CourtListener 9441590•In re E.G. CA4/1
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Filed 11/16/23 In re E.G. CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re E.G., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
D082348
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES
AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. EJ4842)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
I.G. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEALS from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Mark T. Cumba, Judge. Affirmed.
Marisa L. Dersey Conroy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant, I.G.
Liana Serobian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant, M.S.
Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel and Natasha C. Edwards, Deputy County Counsel, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
I.G. (Mother) and M.S. (Father) both appeal from the juvenile court’s
disposition order removing their three-year-old-son E.G. (Child)1 from their
custody pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code2 section 361, subdivision
(c). They contend that the removal of the Child from Mother’s physical
custody was not supported by substantial evidence and there were other
reasonable means of protecting the Child. We reject these claims and affirm
the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mother and Father began dating in 2016, and the Child was born in
2019. Their on-again, off-again relationship has involved a pattern of
domestic violence both before and after the birth of their Child. Both Mother
and Father were perpetrators of the violence, which occurred in the Child’s
presence and, on one occasion, resulted in his physical injury.
The parents’ pattern of domestic violence resulted in five referrals to
Child Welfare Services (CWS) within three years, over 25 calls to law
1 The minor child’s surname and/or last initial are inconsistent within
the record on appeal and among the parties’ briefs.
2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code unless otherwise indicated.
2
enforcement, multiple police reports, four temporary restraining orders,3 a
criminal protective order,4 and six arrests.5
The first CWS referral in March 2020 (for general neglect, emotional
abuse, and physical abuse) resulted from an argument that escalated into the
use of physical force. Father pushed Mother down while she was holding the
Child, and the Child suffered a bruise to the forehead. Father was arrested,
and CWS created a safety plan. Mother subsequently obtained a temporary
restraining order against Father, but just eight days later, Father violated
the order by attempting to break into the home.
The second referral in October 2021 (for general neglect and emotional
abuse) stemmed from another domestic violence incident between the parents
while the Child was present. This time, Mother claimed Father was verbally
attacking her while she was breastfeeding the Child. She responded by
kicking Father in the head. The Child was not physically injured, but Mother
was arrested.
To address the repeated domestic violence concerns, the San Diego
County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) offered voluntary
services to Mother and Father from December 13, 2021 through August 24,
3 Mother filed temporary restraining orders against Father on April 1,
2020, November 1, 2022, and May 23, 2023. On November 4, 2022, Father
filed a temporary restraining order against Mother.
4 A criminal protective order was entered on June 7, 2022 protecting
Mother and Child from Father. The Order was revised on August 11, 2022 to
only protect Mother from Father and remains in effect.
5 Father was arrested four times (March 25, 2020, May 21, 2022, October
21, 2022, and March 1, 2023). Mother was arrested twice (October 29, 2021
and April 10, 2022).
3
2022. Mother engaged in parenting classes and met with a domestic violence
clinician but did not participate in the domestic violence victim program to
which she was referred. Father did not meet with a domestic violence
clinician and did not complete the other programs or services to which he was
referred.
While the voluntary case was ongoing, the parents continued to engage
in combative conduct in the presence of the Child, resulting in two more
domestic violence referrals. The first of these was for emotional abuse
stemming from an incident on April 10, 2022, after the parents took the Child
to Sea World. Mother and Father started arguing on the drive back and
pulled over to continue their argument outside the vehicle. Mother allegedly
slapped the Father, got back in the car, and drove off without him. Father
contacted law enforcement and Mother was arrested. The next referral was
for general neglect and emotional abuse after Father, who had been drinking,
broke into Mother’s home through the back window of the Child’s room on
May 21, 2022. Earlier that day, the parents had an argument during a visit
to Otay Lakes after which Mother went home with the Child. Father was
arrested.6 After Mother obtained a temporary restraining order, the court
issued a criminal protective order protecting the Child and the Mother from
Father. The court later amended the criminal protective order to only protect
the Mother. As amended, the order remains in effect.
While the criminal protective order was in effect, Mother continued to
have direct contact with Father and even allowed him to live in her home
6 Father pled guilty in the associated criminal case. He was sentenced to
summary probation and mandated to attend a 52-week domestic violence
perpetrator program but failed to participate.
4
with the Child.7 On March 1, 2023, yet another argument between Mother
and Father escalated into a serious domestic violence incident that resulted
in the most recent referral and the child being taken into protective custody.
Their argument escalated to a physical altercation when Father accused
Mother of infidelity. He grabbed her by the hair, slammed her body onto the
ground, pushed her head into the ground, and spat in her face. The
neighbors reported that the Child was in the same room as the parents and
was heard crying and yelling, “ ‘stop hurting her, stop.’ ” The Child did not
sustain any physical injuries, but Mother sustained an abrasion to her head,
scratches on her forearm and a bruise to her arm.
When police arrived, Mother was uncooperative. She was initially
resistant to allowing law enforcement into the home or allowing them to
speak with the Child. She also refused to discuss the criminal protective
order against the Father. Father was arrested and Mother planned to
remain in the home with the Child.
As a result of the dangerous and continuing pattern of domestic
violence between the parents and its impact on the Child, the Agency filed a
petition pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1) and obtained a protective
custody warrant.
After his initial detention at the Polinksy Children’s Center, the Child
was placed with a foster caregiver, and on May 4, 2023, he was placed with
his paternal grandmother. Mother and Father engaged in separate
supervised visits with the Child in accordance with the court’s March 22,
2023 order.
7 Father reported that he had been staying at Mother’s home one to two
nights per week for six months.
5
Pending the disposition hearing, Mother and Father began attending
and participating in domestic violence classes and other services. They were
both still early in their domestic violence treatment, and neither parent had
completed a domestic violence relapse prevention plan. The Agency
recommended that the Child be removed from the custody of parents while
they continued to access services to address the safety concerns.
At the conclusion of the contested disposition hearing on June 1, 2023,
the juvenile court ordered the Child removed from the physical custody of
both parents and ordered that the Child remain in the care of paternal
grandmother. It found that both parents had made minimal progress in
alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating placement. The court
ordered the continuation of reunification services with liberal, but separate,
supervised visitation for both parents. A six-month review hearing was
scheduled for November 28, 2023, and a 12-month review hearing was
scheduled for May 15, 2024.
Both parents timely appealed the court’s disposition order.8
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Section 361, subdivision (c)(1) provides a child may not be taken from
the custody of his or her parents unless the juvenile court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the
physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the
minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means
8 Father joined in and adopted the statement of the case, facts, and
arguments raised in mother’s opening brief pursuant to California Rules of
Court, rule 8.200(a)(5).
6
by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the
minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical custody.”
When reviewing the disposition order made by the juvenile court
pursuant to the clear and convincing standard, the appellate court must
determine if it is supported by substantial evidence while “ ‘bearing in mind
the heightened burden of proof’ ” in the court below. (In re Hailey T. (2012)
212 Cal.App.4th 139, 146 (Hailey T.).) The question before us is not whether
we regard the evidence supporting the court’s order is clear and convincing;
“it is whether a reasonable trier of fact could have regarded the evidence as
satisfying this standard of proof.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th
989, 1009 (Conservatorship of O.B.).)
We view the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s
order and indulge in reasonable inferences that the juvenile court might have
drawn from the evidence. (Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at
pp. 1008-1009.) We must accept the juvenile court’s resolution of conflicting
evidence, and we may not insert our own views regarding the credibility of
witnesses in place of the assessments conveyed by the judgment. (Ibid.)
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Finding of
Substantial Danger to the Child
The evidence presented at the contested dispositional hearing,
including the March 22, 2023 detention report, the April 13, 2023
jurisdiction/disposition report, and two addendum reports dated June 1, 2023
constitutes substantial evidence supporting the removal order. The reports
contain detailed information revealing a continuing and escalating pattern of
domestic violence between the parents that posed a substantial danger to the
Child’s physical and emotional safety and well-being, as well as the parents’
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unwillingness to change their destructive behaviors and repeated violations
of a criminal protective order.
The parents failed to carry their burden on appeal to show “there is no
evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the court’s findings or
orders.” (Hailey T., supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 147.) “[T]he court may
consider the parents’ past conduct as well as present circumstances” (In re
Cole (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 900, 917), and in this case, the parents’
continuing pattern of domestic violence placed the child in both physical and
emotional danger. Although the parents’ violence was not intentionally
directed at the child, and there is no evidence that mother harmed the child
when father was not present, the pattern of domestic violence incidents
involving the child nevertheless demonstrate substantial danger to both his
physical and emotional well-being. (Ibid. [“The parent need not be dangerous
and the child need not have been actually harmed for removal to be
appropriate”].) The domestic violence incident in 2020 resulted in direct
physical harm to the Child, and although he was not physically injured in the
subsequent incidents, the parents’ behavior continued to endanger his
physical and emotional well-being. For example, during the most recent
incident in March of 2023, the Child witnessed his Father slam his Mother to
the ground and spit in her face while he cried and screamed for him to “stop
hurting her.” The increasing seriousness of the domestic violence, and
Mother’s demonstrated reluctance to keep Father away from her and the
Child, also supported an inference that the Child was at increasing risk of
physical and emotional harm.
As the juvenile court noted, Mother was engaged in services at the time
of the dispositional hearing and claimed she was “serious this time,” but she
was still early in the process. As for Father, the evidence demonstrates that
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he had previously refused to participate in the services offered. After the
Child was removed from Mother’s care, he began attending a 52-week
domestic violence education program but had only completed six weeks and
was “too early in the process” for the program to provide additional
information regarding his progress.
Mother acknowledged the mistakes she made in the past, but she failed
to establish that she had gained the necessary insight to protect the Child
from the parents’ pattern of domestic violence. The focus of the removal
statute is to avert harm to the child (In re Jamie M. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d
530, 536), and there is substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s
finding that Mother still lacked understanding of the importance of
preventing domestic violence situations and her responsibility to avoid
placing herself and the Child in those situations.9
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
finding by clear and convincing evidence that “[t]here is or would be a
substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or
emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home.” (§ 361,
subd. (c)(1).) Mother’s argument that removal was not appropriate in the
absence of a risk of physical harm fails. Mother relies on In re Isayah C.
(2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684 (Isayah C.) but the same court in In re H.E.
(2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 710 (H.E.) limited the holding in Isayah C. to its facts
and the “unremarkable deduction that, where the subdivision requires risk of
9 Father now supports placement of the Child with the Mother on appeal,
but he objected to such placement at the hearing below where he argued that
Mother’s testimony demonstrated a “severe” lack of insight and her refusal to
take any responsibility for her role in the domestic violence.
9
emotional or physical harm and there is no risk of emotional harm, there
must be risk of physical harm. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 721.)
H.E. explained that Isayah C. failed to consider that “case law has long
construed section 361 as allowing removal where ‘return of the child would
create a substantial risk of detriment to the child’s physical or emotional
well-being” and that California Rules of Court, rule 5.695(d)(1) confirms that
construction. (H.E., supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 720.) And as the California
Supreme Court unequivocally stated in In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295
(Marilyn H.): “The standard for removal from parental custody was changed
from the best interest of the child to clear and convincing evidence of
substantial danger to the physical or emotional health of the child. (§ 361.)”
(Marilyn H., at p. 302; italics added.) We conclude that substantial evidence
supports the juvenile court’s finding of substantial danger to the Child.
C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Finding of No
Alternative Means to Protect the Child
Mother’s contention that the juvenile court failed to consider
alternatives to removal is belied by the record. The juvenile court expressly
stated that reasonable efforts had been made to prevent or eliminate the
need for the removal and to make it possible for the Child to return home, but
there were no reasonable means to protect the Child without removing him.
Mother suggests that continued oversight by the Agency and the court
and the parents’ active participation in services, coupled with her reliance on
supportive friends and family while she seeks confidential housing, would be
sufficient to ensure the Child’s safety if he was returned to her custody. But
Mother’s proposed alternative to removal ignores the history of this case.
The parents’ pattern of domestic violence continued for years despite having
supportive family and friends. Numerous alternatives were extended to the
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parents by the Agency and the court before the Child’s removal, including but
not limited to safety plans, restraining orders, a criminal protective order, a
voluntary services case, and resources to address the domestic violence issue.
Yet the parents failed to fully participate in the services offered, repeatedly
violated restraining orders and the criminal protective order, and continued
to engage in direct contact that led all too frequently to arguments that
escalated into domestic violence placing their Child at risk.
The juvenile court has “broad discretion to determine what would best
serve and protect the child’s best interests” (Alicia B. v. Superior Court (2004)
116 Cal.App.4th 856, 863), and its conclusion that no reasonable means were
available to protect the child without removing him from the parents’ custody
is supported by substantial evidence on this record. (See In re John M. (2012)
212 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1127; see also In re Vonda M. (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d
753, 757 [“The more likely it is that the offending parent will have further
contact with the nonoffending parent, the more the child’s welfare is
jeopardized by being placed unsupervised with the nonoffending parent.”].)
We emphasize that this is not the end of the road for either parent.
The purpose of providing reunification services is to eliminate the conditions
leading to the loss of custody and facilitate reunification of parent and child.
(In re I.A. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 19, 23.) We do not prejudge whether either
parent will be able to accomplish that goal. We merely hold that substantial
evidence supports the juvenile court’s disposition order at this early stage of
the dependency proceeding.
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DISPOSITION
The June 1, 2023, disposition order is affirmed.
BUCHANAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, Acting P. J.
KELETY, J.
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