People v. Estrada

CourtListener 9502463CalctappApr 9, 2024

Full text

Filed 4/9/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B324576

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA086118)
v.

HILDO OCAMPO ESTRADA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Hilleri G. Merritt, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.
Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan S. Pithey, Assistant Attorney
General, Michael C. Keller and Charles S. Lee, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________________
Appellant Hildo Ocampo Estrada appeals from the superior
court’s order denying his petition for resentencing at the prima
facie stage of the proceedings under Penal Code section 1172.61
as to his attempted murder and voluntary manslaughter pleas.
We conclude that the record of conviction does not establish that
Estrada is ineligible for relief as a matter of law even if we
consider the preliminary hearing transcript. Accordingly,
we reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
I. Relevant factual and procedural history
On August 1, 2017, the Los Angeles County District
Attorney’s Office charged Estrada under count 1 with the murder
of Martin Corio (§ 187, subd. (a)), with the allegation that
Estrada personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon
(§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). Count 2 charged Estrada with the willful,
deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder (§§ 664 & 187,
subd. (a)) of Carlos Zuniga Flores and alleged that Estrada
personally inflicted great bodily injury on Zuniga Flores.
(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). Count 3 charged Maria Elena Adame with
assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245,
subd. (a)(4)) upon Zuniga Flores and alleged that she personally
inflicted great bodily injury on him.
On July 18, 2017, a preliminary hearing took place.
Detective Christian Mayes and Officer Juan Garcia testified.
Officer Garcia testified that on or about February 9, 2016, he
responded to a call at a liquor store. Officer Garcia approached a
man who was in the fetal position with his face covered in blood.
The man said his name was Carlos, later identified as Carlos

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless noted otherwise.

2
Zuniga Flores. A woman named Rosa told Officer Garcia and his
partner that someone was stabbed, and directed Officer Garcia to
the injured man. Officer Garcia’s sergeant discovered the body of
decedent Corio. Officer Garcia approached two individuals at the
scene named Perez (or Lopez) and Gonzalo. Rosa, in reference to
Perez and Gonzalo, told Officer Garcia, “Hey, those guys were
involved.” Officer Garcia observed that Perez dropped something
on a bus bench. Officer Garcia noticed that it was a box cutter.
Officer Garcia observed that Gonzalo and Perez had blood on
their shirts and shoes. Perez had cuts on his hands. Officer
Garcia requested two additional units to detain Gonzalo and
Perez and transport them to the police station. Video
surveillance showed that there was a third unidentified person
with Gonzalo and Perez.
Detective Mayes testified that an autopsy report showed
that Corio sustained 12 stab wounds. His cause of death was
multiple stab wounds from a homicide.
On or around April 13, 2016, Detective Mayes interviewed
Adame. Adame told Detective Mayes that Estrada and two
individuals named Jose and Conejo were drinking alcohol in a
parking lot near an encampment. Their group got into a fight
with another group that included Zuniga Flores. Zuniga Flores
pulled Adame by her hair. Multiple people were involved in the
fight. Adame did not indicate whether Gonzalo and Perez were
involved in the fight. Adame stated that Estrada sustained an
injury on the side of his face. Estrada and Adame went to the
hospital and returned to the encampment the same night.
Estrada was angry and obtained a knife. Adame stated that
Estrada found Corio and stabbed him.

3
Adame saw Zuniga Flores laying on the ground. She said
she was angry that he accosted her earlier in the day. She yelled
at him and out of anger, kicked him in the face. Adame then
stated that Estrada kicked Zuniga Flores twice in the face and
stomped down on his head once. Adame then observed Gonzalo
walking towards the parking lot.
On or around February 8, 2016, Detective Mayes also
interviewed Estrada. Detective Mayes testified that Estrada told
him that there was a fight between two groups and Corio stabbed
him. According to Detective Mayes, Estrada was upset over the
fight and his injury. Adame told him, “let’s just do something
about it.” Detective Mayes further testified that Estrada and
Adame found Corio asleep or passed out. Detective Mayes
testified that Estrada said he stabbed Corio “two or three times.”
Detective Mayes further testified that Estrada also told him that
he kicked Zuniga Flores once in the face and stomped on his head
twice.
On July 9, 2018, the prosecution filed an amended
information. Count 1 charged Estrada with the willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder of Corio (§ 187, subd. (a))
with an allegation that he personally used a deadly weapon in
the commission of the offense (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). Count 2
charged Estrada with the attempted murder (§§ 664 & 187,
subd. (a)) of Zuniga Flores with an allegation that he personally
inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) on Zuniga
Flores.
On July 10, 2018, Estrada pleaded no contest to voluntary
manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and attempted murder (§§ 187,
subd. (a), 664). Estrada admitted to use of a deadly weapon
(§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and great bodily injury (§ 12022.7,

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subd. (a)). As to the attempted murder charge, the prosecution
struck the willful, premeditated, and willful allegation. Estrada
was sentenced to an aggregate determinate term of 15 years and
4 months.
Estrada’s plea form shows that he stipulated and agreed
there was a factual basis for his plea and that he was pleading no
contest to take advantage of a plea bargain under People v. West
(1970) 3 Cal.3d 595. A West plea is a “a plea of nolo contendere,
not admitting a factual basis for the plea.” (In re Alvernaz (1992)
2 Cal.4th 924, 932.)
On May 11, 2022, Estrada filed a petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6.
On August 17, 2022, the prosecution filed an opposition
stating that Estrada was ineligible for relief because he was the
actual killer.
On October 3, 2022, Estrada filed a reply to the People’s
opposition. Estrada argued that the record of conviction does not
establish that Estrada is ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
Estrada argued that the record of conviction did not foreclose
that malice was imputed onto him based solely on his
participation in a crime.
On October 17, 2022, the court held a hearing on Estrada’s
petition for resentencing. The court concluded that “it would
appear that a prima facie case cannot be made because
Mr. Estrada was the actual killer.” The court did not state which
portion of the record of conviction supported its conclusion.
Estrada timely appealed.
II. Attorney General’s request for judicial notice
The Attorney General requests that we take judicial notice
of the preliminary hearing transcript in People v. Estrada

5
(Los Angeles County, 2022, No. PA086118). Appellant does not
oppose the request. We grant the request and take judicial notice
of the preliminary hearing transcript in case No. PA086118
because it is a record of a court of this state. (See Evid. Code,
§ 452; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a).)
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable legal background
The California Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) to “ ‘amend the felony
murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with
the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)” (People v. Martinez
(2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719, 723.)
Senate Bill 1437 did this by amending section 188, which
defines malice, and section 189, which defines the degrees of
murder. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2, 3.) Amended section 188
states: “Except as stated in subdivision (e) of Section 189, in
order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act
with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a
person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (Id.,
subd. (a)(3).) Amended section 189 states: “A participant in the
perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony listed in
subdivision (a) in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if
one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual
killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but with the
intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the

6
commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] [or] (3) The person
was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with
reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d)
of Section 190.2.” (Id., subd. (e).)
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 775) “ ‘[c]larifie[d] that persons who were
convicted of attempted murder or manslaughter under a theory of
felony murder and the natural [and] probable consequences
doctrine are permitted the same relief as those persons convicted
of murder under the same theories.’ ” (People v. Birdsall (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 859, 865, fn. 18; People v. Vizcarra (2022)
84 Cal.App.5th 377, 388.)
“In its current form, section 1172.6 applies to those who
pled guilty to manslaughter after being charged with murder and
who would have been subject to prosecution for murder under a
felony murder theory, the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, or any other theory of imputed malice. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a).) To be eligible for relief, the petitioner must make a
prima facie showing that he could not presently be convicted of
murder under changes to these theories of murder liability made
effective January 1, 2019, by” Senate Bill 1437. (People v.
Gaillard (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1206, 1211 (Gaillard).)
Prior to these amendments, a jury could convict a
defendant of murder under the felony-murder rule and the
natural and probable consequences doctrine without finding
malice. A defendant could be convicted of attempted murder
under the theory that the defendant aided and abetted a crime
where murder was a natural and probable consequence. (See
People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 161.) Under the law at that
time, it was not necessary to prove that the defendant intended

7
that the attempted murder be committed or even that the
defendant subjectively foresaw that attempted murder could
result. (See id. at pp. 161–162.) Under the felony-murder rule as
it existed before 2019, malice was imputed if the defendant
intended to commit the underlying qualifying felony. (People v.
Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1184.)
Eligible defendants may petition for resentencing relief.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a), former § 1170.95; People v. Strong (2022)
13 Cal.5th 698, 707–708 (Strong).) Under section 1172.6,
subdivision (a), “[a] person convicted of felony murder or murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine . . . or
manslaughter may file a petition” with the sentencing court to
have his or her murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter
conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining
counts “when all of the following conditions apply: [¶]
(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the
petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory
of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in
a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of
murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter following a trial or
accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner
could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder. [¶]
(3) The petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or
attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made
effective January 1, 2019” under Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a).) After receiving a petition containing the required
information, “the court must evaluate the petition ‘to determine

8
whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.’ ”
(Strong, at p. 708 [citing § 1172.6, subd. (c)].) If the defendant
makes a prima facie showing for relief, the court must issue an
order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6,
subds. (c), (d)(3).)
In ascertaining whether a defendant has made a prima
facie case for relief, the trial court may look at the record of
conviction, which will necessarily inform its “prima facie inquiry
under section [1172.6], allowing the court to distinguish petitions
with potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.”
(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971 (Lewis).) “While the
trial court may look at the record of conviction after the
appointment of counsel to determine whether a petitioner has
made a prima facie case for section [1172.6] relief, the prima facie
inquiry under subdivision (c) is limited. . . . ‘[A] court should not
reject the petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility grounds
without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.’ [Citation.]
‘However, if the record, including the court’s own documents,
“contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,”
then “the court is justified in making a credibility determination
adverse to the petitioner.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 971.)
“In reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this
preliminary juncture, a trial court should not engage in
‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of
discretion.’ [Citation.] . . . [T]he ‘prima facie bar was
intentionally and correctly set very low.’ ” (Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) “At the prima facie stage, a court must
accept as true a petitioner’s allegation that he or she could not
currently be convicted of a homicide offense because of changes to
section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019, unless the

9
allegation is refuted by the record. [Citation.] And this
allegation is not refuted by the record unless the record
conclusively establishes every element of the offense.” (People v.
Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 463 (Curiel).) If the petitioner
makes a prima facie showing of eligibility, the trial court must
issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing.
(Ibid.)
We review de novo whether the trial court conducted a
proper inquiry under section 1172.6, subdivision (c). (People v.
Harrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 429, 437.)
II. Analysis
Estrada contends that the trial court erred by finding him
ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 at the prima facie stage
of the proceedings. Estrada argues that nothing in the record of
conviction conclusively forecloses his eligibility. We agree.
The information charged Estrada with attempted murder,
alleging that Estrada “unlawfully and with malice aforethought
attempt[ed] to murder” Zuniga Flores. Because the crime of
attempted murder was generically charged, the complaint
allowed the prosecution to proceed on a theory of attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
(See § 1172.6, subd. (a)(1); People v. Davenport (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 476, 484.) Our Supreme Court has held that “only a
single statutory offense of murder exists.” (People v. Nakahara
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 712.) “[I]t has long been the law in this
state that an accusatory pleading charging murder need not
specify degree or the manner in which the murder was
committed.” (People v. Thomas (1987) 43 Cal.3d 818, 829, fn. 5.)
Nor does an accusatory pleading need to “specify the theory of
murder on which the prosecution relies at trial.” (People v.

10
Contreras (2013) 58 Cal.4th 123, 147.) “Specifically, neither
felony murder nor murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine need be separately pleaded.” (People v.
Rivera (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217, 233.)
Estrada’s plea to the attempted murder charge does not
answer the question of whether intent could have been imputed
to him under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
(People v. Montes (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1001, 1007–1008.)
Estrada did not plead to any particular type of malice when
pleading to attempted murder. Further, he did not admit to any
specific theory of attempted murder. Instead, the record shows
that he pleaded to the generic charge of attempted murder
without the “willful, deliberate, and premeditated” allegation.
He did not admit he harbored an intent to kill.
In pleading no contest to voluntary manslaughter of Corio,
Estrada also did not admit to a specific theory of guilt. (Gaillard,
supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1212.) Estrada only admitted to
“voluntary manslaughter in generic terms.” (Ibid.) Thus, the
prosecution could have proceeded under any theory of liability,
including a natural and probable consequences theory. (Ibid.; see
also People v. Eynon (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967, 977.) As such,
his generic plea does not make him ineligible for relief at the
prima facie stage as a matter of law.
Likewise, Estrada’s bare admission of the enhancements
for personal use of a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and
infliction of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) do not
establish that he acted with the intent to kill or refute that he
was convicted on a theory of imputed malice. As with pleading
guilty to a criminal offense, a plea or admission of a sentencing
enhancement is likewise deemed a judicial admission of only

11
elemental facts necessary to the enhancement. (People v. Saez
(2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1206.) The enhancements alleged
under section 12022, subdivision (b)(1), and section 12022.7
require only a general intent to use a deadly weapon or inflict
bodily injury. (People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 598;
People v. Elder (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 411, 424.) Thus, Estrada’s
admissions do not establish that he acted with the requisite
malice aforethought.
The Attorney General contends that the trial court’s ruling
should nonetheless be affirmed because the amended information
establishes that Estrada was the sole perpetrator of attempted
murder and voluntary manslaughter. Thus, malice could not
have been imputed to him.
The amended information does establish that Estrada was
charged alone, but a charging decision does not establish any
facts as a matter of law. (See People v. Das (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th
954, 962.) Moreover, we are aware of no authority requiring
prosecutors to try all codefendants together, so this single
charging document does not foreclose the possibility of other
people having been charged for related crimes. Even further, the
information did not foreclose the prosecution from presenting
imputed malice before a jury regardless of whether it charged
others. Thus, the charging document here does not establish
ineligibility as a matter of law, where Estrada’s “ ‘prima facie bar
was intentionally and correctly set very low.’ ” (Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 972.)
Moreover, the trial court did not state the basis for its
finding that Estrada was the actual killer. To the extent the
court relied on the preliminary hearing transcript, such reliance

12
here was improper because it required the court to engage in
impermissible fact finding.
Our Supreme Court has emphasized that at the prima facie
stage, a trial court is only permitted to deny the petition if the
record of conviction “foreclose[s] [the] possibility [that the
petitioner was convicted under an invalid theory] as a matter of
law.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 470.) If there is a
possibility that the petitioner could provide evidence to rebut the
evidence in the record of conviction, including the preliminary
hearing transcript, the resolution of the matter involves
factfinding, and an evidentiary hearing is required. (Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.)
Courts of Appeal are divided on whether a trial court can
consider a preliminary hearing transcript at the prima facie stage
for resentencing under section 1172.6. In Davenport, our
colleagues in the First District held that the trial court
erroneously relied on that transcript to make the prima facie
determination because the defendant “did not stipulate to the
transcript as a factual basis for his plea.” (Davenport, supra,
71 Cal.App.5th at p. 481.) In contrast, our colleagues in Division
One of this district instructed that trial courts can rely on
uncontradicted preliminary hearing transcripts to discern facial
eligibility under section 1172.6 even if a defendant does not
stipulate to it as a factual basis for a plea. (People v. Pickett
(2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 982, 992, review granted Oct. 11, 2023,
S281643 (Pickett).) Similarly, our colleagues in Division Three of
this district held that a court may rely on the preliminary
hearing transcript at the prima facie stage if the evidence
contained within it is uncontroverted. (People v. Patton (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 649, 658, review granted June 28, 2023, S279670

13
(Patton).) Most recently, in People v. Mares (2024) 99
Cal.App.5th 1158 (Mares), our colleagues in the Fourth District
concluded that the record of conviction, including a preliminary
hearing transcript, foreclosed that the defendant could have been
convicted of murder under a now-abrogated theory. (Id. at
p. 1168.)
Estrada did not stipulate to the preliminary hearing
transcript as a factual basis for his plea. But even assuming the
trial court could rely on the preliminary hearing transcript, we
conclude that Patton, Pickett, and Mares are distinguishable.
In those cases, the Courts of Appeal held that the evidence
contained in the preliminary hearing transcript conclusively
foreclosed the possibility that the petitioner was convicted under
an invalid theory of liability. Thus, the preliminary hearing
evidence did not require the court to engage in impermissible
factfinding.
Here, in contrast, relying on the preliminary hearing
transcript to foreclose a successful section 1172.6 motion at this
stage would require the court to engage in impermissible
factfinding. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) At the prima
facie stage, the evidence contains testimony that could potentially
suggest multiple perpetrators were involved, potentially
undermining the Attorney General’s argument that Estrada was
the actual killer or direct perpetrator. Beyond Estrada, there
were two people with blood on their clothes, and one of the
individuals carried a box cutter. Thus, the preliminary hearing
testimony “standing alone, does not conclusively establish as a
matter of law that [Estrada] was the actual killer, acted with
intent to kill or actual malice, or was a major participant in an
underlying crime who acted with reckless indifference to human

14
life” without making factual findings and credibility
determinations. (People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974,
991–992.)
Accordingly, the court erred in denying Estrada’s petition
at the prima facie stage. We express no opinion on the merits of
the petition at the evidentiary hearing.
DISPOSITION
The order summarily denying Estrada’s petition is
reversed. The matter is remanded with directions to issue an
order to show cause under section 1172.6, subdivision (c), and to
hold an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision
(d)(1).

VIRAMONTES, J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, P. J.

WILEY, J.

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