Byers v. Super. Ct.

CourtListener 9502431CalctappMay 7, 2024

Full text

Filed 5/7/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

GEORGE BYERS et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF A169321
CONTRA COSTA COUNTY,
Respondent; (Contra Costa County
USAA GENERAL INDEMNITY Super. Ct. No. C20-01760)
COMPANY et al.,
Real Parties in Interest.

When a party seeks attorney fees as damages caused by an insurer’s
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing under Brandt v.
Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 813, 819 (Brandt), it impliedly waives the
attorney–client privilege with respect to its attorney fees agreements,
invoices, fees statements, billing records, receipts, and proof of payments
(collectively, attorney fees documents) that evidence the amount of its
damages.
In this writ proceeding, George and Sheila Byers challenge the trial
court to vacate its order granting USAA General Indemnity Company’s
(USAA) motion to compel further responses to document requests seeking
attorney fees documents. The Byerses further request that we order the trial
court to delay production of their attorney fees documents until after the jury

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makes a determination of liability. We conclude that the trial court did not
err and deny the petition.
BACKGROUND
This discovery dispute arises from an action brought by the Byerses
against USAA, their homeowners insurer, as well as other defendants
(Masters Distribution, Inc.; Clifton Michael Potter; and Crawford and
Company). Among other causes of action in their operative complaint, the
Byerses allege USAA is liable for breach of contract and breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing related to the installation of hardwood
flooring at their Orinda home.1 The complaint’s prayer for relief includes a
prayer: “For attorneys’ fees and costs.”
On May 17, 2021, the Byerses responded to an interrogatory
propounded by USAA asking: “If YOU contend that YOU are entitled to
Brandt fees from USAA . . . relating to the LOSS, state each and every fact
which supports your contention.” The Byerses’ verified response explained
the facts supporting “[their] basis for Brandt fees” and concluded by stating:
“The Byers are entitled to Brandt fees, as an element of damages caused by
USAA wrongfully withholding benefits owing under its policies, including
attorneys’ fees and other the [sic] prelitigation expenses incurred in the
Byers’ attempts to obtain the benefits owing to them under the policies issued
by USAA.” On May 1, 2023, USAA served document requests, which
included the four requests at issue here. The first two requests at issue are
prefaced with the introductory statement, “If YOU are claiming attorney’s
fees based on YOUR contention that POLICY benefits were unreasonably

1 USAA submitted the Byerses’ fourth amended complaint with its

return. The Byerses acknowledge that the latest amended complaint did not
change the allegations of their causes of action for breach of contract and
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

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withheld” (request for production Nos. 46 and 47), and the last two requests
are prefaced with the slightly different, but essentially the same,
introductory statement, “If YOU are claiming attorney’s fees pursuant to
Brandt v. Superior Court (37 Cal.3d 813 (1985))” (request for production Nos.
48 and 49). The requests then ask for production of “each and every fee
agreement with YOUR attorneys in the instant litigation” and “each and
every billing record, fee statement, invoice, receipt and proof of payment from
YOUR attorneys in the instant litigation.”
The Byerses refused to produce any documents, objecting (1) to
“ ‘YOU’ ” and “ ‘YOUR’ ” as ambiguous, overbroad, and calling for speculation
as to individuals other than themselves;2 (2) on attorney–client privilege
and/or work product doctrine grounds; (3) to the requests not designating a
category of documents with reasonable particularity; and (4) to the time and
place of inspection, as being unreasonable, burdensome, and not in
compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.030.
Following a hearing on USAA’s motion to compel, the trial court
granted USAA’s motion. The order states in relevant part: “Byers admit
that they are seeking recovery of attorneys’ fees as an element of damages in
their cause of action for bad faith. (Brandt v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d
813, 819.) As such, evidence of attorneys fees is discoverable and Byers are
ordered to produce documents responsive to USAA GIC’s Requests for
Production of Documents, Nos. 46, 47, 48 and 49 which are the subject of this
Motion. [¶] The Court believes that there is value in producing the attorney
invoices, based the fact [sic] that Byers intend to seek attorneys’ fees as

2 The document requests also included a definition section. “YOU” and
“YOUR” were defined as “Plaintiff” and his/her agents, employees, attorneys,
accountants, investigators, public adjuster, and anyone else acting on that
plaintiff’s behalf.

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damages in a claim for the attorneys’ fees incurred to obtain the policy
benefits allegedly wrongfully denied under Brandt v. Superior Court (1985)
37 Cal.3d 813, 819, and that, in light of attorneys’ fees being claimed as
damages, USAA GIC would be prejudiced by not having access to this
information during discovery. [¶] Consequently, the Court orders the
production of all documents responsive to USAA GIC’s Requests for
Production of Documents, Nos. 46, 47, 48 and 48 [sic], but Byers’ counsel may
redact the documents to remove references that counsel believes reflect
attorney work product, i.e., information that may give an indication of
counsel’s impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories, or
as to consultants or expert witnesses for which the attorney work product
doctrine has not been waived by Byers’ counsel. [¶] . . . [¶] USAA GIC may
challenge the redactions made by counsel for Byers, and such redactions will
be evaluated by the Court in an in camera hearing. . . .”
The Byerses filed the instant petition seeking relief from the order and
requesting a stay of the trial court’s order. They argue that the trial court
abused its discretion by forcing them to waive the attorney–client privilege
during litigation as a condition of seeking Brandt fees; by forcing an election
of remedies; by ordering production of all invoices, fees agreements and
payment history; by ordering in camera review of attorney invoices; and by
failing to consider the improper form of the requests for production and their
overbreadth. Further, they contend that production of evidence to support
their Brandt fees claims should be deferred until after the jury first
determines liability.
We stayed the trial court’s order and requested briefing. After
consideration of the petition, USAA’s informal opposition, and the Byerses’
reply, we determined that writ review is warranted because the Byerses

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asserted that compliance with the order would violate a privilege or privacy
rights and the petition raises “questions of first impression that are of
general importance to the trial courts and to the profession, and where
general guidelines can be laid down for future cases.” (Oceanside Union
School Dist. v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 180, 185–186, fn. 4; Sav-On
Drugs, Inc. v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1, 5; Roberts v. Superior Court
(1973) 9 Cal.3d 330, 336.) We issued an order to show cause why the
requested relief should not be granted. USAA filed a return to the order to
show cause, and the Byerses filed a reply.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Principles
In Brandt, the California Supreme Court created an exception to the
general rule that each party must ordinarily bear its own attorney fees.
(Brandt, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 817; Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33
Cal.4th 780, 806 (Cassim).) Under Brandt, an insurer is liable for attorney
fees when the insurer’s tortious conduct in refusing to pay insurance benefits
requires the insured to retain an attorney to obtain the benefits of the policy.
“The attorney’s fees are an economic loss—damages—proximately caused by
the tort,” similar to recovery of medical fees as damages in a personal injury
action. (Brandt, at p. 817.)
“In order to recover such Brandt fees . . . , the insured is required to
plead and prove (1) the amount to which [sic] the insured was entitled to
recover under the policy, (2) that the insurer withheld payment unreasonably
or without proper cause, (3) the amount that the insured paid or incurred in
legal fees and expenses in establishing the insured’s right to contract benefits
and (4) the reasonableness of the fees and expenses so incurred. [Fn.

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omitted.]” (Jordan v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1079
(Jordan).)
“Since the attorney’s fees are recoverable as damages, the
determination of the recoverable fees must be made by the trier of fact unless
the parties stipulate otherwise. [Citation.] A stipulation for a postjudgment
allocation and award by the trial court would normally be preferable since
the determination then would be made after completion of the legal services
[citation], and proof that otherwise would have been presented to the jury
could be simplified because of the court’s expertise in evaluating legal
services. [Citations.] If, however, the matter is to be presented to the jury,
the court should instruct along the following lines: ‘If you find (1) that the
plaintiff is entitled to recover on his cause of action for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and (2) that because of such breach it
was reasonably necessary for the plaintiff to employ the services of an
attorney to collect the benefits due under the policy, then and only then is the
plaintiff entitled to an award for attorney’s fees incurred to obtain the policy
benefits, which award must not include attorney’s fees incurred to recover
any other portion of the verdict.’ [Fns. omitted.]” (Brandt, supra, 37 Cal.3d
at pp. 819–820; see CACI No. 2350.)
II. Trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering production
of attorney fees documents.
The Byerses assert several interrelated arguments. They contend that
the trial court abused its discretion by forcing them to waive the attorney–
client privilege during litigation as a condition of seeking Brandt fees.
Similarly, they argue that the trial court abused its discretion by forcing an
election of remedies. They contend that production of evidence to support
their Brandt fees claim should be deferred until after the jury first
determines liability. We find their arguments to be without merit.

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First, we disagree that the trial court “forced” the Byerses to waive the
attorney–client privilege or to elect a remedy. The Byerses’ operative
complaint alleges breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
their prayer for relief includes “attorneys’ fees . . . .” More significantly, the
Byerses’ interrogatory response specifically states they “are entitled to
Brandt fees, as an element of damages caused by USAA wrongfully
withholding benefits owing under its policies, including attorneys’ fees and
other the [sic] prelitigation expenses incurred in the Byers’ attempts to obtain
the benefits owing to them under the policies issue by USAA.” Thus, the trial
court’s finding that the “Byers admit that they are seeking recovery of
attorneys’ fees as an element of damages in their cause of action for bad
faith” is well supported by the record.
The Byerses’ reply to USAA’s informal opposition asserts that they did
not “elect[]” to seek Brandt fees and that their interrogatory response only
states an “ ‘entitlement’ ” to such fees. They further state that the trial
court’s order finding a waiver of attorney–client privilege is erroneous
because they did not specifically plead Brandt fees.3 While it is true that the
Byerses’ causes of action for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing does not specifically reference Brandt fees, their
prayer for relief includes a general reference to attorney fees. USAA properly
propounded discovery in order to determine whether the Byerses were in fact
seeking Brandt fees as an element of damages. The Byerses’ interrogatory
response makes clear that they plan to seek Brandt fees. The Byerses may

3 As discussed further post, the Byerses appear to agree that when a

party seeks Brandt fees, it must make a “limited waiver” of the attorney–
client privilege for the purpose of deciding the issue of Brandt fees. However,
they claim they are entitled to delay production of otherwise privileged
documents supporting a claim for Brandt fees.

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supplement their response to unequivocally state that they are not seeking
Brandt fees. However, they cannot simultaneously assert entitlement to
Brandt fees and then claim they have not “elected” to seek such fees and
therefore are not required to provide discovery regarding the amount of such
fees. (See Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377,
389 [“ ‘An important aspect of legitimate discovery from a defendant’s point of
view is the ascertainment, in advance of trial, of the specific components of
plaintiff’s case so that appropriate preparations can be made to meet them.
It is impossible to discover this other than from the plaintiff’ ”], disapproved
on other grounds in Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 222,
fn. 9.)
Second, we find that the Byerses’ admission that they are seeking
Brandt fees as an element of their damages is an implied waiver of the
attorney–client privilege at least as to the attorney fees documents that the
Byerses plan to rely upon to seek to prove the amount of fees they reasonably
incurred to establish their right to benefits under USAA’s insurance policy.
(Jordan, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 1079.) The parties have not cited, nor
are we aware of, any controlling authority specifically holding that a party
claiming Brandt fees impliedly waives the attorney–client privilege as to
documentation supporting the fees, including fees agreements and invoices.
However, it is well established in other contexts that “[w]here privileged
information goes to the heart of the claim, fundamental fairness requires that
it be disclosed for the litigation to proceed.” (Steiny & Co. v. California
Electric Supply Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 285, 289–292 [affirming trial court
order excluding evidence of damages where litigant invoked trade secret
privilege to prevent discovery of detailed information supporting damage
claim]; Xebec Development Partners, Ltd. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co.

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(1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 501, 567–569 [“A party who asserts a privilege as to
evidence essential to some element of his or her case will usually be obligated
as a practical matter to forsake that element; his or her decision to do so will
have been a necessary part of the decision to assert the privilege”],
disapproved on another ground in Essex Ins. Co. v. Five Star Dye House, Inc.
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 1252, 1265, fn. 4; Merritt v. Superior Court (1970) 9
Cal.App.3d 721, 730 [plaintiff impliedly waived attorney–client privilege by
specifically putting at issue his attorney’s state of mind]; Transamerica Title
Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1047, 1052 [“The [attorney–
client] privilege may also be impliedly waived where a party to a lawsuit
places into issue a matter that is normally privileged”].)
As Brandt explains: “When an insurer’s tortious conduct reasonably
compels the insured to retain an attorney to obtain the benefits due under a
policy, it follows that the insurer should be liable in a tort action for that
expense. The attorney’s fees are an economic loss—damages—proximately
caused by the tort. [Citation.] These fees must be distinguished from
recovery of attorney’s fees qua attorney’s fees, such as those attributable to
the bringing of the bad faith action itself.” (Brandt, supra, 37 Cal.3d at
p. 817.) “[A]s in any tort case, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence both the existence and the amount of damages
proximately caused by the defendant’s tortious acts or omissions.” (Cassim,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 813.) In addition, “[s]ince the attorney’s fees are
recoverable as damages, the determination of recoverable fees must be made
by the trier of fact unless the parties stipulate otherwise.” (Brandt, at
p. 819.)
We agree with the trial court that USAA has a right to learn during
discovery of the attorney fees aspect of the Byerses’ alleged damages and that

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by seeking such damages the Byerses have impliedly waived the attorney–
client privilege. The Byerses have put at issue the attorney fees they
incurred in an effort to seek coverage under their insurance policy, and
disclosure of documents supporting their claim for such fees is necessary to
fairly adjudicate the issue of damages. (Steiny & Co. v. California Electric
Supply Co., supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 292; see R & R Sails v. Insurance Co.
of Pa. (9th Cir. 2012) 673 F.3d 1240, 1246–1247 [party seeking Brandt fees is
required to make attorney fees invoices available for inspection under Fed.
Rules Civ.Proc., rule 26].)
The Byerses appear to agree that production of documents responsive
to USAA’s discovery requests is warranted after the jury has first determined
USAA’s bad faith liability, at which point they assert there will be a “limited
waiver” of the attorney–client privilege for the purpose of deciding the issue
of Brandt fees. Their concern appears to be not that the pursuit of Brandt
fees results in an implied waiver of the attorney–client privilege as to
documents they will rely upon to prove their damages but, rather, the timing
of production of such documents. The Byerses ask that we advise trial courts
to defer discovery of attorney fees invoices and fee agreements until after the
jury’s verdict on bad faith liability. They contend that the trial court has the
authority to establish such an order of proceedings and that it would promote
fairness and prevent insurers from gaining a tactical advantage by accessing
the attorney fees documents prior to a verdict on liability. According to the
Byerses, such a bifurcated procedure would result in an overall reduction in
the duration of trials.4

4 The Byerses also argue that another alternative is for the parties to

stipulate to submit the issue of Brandt fees to the trial court for decision
following the jury’s verdict on liability. The Byerses state such stipulations
were “recommended in Brandt.” Brandt states: “A stipulation for a

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We decline to find that in every case where a party seeks Brandt fees,
discovery and trial of the amount of recoverable fees as damages must be
bifurcated from the issue of bad faith liability. The Byerses’ petition contests
the trial court’s order granting USAA’s motion to compel production of
documents. As the trial court observed at the hearing on USAA’s motion to
compel, the Byerses did not file a motion to bifurcate. Nor are we reviewing
an order denying a motion to bifurcate. We are not persuaded that a
bifurcation procedure is necessary whenever Brandt fees are at issue.
The Byerses further argue that the trial court abused its discretion by
ordering production of all documents responsive to USAA’s requests, which
include “each and every fee agreement with YOUR attorneys in the instant
litigation” and “each and every billing record, fee statement, invoice, receipt
and proof of payment from YOUR attorneys in the instant litigation.” Under
Brandt, only those attorney fees incurred to prove coverage under the
insurance contract may be recovered as damages for the insurer’s breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Brandt, supra, 37 Cal.3d

postjudgment allocation and award by the trial court would normally be
preferable since the determination then would be made after completion of
the legal services [citation], and proof that otherwise would have been
presented to the jury could be simplified because of the court’s expertise in
evaluating legal services.” (Brandt, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 819–820.)
However, immediately preceding this statement, Brandt states: “Since the
attorney’s fees are recoverable as damages, the determination of the
recoverable fees must be made by the trier of fact unless the parties stipulate
otherwise.” (Brandt, at p. 819.) Brandt then explains how the trial court
should instruct the jury on the issue in cases in which the jury will decide the
issue. (Brandt, at p. 820.) It is clear from this discussion that barring a
stipulation of the parties the jury must decide the issue of Brandt fees
because they are an element of damages and the jury must be presented
proof of such fees. USAA has not stipulated, and states it will not stipulate,
to any postjudgment allocation of fees by the trial court.

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at pp. 819–820.) Fees attributable to obtaining any other portion of the
verdict are not recoverable as damages. (Ibid.) The Byerses argue that the
implied waiver of attorney–client privilege based upon a claim for Brandt
fees extends only to those fees recoverable under Brandt, i.e., amounts
incurred to obtain payment under the insurance policy. (Brandt, at p. 819.)
We agree. However, we find no abuse of discretion at this stage in the
proceeding because the trial court’s order explicitly permits the Byerses to
redact the responsive documents. The Byerses may redact entries that are
not recoverable as Brandt fees because such fees were not incurred to obtain
payment under the insurance policy and, therefore, they are not evidence of
the Byerses’ damages. Nor have the Byerses waived any privileges with
respect to records of fees incurred to pursue claims against USAA other than
to prove coverage under the policy.
The Byerses next contend that the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to address their claim that the discovery responses were presented in
an improper form because they present a conditional inquiry by asking for
production “[i]f YOU are claiming attorney’s fees . . . .” The parties and the
trial court focused on the privilege issues, which were the primary issues
addressed in the parties’ moving and opposition papers, at the hearing. The
trial court’s order that the Byerses produce responsive documents implicitly
overruled the Byerses’ additional objections based on improper form. The
Byerses have not established any abuse of discretion.
III. Order’s reference to possible in camera review of redacted
entries was not an abuse of discretion.
The Byerses claim that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering
an in camera review of attorney invoices. Their argument overstates what
the trial court actually ordered and is premature given the current stage of
the proceedings.

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The relevant portion of the order states: “Byers’ counsel may redact the
documents to remove references that counsel believes reflect attorney work
product, i.e., information that may give an indication of counsel’s
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories, or as to
consultants or expert witnesses for which the attorney work product doctrine
has not been waived by Byers’ counsel. [¶] . . . [¶] USAA GIC may challenge
the redactions made by counsel for Byers, and such redactions will be
evaluated by the Court in an in camera hearing.”
The Byerses have not yet produced any responsive documents, and it is
unknown the extent to which they may redact any responsive documents and
whether USAA will seek to challenge the redactions. Thus, the trial court’s
order regarding in camera review is conditioned upon redactions and
subsequent challenges to the redactions. Given the undeveloped record, the
issue framed by the Byerses is speculative and premature. Further, the issue
of the propriety of conducting an in camera review of potentially redacted
documents and the proper scope of such a review was not presented to the
trial court. When the trial court made its ruling at the hearing on USAA’s
motion to compel, it mentioned the possibility of conducting an in camera
review at some point in the future and neither party raised any objections to
such a proceeding. If the Byerses produce redacted documents in response to
USAA’s document requests and if USAA challenges any redactions, the
parties may then present their positions to the trial court regarding whether,
and to what extent, it may review the redacted material in camera.
DISPOSITION
The petition for writ of mandate/prohibition is denied. The stay
previously issued by this court is vacated and shall dissolve upon issuance of

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the remittitur. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(d).) USAA is entitled to its
costs in this writ proceeding. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.493(a)(1)(A).)

Jackson, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

Simons, J.
Burns, J.

A169321/Byers v. Superior Court

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A169321/Byers v. Superior Court

Trial Court: Superior Court of the County of Contra Costa

Trial Judge: Danielle Douglas

Counsel: GinnLaw and David W. Ginn for Petitioners.

No appearance for Respondent.

DKM Law Group, Joshua N. Kastan, Melissa L.
O’Connor, and Keri L. Salet, for Real Party in
Interest USAA General Indemnity Company.

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