CourtListener 9502486•People v. Lezama
Full text
Filed 4/22/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G062075
v. (Super. Ct. No. 17WF0527)
NOE LEZAMA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Patrick H. Donahue, Judge. Affirmed.
Rhonda G. Norris, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski, Alan Mann
and Minh U. Le, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Noe Lezama, who was originally charged with murder and who
later entered a plea to voluntary manslaughter in mid-2019, appeals from the trial court’s
summary denial of his petition for resentencing (Petition) under Penal Code section
1172.6. 1 He contends the trial court erred in concluding the timing and factual basis of
his plea precluded him from being eligible for resentencing. We find no error. Express
legislative history confirms the most reasonable interpretation of the relevant ambiguous
statutory language is that persons who pled guilty to manslaughter after statutory
amendments eliminated imputed malice theories of murder liability are not eligible for
resentencing as a matter of law. Because defendant is such a person, we affirm the
postjudgment order denying the Petition.
FACTS
A 2017 felony complaint charged defendant and Alfredo Quiroz-Muniz
with one count of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and one count of conspiracy to commit
murder (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)). With respect to the murder charge, it alleged the two
“unlawfully and with malice aforethought kill[ed] Frederick T., a human being.” In
connection with the conspiracy charge, it alleged the following overt acts: Quiroz-Muniz
armed himself with a handgun; defendant and Quiroz-Muniz drove to a particular
location; defendant stopped the vehicle; and Quiroz-Muniz exited the vehicle and shot the
victim. The complaint also contained various firearm and gang related enhancement
allegations, as well as prior conviction allegations involving Quiroz-Muniz. Following a
preliminary hearing, prosecutors filed an information containing the same charges and
allegations.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. Defendant filed the
Petition in April 2022 pursuant to former section 1170.95. Effective June 30, 2022, the
Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 to section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
There were no substantive changes to the statute. For purposes of clarity, we refer to the
statute as section 1172.6.
2
In June 2019, the prosecution and defendant reached a plea agreement. The
original information was amended by interlineation to add one count of voluntary
manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and modify a criminal street gang enhancement (§
186.22, subd. (b)(1)) to link to that count. Defendant pled guilty to voluntary
manslaughter, admitted the gang enhancement, and requested immediate sentencing. The
trial court sentenced him to the low term of three years on the manslaughter count, plus a
consecutive 10 years for the gang enhancement, for a total prison sentence of 13 years.
Thereafter, the court granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss the remaining charges.
In April 2022, defendant filed the Petition seeking resentencing pursuant to
section 1176.2. He checked boxes associated with the following statements: (1) “A
complaint, information, or indictment was filed against me that allowed the prosecution
to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
solely on that person’s participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine”; (2) “I was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter following a trial or I accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which I could
have been convicted of murder or attempted murder”; and (3) “I could not presently be
convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes made to Penal Code
[sections] 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019.”
The trial court appointed counsel and the parties filed briefs. The People
argued defendant was not eligible for resentencing as a matter of law because his guilty
plea occurred after the Legislature amended the murder statutes via Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1) (Senate Bill 1437). It reasoned that if
defendant did not enter a guilty plea and the matter instead went to trial, prosecutors
would not have been able to pursue a natural and probable consequences or other imputed
malice theory. Thus, the plea was not a product of a potential imputed malice murder
theory. Separately, the People argued written factual statements made by defendant in
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conjunction with his plea evidenced he was not eligible for resentencing relief.
Defendant disagreed with both aspects of the People’s position. He
maintained he met all three eligibility requirements set forth in section 1172.6, subd. (a),
and he asserted none of the statements made in conjunction with his plea negated his
eligibility as a matter of law.
The trial court held a hearing and found defendant ineligible for
resentencing. In a later issued written order, it explained the two bases for its conclusion.
First, it construed the language of section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(2), “to reference
petitioners convicted of manslaughter obtained via plea in lieu of a trial at which
petitioner could have been convicted of murder based on a now invalidated theory of
liability in which malice is imputed to an offender based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime.” This did not include defendant because he pled guilty to
manslaughter after such theories had been eliminated by Senate Bill 1437. Second, the
court read the factual statement in defendant’s guilty plea as an admission that he directly
aided and abetted the murder.
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant asserts the court’s summary denial of the Petition was error
because he made the requisite prima facie showing to necessitate an evidentiary hearing.
The statutory language and defendant’s record of conviction lead us to conclude
otherwise.
Senate Bill 1437, which took effect January 1, 2019, was enacted to
“amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it
relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the
actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch.
1015, § 1, subd. (f).) It accomplished that purpose by substantively amending sections
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188 and 189, and adding what later became section 1172.6. Pursuant to the statutory
amendments, eligible defendants who could not be convicted under the law as amended
could apply for retroactive resentencing relief. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952,
957.)
Based on language in the original enactment, some courts confronted with
eligibility questions concluded resentencing was limited to those who had been convicted
of murder. (See, e.g., People v. Love (Oct. 1, 2020) B302892, opn. ordered nonpub. Jan.
26, 2022; People v. Dennis (Apr. 14, 2020) G055930, opn. ordered nonpub. Jan. 5, 2022;
People v. Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985, 992-994; but see People v. Medrano (Dec. 3,
2019) F068714 & F069260, opn. ordered nonpub. Jan. 26, 2022 [concluding Senate Bill
1437 eliminated natural and probable consequence theory in attempted murder context].)
Defendants convicted of attempted murder or manslaughter were deemed by those courts
to be ineligible. (See, e.g., People v. Love, supra, opn. ordered nonpub. Jan. 26, 2022;
People v. Lopez (Aug. 21, 2019) B271516, opn. ordered nonpub. Nov. 10, 2021; People v.
Flores, at p. 997.)
Before the issue could be resolved by the Supreme Court, the Legislature
acted. Believing the attempted murder or manslaughter eligibility determinations being
made by courts to be contrary to legislative intent and the purpose behind the statutory
amendments, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats.
2021, ch. 551) (Senate Bill 775). (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d
reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 20, 2021,
p. 5 (Sen. Floor 3d Reading Analysis).) Effective January 1, 2022, it made amendments
to, inter alia, “[c]larif[y] that persons who were convicted of attempted murder or
manslaughter under a theory of felony murder and the natural probable consequences
doctrine are permitted the same relief as those persons convicted of murder under the
same theories.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1, subd. (a).)
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The amended statute specifies, in relevant part, that a person convicted of
manslaughter may file a resentencing petition to have their “conviction vacated and to be
resentenced on any remaining counts when all of the following conditions apply: [¶] (1)
[a] complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the
prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, or attempted murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine[;] [¶] (2) [t]he petitioner was convicted
of . . . manslaughter following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the
petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder[;] [¶] (3) [t]he
petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of
changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
Beginning with the last of the three criteria, we find the statutory language
to be ambiguous. The notion that someone could not presently be convicted of murder or
attempted murder because of changes made by Senate Bill 1437 implies that at one point
in time the circumstances were different. But the statute does not specify the temporal
point of contrast. On one hand, and consistent with defendant’s position, it could be the
time of filing of an information charging murder which left open the possibility the
prosecution could employ an imputed malice theory. On the other hand, and consistent
with the Attorney General’s position, it could be the time of the trial or plea which
resulted in the conviction.
With at least these two reasonable interpretations of the statutory language,
we must look beyond the words to determine the Legislature’s intent. (Nolan v. City of
Anaheim (2004) 33 Cal.4th 335, 340.) We turn to extrinsic aids such as “the ostensible
objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public
policy, . . . and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part.” (Ibid.) “Ultimately[,]
we choose the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the
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lawmakers, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the
statute.” (Allen v. Sully-Miller Contracting Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 222, 227.)
Statements in a variety of California Senate and Assembly reports are
illuminating. A Senate Committee on Public Safety report summarizing the purposes of
Senate Bill 775 states the statutory revisions clarify “that a person . . . who was convicted
of manslaughter when the prosecution was allowed to proceed on a theory of felony
murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine[] [may] apply to
have their sentence vacated and be resentenced.” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on
Sen. Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended Feb. 19, 2021, p. 3; accord, Sen.
Floor 3d Reading Analysis, supra, p. 3 [same].) It also explains the impetus behind the
legislation and elaborates on the impact it would have: “[Senate Bill] 1437 (Skinner) has
left California in a peculiar situation. While it may seem obvious that persons who have
pled or been convicted of manslaughter or attempted murder at trial under a felony
murder or natural and probable consequences theory should be entitled to the same relief
as persons convicted of more serious offenses of first and second degree murder some
courts have ruled that they are not. This bill seeks to clarify that obvious inequity in the
law. If this bill passes, people who are serving a sentence of manslaughter or attempted
murder that were prosecuted under a felony murder theory or a natural and probable
consequences theory will be able to have their sentences recalled under the same
standards as people who have been convicted of first and second-degree murder.” (Sen.
Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended
Feb. 19, 2021, p. 7; accord, Sen. Floor 3d Reading Analysis, supra, p. 5.)
A Senate Appropriations Committee report echoes a similar purpose: “This
bill would allow a person . . . who was convicted of manslaughter when the prosecution
was allowed to proceed on a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine to apply to have their sentence vacated and be
resentenced if, among other things, the complaint, information, or indictment was filed to
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allow the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, or attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine.” (Sen. Com. on Appropriations, Rep. on Sen. Bill No.
775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess) as amended Feb. 19, 2021, p. 3.)
Perhaps most informative to the construction of the “because of changes”
language in section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(3), is a passage in an Assembly Committee on
Public Safety report. After quoting the then-proposed statutory language, which was
identical to the later adopted language, the report continued: “In other words, for
resentencing to be granted, it would have to be established that the petitioner could not
have been convicted of murder or attempted murder under the law as it reads after
January 1, 2019. Changes made by [Senate Bill] 1437 to Penal Code sections 188 and
189 regard the liability of certain accomplices under first degree felony murder, the
application of the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and, likely, conviction of
second degree felony murder. Therefore, relief would be granted if the only way to have
convicted the petitioner was through first degree felony murder, the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, or, likely, second degree felony murder as they existed prior to
January 1, 2019. . . . Or, as this bill would clarify in a catchall provision, relief would be
granted if the only way to have convicted the petitioner was under any other theory in
which malice was imputed to them based solely on their participation in a crime.”
(Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as
amended July 6, 2021, p. 7.)
These consistent statements of legislative intent reveal the Legislature’s aim
in the manslaughter context was to make relief available to defendants who were
convicted by plea or trial at a time when the prosecution could have pursued a murder
charge, but the only way of doing so would have been a now invalid theory of imputed
malice. Thus, in the manslaughter plea context, the most reasonable reading of the third
criterion for establishing resentencing eligibility is that at the time of conviction — i.e.,
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the time the plea was entered — the only way to a murder conviction was through an
imputed malice theory. As a matter of law, this cannot be true for a person, like
defendant, who pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter at a time when imputed malice
theories had already been statutorily eliminated. 2 Accordingly, the trial court did not err
in summarily denying the Petition.
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order is affirmed.
DELANEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
SANCHEZ, J.
2 Our conclusion obviates the need to address defendant’s contentions
concerning the trial court’s and the Attorney General’s alternative ground for ineligibility
— the factual basis for defendant’s plea.
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