CourtListener 9502513•Khorshidi v. Javaheri CA2/4
Full text
Filed 5/15/24 Khorshidi v. Javaheri CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
MICHAEL KHORSHIDI et al., B329246
Plaintiffs and Respondents, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC408948)
v.
ALEXANDER JAVAHERI et al.,
Defendants and Appellants;
PARVIZ ABDI,
Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mitchell L. Beckloff, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with instructions.
Reuben Raucher & Blum, Stephen L. Raucher, Yunfei Ni
for Appellants Alexander Javaheri and David Javaheri.
Harrison Law and Mediation, Susan L. Harrison; Brent
Law, Karen K. Brent for Appellant Parviz Abdi.
Early Sullivan Wright Gizer & McRae, Scott E. Gizer,
Padideh Zargari, Zachary C. Hansen for Respondents Michael
Khorshidi and Nejatolah Rabbanian.
INTRODUCTION
Appellants Alexander Javaheri, David Javaheri, and Parviz
Abdi (collectively, J&A) were in a joint venture with respondents
Michael Khorshidi and Nejatolah Rabbanian (K&R). K&R
defaulted under the terms of the joint venture agreement. J&A
sued for specific performance of the provision in the joint venture
agreement that allowed non-defaulting venturers to buy out the
interests of defaulting venturers. In 2012, the trial court found
in J&A’s favor, and in 2013 the joint venture was appraised to
determine the value of the buyout. Litigation on the parties’
remaining claims dragged on, however, and a final judgment was
not entered until 2017. When J&A asked the trial court to
include the 2013 valuation in the 2017 statement of decision and
judgment on J&A’s specific performance claims, the trial court
declined, stating that the buyout provision of the joint venture
agreement was “self-executing” and “[c]ourt supervision of the
buyout process is not required.”
After this division affirmed the judgment in 2021, K&R
refused to sell their interests in the joint venture. J&A filed a
motion seeking an elisor to effect compliance with the judgment
for specific performance. The trial court denied the motion on the
grounds that the 2017 judgment did not include a buyout
valuation. J&A appealed.
2
We reverse. The trial court abused its discretion in
denying J&A’s request for an elisor. In 2017, the trial court
declined to include the 2013 valuation in the judgment on the
grounds that court involvement was not needed for the buyout,
but then declined to appoint an elisor on the grounds that no
valuation was included in the judgment—effectively holding that
court involvement actually was needed. J&A are entitled to the
remedy they were awarded in 2017; the trial court’s denial of the
motion to enforce the judgment for specific performance rendered
the judgment illusory.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Background
1. Joint venture
On April 1, 1987, the five parties entered into a joint
venture agreement (“Agreement”) regarding a property at the
intersection of 5th Street and Los Angeles Street in downtown
Los Angeles (5th & LA). Under the Agreement, Khorshidi and
Rabbanian each held a 30 percent interest in the joint venture,
Abdi held a 20 percent interest, and the Javaheris each held a 10
percent interest
Section 9 of the Agreement was titled “Default and
Dissolution”; it set out the terms under which a joint venturer
would be considered in default of the agreement. Section 9.3 of
the joint venture agreement set out how non-defaulting venturers
could elect to purchase the interests of defaulting venturers.
Section 9.3.1 stated, “Upon the occurrence of an Event of Default
by a Venturer,” the non-defaulting venturers “shall have the
right to acquire the Joint Venture interest of the Defaulter for
cash . . . at a price determined pursuant to the appraisal
3
procedure set forth in Paragraph 10” of the agreement, subject to
certain adjustments.
Paragraph 10 stated, “Whenever this Agreement provides
for the valuation of an interest in the Joint Venture to be
purchased or sold, the value of such interest in the Joint Venture
shall be determined” according to an appraisal procedure.
“[E]ach Venturer or group shall select one appraiser and the two
appraisers so selected shall agree upon and designate a third
appraiser.” “Each appraiser selected shall furnish the Venturers
and the Venturer’s certified public accountants with a written
appraisal within ninety (90) days of his selection, setting forth his
determination of the net fair market value of all real estate and
other tangible assets owned by the Venture as of the date all
three appraisers were selected.” “Upon receipt of the appraisals
of the net fair market value of the Venture, the independent
certified public accountants of the Venture shall make the final
determination as to the net fair market value of the Joint
Venture and of the Joint Venture interest to be sold or purchased
. . . .” The accountants would also “refer to this Agreement, the
Capital Accounts of the venturers and other pertinent
agreements and facts in determining the net fair market value of
the Joint Venture and the net fair market value of each
Venturer’s interest in the Joint Venture.” “The determination of
the accountants shall be treated as the net fair market value of
the Joint Venture and of the Joint Venture interests to be sold or
purchased determined pursuant to this Paragraph 10 and the
determination shall be final and binding on the Venturers.”
2. 2009 litigation and 2012 “phase one” ruling
There has been extensive litigation among the parties, as
discussed in two prior nonpublished opinions, Javaheri v.
4
Khorshidi (Nov. 13, 2006, B183177) and Khorshidi v. Javaheri,
Aug. 5, 2021, B285132 (Khorshidi II). Most of the details of the
previous litigations are not relevant to this appeal. Notably, in
2008 an arbitrator found that K&R had defaulted according to
the terms of the Agreement, and held that the Javaheris had the
option of buying out K&R’s shares in the joint venture according
to the Agreement. (Khorshidi II, supra.)
In 2009, K&R sued the Javaheris, initiating case number
BC408948. The Javaheris filed a cross-complaint for specific
performance to “invoke [the] right to purchase the interest of
Khorshidi and Rabbanian” under the Agreement. The Javaheris
alleged in their cross-complaint that K&R had defaulted
according to the Agreement, as found in a prior arbitration, and
“Paragraph 9.3 of the joint venture agreement provides that a
non-defaulting venturer has the ‘right to acquire the joint
venture interest of the defaulter for cash’ pursuant to the
appraisal provisions of paragraph 10. [¶] By this Cross-
complaint, [the Javaheris] hereby invoke said right to purchase
the interest of Khorshidi and Rabbanian.” Abdi also filed a cross-
complaint against K&R for declaratory relief and specific
performance, using nearly identical language to invoke his right
to purchase K&R’s interests in the joint venture.
As stated in Khorshidi II, supra, the parties agreed to
litigate their various claims against one another in two phases.
“The parties and court ultimately agreed that phase one would
determine the parties’ rights to buy out the other joint venturers
under the terms of the joint venture agreement.” In its oral
statement of decision on January 10, 2012, the trial court held
that K&R had again defaulted under the Agreement, and
5
concluded that J&A could “proceed with their section 9 rights”
under the Agreement. (Khorshidi II, supra.)
J&A reiterated in court the same day that they intended to
exercise their buyout rights. The court and parties discussed how
to proceed with the appraisal process required by paragraph 10 of
the Agreement to determine a net fair market value of the joint
venture for buyout purposes. In March 2012, all parties entered
into a stipulation about the appraisal process, acknowledging the
court’s holding that J&A had a right to exercise their rights
under the agreement to buy K&R’s interests in the joint venture,
and stating that the parties “have commenced the process of
nominating the 3 appraisers” as required in the Agreement.
“On February 27, 2013, there was a hearing before Judge
Heeseman with the three appraisers who had been selected
through the appraisal process set out in the joint venture
agreement. The attorneys gave short presentations to the three
appraisers, [James Pike, David Zoraster, and David Rosenthal,]
urging them to focus on certain issues relevant to the valuation of
the building. After the presentations, the appraisers asked
questions. . . . [¶] The appraisers submitted their reports, and the
independent CPA submitted his report in March 2013.”
(Khorshidi II, supra.) The CPA, Michael J. Krycler, stated in his
March 18, 2023 report that the joint venture’s total assets
amounted to $7,557,080, and its liabilities amounted to
$2,328,805, so the net fair market value was $5,228,275 as of
December 31, 2012. Khorshidi and Rabbanian’s thirty percent
shares each amounted to $1,568,483.
On July 1, 2013, K&R filed a petition to vacate a
contractual arbitration award. K&R stated that the three
appraisals from Pike, Zoraster and Rosenthal “collectively
6
constitute the signed award of the panel of appraisers.” The trial
court denied the petition, finding that “the subject appraisals did
not constitute arbitration under the California Arbitration Act,
[or] under the unique facts and procedures here.” K&R appealed
the court’s ruling, but after briefing was completed and the case
was set for oral argument, K&R requested dismissal of the
appeal, stating that it was based on a nonappealable order.
(Khorshidi II, supra.)
The case was transferred to a different judge. In
September 2013, Abdi filed a motion for preliminary injunction
asking the court to order K&R “to specifically perform pursuant
to” the Agreement by “allowing Abdi to purchase at least one half
of [K&R’s] interest in [the joint venture] at the price of
$1,568,483 per 30% interest, in accordance with rulings made
during the Phase One trial of this matter and the subsequent
appraisal process.” K&R opposed the motion, stating in part that
a preliminary injunction would amount to a final judgment being
entered in the case even though there was a second phase of
issues to be tried.
The trial court, with Judge Abraham Khan presiding,
denied the motion. The minute order stated that the parties were
going to seek a written statement of decision from Judge
Heeseman. As discussed in Khorshidi II, supra, Judge Heeseman
declined to issue a written statement of decision, instead
referring the parties to his extensive oral statement of decision.
3. Phase two, the 2014 action, and the 2017 judgment
The case was eventually reassigned to Judge Mitchell L.
Beckloff. (Khorshidi II, supra.) K&R filed a motion for mistrial,
asserting that because phase one had been decided by Judge
Heeseman, the determination of additional matters by anyone
7
other than Judge Heeseman would violate the one-judge rule.
K&R also challenged the substance of some of Judge Heeseman’s
findings. (Khorshidi II, supra.) Judge Beckloff denied the
motion, observing in a written ruling that Judge Heeseman had
ruled on the parties’ defaults and buyout rights under the joint
venture agreement, and “Judge Heeseman's decision on those
issues is complete and does not require further action by the
court.” (Khorshidi II, supra.)
On December 24, 2014, K&R filed another lawsuit against
the Javaheris, initiating case number BC567865. K&R asserted
in part that the Javaheris “intentionally acted to suppress the
revenues of 5th and LA for purposes of artificially depressing its
valuation” to the appraisers. (Khorshidi II, supra.)
“Phase two” of the parties’ competing claims from the 2009
action (BC408948) and K&R’s claims in the 2014 action
(BC567865) were tried in a bench trial in 2017. For K&R’s 2014
claims that the appraisals were flawed, the court considered the
three appraisal reports and heard testimony from each of the
three appraisers about the process they employed in appraising
the venture. The court also considered the testimony of K&R’s
expert witness and forensic accountant, as well as other evidence
regarding the value of the property. In July 2017, the trial court
issued separate statements of decision for each case.
In its written statement of decision addressing K&R’s 2014
complaint (BC567865), the court “reject[ed] [K&R’s] contention
that the appraisers’ results are suspect and unreliable.” The
court found that K&R were “not entitled to any relief based upon
their claims that the Javaheris took actions to artificially reduce
the Joint Venture’s appraised valuation in an effort to suppress
any prospective buyout.”
8
In its statement of decision addressing the claims raised in
the 2009 action (BC408948), the trial court noted again that in
phase one, “Judge Heeseman ruled on the parties’ rights relative
to one another under the joint venture agreement. Judge
Heeseman’s decision on those issues is complete and does not
require further action by the court.” The court continued, “Judge
Heeseman determined that . . . the Javaheris are entitled to
proceed with their Section 9 rights [and] Abdi can exercise his
Section 9 rights.” The court also noted that in phase one, Judge
Heeseman found in favor of the Javaheris on their cause of action
for specific performance, and “granted the Javaheris’ request that
they be permitted to purchase [K&R’s] interest in the Joint
Venture. Judge Heeseman specifically granted the Javaheris
their buy-out rights pursuant to Section 9 of the JVA. . . . Judge
Heeseman also permitted Mr. Abdi to participate in the buy-out
pursuant to Section 9 of the JVA.” The court noted that Judge
Heeseman also held in favor of Abdi on his specific performance
cause of action, which requested an order that K&R “specifically
perform paragraph 9.3 of the JV Agreement.”
However, the trial court declined the Javaheris’ request to
“order the sale of [K&R’s] interest[s] at the price to be determined
according to the appraisal process detailed in the JV Agreement.”
The court held that this request, which the Javaheris asserted in
their closing brief, “exceeds the scope of that prayed for in the
[Javaheris’ cross-]complaint,” because the Javaheris did not ask
the court to “resolve a dispute concerning the appraisal process
set forth in Section 10 of the JVA.” The court continued, “The
buy-out provision in the JVA is a self-executing provision. . . .
Court supervision of that buy-out process is not required and was
not warranted under the Javaheris’ Cross-Complaint.”
9
The court entered judgment in favor of J&A on July 17,
2017. The judgment stated that J&A “are entitled to exercise
their buy-out rights as against [K&R] under Section 9 of the
[Agreement.] No price or date for the buy-out of joint venture
interests of [K&R] is being set or established by the Court, such
matters not being encompassed by the pleadings and not before
the Court.”
B. 2018 litigation
In December 2018, after the 2017 judgment was entered
and while its appeal was pending, the Javaheris filed a complaint
against K&R, initiating case number 18STCV07563, which is
currently pending before Judge Stephanie M. Bowick. The
Javaheris discussed the extensive litigation and multiple findings
that K&R had defaulted under the Agreement, and asserted that
the 2017 judgment awarded them specific performance. The
Javaheris further alleged that the three appraisers completed
their appraisals, and CPA Krycler “reached his preliminary
findings and published same on March 18, 2013.” Although the
Javaheris were “willing and able” to buy out K&R for the
appraised value, K&R “refused to consummate the transaction.”
The Javaheris noted that the 2017 judgment required specific
performance of paragraph 9.3 of the Agreement. In a cause of
action for breach of contract, the Javaheris alleged that K&R
breached the Agreement by refusing to sell their interests in the
joint venture, and in a cause of action for specific performance,
asked that K&R be compelled to sell their shares at the 2013
appraised value. Another cause of action to enforce the 2017
judgment requested an order that K&R be compelled to sell their
interests.
10
Abdi filed a cross-complaint noting the 2012 ruling, the
appraisal process, and the 2017 judgment. Abdi also alleged that
K&R refused to sell their interests in the joint venture, and
continued to collect distributions from the venture even though
they were not entitled to do so. Abdi alleged that K&R’s refusal
to sell their interests was a breach of the JV agreement, and
requested specific performance of a buyout at the 2013 value. In
a cause of action for “mandatory injunction,” Abdi sought
enforcement of the 2017 judgment.
The 2018 matter was stayed while the 2017 judgment was
on appeal. In 2021, a different panel of this division affirmed the
judgment in Khorshidi II, supra.
C. This appeal: motion for elisor
1. Motion, opposition, and reply
On June 15, 2022, in the case filed in 2009 (BC408948), the
Javaheris filed a motion seeking an elisor as a means to enforce
the 2017 judgment. They asserted, “After the [Javaheris] sent
out their demand for sale, the self-executing buyout provision in
the Joint Venture Agreement was completed, and [K&R] were
required to sell their interests in the Joint Venture. However,
[K&R] have refused to convey their interests to date.
Accordingly, the Court should enforce the transfer of [K&R’s]
Joint Venture interests at the 2013 appraisal amount (offset by
the credits due to the Javaheris) through its broad equitable
powers, on a per capita basis, and appoint an Elisor to effectuate
the transfers.”
The Javaheris attached a letter from their counsel to K&R’s
counsel requesting that K&R comply with the judgment. Abdi’s
counsel sent a similar letter. K&R’s counsel responded that the
lack of a valuation finding in the 2017 judgment meant that
11
“[t]here is no judicially ordered set price in the Judgment for the
Javaheris and Abdi to enforce.” K&R’s letter further noted that
the 30-year joint venture had expired according to the terms of
the Agreement, and K&R “are willing to sell their shares to the
Javaheris and/or Abdi, but the price is not one that is determined
in the 2017 Judgment or any other prior Judgment or ruling.”
In the Javaheris’ motion seeking appointment of an elisor,
they asserted that the appraisal had been completed in
conformance with the Agreement, and “the 2013 appraisal
amount undisputedly is final and binding on all venturers.” They
continued, “After the 2017 Judgment specifically ordered K&R to
perform Paragraph 9.3 of the JV Agreement, the Javaheris
notified K&R of their election to buy them out at the 2013
appraisal amount, both via the filing of the 2018 lawsuit and
their demand letter of April 29, 2022, so K&R now legally and
contractually must sell their JV interests to the Javaheris at the
2013 appraisal amount (less credits due). Yet they have refused
to do so, necessitating the Court’s adoption of the 2013 appraisal
amount.” The Javaheris also asserted that K&R “actively
participated in the entire appraisal process,” and “[a]lthough they
objected to the appraisal process later, their objection was
meritless” according to the 2017 judgment, “so it is now proper
for the Court to adopt the 2013 appraisal amount, rather than
force the Javaheris to seek the same remedy in a different
action.”
The Javaheris noted that their request was “not based on
the scope of the original pleadings, but rather on the court’s
equitable powers to enforce” the 2017 judgment. They asserted
that “an Elisor is necessary to consummate the sale of two-thirds
of K&R’s interest (40%) to the Javaheris based on the 2013
12
appraisal amount of $7,555,000 (less credits due), with the other
one-third (20%) being sold to Abdi.”
Abdi filed a memorandum of points and authorities stating
that he supported the Javaheris’ request to have the court
appoint an elisor to transfer K&R’s interests.
K&R opposed the motion, arguing that the Javaheris were
“ask[ing] ask this Court to do what it expressly said it cannot do
without violating the One Judge Rule—decree that [K&R] are
required to sell their interests in the joint venture . . . at the 2013
appraised price. Compounding the problem, the Javaheris are
asking this Court to provide the same relief the Javaheris are
currently seeking by way of their 2018 action in front of Judge
Bowick, essentially asking this Court to usurp Judge Bowick’s
jurisdiction over the parties’ present dispute.”
K&R noted that the 2017 judgment specifically stated that
the court would not set a price for the buyout. They argued that
by seeking an order for an elisor, the Javaheris were “effectively
asking for this Court to retroactively determine issues that [the
Javaheris] failed to raise in the Consolidated Cases prior to the
2017 Judgment and issue a completely different ruling than the
Court initially issued.” K&R noted that in its 2017 statement of
decision, the trial court observed that the buyout provision in the
Agreement was “self-executing” and did not require court
involvement. K&R also argued that they had not sold their
shares to the Javaheris because the Javaheris “never actually
made such a demand for K&R to sell their shares at any time,
13
despite having been vested with this right” under the 2017
judgment and earlier arbitration awards.1
In their reply, the Javaheris asserted, “Although this Court
did not set a buyout price in the 2017 Judgment, the 2013
appraisal process, due to its self-executing nature, has produced
the final and binding buyout price pursuant to Paragraph 10.2 of
the JV Agreement, and the Court need not make any further
determination.” They argued that if the court granted the motion
for an elisor, the court would “simply be enforcing the specific
performance relief awarded to the Javaheris against K&R, and
will not be modifying anything in the 2017 Judgment.”
2. The trial court’s initial ruling
At a hearing on July 8, 2022, the trial court noted that it
was “concerned about how [to] determine the adjustments that
have to be made [pursuant to the Agreement], which is clearly
called for in section 10, when all of that would be subject to
dispute. I’m not sure that it’s appropriate, the enforcement of the
judgment.”2 The court continued the matter until after Judge
Bowick ruled on the pending demurrers in the 2018 action, in
which the parties were asserting some similar legal arguments.
1 The record includes many demands that K&R sell their
shares to J&A, including demands in the 2009 cross-complaints
and the 2018 pleadings.
2 Section 10 of the Agreement required the CPA, in
determining the fair market value of each venturer’s interest, to
consider “the Capital Accounts of the Venturers and other
pertinent agreements and facts.” Here, because the valuation
was completed in 2013 but the parties had remained co-venturers
for the ensuing decade as the litigation dragged on, the parties
and court acknowledged that some changed circumstances should
be considered when determining a final buyout valuation.
14
After the hearing, Abdi filed a “position statement in
support of appointing an elisor,” stating, “The time has come to
finally make the 2012 ruling and 2017 Judgment mean
something, and there is NO reason to allow K&R to delay the
interest transfers any further.” He also asserted that the 2017
trial and judgment specifically addressed K&R’s challenges to the
2013 appraisals, and “[t]his Court did not decide a hypothetical
question regarding an appraisal price that would never be used.
The 2013 Appraisal Price was reached by the appraisers,
challenged by K&R, analyzed by the Court, and found to be
appropriate, for a reason. It must now be used by this Court.”
K&R objected to this late filing.
There was a second hearing on the elisor motion on October
26, 2022, and the court took the matter under submission. On
November 23, 2022, the trial court issued a written order stating
that it intended to grant the motion, and setting an evidentiary
hearing. The court discussed the history of the litigation and
noted, “[K&R] have known since early 2012 they were defaulting
co-venturers. The Joint Venture Agreement made clear their
obligations at that point—forced sale to Abdi and the Javaheris.”
The court also stated, “The Javaheris have sought enforcement of
the 2017 Judgment. There can be no real question [K&R] have
elected not to specifically perform as required by the 2017
Judgment. An enforcement action is appropriate.”
The court stated, “[T]he court is not modifying the now
final 2017 judgment—the court is merely implementing it.
[K&R] have been ordered to comply with the Joint Venture
Agreement and its buy-out provisions. [K&R] acknowledge [that
the CPA] Krycler determined the fair market value of the joint
venture pursuant to the terms of the Joint Venture Agreement.
15
To the extent, [K&R] attempted to undermine Krycler’s opinion,
they failed. The court upheld the appraisals and (after
considering significant testamentary and documentary evidence)
found the appraisals were unassailable. The buy-out provisions
of the Joint Venture Agreement do not require the court’s
involvement, but [K&R] have chosen to not comply with the
court’s specific performance command in the 2017 Judgment
necessitating enforcement measures. To adopt [K&R’s] position
is as if the 2017 Judgment does not exist.”
The trial court further stated, “[T]he relief requested does
not alter the substantive rights of the parties—it merely enforces
the court’s 2017 Judgment. The relief requested is consistent
with the finding that [K&R] are defaulting co-venturers, and
Krycler set a fair market value on the joint venture based on
appraisals conducted pursuant to court order and evaluated by
the court. The court is not adjusting the respective rights of the
parties beyond that required in the 2017 Judgment.” The court
stated, “[T]o the extent [K&R] challenge adjustments to the buy-
out price (not the valuation date or appraisal amounts) the court
intends to set an evidentiary hearing.[ ] An evidentiary hearing
will provide the parties with the right to be heard about Krycler’s
valuation and changed circumstances such as the joint venture’s
payment of debt. The court also notes the Joint Venture
Agreement at paragraph 8.6.2 provides for certain adjustments.
The court cannot make those adjustments in the context of
enforcing the court’s judgment without an evidentiary hearing....
Plaintiffs’ objections based on claimed offsets (not the valuation
date or appraisal amounts) may also be addressed at an
evidentiary hearing.” The court reiterated, “Again, the court
finds against [K&R] on their claim Krycler’s valuation cannot
16
serve as the basis for the buy-out price and will not entertain
further argument on the issue.” The court set an evidentiary
hearing. The parties filed a joint stipulation of undisputed facts,
and filed briefs asserting their positions regarding valuation and
offsets.
3. The trial court’s denial of the elisor motion
At the hearing on April 13, 2023, the trial court stated that
it wanted to revisit the issue of “whether the motion should be
granted.” The court stated that it was reconsidering its previous
ruling because the 2017 judgment did not set a price or date for
the buyout.
Counsel for the Javaheris noted that the court stated in its
2017 ruling that the buyout terms of the Agreement were “self-
executing.” He continued, “[T]he court ordered the parties to
specifically perform and . . . there has been a refusal to comply
with that decree of specific performance. So if we can’t then come
back to your honor and enforce it pursuant to what should be
self-executing terms of the joint venture agreement then the
whole exercise was for nothing and the relief that your honor
ordered was, you know, meaningless.”
Counsel for Abdi agreed, stating that the court would not
be setting the price for the buyout, rather, “[t]he appraiser sets
the price and all we need you for is enforcement of your specific
performance judgment and that is what it boils down to.”
Counsel for K&R argued that in 2013, the Javaheris and
Abdi “could have tendered the funds that they thought were due
to my clients, they could have opened an escrow, there were
many things that they could have done or initiated a lawsuit
saying we want to enforce that. They didn't do any of those
things which then results in 2013 appraisals whether you want to
17
call it waiver, latches or statute of limitation the claim on that is
bar[red].” He asserted that K&R “couldn’t be enforced [sic] to sell
[for] that 2013 price anymore because [J&A] did not take the
appropriate steps to enforce that appraisal.”
The trial court noted that K&R’s 2014 complaint challenged
the 2013 appraisals, and much of the 2017 trial involved
testimony from each of the appraisers and Krycler. The court
asked K&R’s counsel, “I'm curious as to what that was all about
then if Khorshidi and Rabbanian were not conceding the issues
that they were bound by the 2013 appraisals. Why were they
challenged then?” K&R’s counsel responded that the 2013
valuation could have had an effect if J&A had “taken the
appropriate steps to enforce those remedies,” but they did not.
Abdi’s counsel disagreed, stating, “Khorshidi and
Rabbanian have consistently taken the position in numerous
pleadings filed that they were not required to sell despite Judge
Heeseman’s finding and ruling until a final judgment was
entered.” She added, “They stipulated to it, they agreed to it,
they made every single challenge they can up and down the court
system numerous times and trying to make us wait for yet
another action that they are going to appeal again is just not
appropriate.” The court and parties turned to the question of the
appropriate value of the buyout, which we do not summarize
here.
The following day, the trial court issued a short, two-page
order denying the elisor motion. The court stated, “In the context
of these difficult protracted proceedings before multiple judicial
officers (and three different attorneys representing K&R and two
different attorneys representing the Javaheris) the court finds it
inequitable to use an elisor here in aid of enforcement of the
18
court’s judgment. Importantly, the use of an elisor appears to
conflict with the court’s judgment finding it inappropriate to set a
buy-out price or date.” The court continued, “When the court
entered its judgment the court specifically denied the Javaheris’
request to order the sale of K&R’s interest in the joint venture
pursuant to the appraisal process detailed in the joint venture
agreement. Among other things, this court found the parties had
not prayed for court supervision of the buy-out process.”
The court stated that because the availability of the court
record was limited, “it is not entirely clear whether K&R could be
deemed to have consented to the appraisal process.” It noted,
however, that “K&R challenged the validity of the appraisals in
their first amended complaint in Case No. BC567865 . . . as if
they were bound by them.” The court concluded, “Given that the
court did not enter its judgment in this matter until July 17,
2017, K&R’s challenge to their status as defaulting joint
venturers in that judgment, the judgment becoming final on
October 12, 2021 as well as the lack of clarity concerning K&R's
consensual participation of the appraisal process (and their
related challenge to values), the court cannot find appointment of
an elisor is appropriate and warranted in equity here.”
The Javaheris and Abdi timely appealed. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 904.1, subd. (a)(2).)
DISCUSSION
J&A contend that by denying the elisor motion, the trial
court rendered the 2017 judgment for specific performance
illusory. K&R assert that the trial court’s denial was correct,
because the court never granted J&A the relief they now seek.
19
A. Legal standards
“Every court” has the power to “compel obedience to its
judgments.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(4).) It is well
established that a trial court has the “inherent power . . . to
exercise reasonable control over litigation before it, as well as the
inherent and equitable power to achieve justice and prevent
misuse of processes lawfully issued.” (Venice Canals Resident
Home Owners Assn. v. Superior Court (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 675,
679.)
“[A]n elisor is a person appointed by the court to perform
functions like the execution of a deed or document.” (Blueberry
Properties, LLC v. Chow (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1020
(Blueberry Properties); see also Rayan v. Dykeman (1990) 224
Cal.App.3d 1629, 1635 [“in common legal parlance the term elisor
is used to designate persons appointed to perform functions such
as . . . deed and document execution”].) “A court typically
appoints an elisor to sign documents on behalf of a recalcitrant
party in order to effectuate its judgments or orders, where the
party refuses to execute such documents.” (Blueberry Properties,
supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 1020.)
A trial court’s order regarding the appointment of an elisor
is reviewed for abuse of discretion, considering “the court's
authority and reasonableness in issuing the order appointing the
elisor.” (Blueberry Properties, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 1020.)
“‘An abuse of discretion occurs only where it is shown that the
trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. [Citation.] It is a
deferential standard of review that requires us to uphold the trial
court's determination, even if we disagree with it, so long as it is
reasonable.’” (Ibid.)
20
The elisor motion was a request that the court employ its
equitable powers. “[A] a court of equity retains inherent
jurisdiction to oversee and enforce execution of its decrees.”
(Brown v. Brown (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 82, 84 (Brown).) “When a
trial court makes a ruling based upon equitable considerations,
the abuse of discretion standard applies on review of that ruling.”
(Lin v. Jeng (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1025.)
B. Analysis
J&A assert that the trial court’s denial of the elisor motion
“essentially renders [the 2017 judgment] illusory” by holding that
J&A were not entitled to the relief they were awarded in 2017—
specific performance of the “self-executing” buyout. Indeed, in
2012 Judge Heeseman found that J&A were entitled to the
remedy of specific performance of the buyout provision in the
Agreement. The 2013 appraisals and CPA report set a value for
the joint venture, and K&R’s challenges to the valuation were
unsuccessful. In its 2017 judgment the trial court declined to
include a buyout date or amount because the buyout provisions
were “self-executing,” and “[did] not require any court
involvement.”
K&R, however, refused to perform as required by the 2017
judgment. When J&A asked that the court enforce its judgment,
the trial court declined based on reasoning that contradicted the
judgment. When the trial court held that J&A were not entitled
to the relief they sought in the elisor motion because a buyout
date and amount were not included in the 2017 judgment, the
court effectively held that the buyout provisions were not self-
executing, and that a court finding was in fact required before
J&A were entitled to specific performance. This contradictory
ruling rendered the judgment for specific performance illusory,
21
and therefore denial of the motion was an abuse of the trial
court’s discretion.
The court’s refusal to enforce its 2017 judgment deprived
J&A of the benefits of the judgment. J&A’s causes of action for
specific performance were claims in equity. (See, e.g., Darbun
Enterprises, Inc. v. San Fernando Community Hospital (2015)
239 Cal.App.4th 399, 409 (Darbun Enterprises) [a “plaintiff may
seek specific performance, an equitable remedy, as an alternative
to damages”].) A successful claim for specific performance
necessarily includes a finding that a remedy at law would be
inadequate. (Id., p. 409 fn. 5.) As the trial court correctly
recognized in its initial ruling stating its intent to grant the elisor
motion, “There can be no question the court ordered [K&R] to
transfer their interest in the joint venture to [J&A] pursuant to
provisions in Section 9.3 of the Joint Venture Agreement. . . . The
2017 Judgment did not provide [K&R] with a choice—the court
ordered them to perform the buy-out process contained within the
Joint Venture Agreement.” K&R have refused to comply with the
judgment, and as the court noted in its initial order stating its
intent to grant the elisor motion, “To adopt [K&R’s] position is as
if the 2017 Judgment does not exist.” Yet when the court
changed its ruling and denied the elisor motion, this is the
position it adopted.
K&R argue that J&A “have never been granted the relief
they sought in their motion.” They assert that because the trial
court declined to include a buyout value in the 2017 judgment,
J&A are now attempting to get “a second bite at the apple,” and
are “effectively asking this Court to ignore the findings of the
trial court.” We disagree. The trial court’s conclusion in 2017
that a judicial finding on the buyout valuation was unnecessary
22
was not tantamount to a statement that the 2013 valuation was
ineffective or unenforceable. Rather, the trial court simply found
that no specific finding about the valuation was necessary at the
time. Neither party challenged this ruling, and the conclusion is
supported by the Agreement itself, which states that a valuation
as completed in section 10 of the agreement “shall be final and
binding on the Venturers.”
K&R complain that J&A want to exercise their buyout
rights “at the 2013 Appraisal Price (at the bottom of the real
estate market following the financial crisis) as opposed to current
prices (or even 2017 prices), a multi-million dollar swing in the
buy-out price.” However, the history of the litigation makes clear
that K&R were aware they would be bound by the 2013
valuation. They challenged the valuation first as an arbitration
award, and then in a separate lawsuit leading to years of
litigation culminating in the 2017 trial. The court below, in a
bench trial that included testimony from the appraisers and
expert witnesses, rejected K&R’s claims that the appraisal
process was improper, tainted, or otherwise invalid. K&R did not
appeal that portion of the court’s ruling. There can be no credible
argument that the 2013 valuation was somehow unfairly foisted
upon K&R; that K&R have been prejudiced by delays that were,
in large part, of their own making; or that K&R are entitled to
reap the benefits of changed market prices following such delays.
Thus enforcement of the 2017 judgment—based on the 2012
finding that J&A were entitled to specific performance of a
buyout and the 2013 valuation—will not materially change the
parties’ substantive rights. (See, e.g., Lesser & Son v. Seymour
(1950) 35 Cal.2d 494, 500 [“There is a clear distinction between
material adjudicated portions of a judgment of decree, and mere
23
procedural matters incident to the determined issues, which are
incorporated as the proposed means of fulfilling the judgment.”].)
J&A assert that the trial court, acting in equity, erred by
holding that it was limited to the allegations in the 2009 cross-
complaints. Indeed, “‘[i]t has always been the pride of courts of
equity that they will so mold and adjust their decrees as to award
substantial justice according to the requirements of the varying
complications that may be presented to them for adjudication.’”
(Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles
County (1935) 3 Cal.2d 309, 331.) “[E]quitable relief is flexible
and expanding, and the theory that ‘for every wrong there is a
remedy’ [(Civ. Code, § 3523)] may be invoked by equity courts to
justify the invention of new methods of relief for new types of
wrongs.” (13 Witkin, Summary (11th ed. 2023) Equity, § 3; see
also Bisno v. Sax (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 714, 729 [“Equity having
taken jurisdiction over a cause does complete justice, even to the
extent of exceeding the specific prayers of the complaint when
necessary.”].) Thus, it was not beyond the court’s equitable
powers to fashion an appropriate remedy to enforce the 2017
judgment, even if such a remedy was not explicitly anticipated by
J&A in their 2009 cross-complaints.3
3 The trial court also had authority to modify the judgment if
necessary. “[I]n a circumstance in which a trial court issues a
judgment governing future actions and there exists the
possibility of an unforeseen change in circumstances over which
the judgment has no control, the court retains the inherent
authority to modify that judgment when such changes in
circumstances render modification necessary or appropriate.”
(Petrolink, Inc. v. Lantel Enterprises (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 156,
169, citing Rest.2d Judgments, § 73, com. b.)
24
J&A assert that they should not have to pursue
enforcement of the 2017 judgment in a separate litigation, which
will further delay resolution of the case. K&R argue that J&A
have brought such a result upon themselves by filing the 2018
litigation, which included requests to enforce the 2017 judgment.
We agree with J&A that resort to additional litigation to enforce
the judgment is unnecessary. In Brown, supra, 22 Cal.App.3d 82,
for example, a divorce decree ordered that certain stock be
divided between the spouses. The wife, Beverly, sold her share of
the stock for $11,680 and paid the husband, Leon, $1,086. The
trial court ordered Beverly to pay Leon the remaining half of the
sale amount. On appeal, Beverly argued that the trial court’s
order modified the judgment. The appellate court disagreed,
stating that the court’s order “merely implemented the existing
order to divide the stock.” (Brown, supra, 22 Cal.App.3d at p. 84.)
The court continued, “Under the circumstances it would have
been reasonless for the trial court to bring about unnecessary
litigation and delay an inevitable result by requiring Leon to
initiate a new action against Beverly to obtain what was already
his under the existing judgment.” (Ibid.) The same is true
here—J&A are entitled to specific performance under the 2017
judgment, and additional litigation to establish that entitlement
is unwarranted.
K&R point out that Judge Bowick, presiding over the
litigation filed in 2018, recently denied Abdi’s motion for
summary judgment. Abdi moved for summary judgment on the
issue of duty only, and based on the evidence presented, Judge
Bowick found a triable issue of material fact and denied the
motion. K&R assert that this ruling, as well as the parties’
25
various disagreements about how to implement the judgment,
support the court’s denial of the elisor motion.
Indeed, the parties continue to disagree about how the 2017
judgment should be enforced. Because the valuation was
completed in 2013, the parties and court will need to determine,
for example, the effects of years’ worth of distributions, tax
liabilities, and other details. We express no opinion on these
matters; the parties and trial court are in the best position to
determine them in the first instance. However, these details
cannot serve as a basis to undermine the court’s 2017 award of
specific performance to J&A. Because K&R have refused to
comply with the judgment for specific performance—a fact K&R
do not deny—J&A were entitled to the remedy of an elisor to
enforce the judgment. The court’s refusal to enforce its 2017
judgment deprived J&A of the benefits of that judgment, and
therefore was an abuse of discretion.4
DISPOSITION
The order denying the motion for an elisor is reversed, and
the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. Appellants are entitled to their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COLLINS, ACTING P. J.
We concur:
MORI, J. ZUKIN, J.
4 K&R filed a request for judicial notice of four documents.
These documents are already in the parties’ appendixes, so judicial
notice of them is unnecessary. The request for judicial notice is
therefore denied.
26
Wondering how this text applies to your situation?
Free consultation, no commitment
Describe your situation. Our team will contact you by email about your consultation.
Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.