People v. Ward CA1/5

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Filed 5/10/24 P. v. Ward CA1/5
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A165864
v.
KAIREE KIEON WARD, (Alameda County
Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. No. 20CR013946A)

Defendant was convicted by a jury of three counts of second degree
robbery (Pen. Code, § 211; first, second and fourth counts)1 and one count of
misdemeanor carrying a concealed firearm within a vehicle (§ 25400, subd.
(a)(1); seventh count). As to the three robbery counts, the jury found true
allegations that defendant was armed with a firearm (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a),
12022.53, subd. (b)). Defendant was sentenced to a total term of seven years.
On appeal, defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in admitting a
video recording of one of the victims identifying defendant in a photograph
lineup as a prior inconsistent statement, (2) the prosecutor committed
misconduct by violating the trial court’s order barring evidence of gang
activity, and (3) the trial court erred by admitting custodial statements by

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise

stated.

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codefendant Joshua West. Although not raised by defendant, the People
request that we strike the concurrent 16-month terms imposed based on the
jury’s true findings on the firearm enhancements on the second and fourth
counts. As the People explain, the firearm enhancements on the second and
fourth counts were alleged only against West and not against defendant. We
modify the judgment as requested by the People and otherwise affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Trial Evidence
Defendant and codefendant West were tried together before a jury.
A. K.J.’s Testimony
The week before trial, K.J. failed to appear in response to the
prosecutor’s subpoena. The next day, he appeared before the trial judge with
his mother. His mother expressed concerns about retaliation. The trial court
ordered K.J. to appear for trial; otherwise, a warrant would be issued. K.J.
testified reluctantly. At the time of trial, he was 19 years old. However, on
October 11, 2020, the day of the robbery, K.J. was a 17-year-old high school
student. He testified that he did not remember being robbed and denied
contacting the police. K.J. stated he had never reported a crime. The
prosecutor played a recording of a 911 call in which the victim states he was
robbed when a young Black man got out of a silver BMW SUV and displayed
a gun “like an AR-15.”2 The victim further stated in the 911 call that another
young Black man exited the car and stole his chain, money, and phone. After
hearing a portion of the 911 recording, K.J. admitted the voice on the call
“may” have been him, but he was unsure if he said the specific words.

2 The audio recording of the 911 call does not state the time of the call;

however, the victim said the robbery occurred 10 or 15 minutes prior to the
call. The prosecutor argued in opening and closing that the Oakland robbery
occurred around 12:35 p.m. The timing of the robbery is not disputed.

2
K.J. also stated he did not recall speaking to police officers who
responded to the scene or telling them that three people approached him in a
BMW; one person took his phone, $5 in cash, and his “Buddha” pendant; or
that he recognized the individuals from social media. When shown a video
recording of the police officers’ body camera footage, K.J. admitted the person
in the video looked like him. He testified that he did not recall showing the
police officers screenshots of defendant.
K.J. also did not recall police officers’ showing him a photograph lineup
in which he identified three suspects.3 He did not recognize his signature on
the photographs. Over the defendants’ objections, the prosecutor played a
video recording of K.J.’s being administered the photograph lineup. K.J.
stated that the person in the video “may be me and it sounds like me, but I’m
not sure if it is.” In the video, the victim identified defendant’s photograph
from the photograph lineup as “the one with the gun” and stated he knew
defendant’s face from music videos and had seen him in the streets before.
B. Testimony of Walnut Creek Robbery Victims
Bettie K. was 82 years old on October 11, 2020. Around 2 p.m. that
day, she was walking from a grocery store to her home in Walnut Creek with
her daughter (Karen F.) and her teenage grandson. A young man about 5’7”
tall suddenly got in front of her and shouted at her to give him her purse.
When Bettie K. initially refused, the man grabbed her purse and hit her in
the face with the butt of a long gun. She described the man as a thin, young
“Black man.” A second young “Black . . . man,” who was taller, took her
daughter’s purse. Bettie K. gave the first man her purse. Both men ran to a
“light-colored car” and drove away. Bettie K. was unable to identify the men

3 A third suspect was not charged.

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who robbed her when the police later showed her photographs of possible
suspects, and she could not identify the defendant in court.
Karen F. testified that on October 11, 2020, while she was walking
back from a grocery store in Walnut Creek with her mother and son, she
heard and saw a BMW SUV pull up on the opposite side of the road. Two
“African-American” men in their early 20’s wearing hoodies approached her
and her mother. The man in front of her mother was about 5’7” and wore a
dark hoodie and had a long gun. He pointed the gun at her mother and
demanded her purse. When her mother said no, the man hit her mother with
the butt of the gun. Karen F. told her mother to give the man her purse, and
she did. The other man then asked for Karen F.’s purse, and she gave it to
him. The man who took Karen F.’s purse was at least 5’9” or “maybe taller”
and was wearing a yellow hoodie. Karen F. was unable to identify either
defendant at trial.
C. Law Enforcement Testimony
Officer Luu of the Oakland Police Department was patrolling the High
Street and MacArthur Boulevard area of East Oakland on October 11, 2020.
He met with K.J. after the robbery occurred, at Maybelle and Masterson.
Officer Luu’s partner, Officer Frias, was with him when they met with K.J.
Both officers were wearing body cameras. The prosecutor played a video
recording of the body camera footage, and Officer Luu identified himself
speaking with K.J. K.J. tentatively identified three people involved in the
robbery by showing Officer Luu music videos. One of the three people K.J.
identified in one of the music videos was the man who had the AR-15. K.J.
also said he recognized the men who robbed him from “the area 45 and
Fairfax.” (Sic.)

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Officer Cardana of the Oakland Police Department testified regarding
the three photograph lineups he conducted with K.J. on October 14, 2020.
The photograph lineups were “double-blind,” meaning that Officer Cardana
had no knowledge or information about the case. Officer Rosin, who was the
lead investigator in the case, created the three photograph lineups for Officer
Cardana to administer. The prosecutor played a portion of the video
recording of the photograph lineups, and Officer Cardana confirmed the video
accurately depicted him administering the photograph lineups to K.J. Officer
Cardana also identified the three separate sets of photograph lineups he
administered to K.J. and the photograph lineup “waiver advisement” signed
by K.J. K.J. identified an individual in each of the three sets of photograph
lineups and signed his initials.
Oakland Police Officer Rosin, the investigator who created the
photograph lineups, testified that in the first set of photographs, defendant
was in photograph number 3. K.J. selected defendant’s photograph. Officer
Rosin was familiar with defendant. Officer Rosin reviewed surveillance video
from near the scene of the robbery. In video timestamped 12:32 p.m., Officer
Rosin identified codefendant West’s car and K.J. in the area. The robbery
was not captured on the surveillance.
Oakland Police Officer Loya testified that on October 11, 2020, he was
working in the department’s “Ceasefire section” and focused on violent
crimes. Officer Loya was familiar with defendant from electronic and
in-person surveillance he had been conducting for several months. Officer
Loya had surveilled defendant over a dozen times and identified him in court.
On October 11, 2020, about 2 p.m., Officer Loya viewed a video from
defendant’s social media account, which had been posted about 10:00 a.m.
that morning. In the video, defendant was wearing a “black do rag, white

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T-shirt . . . , camo hoody.” (Sic.) The hoodie was a “[v]ery distinct yellow and
green.”
About 2:30 p.m. on October 11, 2020, Walnut Creek Police Officer Spoto
was dispatched to the area of the westbound on-ramp to Highway 24 in
Walnut Creek. She located two purses, a wallet, and a pair of glasses, which
she photographed and provided to the investigating officer. A license plate
reader showed that West’s car was in the area of the Walnut Creek
Highway 24 on-ramp at 2:10 p.m. on October 11, 2020.
Oakland Police Officer Urquiza worked in the special investigations
unit, which was part of the “Ceasefire program.” As part of this unit, Officer
Urquiza investigated violent crime. About 12:45 p.m. on October 11, 2020,
Officer Urquiza was observing a live feed of surveillance footage from the
4700 block of Fairfax Avenue. At 12:45 p.m., codefendant West’s silver
BMW X3 pulls up on the side of the street. Officer Urquiza was familiar with
codefendant West and his car from surveillance over several months. He was
also familiar with defendant from prior surveillance. He identified both
defendants in court. In the surveillance video from 12:45 p.m. on October 11,
Officer Urquiza identified codefendant West exiting his car and defendant
exiting the front passenger seat.4 Defendant was wearing a “camo
hoody [sic].” Officer Urquiza believed defendant was approximately 6’3” or
6’4” and that codefendant West was significantly shorter. There was a third
person in the car whom Officer Urquiza did not identify at the time.
Defendant and codefendant West returned to West’s car, with West in the
driver seat and defendant in the front passenger seat. The car left at
1:24 p.m.

4 Officer Urquiza explained he was able to identify the defendants’

faces by zooming in the surveillance footage.

6
Officer Urquiza identified codefendant West’s car in a second video
taken from a location two blocks away. About 3 p.m. on October 11, West’s
car pulled up to the curb. Defendant exited the front passenger seat wearing
the same clothing as earlier.
Officer Urquiza was also shown surveillance video from the Walnut
Creek robbery. He recognized that the two men were wearing the same
clothing he observed defendants wearing in the earlier videos. The man with
the “distinctive camouflage hoody [sic]” appeared to be the same height as
defendant.
On October 12, 2020, codefendant West’s car was involved in a traffic
collision. The police searched the car. An “extended magazine” for a firearm
was found under the driver’s seat, and spent casings were found in the trunk.
A gold chain with a jade Buddha pendant was in the rear passenger seat.
On October 20, 2020, California Highway Patrol Officer Brown pulled
over a Toyota Avalon in San Lorenzo. Defendant was a passenger in the car.
A loaded AR-15 pistol, approximately 12–18 inches long, was located on the
floorboard of the driver’s seat.
D. Verdict and Sentencing
After jury instructions were given but before the verdict, codefendant
West entered a plea to one count of second degree robbery and admitted he
was armed with an assault weapon. The jury convicted defendant on the first
count (Oakland robbery), second count (Walnut Creek robbery), fourth count
(Walnut Creek robbery) and seventh count (misdemeanor carrying concealed
firearm in vehicle). As to the first count, the jury found true that defendant
personally used a firearm (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (b)) and
found not true that he personally used an assault rifle. As to the second and
fourth counts, the jury found true the personal firearm use allegations

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(§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (b)) and found not true the principal
armed allegation (§ 12022, subd. (a)(2)).
Defendant was sentenced to a total term of seven years, comprised of
the middle term of three years on the first count (§ 211) plus four years for
the personal use firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). Additionally, on
the second and fourth counts, defendant was sentenced on each count to
concurrent terms of one year plus 16 months for the personal use firearm
enhancements. On the seventh count (§ 25400, subd. (a)(1)), he was
sentenced to a one-year term, which was stayed pursuant to section 664.
DISCUSSION
I. The trial court did not err in admitting K.J.’s video
identification of defendant.
Defendant contends the trial court erred by admitting K.J.’s video
identification of defendants (exhibit 7) as a prior inconsistent statement. He
argues that because K.J. did not deny participating in the lineup but, rather,
stated he could not recall doing so, there was no inconsistency.
A. Additional Background
K.J. testified that he did not recall identifying defendant as the person
with the AR-15 or codefendant West as the driver of the BMW. The
prosecutor played the first 10 seconds of a video recording of K.J. identifying
the suspects in the photograph lineups. She then asked K.J. if he recognized
himself in the video. He stated, “That may have been me, but I don’t recall
me ever speaking with anybody, neither do I recall making any police report.”
Neither defendant objected up to this point. The prosecutor then distributed
transcripts and indicated she was going to continue playing the video.

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Codefendant West’s counsel objected that the video was not admissible
as either a prior identification5 or an inconsistent statement, under Evidence
Code sections 1235 and 770. He argued that K.J.’s statements that he did
not recall the lineup were not a denial and therefore he could not be
impeached with a prior inconsistent statement. The trial court overruled the
objection and stated: “I believe the witness was given an opportunity to
discuss, to explain, to deny. The witness has indicated that it may be him
but he does not recall making a statement at any time. I do think that he can
be impeached with his inconsistencies pursuant to 770 of the Evidence Code.”
“He said that may be me. I don’t remember making a statement and I never
made a statement to police. I never made a statement to police is what he
said on numerous occasions.” Defense counsel, who joined in the
codefendant’s objection, stated: “So if it’s to impeach, we’re essentially saying
he’s lying on the stand about his lack of memory. Is that what counsel’s
implication is?” The trial court, which previously noted that K.J. had been
declared a hostile witness, responded: “It’s impeachment. He’s being
impeached. So his statement today is different from his statement before. So
the jury can make a determination in terms of that . . . I’m not going to put a
label on it, but it is inconsistent.”
The prosecutor then played additional portions of the video in which
the witness signed paperwork identifying suspects, including defendant.
B. Legal Principles
We review rulings on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of
discretion and will not reverse unless it is established that the “court

5 The People argue that the evidence was properly admitted as a prior

inconsistent statement under Evidence Code section 1235. They do not argue
it was admissible as a prior identification under Evidence Code section 1238.

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exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner
that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice [citation].” (People v.
Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9–10.) Evidence Code section 1235 states:
“Evidence of a statement by a witness is not made inadmissible by the
hearsay rule if the statement is inconsistent with his testimony at the
hearing and is offered in compliance with Section 770.” Evidence Code
section 770 states: “Unless the interests of justice otherwise require,
extrinsic evidence of a statement made by a witness that is inconsistent with
any part of his testimony at the hearing shall be excluded unless: [¶] (a) The
witness was so examined while testifying as to give him an opportunity to
explain or deny the statement; or [¶] (b) The witness has not been excused
from giving further testimony in the action.”
“Generally it is true that the testimony of a witness indicating that he
or she does not remember an event is not inconsistent with a prior statement
describing the event. (People v. Sam (1969) 71 Cal.2d 194, 208–210
[citations].) ‘But justice will not be promoted by a ritualistic invocation of
this rule of evidence. Inconsistency in effect, rather than contradiction in
express terms, is the test for admitting a witness’ prior statement [citation],
and the same principle governs the case of the forgetful witness.’ ” (People v.
Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 221.) A trial witness’s deliberatively evasive
forgetfulness is an implied denial of prior statements, which creates
“inconsistency in effect” and authorizes admission of the witness’s prior
statements under Evidence Code section 1235. (People v. Green (1971) 3
Cal.3d 981, 988–989.) A prior trial court finding of evasiveness is not a
“condition precedent” for admission of a prior inconsistent statement. (People
v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 937, disapproved on other grounds in
People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 459.) “As long as there is a

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reasonable basis in the record for concluding that the witness’s ‘I don’t
remember’ statements are evasive and untruthful, admission of his or her
prior statements is proper.” (People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1219–
1220.)
C. Analysis
Defendant correctly argues that a lack of recall is not necessarily
inconsistent with a prior statement. He then asserts that a prior statement
is admissible to impeach a lack of memory “if the trial court finds that the
witness is being dishonest or evasive.” Defendant concludes that the trial
court erred in admitting the prior statement because it “declined” to find K.J.
was lying or being evasive and it incorrectly stated that K.J. testified that he
“ ‘never made a statement to police . . . .’ ”
Defendant’s argument is without merit. First, to the extent defendant
suggests that a trial court must first make a finding that a witness who
asserts a lack of memory is being dishonest or evasive before admitting a
prior inconsistent statement, our high court has held the opposite. (People v.
Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 937.) Defendant’s cited authority, People v.
Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 415, does not hold
otherwise. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler held that substantial evidence
supported the trial court’s finding that the witness’s “claimed failure of
recollection was actually a deliberate evasion tantamount to a denial.” (Ibid.)
Because the trial court made this express finding, there was no need for the
California Supreme Court to reconsider the issue of whether such a trial
court finding is a “condition precedent” to admitting an inconsistent
statement. (Ibid.) Bryant, Smith and Wheeler does not even cite, much less

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overrule, Pinholster’s holding that it is not a “condition precedent” for the
trial court to make such an express finding. (Ibid.)6
Further, the record supports the trial court’s finding that K.J. made at
least some statements inconsistent with his participation in the photograph
lineup. It is true that in response to the prosecutor’s questions regarding the
robbery that occurred two years prior, K.J. repeatedly stated he could not
remember or did not recall. However, he also denied calling the police and
denied ever reporting a crime. Defendant argues that K.J.’s statement that
he did not call the police was accurate because the call was placed by another
person before K.J. was put on the line to speak with the 911 operator.
Regarding K.J.’s denial that he ever reported a crime, defendant asserts that
the question posed to him was whether “ ‘he had ever reported a crime
before’ ” and that his denial in response to this question was not inconsistent
with his prior statements to the police during the photograph lineups. We
reject defendant’s hairsplitting contentions that K.J.’s denials were not
inconsistent with his cooperation with police in the photograph lineups. A
fair reading of K.J.’s testimony supports the trial court’s finding that he
testified inconsistently with his prior statements to the police.

6 Defendant also cites to People v. Parks (1971) 4 Cal.3d 955 in support

of his position that the trial court must find a witness’s lack of memory is
evasive before admitting a prior inconsistent statement. Similar to Bryant,
Smith and Wheeler, Parks does not address this precise issue. Rather, it
found the witness’s lapse of memory as to some statements contained in a
police report was not inconsistent and that “[i]t was not established that she
was deliberately evasive or that her asserted lapse of memory was untrue.”
(Parks, at p. 960.) To the extent defendant reads this statement as imposing
a requirement that the trial court must make a specific finding of
evasiveness, we think he reads it too broadly. Moreover, Parks was decided
over 20 years before Pinholster, which directly addresses the issue at hand
and clearly states that such a finding is not a “condition precedent.”
(Pinholster, at p. 937.)

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Moreover, although the trial court did not specifically state that K.J.’s
lack of memory was evasive or dishonest, we find “there is a reasonable basis
in the record for concluding that the witness’s ‘I don’t remember’ statements
are evasive and untruthful [such that] admission of his . . . prior statements
is proper.” (People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 1219–1220; People v.
Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 937.) K.J., who was 19 years old at the time
of trial, initially failed to appear in response to a subpoena. He then
appeared before the trial court with his mother, who expressed concerns
about retaliation. The trial court explained that if he did not appear at trial
in response to the subpoena, a bench warrant would be issued. At trial, K.J.
admitted that he was not comfortable testifying. Shortly after his testimony
began, he was declared a hostile witness. When presented with audio of the
911 call, he denied it was his voice, before admitting it “may” have been his.
He made similar statements when shown videos, saying it “may have been
me” then adding it did not help him recall anything. He claimed he could not
remember as far back as October 2020. However, K.J. remembered other
events from the fairly recent past. He testified that he had attended high
school and graduated in 2021. When K.J. was asked if he lived in Oakland
on October 11, 2020, he said, “I don’t recall. Not sure.” He then admitted he
was born in Oakland and currently lived in Oakland. When he was asked
again if he was living in Oakland a couple of years prior, he testified, “Like I
said, I can’t recall. [T]hat was two, three years ago. You just named a date.
I don’t recall,” before finally admitting that he had never lived anywhere
other than Oakland. On this record, even if K.J.’s testimony did not
expressly contradict his prior statements, the record supports a finding that
his testimony was evasive and untruthful, and therefore “inconsisten[t] in
effect,” such that the trial court’s admission of K.J.’s prior statements in the

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video recording of the photo lineups was proper. (People v. Pinholster, supra,
1 Cal.4th at p. 937; People v. Green, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 989.)
II. Prosecutorial Error
Defendant contends the prosecutor violated a pretrial court order that
police officers “ ‘not mention[] anything about being on the gang team or
monitoring potential gang activity.’ ” He asserts the order was violated when
(1) Officer Loya testified he was assigned to the “ ‘Ceasefire Section,’ ” which
was “ ‘the gang unit for the departments’ ”; (2) Officer Urquiza testified that
he identified codefendant West from a “ ‘live feed’ ” area he surveilled because
it “ ‘was associated to a group that had been involved in additional violent
crime as well as firearms possession’ ” and that he knew West because a
month earlier he executed a search warrant and took West into custody
regarding a firearm; and (3) the prosecutor played a video of Officer Rosin’s
interview of West, in which Officer Rosin noted West had “ ‘some gang ties.’ ”
A. Additional Background
The prosecution called Officer Loya, who testified that he had worked
for the Oakland Police Department for over seven years. The prosecutor then
asked him what he was doing for the department on October 11, 2020.
Officer Loya responded that he was working for the Ceasefire section. When
asked, “And what is Ceasefire?” Officer Loya stated, “Ceasefire, we do quite a
bit of things, but, similar, like, the gang unit for the departments.” When
asked why he was communicating with Officer Urquiza, Officer Loya said,
“Probably our ongoing investigations. Like I said, we focus on, like, violent
crimes. Probably had something going on that day.” He then said he had
surveilled defendant more than a dozen times over the course of several
months. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked if Officer Loya was
“spying on the neighborhood kids for several months.” He responded,

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“Neighborhood kids is subjective. Ceasefire doesn’t target neighborhood kids.
Violent crimes and gangs.” Defense counsel then asked, “Everybody in that
neighborhood is in a gang, correct?” Officer Loya said, “That’s a very vague
statement. I don’t know how to respond to that.”
At the conclusion of Officer Loya’s testimony, counsel for codefendant
West moved for a mistrial on the basis that Loya’s testimony violated the
court’s ruling that “there be no reference to any gang activity, association or
the like.” Defendant’s counsel joined. The trial court noted that defense
counsel “open[ed] the door” during cross-examination. Counsel for
codefendant West argued that the prosecutor initially elicited the improper
testimony and that at a minimum the trial court should instruct the jury to
disregard the references to gangs. The trial court denied the motion for
mistrial and agreed to admonish the jury. Upon return from a recess, outside
the presence of the jury, the trial court read the following proposed
admonition to counsel: “[A]lthough Officer Loya testified that in 2020 he was
working in the Ceasefire unit which addressed gangs, you are not to make
any inferences, conclusions, and there are no allegations that any of the
defendants in this case are engaged in gang activity.” Both defense counsel
confirmed, “That’s fine.” When the jury returned, the trial court gave the
admonition and added: “So I just want to make that comment to you with
regard to gangs. That was discussed in terms of what his duties were, but
there are no allegations in this case and you are to make no inferences that
these defendants are gang members.”
Officer Urquiza testified that in October 2020 he worked in the
Oakland Police Department’s special investigations unit that is part of the
Ceasefire program and he investigated violent crimes. As defendant admits,
Officer Urquiza did not use the word “gang” during his testimony. He

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surveilled “a group that had been involved in additional violent crime as well
as firearms possession.” Officer Urquiza had seen codefendant West in
person and through surveillance. He most recently saw codefendant West in
person a month earlier when he executed a search warrant and took West
into custody “regarding a firearm.” West’s counsel moved for a mistrial on
the grounds that Officer Urquiza’s testimony about West’s recent arrest for a
firearms violation “violates the court’s in limine order . . . .”7 In the
alternative, West’s counsel asked for a curative instruction to direct the jury
not to consider evidence of any uncharged crimes. Defendant’s counsel joined
in the request for a curative instruction. The trial court denied the motion
for mistrial and agreed to draft a curative instruction about codefendant
West and the reference to uncharged crimes regarding firearms. No such
instruction was given.
The third alleged violation of the trial court’s order not to refer to gangs
occurred when the prosecutor played a video recording of Officer Rosen’s
custodial interrogation of codefendant West. During the interrogation,
Officer Rosen tells West, “This isn’t a gang case but I can tell you that from
my experience you have some gang ties.” After the video was played, West’s
counsel moved for a mistrial, which motion defendant’s counsel joined
“reluctantly.” The trial court denied the motion, stating that it was
“unfortunate that this happened” and noting that the parties had a copy of
the transcript previously. The trial court further noted that it previously
gave a curative instruction that there are no gang allegations and that the

7 Defendant’s opening brief does not cite to the in limine order West’s

counsel referenced when he made his motion for mistrial. Although it is not
clear from the record, the People appear to assume that the motion for
mistrial was based on an alleged violation of the trial court’s order regarding
gang evidence.

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jurors should not make any inference of gang associations and that it would
do so again. No additional curative instruction was given.
On June 6, 2022, the parties discussed admission of exhibits and the
parties’ proposed jury instructions. Regarding the video recording of West’s
interrogation, the trial court admitted it but ordered that the prosecutor
modify the video recording to delete the reference to gangs. Defendant’s
counsel filed a request that the jury be instructed with CALCRIM Nos. 305
(multiple defendants: limited admissibility of defendant’s statement) and 315
(eyewitness identification), both of which were given. No party requested
further curative instructions regarding references to gangs. CALCRIM No.
305 states: “You have heard evidence that defendant Joshua West made a
statement before trial. You may consider that evidence only against him, and
not against any other defendant.”
B. Legal Principles
“A prosecutor’s conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the
federal Constitution when it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make
the conviction a denial of due process. Conduct by a prosecutor that does not
render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct
under state law only if it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible
methods to attempt to persuade either the trial court or the jury.” (People v.
Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 44.) Eliciting or attempting to elicit
inadmissible evidence in violation of a court order is prosecutorial error.
(People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 839.) However, we will only reverse a
conviction based on prosecutorial error if it is reasonably probable that a
result more favorable to the defendant would have been reached without the
error. (Ibid.)

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C. Analysis
We find no prejudicial error. The first alleged violation, during Officer
Loya’s testimony regarding his work in the “Ceasefire section,” provided
limited background information, including the basis for the officer’s
identification of defendant. The identification of defendant was one of the
primary issues at trial. Testimony regarding the basis for the officer’s
identification of defendant gave the jury the ability to evaluate the credibility
of the officer’s identification. Officer Loya never stated that defendant was a
gang member. More importantly, after denying the motion for mistrial made
by West’s counsel, the trial court gave a curative instruction that was agreed
to by both defendants. (People v. Pigage (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1375
[“only misconduct that prejudices a defendant requires reversal [citation],
and a timely admonition from the court generally cures any harm”].)
Defendant’s argument that the trial court’s curative instruction was
insufficient because it did not specifically state the jury should “disregard”
the evidence and that it was “confusing and contradictory” is without merit.
Defendant made no such objections when the trial court gave his counsel the
opportunity to comment on its proposed admonition and, therefore, has
forfeited this claim. (People v. Williams (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1166, 1188.) The
trial court’s admonition twice states the case does not involve gang
allegations and that the jury is not to make any inferences that the
defendants are gang members. We presume the jury followed this
admonition. (People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 436.)
We reject defendant’s argument that Officer Urquiza’s testimony
violated the trial court’s order not to refer to gangs. As defendant admits,
Officer Urquiza “avoided using the word ‘gang’ . . . .” His references to the
Ceasefire section and surveillance of an area “associated to a group that had

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been involved in additional violent crime as well as firearms possession” do
not violate the order because they do not mention gangs or suggest that
defendant was a gang member. Nor does Officer Urquiza’s testimony that he
knew codefendant West from having executed a search warrant and taken
him into custody for a firearms violation implicate the order not to refer to
gangs. The fact that the trial court agreed to, but then did not, give a
curative instruction “to direct the jury not to consider evidence of any other
crimes not charged with respect to Mr. West when determining his guilt or
innocence of the charged crimes” does not warrant reversal as to defendant.
(People v. Crew, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 836.)
As the People admit, Officer Rosin’s reference to codefendant West’s
“ ‘gang ties’ ” in the video recording of West’s custodial interrogation should
have been redacted. However, we also agree with the People that it appears
the prosecutor’s failure to do so was an oversight, which the prosecutor
readily agreed to remedy by redacting the video recording before it was
submitted to the jury. The prosecutor made no mention of gangs during
closing argument. We find that the prosecutor’s conduct did not amount to
the “use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either
the trial court or the jury.” (People v. Morales, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 44.)
Although the trial court agreed to give another admonition regarding
gang references, it did not do so. However, neither defendant renewed a
request for such an instruction at the time they requested other jury
instructions. It is unclear if this was again an oversight or if it was a
strategic decision to avoid highlighting fleeting references to gangs. In any
event, we find no prejudicial error. The trial court had already admonished
the jury to make no inferences regarding gangs. Further, the jury was
instructed that codefendant West’s pretrial statement may only be considered

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against him and not against defendant. We assume the jury followed the
trial court’s instructions. (People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 436.)
West entered a plea during jury deliberations, which suggests that his
custodial interview may have had limited value to the jury. Based on this
record, we find that it is not reasonably probable that defendant would have
obtained a more favorable verdict had the jury not heard Officer Rosin’s
reference to West’s alleged “ ‘gang ties’ ” in the video recording of West’s
custodial interrogation. (People v. Crew, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 836.)
III. Admission of Codefendant West’s Custodial Statements
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously found that codefendant
West’s custodial interrogation was not coercive and that West made a
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights.
Specifically, he argues that West, who was ill while being held in the
interrogation room, was “softened up” before he was advised of his rights and,
therefore, his waiver was involuntary.
Even assuming, without deciding, that West’s statement was
erroneously admitted as to West, it had no impact on defendant. West was
not asked about and never mentioned defendant in his statement, much less
implicated him. Nothing in the record suggests defendant sought to sever his
trial. Defendant did not argue either below or on appeal that West’s
statement directly implicated defendant such that it should have been
excluded under the Aranda/Bruton doctrine. (People v. Aranda (1965) 63
Cal.2d 518, 529–531; Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 [20 L.Ed.2d
476].) Most significantly, the trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM
No. 305, which explicitly stated that West’s statement could only be
considered against him and not against defendant. We assume the jury

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followed the trial court’s instructions. (People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at
p. 436.)
IV. Firearm Enhancements as to the Second and Fourth Counts
(Walnut Creek Robberies)
Although not raised by the defendant, the People request that we
correct a sentencing error regarding the firearm enhancements found true as
to the second and fourth counts (§ 211). The second count of the information
alleges that defendant and codefendant West committed second degree
robbery against Karen F. The fourth count alleges both defendants
committed second degree robbery against Bettie K. The second and fourth
counts also further allege that codefendant West personally used a firearm
within the meaning of sections 12022.5, subdivision (a) and 12022.53,
subdivision (b). The firearm enhancement alleged against defendant in the
second and fourth counts is that in the commission of the offense a principal
was armed with a firearm within the meaning of section 12022,
subdivision (a)(2).
The trial court correctly instructed that as to defendant, the second and
fourth counts included the special allegation that a “principal was armed
with a firearm.” The prosecutor argued in closing that as to the Walnut
Creek robberies (the second and fourth counts), the personal use allegation
applies to codefendant West because he was armed with a gun.
The jury verdicts as to defendant8 on the second and fourth counts
found the principal armed enhancements (§ 12022, subd. (a)(2)) not true.
However, they found true the personal use firearm enhancements
(§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (b)), which were not alleged against
defendant on the second and fourth counts. The trial court orally pronounced

8 Codefendant West accepted a plea during jury deliberations.

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defendant’s sentence on the second and fourth counts as one year on each
count for the robbery plus 16 months on each count for the use of firearm
allegations, all concurrent to his seven-year sentence on the first count.9
The People ask us to modify the judgment to strike the personal use
firearm enhancements as to the second and fourth counts and the 16-month
concurrent sentences imposed on each of them. We accept the People’s
position that it was error for the trial court to sentence defendant for firearm
enhancements that were not alleged against him. (People v. Anderson (2020)
9 Cal.5th 946, 955, 963 [imposition of firearm enhancements not alleged in
connection with relevant counts violates pleading requirements and due
process, and appellate court may address error even if it was not raised
below].)
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded with directions that the trial court vacate the
personal use firearm enhancements (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and the 16-month
concurrent terms imposed as to the second and fourth counts (incorrectly
listed as the third count on the abstract of judgment). The trial court shall
forward an amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

9 The abstract of judgment states a section 12022.5, subdivision (a)

firearm enhancement for the second and third counts but not for the fourth
count. However, based on the trial court’s oral pronouncement of the
sentence, and the fact that defendant was acquitted on the third count (elder
abuse), it appears that the abstract of judgment’s listing of the third count in
the enhancement section was a clerical error.

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Jackson, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

Simons, J.
Burns, J.

A165864/People v. Kairee Kieon Ward

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