People v. Bunyad CA1/5

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Filed 5/14/24 P. v. Bunyad CA1/5

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. A165881
DARIUS BUNYAD,
Defendant and Appellant.
(Sonoma County
Super. Ct. No. SCR-673191-1)

Darius Bunyad, who worked as a chiropractor, appeals
after a jury convicted him of six counts of felony sexual battery by
fraud (Pen. Code, § 243.4, subd. (c)), one count of misdemeanor
battery (id., § 242), and six misdemeanor counts of annoying or
molesting a child (id., § 647.6, subd. (a)(1)). Bunyad asserts
claims of evidentiary and instructional error. We find no error
and affirm.

BACKGROUND

A.

In October 2014, Jane Doe One was 16 years old and played
high school basketball. She started seeing Bunyad frequently—
for chiropractic treatment of a torn shoulder tendon and spinal
issues related to scoliosis and a (later) car accident. At almost
every appointment, Bunyad massaged Doe One’s bicep, taped her

1
shoulder with kinesiology tape, and adjusted her spine, ribs, and
neck.

Initially, Doe One’s mother accompanied her to
appointments. On those occasions, Bunyad left the treatment
room door open, and Doe One remained clothed in her sports bra
and tank top while he adjusted her. For rib adjustments, Bunyad
stood behind Doe One, put his arms around her, felt her chest
above and below her breasts, by placing his hands over her shirt
and bra, to see if there any ribs were out of place. He then lifted
her up as she leaned backwards and would “pop” her ribs back
into place.

After Doe One got her driver’s license (in November 2014),
she went to appointments alone and Bunyad changed his
methods. He began closing the door to the treatment room and,
during rib adjustments, began to “grab” Doe One’s breasts and
“manipulate them” (still with his hand over her shirt and bra) in
a way he said would help. After a few more visits, Bunyad told
Doe One that it would make it easier if she took her sports bra off
but kept her shirt on. She complied because she trusted Bunyad
and thought the elastic from her bra might hinder treatment.

In May 2015, during a lunchtime appointment when
Bunyad and Doe One were alone in the office, Bunyad asked her
to take both her bra and shirt off. Believing that this would help
Bunyad see an injury she had recently sustained during a
basketball tournament, Doe One did what he asked despite
feeling “really uncomfortable.” While she was naked from the
waist up, without a gown, Bunyad manipulated her shoulder and
then offered her a job in his office. During this same
appointment, Bunyad also performed a rib adjustment on Doe
One. To do so, he stood behind Doe One, put his arms around
her, grabbed her bare breasts and manipulated them for a couple
minutes—purportedly so that they were “in the right spot” to
“pop [her] ribs back in”—before lifting her up with his arms.

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While doing so, Bunyad’s pelvis touched her butt, and Doe One
felt what may have been his erection. Doe One felt
uncomfortable but did not say anything because they were alone,
and she was scared.

Doe One started working for Bunyad in June 2015. As a
benefit, she received free adjustments. During such adjustments,
Bunyad treated her alone, with the door closed, and always had
Doe One remove her shirt and bra (without giving her a gown).
He also began to use a vibrating massager on her legs, butt, and
lower back. On three or four occasions, Bunyad touched Doe
One’s vagina with the massager but acted as if it was accidental.
He also told Doe One that her pectoral muscles seemed “tight,”
that her boyfriend must not have been touching her breasts
enough, and that he could “take care of that” for her by
massaging them. Doe One declined.

On September 25, 2015, Bunyad adjusted Doe One, at
closing time, when they (again) were alone in the office. After he
finished her standard rib adjustment, Bunyad placed his hands
on Doe One’s pelvic area (over her pants) close to her vagina—
and asked her when she would turn 18. When Doe One told
Bunyad her birthday, he said, “okay, I guess I can wait until
then.” Doe One immediately left and, that night, told her ex-
boyfriend and her mother about Bunyad’s age comment and
touching of her pelvis.

The next morning, Doe One called Bunyad’s office manager
(J.H.) and quit. Doe One’s mother later called and told J.H. that
Doe One had been scared by an encounter with Bunyad. Doe
One’s therapist and school counselor reported her account to law
enforcement.

Santa Rosa Police Department Detective Chris Diaz
arranged for Doe One’s mother to make a pretext phone call to
Bunyad. A recording of the telephone conversation was played
for the jury. During the call, Bunyad admitted touching Doe
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One’s breast, but stated he had not meant to make her feel
unsafe or like he was “coming on to her.” He also said it was
common for him to have girls take their shirts and bras off for
taping, that he did not know how many times he had Doe One do
so, and that he “shouldn’t have done [that] with her.” Bunyad
also told Doe One’s mother that he “had more relations with men”
and that it did not excite him to see Doe One naked. He also
said, “I’m at your mercy” and that he wanted to see his three-
year-old son grow up.

B.

Doe One provided Detective Diaz with Jane Doe Two’s
contact information. Diaz had spoken to Doe Two, in early 2015,
regarding another complaint that had been made against
Bunyad. When Diaz spoke with her again, in November 2015,
she provided additional information that she had not previously
shared. She also gave Diaz the names of Jane Does Six, Seven,
and 12, who had also worked for Bunyad.

Bunyad was arrested on November 20, 2015. A few days
later, the Santa Rosa Police Department issued a press release
regarding the arrest. An article was published in the Press
Democrat, which asked anyone with additional information to
contact Detective Diaz. In response, Detective Diaz received calls
from, among others, Jane Doe Four, Jane Doe Three’s mother,
Jane Doe Six, Jane Doe Seven, Jane Doe Eight, and Jane Doe 11.

C.

In August 2014, Doe Two, who was 15 years old, received
treatment from Bunyad for a dislocated shoulder. After a few
weeks of treatment, she accepted his offer to work as a
receptionist and assistant in his office.

After she began working for him, Doe Two was no longer
charged for her adjustments. Bunyad began sometimes telling
Doe Two to take her shirt and bra off when she got her shoulder
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taped (without giving her a gown).1 Bunyad also touched the
bare skin between her breasts while doing rib adjustments.

During one treatment, while Doe Two was topless at his
direction, Bunyad said she had “an ouchy on [her] nippy,” pointed
at her inverted nipple, and put his finger close to it (without
touching). On another occasion, Bunyad performed an
ultrasound treatment on Doe Two’s inner thigh and hip. She had
her pants pulled down to around her knees while Bunyad used
the ultrasound machine on the area between her hip and groin.
Doe Two did not remember whether she was wearing underwear
during the treatment but remembered being alone with Bunyad
and feeling uncomfortable and awkward. Doe Two quit her job
with Bunyad in January 2015.

D.

Bunyad first treated Doe Three in October 2015, when she
was 16 years old, after she had been in a car accident and injured
her neck and shoulder. Bunyad had Doe Three stand facing the
wall, with her arms out. Bunyad patted her on the shoulders and
neck, then slipped his hand under her shirt and into her bra.
While Bunyad felt both of Doe Three’s bare breasts, he asked her
whether she had her period and said her breasts could feel more
tender as a result. She had never seen a chiropractor before, so
she did not know whether the touching was a normal part of
treatment.

Bunyad also told Doe Three to take off her shirt and bra so
he could tape her shoulders. He gave her a gown to wear, so she
was covered in the front, but it was open at the back. Doe Three’s

1Doe Six, who was also working in Bunyad’s office at the
time, once helped him tape Doe Two’s shoulder. Doe Six
corroborated Doe Two’s account that Bunyad had Doe Two
remove all her clothes from the waist up for this treatment.
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boyfriend testified that, shortly after her appointment, Doe Three
said Bunyad touched her breasts during the treatment.

E.

Doe Four was 17 years old when she first saw Bunyad for
chiropractic treatment, in the fall of 2013, after she dislocated a
rib while wrestling. She saw him approximately once a week to
have her shoulder taped and for rib or spine adjustments. When
Bunyad taped Doe Four’s shoulder, which he did at least 10
times, he had her take off her shirt and bra and she was not
offered a gown to cover herself. This made Doe Four
uncomfortable, but she thought it was a necessary part of her
treatment.

Bunyad also told Doe Four that her pectoral muscles were
tight. To purportedly help, Bunyad gave her between five and 10
treatments that involved Doe Four taking off her shirt and bra
and lying (naked from the waist up) on a chiropractic table while
he used a percussor massager on her pectoral muscles. During
this treatment, Bunyad also sometimes used his hands to
massage above her breasts. During one such treatment, when
Doe Four was still 17 years old, Bunyad grabbed one of her
breasts with his hands, commented that he was not performing
an “official breast exam,” and guessed her cup size.

During Doe Four’s rib adjustments, Bunyad again had Doe
Four remove her shirt and bra. He stood behind her, felt beneath
her breasts, had her lean back, and then lifted her up. During
this procedure, the back of Bunyad’s hands sometimes contacted
Doe Four’s bare breasts. Bunyad pressed his body against her
back and, on a few occasions, Doe Four felt what may have been
his erection.

F.

In December 2014, when she was 17 years old, Doe Six
began working for Bunyad as a receptionist. Doe Two and Doe
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Seven (who was Doe Six’s aunt) also worked for him at the time.
Doe Six described Bunyad as “overly friendly for a boss.” He
hugged his employees and slapped their butts.

Doe Six received approximately six back adjustments from
Bunyad. During the adjustments, she remained fully clothed and
stood with Bunyad behind her. He wrapped his arms around
Jane Doe Six and “cup[ped]” her breasts with his hands, over her
clothing. Doe Six thought it was a little weird, but initially
thought it was okay because Bunyad was a doctor.

On her last day of employment with Bunyad, he performed
a hip adjustment on her because her hip kept popping out of
place. Bunyad had Doe Six lie on her back on the table. While he
felt her hips, Bunyad pulled Doe Six’s leggings and underwear
down to where he could see her pubic area. Bunyad commented
on a tattoo that she had in her pubic area, which was normally
covered by her underwear. At this point, she knew Bunyad had
pulled her leggings down “way too low” for an adjustment, got up,
and left the room. Doe Six told Doe Seven, who was also working
that day, what had happened. The two of them immediately left
the office and then quit.

G.

At the end of 2014, when she was 32 years old, Doe Seven
started working for Bunyad as a receptionist. When she was
hired, Bunyad told Doe Seven that she would receive free
chiropractic care, a gym membership, and treatments with the
“Zerona” cold laser machine. Doe Six and Doe Two also worked
for Bunyad at the same time.

Doe Seven wanted to have the laser treatment on her
thighs and hips. At her first treatment, Bunyad gave Doe Seven
a robe, told her to “strip down” and to leave the front of the robe
open “so he could do measurements.” He specifically instructed
her to take off her shirt and bra. Although this felt odd, Doe

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Seven took all her clothes off as instructed, but left her panties on
and the front of the robe open. Bunyad used a measuring tape to
measure her bare chest (underneath her robe). In the process, he
touched her breasts, including her nipples.

Bunyad also told Doe Seven that he could cure lactose
intolerance with a rib adjustment. He adjusted her ribs two or
three times. This involved Bunyad standing behind Doe Seven
and reaching his arm around her to feel under her shirt and bra
for the purportedly involved rib. He cupped Doe Seven’s bare
breast with his hand and stuck his fingers under her rib cage,
which caused her to fall backwards. Bunyad caught her and
helped her up with a hand on each of her breasts.

One day in December of 2014, Doe Seven was working
while Doe Six received a hip adjustment from Bunyad. After the
treatment, Doe Six asked Doe Seven whether it was necessary for
him to have pulled her pants down. Doe Seven said it was not,
they both left the office, and then quit the next day.

H.

On September 12, 2015, 27-year-old Doe Eight, who had
been diagnosed with cancer about nine months earlier and had
undergone surgery and chemotherapy, went to Bunyad for
treatment of pain in her neck and shoulders. Bunyad said that
his chiropractic adjustments could cure her cancer.

At her first appointment, Bunyad stood in front of Doe
Eight and, using his hands and fingers, pushed on her pelvis
directly above her vagina (over her clothes). After he felt around
her pelvis area for 30 to 45 seconds, Bunyad moved behind her,
had her lean back, and cracked her back. When she stood back
up, he “spanked [her] butt” and made “a grunting sound.” While
still standing behind her, Bunyad moved his left hand over her
left shoulder, down her shirt, and under her bra. Bunyad cupped
Doe Eight’s breast with his hand, which made her uncomfortable.

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Just before she said something, Bunyad told her that she had “a
breast bone out.” He yanked Doe Eight’s breast upward. Doe
Eight heard a crack, which made her think Bunyad knew what
he was doing.

Bunyad next had Doe Eight lie on her side on the table. He
lay behind her in a “spooning position,” intertwined his legs with
hers, cracked her back, and made a grunting noise. Bunyad
giggled and told Doe Eight that he was sorry but “sometimes it
just like feels so good.” He “smacked [her] butt” again and had
her roll over to repeat this procedure on Doe Eight’s other side.

Doe Eight told her sister what happened at the
appointment but did not report the incident to law enforcement.
About two months later, Doe Eight called Detective Diaz after
her sister saw an article about Bunyad and urged her to call.

I.

In 2012, when she was 27 years old, Doe 11 received
chiropractic treatment from Bunyad for her back. She saw him
approximately 11 times without anything unusual occurring. At
an appointment in August 2012, Bunyad stood behind her and,
after cracking her spine as usual, he put his hand into her shirt,
under her bra, and touched Doe 11’s nipple. She was shocked but
said nothing—thinking maybe he had touched her nipple by
mistake.

After a break, Doe 11 eventually returned for four
additional adjustments. The first three times, nothing unusual
occurred. However, before the fourth appointment, Doe 11 hurt
her leg and hip in a fall. During the appointment, Bunyad had
Doe 11 lie on her back on the treatment table and then moved her
legs apart. Bunyad touched Doe 11’s vagina over her clothing
with three of his fingers.

Doe 11 immediately got up and left the office without
saying anything. She did not report the incident because she was
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embarrassed. In November 2015, Doe 11 saw a newspaper
article about Bunyad’s arrest, told her husband about what had
happened to her, and contacted the police.

J.

The People’s expert in chiropractic medicine testified that it
was not an appropriate chiropractic technique for a doctor’s arms
or hands to be on or across the patient’s breasts during a rib
adjustment. Instead, the patient’s arms should be between the
doctor’s arms and the patient’s breasts. Furthermore, it was
inappropriate for a chiropractor’s groin to touch a patient’s back.
The expert opined that a chiropractor would have no professional
purpose for touching a patient’s breast or nipple—either over or
under clothing or with his hands or with a percussor massager.
Similarly, there was no professional purpose for a chiropractor to
touch a patient’s vaginal area—either with his hands or with a
massager—during a hip adjustment (or any other chiropractic
treatment). Finally, the expert opined that there was no
professional reason for a patient to be naked from the waist up
without a gown.

K.

One of Bunyad’s office managers, H.E., testified that no
patient had ever complained about Bunyad touching them
inappropriately. Both J.H. and H.E., as well as another of
Bunyad’s employees, testified that occasionally a patient needed
to remove her shirt and bra, but in such an instance the patient
would be given a gown.

J.H. testified that she was working on Doe One’s last day.
When Bunyad treated Doe One at the end of the day, the door to
the treatment room was open, and Doe One was wearing a gown.

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L.

The jury convicted Bunyad of six counts of felony sexual
battery by fraud, one count of misdemeanor battery, and six
counts of misdemeanor annoying or molesting a child. The trial
court sentenced Bunyad to a total prison term of 10 years.

DISCUSSION

A.

Bunyad contends the trial court abused its discretion, and
violated his due process rights, by admitting evidence of his prior
misconduct with Does 12 and 13 under Evidence Code sections
1101, subdivision (b), and 1108.2 He is wrong.

1.

Although evidence of prior bad acts is ordinarily
inadmissible to show a defendant’s disposition to commit such
acts (§ 1101, subd. (a)), subdivision (b) of the statute creates an
exception to this rule. “Evidence of prior criminal acts [or
misconduct] is admissible ‘when relevant to prove some fact (such
as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge
. . . ),’ but not to prove the defendant carried out the charged
crimes in conformity with a character trait.” (People v. Lewis
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 636; accord, § 1101, subd. (b).)

The least degree of similarity with the charged offense is
required to admit evidence of prior bad acts to prove intent or to
negate accident or mistake. (People v. Phillips (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 643, 672.) “ ‘For [such] purpose[s], the uncharged
crimes need only be “sufficiently similar [to the charged offenses]

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence
Code. Additional evidence of uncharged misconduct was received
from Jane Doe Nine. We do not provide any detail regarding Doe
Nine’s testimony because Bunyad does not challenge its
admission.
11
to support the inference that the defendant ‘ “probably harbored
the same intent in each instance.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Lewis, supra,
25 Cal.4th at p. 637.) “To establish the existence of a common
design or plan, the common features must indicate the existence
of a plan rather than a series of similar spontaneous acts, but the
plan thus revealed need not be distinctive or unusual.” (People v.
Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 403.)

The analysis proceeds in two steps. Although admission
under section 1101, subdivision (b), “does not require the conduct
to be a crime, but rather applies more broadly to ‘evidence that a
person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act,’ ” the trial
court may first need to make a preliminary fact determination—
i.e., “the fact that the conduct occurred and the defendant’s
connection to it.” (People v. Cottone (2013) 57 Cal.4th 269, 286,
fn. 10.)

Second, the trial court has discretion, under section 352, to
exclude the evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that it will consume an undue
amount of time or create a substantial danger of undue prejudice,
confusion of issues, or misleading the jury. (§ 352; People v. Avila
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 496, 515.) We review the trial court’s section
352 determination for abuse of discretion. (People v. Cordova
(2015) 62 Cal.4th 104, 132.)

2.

At trial, Doe 12 testified that she began chiropractic
treatment with Bunyad in 2010, when she was 24 years old.
They developed a friendship and saw each other socially outside
of the office. In 2012 or 2013, after Bunyad moved his office and
opened his own practice, he began to touch Jane Doe 12
inappropriately during treatments. Specifically, Bunyad touched
and fondled her breasts when he taped her chest and when he
performed rib adjustments. He also started pushing his erect
penis against Doe 12’s back during adjustments. Initially, his
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touching was “quite subtle,” and she assumed it was inadvertent
because she trusted him.

Bunyad became more “overtly sexual” when Doe 12 started
working for him, in September 2014, and she received free
adjustments after her shifts. He stopped offering her a gown
during treatments—leaving her completely topless during rib
adjustments—and he would not remove his hands from her
breasts when she asked. Eventually Bunyad became more
aggressive and began requesting sexual favors when Doe 12 was
getting adjustments—telling her, “ ‘I made you feel good so you
can make me feel good.’ ” He put his mouth on Doe 12’s breast
three to five times and requested oral sex at least twice.

On the first occasion, Doe 12 was having cold laser
treatment for breast reduction, which meant she was lying down
(with her movement limited) and unclothed from the waist up.
Bunyad then put his uncovered penis in her hands and on her
face. Although she initially refused, she eventually performed
oral sex on him. The second occasion was similar, but the
machine was set up so that she “absolutely could not move.” Doe
12 repeatedly told Bunyad “no,” but he only raised the machine
off her after she began performing oral sex.

In November 2014, Doe 12 reported Bunyad’s inappropriate
touching (and her performance of oral sex) during treatments to
the Santa Rosa Police Department. Detective Diaz closed the
case without referring it to the district attorney for possible filing
of charges.

Doe 13 testified that, when she was 39 years old, she was
treated by Bunyad after injuring her back and hip. Her
treatments began appropriately, and she and Bunyad became
friendly. After her usual treatment one day, when no one else
was in the office, Bunyad offered to use a cold laser machine on
Doe 13 to help her back and to lose “baby fat [and] any baby
scars.” She agreed, he told her to get undressed for the
13
treatment, and when Doe 13 asked him to leave the room while
she undressed, he told her he was a doctor and had seen
thousands of bodies. He finally left the room when she insisted.
Doe 13 did not understand why she needed to be fully undressed
and was uncomfortable, but she did as he asked because she
trusted Bunyad.

During a subsequent laser treatment, Bunyad touched one
of Doe 13’s nipples. Bunyad then began fondling Doe 13’s breasts
at the beginning of her laser treatments, and then (on more than
10 occasions) rubbing her clitoris with his fingers—saying that
this would help her heal by stimulating endorphins. She acted as
though she enjoyed it and even faked an orgasm in the hopes of
getting Bunyad away quickly. On other occasions, while
massaging Doe 13’s neck, Bunyad unzipped his pants, grabbed
her hair, and pulled her face to his penis. She orally copulated
him to leave.

On another occasion, when Doe 13’s hip was hurting, he
manipulated her hip joint and then rubbed his fingers inside Doe
13’s vagina. She thought maybe his fingers had slipped while he
was manipulating her joint.

Bunyad had vaginal intercourse with Doe 13 at least five
times. On these occasions, she was already naked and restrained
under the laser machine when Bunyad took off his clothes and
got on top of her. In December 2014, Doe 13 reported Bunyad’s
inappropriate touching during treatments, including digital
penetration, oral sex, and intercourse. Detective Diaz again
closed the case without referring it to the district attorney for
review.

3.

Before trial, the People filed a motion in limine to admit
evidence of Bunyad’s prior acts involving Does 12 and 13,
claiming that such evidence was admissible under both sections

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1101, subdivision (b), and 1108. Over defense counsel’s section
352 objection—that the evidence was more prejudicial than
probative—the trial court found the evidence admissible as to
Bunyad’s intent, lack of mistake or accident, and common plan
under section 1101, subdivision (b). The trial court also admitted
the evidence to show propensity to commit sex offenses under
section 1108.

The trial court recognized the conduct involving Does 12
and 13 was more extreme, in some ways, than the evidence
underlying the charged offenses—because the former involved
oral copulation, sexual intercourse, and digital penetration. On
the other hand, the trial court noted that the prior acts were
nonetheless like the charged acts—as they all involved Bunyad’s
intimate touching of his patients during chiropractic treatments.
The trial court further noted that many of the charged offenses
involved minors, whereas Does 12 and 13 were adults. In that
way, and because Does 12 and 13 had ongoing friendships with
Bunyad, the uncharged conduct evidence was less inflammatory
than the evidence supporting the charged offenses. Ultimately
the trial court found that the probative value of the evidence,
with respect to intent, absence of mistake, and common plan,
outweighed its potential for prejudice.

4.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
uncharged acts involving Does 12 and 13, under section 1101,
subdivision (b).3

3 Although we do not doubt the correctness of the trial
court’s decision under section 1108, we need not address it. (See
People v. Branch (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 274, 280-281 [“we would
only find error in its admission if the testimony were
inadmissible under both”].)
15
Bunyad only argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by declining to exclude the evidence under section 352.
He claims the evidence was insufficiently probative to outweigh
its prejudice. We agree with the trial court that the evidence of
Bunyad’s sexual conduct with Does 12 and 13 was highly
probative of his intent at the time of the charged offenses.
“Evidence of intent is admissible to prove that, if the defendant
committed the act alleged, he or she did so with the intent that
comprises an element of the charged offense. ‘In proving intent,
the act is conceded or assumed; what is sought is the state of
mind that accompanied it.’ ” (People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at
p. 394, fn. 2, italics added and omitted.)

Here, both charged offenses required the prosecution to
prove Bunyad acted with sexual intent. (Pen. Code, §§ 243.4,
subd. (c), 647.6, subd. (a)(1).) “[T]o be guilty of sexual battery by
fraud, the perpetrator must touch an intimate part of the victim
for sexual purposes and, at the time of the touching, the victim
must be ‘unconscious of the nature of the act because the
perpetrator fraudulently represented that the touching served a
professional purpose.’ ” (People v. Pham (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th
919, 924, quoting Pen. Code, § 243.4, subd. (c).) Annoying or
molesting a child (Pen. Code, § 647.6, subd. (a)), requires conduct
that would unhesitatingly irritate a normal person, which is
motivated by “ ‘ “an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest” ’ ” in
the victim. (People v. Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 289.)

Bunyad’s intent as to these charges was put at issue when
he pled not guilty. (People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 864.)
In fact, in his supplemental opening brief, Bunyad concedes that
his intent—whether he touched Does One, Three, Four, Six,
Seven, Eight, and 11 to serve a professional purpose or for the
specific purpose of sexual arousal or gratification—was the key
contested issue at trial. After all, in the pretext call regarding
Doe One, Bunyad claimed that he was not excited by seeing Doe

16
One topless and that he was more attracted to men. This made
Bunyad’s conduct with Does 12 and 13 more probative to rebut
his claims. (See People v. Robbins (1988) 45 Cal.3d 867, 879 [it is
well established “ ‘that if a person acts similarly in similar
situations, he probably harbors the same intent in each instance’
” and “that such prior conduct may be relevant circumstantial
evidence of the actor’s most recent intent”].)

The probative value of the testimony from Does 12 and 13
was further heightened because each independently reported
Bunyad’s conduct to police mere months before the charged
offenses against Doe One came to light. (See People v. Balcom
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 414, 427 [probative value of uncharged offense
evidence increased by close temporal proximity to charged
offenses and when prior acts are reported without knowledge of
other victims’ claims of abuse].)

Bunyad’s main objection to the admission of testimony from
Does 12 and 13 appears to be based on its alleged dissimilarity to
the evidence underlying the charged offenses. He focuses on Doe
12’s and Doe 13’s testimony regarding the ultimate acts of
intercourse, oral copulation, and vaginal penetration—arguing
that this makes the evidence unduly inflammatory. He misses
the point. That his sexual conduct with two adult patients (Does
12 and 13) started with grooming behaviors that were
remarkably similar to the charged offenses and then progressed
to digital penetration, oral copulation, and sexual intercourse
does not diminish the probative value of this evidence. Rather
his unmistakably sexual conduct with Does 12 and 13 tends to
suggest that (1) he was sexually attracted to females; (2) that his
more ambiguous acts with Does One, Two, Three, Four, Six,
Seven, Eight, and 11 were intended for his sexual arousal or
gratification rather than for professional treatment purposes; and
(3) that the touching that occurred in the charged offenses was
not mistaken or accidental.

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Furthermore, the trial court reasonably concluded that the
uncharged misconduct was not more inflammatory and that there
were sufficient similarities to support an inference that all three
resulted from a common design or scheme. (See People v. Shea
(1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1268-1269, disapproved on other
grounds by People v. Dalton (2019) 7 Cal.5th 166, 214.) Bunyad’s
conduct with all the Does began by him using his position of trust
to view or touch their intimate body parts somewhat subtly under
the guise of chiropractic treatment in his office. That Bunyad’s
conduct with Does 12 and 13 became more explicitly sexual (after
the initial grooming stage) was relevant evidence from which it
could be inferred that he was advancing according to a common
plan or scheme.

True, the potential for prejudice is increased by the fact
that the acts involving Does 12 and 13 did not result in any
charges, much less a conviction. (See People v. Merriman (2014)
60 Cal.4th 1, 59 [jury might be inclined to punish defendant for
uncharged acts].) But the risk of undue prejudice was limited by
the evidence that Detective Diaz had concluded Bunyad’s conduct
with Does 12 and 13 was not criminal. This evidence might have
benefited the defense—to the extent it suggested that the
charged conduct might not be criminal.

Finally, we note that the risk of prejudice was further
reduced by the court’s instruction to the jury that it could not
conclude from the evidence of uncharged acts involving Does 12
and 13 “that the defendant has a bad character or is disposed to
commit crime” and the uncharged misconduct evidence “is not
sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is guilty of the
crimes charged. The People still must prove every charge beyond
a reasonable doubt.” Juries are presumed to follow the
instructions given. (People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865,
919, disapproved on other grounds by People v. Williams (2010)
49 Cal.4th 405, 458-459.)

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The trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate
Bunyad’s due process rights in concluding that the evidence’s
probative value outweighed its potential for undue prejudice or
delay.

B.

Bunyad also contends that the trial court committed
instructional error in its response to a question the jury posed
during deliberations. We disagree.

1.

Penal Code section 1138 imposes a duty on the trial court
to provide a deliberating jury with requested information on
questions of law. (See People v. Lua (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1004,
1016.) But “[t]his does not mean the court must always elaborate
on the standard instructions. Where the original instructions are
themselves full and complete, the court has discretion under
[Penal Code] section 1138 to determine what additional
explanations are sufficient to satisfy the jury’s request for
information.” (People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 97.)

We review the trial court’s decision whether to provide
additional instruction for abuse of discretion. (People v. Waidla
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 745-746.) The correctness of any
supplemental instruction presents a question of law that we
review de novo. (People v. Doane (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 965, 980.)
“[W]e view the challenged instruction in the context of the
instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether
there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in
an impermissible manner.” (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th
1186, 1229.)

2.

With respect to the evidence admitted from Does Nine, 12,
and 13, the jury received two jury instructions. First, the jury

19
was instructed, pursuant to CALCRIM No. 375: “You may
consider this evidence only if the People have proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant, in fact,
committed the uncharged acts. . . . A fact is proved by a
preponderance of the evidence if you conclude that it is more
likely than not that the fact is true. [If the People have not met
this burden, you must disregard this evidence entirely.] If you
decide that the defendant committed the uncharged acts, you
may, but are not required to, consider that evidence for the
limited purpose of deciding whether . . . one, the defendant acted
with the intent to touch . . . [the] Jane Does[] alleged in this case
as victims for the specific purpose of sexual arousal or sexual
gratification. And/or the defendant’s conduct was motivated by
an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest in Jane Does 1, 2, 3, 4,
and 6. And the defendant’s alleged actions were not the result of
mistake or accident. And/or the defendant had a plan or scheme
to commit the offenses alleged in this case. In evaluating this
evidence, consider the similarity or lack of similarity between the
uncharged offenses and the charged offenses. Do not consider
this evidence for any other purpose. Do not conclude from this
evidence that the defendant has a bad character or is disposed to
commit crime. If you conclude that the defendant committed the
uncharged offenses, that conclusion is only one factor to consider
along with all the other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to
prove that the defendant is guilty of the crimes charged. The
People still must prove every charge beyond a reasonable doubt.”

The jury was further instructed, pursuant to CALCRIM No.
1191: “The People presented evidence that the defendant may
have committed the offenses with Jane Does 12 and 13 of digital
penetration, oral copulation and vaginal penetration that were
not charged in this case. And these crimes will be defined for you
in these instructions. [¶] You may consider this evidence only if
the People have proved to you by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant, in fact, committed one or more of the

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uncharged offenses of digital penetration, oral copulation or
vaginal penetration. . . . A fact is proved by a preponderance of
the evidence if you conclude that it is more likely than not that
the fact is true. If the People have not met this burden of proof,
you must disregard this evidence entirely. [¶] If you decide that
the defendant committed one or more of the uncharged offenses,
you may, but are not required to, conclude from that evidence
that the defendant was disposed or inclined to commit sexual
offenses. And based upon that decision also conclude that the
defendant was likely to commit sexual battery by fraudulent
representation and/or annoying or molesting a child as charged
here.” (Italics added.)

During deliberations, the jury asked the court: “If we
believe by a preponderance of evidence that testimony of [Doe
Nine], [Doe] 12, [and Doe] 13 is true, but don’t believe by [a
preponderance of evidence] that the uncharged acts ([forcible]
sexual penetration, [forcible] oral copulation, rape) were
committed, can we still use the testimony as evidence of intent of
sexual arousal for example[?] [E].g. we believe [Doe] 13 and
[Bunyad] had intercourse, but not necessarily that it was ‘rape.’ ”

In response, the court told the jury (after proposing the
response to the parties and receiving no objection): “[Y]es you
may. [S]ee jury instruction #375.”

3.

Despite defense counsel’s failure to object to the trial
court’s response to the jury question, we (like the People) address
Bunyad’s argument on the merits. (See Pen. Code, § 1259; People
v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1011-1012.)

Bunyad complains that the court’s instruction was legally
incorrect as applied to consideration of the evidence under section
1108 because section 1108 only permits use of a defendant’s

21
uncharged “sexual offenses,” as statutorily defined, to prove
disposition. That may be so.

But the jury’s question to the court did not ask for
clarification on the use of the evidence to show disposition or
propensity. The jury’s question asked about consideration of the
evidence for intent alone and made clear that it had already
concluded that the People failed to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that Bunyad committed rape, forcible oral
copulation, or forcible penetration. And the trial court had
already instructed the jury, pursuant to CALCRIM No. 1191,
that if the prosecution failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that Bunyad in fact committed one or more of these
uncharged offenses, “you must disregard this evidence entirely.
[¶] If you decide that the defendant committed one or more of the
uncharged offenses, you may, but are not required to, conclude
from that evidence that the defendant was disposed or inclined to
commit sexual offenses.” (Italics added.)

The trial court properly answered the jury’s question by
affirming that if the jury believed Bunyad committed the
uncharged acts, but that the acts did not constitute an
enumerated criminal offense, it could nonetheless use the
evidence of the uncharged acts to find that Bunyad had the
requisite intent for the charged crimes. (See § 1101, subd. (b);
People v. McCurdy (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1063, 1100 [“section 1101,
subdivision (b), . . . is not limited to evidence of criminal conduct,
but may encompass any wrong or other act”]; People v. Cottone,
supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 286, fn. 10 [“unlike section 1108, [section
1101, subdivision (b)] does not require the conduct to be a crime,
but rather applies more broadly to ‘evidence that a person
committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act’ ”].)

On this record, it is not reasonably likely the jury—who
only asked about considering the evidence to prove intent—
understood the court’s affirmative answer, including its reference

22
to CALCRIM No. 375, as applying to proof of disposition under
CALCRIM No. 1191. The trial court properly determined that
further explanation was not required.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:

JACKSON, P.J.
CHOU, J.

People v. Bunyad (A165881)

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