People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of
first degree murder and the murder is second degree murder.”
Further, as to CALCRIM No. 571, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
17.
“A killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary
manslaughter if the defendant killed a person because he acted in imperfect
self-defense.
“If you conclude the defendant acted in complete self-defense, his
action was lawful and you must find him not guilty of any crime. The
difference between complete self-defense and imperfect self-defense
depends on whether the defendant’s belief in the need to use deadly force
was reasonable.
“The defendant acted in imperfect self-defense if:
“The defendant actually believed that he was in imminent danger of
being killed or suffering great bodily injury;
“AND
“The defendant actually believed that the immediate use of deadly
force was necessary to defend against the danger;
“BUT
“At least one of those beliefs was unreasonable.
“Belief in future harm is not sufficient, no matter how great or how
likely the harm is believed to be.
“In evaluating the defendant’s beliefs, consider all the circumstances
as they were known and appeared to the defendant.
“A danger is imminent if, when the fatal wound occurred, the danger
actually existed or the defendant believed it existed. The danger must seem
immediate and present, so that it must be instantly dealt with. It may not be
merely prospective or in the near future.
“Imperfect self-defense does not apply when the defendant, through
his own wrongful conduct, has created circumstances that justify his
adversary’s use of force.
“Great bodily injury means significant or substantial physical injury.
It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.
“The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant was not acting in imperfect self-defense. If the People
18.
have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of
murder.”
C. Analysis
1. CALCRIM No. 521
Here, CALCRIM No. 521 adequately apprised the jury of the relevant legal
principles. Our Supreme Court explained, “‘In the context of first degree murder,
“‘premeditated’ means ‘considered beforehand.’”’” (People v. Houston (2012) 54
Cal.4th 1186, 1216.) Defendant argues the language of CALCRIM No. 521, which
stated, “The defendant acted with premeditation if he decided to kill before completing
the acts that caused death,” eliminated the critical distinction between premeditation and
intent to kill. We do not find this sentence to be an incorrect statement of the law. In the
context of the instruction, we see no meaningful distinction between “‘“‘considered
beforehand’”’” (Houston, at p. 1216) and “decided to kill before ….” (CALCRIM
No. 521).
Our Supreme Court has held that CALJIC No. 8.20, the predecessor to CALCRIM
No. 521, is a correct statement of law. (People v. Lucero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1006, 1021.)
CALJIC No. 8.20 provides that “[t]he word ‘premeditated’ relates to when a person
thinks and means considered beforehand. One premeditates by deliberating before taking
action.” On the other hand, CALCRIM No. 521 provides a “defendant acted with
premeditation if (he/she) decided to kill before completing the act[s] that caused death.”
(Italics omitted.) We conclude the phrase “considered beforehand” in CALJIC No. 8.20
and the phrase “decided to kill before completing the act[s]” in CALCRIM No. 521 both
convey the correct principle of law concerning premeditation, meaning “considered
beforehand.” (See People v. Houston, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1216.) Additionally,
CALCRIM No. 521 also instructed the jury “[a] decision to kill made rashly, impulsively,
or without careful consideration is not deliberate and premeditated. On the other hand, a
cold, calculated decision to kill can be reached quickly. The test is the extent of the
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reflection, not the length of time.” (Italics added.) Although defendant argues “[t]he
remainder of the instruction failed to clarify and accurately define this essential element,”
we instead conclude this additional language further clarified the requirements for both
premeditation and deliberation.7 Accordingly, we conclude that CALCRIM No. 521, as
given here, was a correct statement of the law and adequately instructed the jury
regarding premeditation. (Lucero, supra, at p. 1021.)
2. CALCRIM No. 571
Further, the trial court properly instructed the jury with the “wrongful conduct”
language of CALCRIM No. 571. As discussed above, “It is well established that the
ordinary self-defense doctrine—applicable when a defendant reasonably believes that his
safety is endangered – may not be invoked by a defendant who, through his own
wrongful conduct (e.g., the initiation of a physical assault or the commission of a felony),
has created the circumstances under which his adversary’s attack or pursuit is legally
justified.” (In re Christian S., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 773, fn. 1, italics omitted.) “It
follows, a fortiori, that the imperfect self-defense doctrine cannot be invoked in such
circumstances. For example, the imperfect self-defense doctrine would not permit a
fleeing felon who shoots a pursuing police officer to escape a murder conviction even if
7Defendant attempts to analogize this case with our Supreme Court’s decision in People
v. Bender (1945) 27 Cal.2d 164, abrogated on another ground in People v. Lasko (2000) 23
Cal.4th 101, 110. In Bender, our Supreme Court found instructional error when the trial court
instructed the jury that a defendant “‘can premeditate, that is, think before doing the act, the
moment he conceives the purpose, as well as if the act were the result of long preconcert or
preparation.’” (Id. at p. 182.) The court concluded the jury was not properly instructed
regarding first degree murder because “if an act is deliberate and premeditated even though it be
executed in the very moment it is conceived, with absolutely ‘no appreciable’ time for
consideration—then it is difficult to see wherein there is any field for classification of second
degree murder.” (Ibid.) Essentially, the trial court “wholly deleted the only difference, in this
type of case, between first and second degree murder.” (Id. at p. 183.) As noted above, unlike in
Bender, the trial court here defined both “premeditation” and “deliberation” with the model
CALCRIM instruction (CALCRIM No. 521), which our Supreme Court has held to be an
accurate statement of the law. (People v. Lucero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1021.) Therefore,
Bender is distinguishable from the instructions in this case.
20.
the felon killed his pursuer with an actual belief in the need for self-defense.” (Ibid.; see,
e.g., People v. Ramirez (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 940, 948 [“Simply put, a defendant who
assaults his victims with a gun may not set up a valid self-defense claim with evidence he
believed the victims also reached for a gun, since they would be justified in meeting
deadly force with deadly force”]; Hardin, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 634 [“Because [the
victim] had justification, [the] defendant was not … ‘defend[ing] himself against a
criminal attempt to take his life.’ [Citation.] The entire situation was created by [the]
defendant. [The victim’s] use of force was privileged; [the] defendant’s was not,” italics
omitted].)
Defendant argues that “due to the inclusion of the wrongful conduct sentence in
CALCRIM No. 571, the jury was not allowed to find that [he] acted in imperfect self-
defense if it found that he forced his way into [Mendez]’s room or otherwise created
circumstances which justified [Mendez]’s use of nondeadly force.” However, as we
discussed in part I of the Discussion, ante, in analyzing whether substantial evidence
supported the jury’s finding defendant did not act in lawful self-defense, C.R. testified
defendant forced himself into Mendez’s room while holding a black handgun with a red
laser. Without considering other corroborating evidence, C.R.’s testimony alone
provided sufficient evidence to support the “wrongful conduct” instruction. (In re
Christian S., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 773, fn. 1; People v. Jones, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 963;
see People v. Ponce (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1386 [“[A] trial judge must only give
those instructions which are supported by substantial evidence”].) Again, defendant
directs this court to numerous inconsistencies in the record in support of his contention.
However, as we stated above, irrespective of these inconsistencies, we do not redetermine
the weight of the evidence or issues of witness credibility and resolution of conflict and
inconsistencies in the evidence because these determinations are the exclusive province
of the trier of fact. (In re M.S., supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 1185.) Accordingly, the trial
21.
court properly instructed the jury with the “wrongful conduct” language in the
CALCRIM No. 571 instruction.
Defendant further contends these alleged errors were prejudicial under the
standard articulated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24. Because we
conclude the trial court accurately instructed the jury regarding the elements of first
degree murder (CALCRIM No. 521) and voluntary manslaughter (CALCRIM No. 571),
we need not undertake a prejudicial error analysis.
III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
Defendant further contends he was denied his federal and state constitutional right
to effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to: (1) “request the court
to instruct the jury that provocation can reduce first degree murder to second degree
murder, and that a subjective test for provocation applies to murder, which is different
than the objective test for provocation that applies to voluntary manslaughter”; and (2)
“object to several instances of prosecutorial misconduct that occurred during the
prosecutor’s closing and rebuttal arguments.” (Some capitalization omitted.) As to each
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we disagree.
A. Standard of Review
Defendant has the burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel. (People v.
Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 425, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Berryman
(1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1081, fn. 10.) To establish such a claim, defendant must show (1)
his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) but
for counsel’s error, a different result would have been reasonably probable. (Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687–688 (Strickland); People v. Ledesma (1987) 43
Cal.3d 171, 216–218.) “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” (Strickland, at p. 694.)
22.
“Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation [of counsel’s
performance], a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must
overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be
considered sound trial strategy.’” (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 689.) “When a claim
of ineffective assistance is made on direct appeal, and the record does not show the
reason for counsel’s challenged actions or omissions, the conviction must be affirmed
unless there could be no satisfactory explanation.” (People v. Anderson (2001) 25
Cal.4th 543, 569.) Reversal is permitted “‘only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses
counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel
was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no
satisfactory explanation.’” (People v. Arredondo (2019) 8 Cal.5th 694, 711.) “In light of
the deferential standard, appellate courts do not second-guess reasonable, if difficult,
tactical decisions in the harsh light of hindsight and, for this reason, tactical errors do not
generally provide a basis for reversing a conviction.” (People v. Clotfelter (2021) 65
Cal.App.5th 30, 55, accord, People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1212.)
B. Defendant Did Not Receive Ineffective Assistance of Counsel When His
Trial Counsel Did Not Request the Trial Court to Instruct the Jury
with CALCRIM No. 522
Specifically, defendant argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel when
his trial counsel failed to request CALCRIM No. 522 because the “evidence warranted
the instruction on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter based on heat of
passion, as well as the instruction on excusable homicide based on an accidental killing in
the heat of passion, and thus it also warranted an instruction [CALCRIM No. 522] on the
effect of provocation on the degree of murder.”
23.
1. Additional Factual Background
During the jury instruction conference, trial counsel requested jury instructions on
both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. The prosecutor objected, but the trial court
instructed the jury on both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, as well as first and
second degree murder. Further, as to whether CALCRIM No. 522 (Provocation: Effect
on Degree of Murder) should be provided to the jury, the following exchange occurred
between the trial court, the prosecutor, and trial counsel:
“[THE COURT:] And then my next question is whether the
provocation instruction 522 should be given. There is some mention of
provocation in one of the instructions, but 522 specifically deals with
provocation right after first degree murder.
“[PROSECUTOR]: I think we need to wait until defense’s evidence is
put on. I haven’t seen any evidence of provocation which is why I didn’t
include it.
“[TRIAL COUNSEL]: I don’t have the 522 in the stack.
“THE COURT: It’s not in there, I was just wondering whether it is
needed. I’ll review that again then, but it would depend in part on what
happens in defense case.”
No further discussions occurred regarding CALCRIM No. 522. Subsequently, the trial
court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 511 (Excusable Homicide: Accident in the
Heat of Passion), in pertinent part, as follows:
“The defendant is not guilty of murder if he killed someone by
accident while acting in the heat of passion. Such a killing is excused, and
therefore not unlawful, if, at the time of killing:
“1. The defendant acted in the heat of passion;
“2. The defendant was suddenly drawn into combat by [Mendez];
“3. The defendant did not take undue advantage of [Mendez];
“4. The defendant did not use a dangerous weapon;
“5. The defendant did not kill [Mendez] in a cruel or unusual way;
24.
“6. The defendant did not intend to kill [Mendez] and did not act
with conscious disregard of the danger to human life;
“AND
“7. The defendant did not act with criminal negligence.
“A person acts in the heat of passion when he or she is provoked into
doing a rash act under the influence of intense emotion that obscures his or
her reasoning or judgment. The provocation must be sufficient to have
caused a person of average disposition to act rashly and without due
deliberation, that is, from passion rather than from judgment.
“Heat of passion does not require anger, rage, or any specific
emotion. It can be any violent or intense emotion that causes a person to
act without due deliberation and reflection.
“In order for the killing to be excused on this basis, the defendant
must have acted under the direct and immediate influence of provocation as
I have defined it. While no specific type of provocation is required, slight
or remote provocation is not sufficient. Sufficient provocation may occur
over a short or long period of time.
“It is not enough that the defendant simply was provoked. The
defendant is not allowed to set up his own standard of conduct. You must
decide whether the defendant was provoked and whether the provocation
was sufficient. In deciding whether the provocation was sufficient,
consider whether a person of average disposition would have been
provoked and how such a person would react in the same situation knowing
the same facts. [¶] … [¶]
“The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that the killing was not excused. If the People have not met this burden,
you must find the defendant not guilty of murder.” (Italics omitted.)
Further, the trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 570 (Voluntary
Manslaughter), as follows:
“A killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary
manslaughter if the defendant killed someone because of a sudden quarrel
or in the heat of passion.
“The defendant killed someone because of a sudden quarrel or in the
heat of passion if:
25.
“1. The defendant was provoked;
“2. As a result of the provocation, the defendant acted rashly and
under the influence of intense emotion that obscured his reasoning or
judgment;
“AND
“3. The provocation would have caused a person of average
disposition to act rashly and without due deliberation, that is, from passion
rather than from judgment.
“Heat of passion does not require anger, rage, or any specific
emotion. It can be any violent or intense emotion that causes a person to
act without due deliberation and reflection.
“In order for heat of passion to reduce a murder to voluntary
manslaughter, the defendant must have acted under the direct and
immediate influence of provocation as I have defined it. While no specific
type of provocation is required, slight or remote provocation is not
sufficient. Sufficient provocation may occur over a short or long period of
time.
“It is not enough that the defendant simply was provoked. The
defendant is not allowed to set up his own standard of conduct. You must
decide whether the defendant was provoked and whether the provocation
was sufficient. In deciding whether the provocation was sufficient,
consider whether a person of average disposition, in the same situation and
knowing the same facts, would have reacted from passion rather than from
judgment.
“If enough time passed between the provocation and the killing for a
person of average disposition to ‘cool off’ and regain his or her clear
reasoning and judgment, then the killing is not reduced to voluntary
manslaughter on this basis.
“The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant did not kill as the result of a sudden quarrel or in the heat
of passion. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the
defendant not guilty of murder.”
2. Analysis
Here, defendant has failed to establish he received ineffective assistance of
counsel as trial counsel could have had a sound tactical basis for not asking the trial court
26.
to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 522. Specifically, it was reasonable for trial
counsel to decline to request an instruction that did not advance the defense’s theory of
the case. (People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 643 [holding that defense counsel could
have had a rational tactical purpose for not requesting an instruction that was inconsistent
with the defense’s theory of the case that the defendant did not intend to kill the victim].)
Here, trial counsel’s primary argument was focused on convincing the jury that “[i]f
[defendant] did shoot [Mendez], it was self-defense because he was shot first.” Trial
counsel wanted the jury to fully acquit defendant of murder based either on perfect self-
defense (CALCRIM No. 505) or accidental homicide in the heat of passion (CALCRIM
No. 511). Alternatively, he argued the murder should be reduced to voluntary
manslaughter based either on heat of passion/provocation (CALCRIM No. 570) or
imperfect self-defense (CALCRIM No. 571). Additional jury instructions on
provocation, as a basis for second degree murder as set forth in CALCRIM No. 522,
would have been contrary to trial counsel’s strategy because this instruction would have
instead focused the jury’s attention on using the heat of passion/provocation theory to
reach a verdict of second degree murder, rather than to reach a verdict of not guilty or,
alternatively, guilt based on voluntary manslaughter. It is possible trial counsel only
wanted the jury to choose between first degree murder and voluntary manslaughter, and
did not want the jury to have the option of finding defendant guilty of second degree
murder. Therefore, it was reasonable for trial counsel not to request the trial court to
instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 522.
Nonetheless, defendant attempts to analogize this case to the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals’ decision in Duncan v. Ornoski (9th Cir. 2008) 528 F.3d 1222. In Duncan,
the court held the defendant’s trial counsel provided deficient performance by failing to
obtain a serology expert to test the defendant’s blood and present the results at trial. (Id.
at pp. 1234–1239.) If trial counsel had done so, the jury would have heard evidence there
was a third-party’s blood at the scene of the crime. (Id. at p. 1241.) The court concluded
27.
this evidence would have raised considerable doubt as to whether the defendant killed the
victim, and that, as a result, the defendant might have escaped the death penalty. (Ibid.)
Specifically, the court found that trial counsel was demonstrably ill-informed about the
field of serology. (Id. at p. 1236.) At the outset of trial counsel’s cross-examination of
the government’s serology expert, trial counsel told the expert, “‘You lost me’” (id. at p.
1235), and then proceeded to ask the expert about hair evidence, even though serology
involves the study of blood. (Id. at pp. 1235–1236.) Thus, the court concluded trial
counsel “did not have the personal expertise in serology to make strategic decisions about
how to handle the blood evidence on his own and he certainly was not qualified to
undermine the State’s case by simply cross-examining its experts without obtaining
expert assistance himself.” (Id. at p. 1236.) Therefore, in ruling in the defendant’s favor,
the court observed, “Although it may not be necessary in every instance to consult with
or present the testimony of an expert, when the prosecutor’s expert witness testifies about
pivotal evidence or directly contradicts the defense theory, defense counsel’s failure to
present expert testimony on that matter may constitute deficient performance.” (Duncan,
at p. 1235.)
Here, although defendant argues trial “counsel’s choices, like those in Duncan,
were not consistent with sound trial strategy,” we find trial counsel’s decisions to be fully
reasonable. Unlike in Duncan, trial counsel did not fail to investigate potentially
exculpatory evidence. Instead, trial counsel used evidence in this case, such as evidence
that defendant was shot during the altercation, along with evidence that two firearms may
have been involved, to argue defendant acted in lawful self-defense. Further, as we noted
above, trial counsel ran with this argument in an attempt to fully acquit defendant of
murder, or at a minimum, convince the jury to find defendant guilty of only
manslaughter. On the record on appeal, we will not say there was no strategic or tactical
reason for not requesting the trial court to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 522.
28.
Because we are unable to hold trial counsel’s performance deficient, we need not address
defendant’s prejudice argument. (See Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697.)
C. Defendant Did Not Receive Ineffective Assistance of Counsel When His
Trial Counsel Failed to Object to the Prosecutor’s Comments During
Her Closing and Rebuttal Arguments
Additionally, defendant argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to
trial counsel’s failure to object when “[t]he prosecutor committed misconduct during her
arguments to the jury by misstating the law on numerous occasions and by relying on a
jury instruction that was not given which was an inaccurate statement of the law on to
[sic] the right to self-defense.”
1. Additional Factual Background
As it relates to provocation, the prosecutor during her closing argument argued the
following:
“Either way there has to be provocation, and you heard the judge say
earlier that slight provocation or remote provocation is not adequate for
voluntary manslaughter. The provocation has to happen immediately
before.
“So we can’t think about maybe it was something that was said on
the phone call, because that’s not adequate. That’s remote provocation.
That’s too far away. That was an hour earlier. And words don’t justify the
use of deadly force anyway. So we know that heat of passion definitely
does not work.”
Additionally, as to an individual’s right to self-defense, the prosecutor argued the
following during her closing argument:
“See self-defense is when someone reasonably believes they’re in
imminent danger of being killed or being hurt severely, essentially GBI,
which is great bodily injury. In fear of being killed or being gravely
injured. And that the immediate response is to use deadly force in order to
stop that danger. So it has to be immediate, and it has to be necessary. It
has to be reasonable, necessary, and immediate. And that you can’t use any
more force than necessary.
29.
“We know this is not the case in this situation. One of the biggest
factors is that self-defense cannot be contrived, which means you can’t
provoke it. You have no right to self-defense if you provoke a fight or
quarrel with the intent of creating an excuse to use force.
“So you can’t just go to somebody’s house, break into their bedroom
expecting or knowing that they’re going to try to defend themself, and then
when they do defend themself, use that as a justification for shooting them.
That’s not self-defense.”
Subsequently, during the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument, she reiterated the
following:
“And, again, with the self-defense argument, it can’t be contrived.
He can’t break into—defense says, well, you have to prove he broke into
the house knowing that [Mendez] would shoot him so he could shoot back.
That’s not what I said. It is reasonable and logical under any circumstance
that if you break into somebody else’s bedroom while you’re carrying a
gun, that someone could die. And [defendant] wanted to make sure it
wasn’t him because he was trying to kill [Mendez], and that’s exactly what
he did.
“You cannot create a situation and then claim self-defense. You
cannot go to someone else’s house, shoot them and then claim that they
attacked you when you force your way in. You are the whole reason why
you were shot. You are the whole reason why the person that is dead on
the ground is dead.”
Finally, as to the law on imperfect self-defense, the prosecutor argued the
following during her closing argument:
“Now, the other theory of voluntary manslaughter is imperfect self-defense.
And in this case you have to have—the defendant had to believe in
imminent danger and believe immediate use of force is necessary to defend
against that danger. So everything that we had in self-defense, but one of
those has to be unreasonable. But if both of them are unreasonable, then
neither voluntary manslaughter or self-defense apply. You’re back to
murder. Because that’s the intent to kill so we know this doesn’t apply.”
2. Applicable Law
Prosecutorial misconduct exists “‘under state law only if it involves “‘the use of
deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.’”’”
30.
(People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 858.) In more extreme cases, a prosecutor’s
improper remarks “‘“‘infect[s] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting
conviction a denial of due process.’” [Citations.]’” (Ibid.) For example, it is
prosecutorial misconduct to misstate the law (People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101,
130), and to misstate the evidence or go beyond the record (People v. Gonzales (2011) 51
Cal.4th 894, 947; People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 550). However, the prosecution
“enjoys wide latitude in commenting on the evidence, including the reasonable inferences
and deductions that can be drawn therefrom.” (People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th
863, 928; see People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 277 [“hyperbolic and tendentious”
comments, even if “harsh and unbecoming,” may be reasonable if they can be inferred
from the evidence].)
3. Analysis
a. The Prosecutor’s Comments Regarding “Provocation”
First, defendant argues the prosecutor committed misconduct when she stated
during her closing argument that “[t]he provocation has to happen immediately before”
the homicide and that “we can’t think about maybe it was something that was said on the
phone call, because that’s not adequate. That’s remote provocation. That’s too far away.
That was an hour earlier. And words don’t justify the use of deadly force anyway.”
Specifically, defendant argues trial counsel should have objected to these improper
comments because provocation “may be physical or verbal, and it may be comprised of a
single incident or numerous incidents over a period of time,” and that “[i]t is also not
necessary for the provocation to occur immediately before the defendant’s response
thereto.” (Italics omitted.) However, even if we assume these comments were improper,
trial counsel may have decided not to object because: (1) he reasonably believed these
isolated comments did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct (see People v. Medina
(1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 759–760 [holding that even if a prosecutor improperly appealed to
31.
“the jury’s passions and prejudices,” any misconduct was harmless because the
prosecutor’s comments were “brief and isolated”]), and/or (2) trial counsel did not want
to draw the jury’s attention to this potential misstatement of the law. (See People v.
Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1290 [“[C]ounsel could also have decided that objecting
would focus the jury’s attention … in ways that would not be helpful to the defense”]; see
also People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 772–773 [holding that although defense
counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s personal opinion regarding the
appropriateness of the death penalty in the case, ineffective assistance of counsel was not
found because “[c]ounsel may well have tactically assumed that an objection or request
for admonition would simply draw closer attention to the prosecutor’s isolated
comments”].) In sum, trial counsel’s decision to not object to the prosecutor’s comments
regarding provocation did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.
However, even if trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
prosecutor’s comments, defendant is unable to establish he was prejudiced as a result of
this failure to object. As noted ante, the trial court provided both CALCRIM Nos. 511
and 570 wherein it instructed the jury, “Sufficient provocation may occur over a short or
long period of time.” (Italics added.) Further, the trial court instructed the jury that
“[n]othing that the attorneys say is evidence [and] [i]n their opening and closing
arguments, the attorneys discuss the case, but their remarks are not evidence”
(CALCRIM No. 222). Because we “presume [the jury] generally understand[s] and
follow[s] the [court’s] instructions” (People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 670), it
is highly unlikely the jury misapplied the prosecutor’s brief comments regarding
provocation before finding defendant guilty of first degree murder. Therefore, trial
counsel’s failure to object to these comments was not prejudicial.
32.
b. The Prosecutor’s Reliance on CALCRIM No. 3472
Second, defendant argues the prosecutor committed misconduct when “she relied
on CALCRIM No. 3472[8] which was not given, but also because she failed to inform the
jury about the exception for the situation where the defendant only intended to provoke a
nondeadly confrontation and the victim responded with deadly force, which was
previously referenced in the Bench Notes to the instruction and is now included as an
optional portion of the instruction.” Defendant argues trial counsel should have objected
to these comments and requested a curative instruction be given to the jury.
Here, CALCRIM No. 3472 was a correct statement of the law at the time of
defendant’s trial in March 2022. (People v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735, 761
[approving materially identical CALJIC analog to CALCRIM No. 3472]; People v.
Eulian (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1333–1334 [holding that CALCRIM No. 3472 is “a
correct statement of law” under Enraca].) With that being said, the Eulian court also
indicated CALCRIM No. 3472 “might require modification in the rare case in which a
defendant intended to provoke only a nondeadly confrontation and the victim responds
with deadly force.” (Eulian, at p. 1334.) Eventually, as noted above, in September 2022,
CALCRIM No. 3472 was modified to address the Eulian court’s concern. Defendant
argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s reference
to this instruction without also providing the jury with this newly added bracketed
language. However, at the time of defendant’s trial, CALCRIM No. 3472 was a correct
8CALCRIM No. 3472 states the following:
“A person does not have the right to self-defense if he or she provokes a fight or quarrel
with the intent to create an excuse to use force.”
In September 2022, CALCRIM No. 3472 was modified to include a bracketed second
sentence for use only in such cases as follows:
“[However, if the defendant used only non-deadly force, and the opponent responded
with such sudden and deadly force that the defendant could not withdraw from the fight, then the
defendant had the right to defend (himself/herself) with deadly force and was not required to try
to stop fighting.]”
33.
statement of law, and in the context of a change of a law, “defense counsel could not
reasonably have been expected to anticipate [a] change in the law.” (People v. Harris
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 840.) While a skilled attorney may craft an argument anticipating
a change in the law, “it was not objectively unreasonable within the meaning of
Strickland for … trial counsel to fail to predict” a change in the law. (Larrea v. Bennett
(2d Cir. 2004) 368 F.3d 179, 184.) Therefore, a failure to anticipate changes in the law is
not generally considered ineffective assistance of counsel. (See Green v. Johnson (5th
Cir. 1997) 116 F.3d 1115, 1125 [holding that “there is no general duty on the part of
defense counsel to anticipate changes in the law”]; Alcorn v. Smith (6th Cir. 1986) 781
F.2d 58, 62 [holding that “nonegregious errors such as failure to perceive or anticipate a
change in the law … generally cannot be considered ineffective assistance of counsel”].)
In sum, trial counsel’s decision not to object to the prosecutor’s reference to CALCRIM
No. 3472 did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.
However, even if trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
prosecutor’s reference to CALCRIM No. 3472, defendant is unable to establish he was
prejudiced as a result of this failure to object. As we discussed in part I of the
Discussion, ante, defendant used deadly force when he forced his way into Mendez’s
room while holding a loaded handgun. Defendant’s act of engaging in “deadly force”
made CALCRIM No. 3472’s bracketed language inapplicable to this case. Therefore,
even if trial counsel had objected and requested the trial court provide the jury with this
bracketed language, it is not reasonably probable the trial court would have agreed to
provide this bracketed language, and it was not reasonably probable the jury would have
reached a different conclusion even if it was provided this further instruction.
(Strickland, 466 U.S. at pp. 687–688, 694.) Accordingly, defendant was not prejudiced.
34.
c. The Prosecutor’s Comments Regarding the Law on
Imperfect Self-defense
Lastly, defendant argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his
trial counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s improper statement during her closing
argument regarding the law on imperfect self-defense. Specifically, as it related to
imperfect self-defense, the prosecutor argued the following during her closing argument:
“So everything that we had in self-defense, but one of those has to be unreasonable. But
if both of them are unreasonable, then neither voluntary manslaughter or self-defense
apply. You’re back to murder.” (Italics added.)
As both parties agree, the prosecutor’s argument is contrary to the language of
CALCRIM No. 571 provided to the jury. The trial court correctly instructed the jury that
a “defendant acted in imperfect self-defense if: [¶] [t]he defendant actually believed that
he was in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury; [¶] AND
[¶] [t]he defendant actually believed that the immediate use of deadly force was
necessary to defend against the danger; [¶] BUT [¶] [A]t least one of those beliefs was
unreasonable.” (Italics added.) Although we agree this statement was improper, we are
unable to conclude trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness when he decided not to object to this statement.
Similar to our conclusion above (see pt. III.C.3.a of the Discussion, ante), trial
counsel may have decided not to object because: (1) he reasonably believed this brief
statement by itself did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct, especially considering the
prosecutor immediately directed the jury to the trial court’s instructions regarding
CALCRIM No. 571 (see People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 676 [“‘When
argument runs counter to instructions given a jury, we will ordinarily conclude that the
jury followed the latter and disregarded the former, for “[w]e presume that jurors treat the
court’s instructions as a statement of the law by a judge, and the prosecutor’s comments
as words spoken by an advocate in an attempt to persuade.” [Citation.]’”]; and/or (2) he
35.
did not want to draw the jury’s attention to this potential misstatement of the law. (See
People v. Harris, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1290; see also People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d
at pp. 772–773.) In sum, trial counsel’s decision to not object to the prosecutor’s
misstatement of the law regarding the law of imperfect self-defense did not fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness.
However, even if trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
prosecutor’s misstatement of the law, defendant is unable to establish he was prejudiced
thereby. As noted above, immediately after the prosecutor made these improper
comments, she referred the jurors to a presentation slide wherein the correct language of
CALCRIM No. 571 was on full display for the entire jury, and then told the jury, “You
guys will have this in the jury deliberation room[,] [b]ut I wanted to put it up here so you
can see it and write the number down if you wanted.” Further, the trial court correctly
instructed the jury on voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense
(CALCRIM No. 571), and we presume the jury correctly followed the trial court’s
instructions. (People v. McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 670.) Because the prosecutor
directed the jury to the correct language of CALCRIM No. 571, coupled with the trial
court correctly instructing the jury regarding the law on imperfect self-defense, we are
unable to say that trial counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s misstatement of the
law was prejudicial.
IV. Cumulative Prejudice
Defendant further contends he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of the
alleged errors. Under the cumulative error doctrine, “the cumulative effect of several
trial errors may be prejudicial even if they would not be prejudicial when considered
individually.” (People v. Lua (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1004, 1019.) “We have concluded
that only one of [defendant’s] asserted claims of error has merit, and … [w]e conclude
that his other claims of error are without merit.” (People v. Woods (2015) 241
36.
Cal.App.4th 461, 489.) “As a result, there are no additional errors as to which the
cumulative effect would require reversal of any … counts.” (Ibid.)
V. Section 654 Does Not Apply to Count II
Finally, defendant contends “the trial court imposed an unauthorized sentence by
failing to stay the sentence on either count [I] or [II] pursuant to section 654 because
based on the verdicts and the prosecutor’s theory of the case, it is evident the jury found
the murder was the intended offense underlying the burglary, and thus both offenses were
committed pursuant to a single intent and objective.” We conclude the trial court
properly imposed a concurrent term for count II because multiple victims existed apart
from the murder victim Mendez.
A. Additional Factual Background
On May 23, 2022, at defendant’s sentencing hearing, the trial court stated the
following:
“I am aware that I do have discretion to strike the strike prior, the (a)
prior, and the gun enhancement prior. And in light of the circumstances of
this case, the fact that there were two—[Mendez] had two younger brothers
present in this room that was not very large, they were present when
[Mendez] was shot and killed, to mitigate against any reason to strike the
strike prior or the gun enhancement.
“I obviously never had a chance to meet [Mendez], but from what I
have heard from people that have discussed him and what he was like, I
think it’s going to leave a big hole in his family, [defendant]. And I don’t
know what it was that led to all this happening, but a lot of good was told to
me today about him, that he was willing to give the shirt off his back to
help someone else out. And you were his friend and had been there
previously. There was testimony about that. That this is not a stranger
situation. And I know there was testimony during the trial there was a
lengthy telephone conversation between the two of you, and it was pretty
clear that he had an idea you were coming when he told his younger
brothers to hide, to go back into the house, because he heard the gate open.
“And obviously this is going to leave a big hole in their lives. It is
obviously going to affect your family because you are going to be locked
37.
up a long time. I hope you take advantage of whatever programs might be
available for you in state prison and that you do think about this for the rest
of your life. And as his cousin said, he hopes that you have guilt for the
rest of your life about what happened and you think about this daily.
“I think that the fact that [defendant] was on parole and this involved
a serious use of violence and the firearm all are aggravating factors. And in
light of the sentencing was very violent conduct under Rule 4.441,
increasing seriousness of [defendant’s] adult convictions, Rule 4.421(b)(2).
It was indicated in your 4.421(b)(4). And his probation [sic] on probation
and parole was unsatisfactorily [sic] under Rule 4.421(b)(5). And the
victim in this case was particularly vulnerable having been shot in his own
home.
“So what I’m going to do at this point, I’m going to deny probation
in this matter. I will sentence [defendant] to the term of 25 years to life in
the state prison for Count I, first-degree murder. That will be doubled due
to the strike prior, for a total of 50 years to life. Plus an additional 25 years
to life for the [section] 12022.53(d), as in David. [¶] … [¶]
“… With respect to the [section] 667(a) prior, I am going to exercise
my discretion to strike that since that prior—although the Court does have
the authority to add an additional five years for that conviction, that
conviction was used to elevate or double the sentence on the homicide
count. So the total commitment for Count I will be 25 years to life times
two, plus 25 years to life with a gun enhancement.
“I will strike the [section] 667(a) enhancement and not impose the
additional five years that could be imposed for that.
“And with respect to the burglary count, which is Count II, I will
sentence [defendant] to concurrent sentence for Count II.
“If the Court of Appeal determines that it should have not run
concurrent, it would be my intent to run them—stay them pursuant to
section 654. And that would be for Count II for four years, which is the
midterm, times two, for eight years.
“I will strike the [section] 667(a) prior with respect to Count II as
well. And for the gun enhancement, impose the midterm of four years,
doubled due to the strike prior, which would be an additional eight years
consecutive.
38.
“So total commit for Count II will be 16 years to run concurrent or
stayed pursuant to [section] 654.…”
Subsequently, on July 11, 2022, the trial court conducted a resentencing hearing
based on an error it realized after the fact. Specifically, the following relevant exchange
occurred between the trial court and trial counsel:
“THE COURT: Okay. I think that, in light of the circumstances of
this case, and the fact that [defendant] does have a prior criminal history
and was on release at the time that this occurred, the Court did
acknowledge that it had the authority to strike the firearm enhancement at
the last hearing. I declined to do that, based on those circumstances.
“But I did make an error in terms of the sentencing for Count [II]. I
ordered that they were stayed, pursuant to [section] 654. I sentenced him to
the midterm of four years times two on the specific charge, and then the
midterm on the gun enhancement times two because of the strike prior.
And that second part of the sentence was unlawful, so my intended decision
will be to affirm the four times two for Count [II] and then add four years
for the gun enhancement and not double that. [¶] … [¶]
“[TRIAL COUNSEL]: … And I think, under the new changes to
[section] 1385, the Court should use its discretion to limit the entire case to
25 years to life.
“THE COURT: Okay. That request will be denied, but I will modify
the sentence. It will be 12 years stayed for Count [II], four times two plus
four for the firearms. And there’s already been a notice of appeal, so the
Court will issue an amended abstract of judgment reflecting the change in
the disposition today.”
Later that same day, the trial court recalled the case to provide clarification
regarding its earlier sentence. Specifically, the trial court stated the following:
“But I just wanted to clarify with respect to Count [II]—I think I said this
morning that I was going to stay them, the sentence, pursuant to …
[s]ection 654. And what I did previously was run them concurrent. And
then I said in the event that the court of appeal determines that that’s not
appropriate, I would stay that under … [s]ection 654. So that should not
change anything other than the length of the sentence, which I did
previously today. That was on Count [II], which was run concurrently, so
that would be 12 years instead of 16 years.”
39.
Both the abstract of judgment and the July 11, 2022, minute order reflect the trial
court’s imposition of a concurrent 12-year term on count II.
B. Applicable Law
Section 654 provides, in relevant part, “An act or omission that is punishable in
different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such
provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one
provision.” (§ 654, subd. (a).) The statute “expressly prohibits separate punishment for
two crimes based on the same act, but has been interpreted to also preclude multiple
punishment for two or more crimes occurring within the same course of conduct pursuant
to a single intent.” (People v. Vargas (2014) 59 Cal.4th 635, 642.) Determining
“[w]hether a defendant may be subjected to multiple punishment under section 654
requires a two-step inquiry …. We first consider if the different crimes were completed
by a ‘single physical act.’ [Citation.] If so, the defendant may not be punished more than
once for that act. Only if we conclude that the case involves more than a single act—i.e.,
a course of conduct—do we then consider whether the course of conduct reflects a single
‘“intent and objective”’ or multiple intents and objectives.” (People v. Corpening (2016)
2 Cal.5th 307, 311) “If all of the offenses are incident to one objective, the court may
punish the defendant for any one of the offenses, but not more than one. [Citation.] If,
however, the defendant had multiple or simultaneous objectives, independent of and not
merely incidental to each other, the defendant may be punished for each violation
committed in pursuit of each objective even though the violations share common acts or
were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct.” (People v. Cleveland (2001)
87 Cal.App.4th 263, 267–268.) However, this two-step inquiry is not required “where
‘“one act has two results each of which is an act of violence against the person of a
separate individual.”’” (People v. Correa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 331, 341, fn. 10.)
40.
“The question whether section 654 is factually applicable to a given series of
offenses is for the trial court, and the law gives the trial court broad latitude in making
this determination. Its findings on this question must be upheld on appeal if there is any
substantial evidence to support them.” (People v. Hutchins (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1308,
1312.) Under substantial evidence review, we review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the judgment and presume the existence of every fact that could reasonably
be deduced from the evidence. (People v. Cleveland, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 271.)
We “affirm the trial court’s ruling, if it is supported by substantial evidence, on any valid
ground.” (People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 886, fn. 14, overruled in part on
another ground in People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 103–104.)
C. Analysis
Even assuming defendant only possessed a single intent and objective in
committing both the burglary and murder, we find section 654 inapplicable in this case
based on the “multiple victim” exception. (People v. Correa, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 341
& fn. 10.) “[O]rdinarily, if the defendant commits both burglary and the underlying
intended felony, … section 654 will permit punishment for one or the other but not for
both.” (People v. Centers (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 84, 98–99 (Centers).) For example, a
defendant who enters a residence in order to commit an assault has a single intent and
objective and may not receive punishment for both the burglary and the assault. But
under the multiple victim exception to section 654, “‘“even though a defendant entertains
but a single principal objective during an indivisible course of conduct, he may be
convicted and punished for each crime of violence committed against a different victim.”
[Citations.] The reason for the multiple victim exception is that “when a defendant
‘“commits an act of violence with the intent to harm more than one person or by means
likely to cause harm to several persons,” his greater culpability precludes application of
section 654.’” [Citation.]’” (Centers, at p. 99.) “[B]urglary is a violent crime for
41.
purposes of the ‘multiple victim’ exception when the jury finds that, in the commission of
the burglary, the defendant personally used a firearm.” (Id. at p. 88.)
We find Centers instructive. In Centers, the defendant, while holding a gun,
entered a house occupied by three individuals and kidnapped one of these individuals.
(Centers, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at pp. 88–90.) The jury convicted defendant of
kidnapping, and of a single count of burglary with a firearm use enhancement (§ 12022.5,
subd. (a)). (Centers, at p. 90.) The court noted that neither the information nor the
verdicts specified a particular victim of the burglary and its firearm use enhancement (id.
at pp. 100–101), and in that circumstance “the trial court is entitled to make any
necessary factual findings not already made by the jury.” (Id. at p. 101, italics added.)
Specifically, Centers correctly pointed out “a number of cases have upheld the
application of the multiple victim exception based on evidence of multiple victims,
without considering whether the identities of those victims had been pleaded.” (Ibid.,
citing People v. Cruz (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 427, 434–435; People v. Gutierrez (1992) 10
Cal.App.4th 1729, 1736–1737.) Thus, the trial court “could properly find multiple
victims” (a finding for which there was substantial evidence) and impose punishment for
the burglary and enhancement in connection with one of the occupants of the apartment
as well as the kidnapping of the other. (Centers, supra, at p. 101.)
Overall, “in the absence of some circumstance ‘foreclosing’ its sentencing
discretion …, a trial court may base its decision under section 654 on any of the facts that
are in evidence at trial, without regard to the verdicts.” (People v. McCoy (2012) 208
Cal.App.4th 1333, 1340, italics omitted.) This is a “reasoned conclusion [because] [a]fter
all, a court may even rely on facts underlying verdicts of acquittal in making sentencing
choices.”9 (Ibid., italics omitted.)
9Defendant focuses a significant portion of his argument on the trial court’s improper
reliance on People v. Coelho (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 861 in making its determination that section
654 did not apply. In Coelho, the court developed a methodology for identifying the factual
42.
Here, there is at least one victim of the burglary and firearm enhancement (i.e.,
C.R.) who was not also a victim of the murder. Although the first amended information
did not identify C.R. as a potential burglary victim, he undoubtedly was a victim of the
burglary because he lived in and was present at the Larkin Avenue residence during the
offense. (Centers, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at pp. 100–101; see People v. Davis (1998) 18
Cal.4th 712, 720–722 [holding that the burglary statute protects an occupant’s possessory
interest in the building].) Specifically, the jury found true that (1) defendant “did
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously enter the inhabited dwelling, occupied by another,
to wit, [the Larkin Avenue residence] … with the intent then and there and therein to
commit theft or any other felony offense”; (2) the burglary was a violent felony because
“during the commission of said offense, another person other than an accomplice, was
present in the residence, within the meaning of … [s]ection 667.5(c)(21)[10]”; and (3)
“[d]uring the commission of the above said offense, defendant personally used a firearm,
in violation of [s]ection 12022.5(a) ….” (Italics added.) As in Centers, the trial court’s
implicit finding of multiple victims is supported by substantial evidence. The evidence
supports the implicit finding the occupants of the house (including C.R.) were all victims
of the offense and firearm enhancement charged in count II because there was ample
testimony that an adult and several children were in the house at the time of the burglary.
basis for a verdict in the context of determining whether a recidivist provision for mandatory
consecutive sentences was applicable. (Coelho, at pp. 879–884.) Coelho is premised on a
defendant’s right under the federal Constitution to a jury trial, concluding as a result that a
sentencing court can rely only on facts that are the basis for the jury’s verdict. (Coelho, at p.
876.) As the right does not apply to statutes that mitigate punishment, such as section 654
(People v. Cleveland, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at pp. 269–271), we agree with defendant that
Coelho is not relevant to this present analysis. Nonetheless, as we discuss in detail below, the
trial court properly exercised its discretion in sentencing defendant to a concurrent sentence on
count II.
10Section 667.5, subdivision (c) provides: “For the purpose of this section, ‘violent
felony’ means any of the following: [¶] … [¶] (21) Any burglary of the first degree, as defined
in subdivision (a) of Section 460, wherein it is charged and proved that another person, other
than an accomplice, was present in the residence during the commission of the burglary.”
43.
Therefore, although the first amended information did not specifically allege the
identities of the victims in the house, nor did the jury make any explicit findings
regarding the victims of count II, it was proper for the trial court to impose a concurrent
term because multiple victims existed apart from the murder victim Mendez.
DISPOSITION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is affirmed.
PEÑA, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
MEEHAN, J.
SNAUFFER, J.
44.
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