CourtListener 9435144•In re E.D. CA4/3
Full text
Filed 10/25/23 In re E.D. CA4/3
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re E.D. et al., Persons Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL
SERVICES AGENCY,
G062365
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. Nos. 22DP0774,
v. 22DP0775, 22DP0776)
A.D., OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County, Daphne Grace
Sykes, Judge. Affirmed.
Brent Riggs, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Aurelio Torre,
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
Armando D. (Father) appeals from a dispositional order declaring his three
young daughters dependents of the juvenile court and removing them from his custody.
1
He claims the court’s jurisdictional findings under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300 were not supported by substantial evidence; the subsequent removal order
under section 361 was also in error; and his attorneys provided ineffective assistance by
failing to present exculpatory evidence on his behalf.
We affirm. As discussed below, the record contains substantial evidence
Father repeatedly struck his five-year-old daughter in the face, causing swelling,
bleeding, bruising, and redness. His insistence that these markings are birthmarks is
belied by multiple accounts from the children, responding police officers, and the
assigned social workers. Although the striking involved a single incident, the extent of
the child’s injuries and her tender age are sufficient to establish Father’s conduct
amounted to serious physical abuse. Father’s denial of any culpability lends further
support to the at-risk findings for all three children. Accordingly, we conclude there is
sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional
order. The dispositional order is further insulated from any challenge by Father’s
stipulation to its parameters.
We also reject Father’s argument that his counsel provided ineffective
assistance by not investigating or submitting allegedly exculpatory evidence—namely,
photographs and medical reports that document the child’s birthmarks. There were
logical tactical reasons for counsel to forego pressing this defense, and there is no
1
All further statutory references are to this code.
2
reasonable probability Father would have obtained a more favorable result had his
counsel submitted this evidence.
FACTS
1. Events Leading to the Petition
M.I. (Mother) and Father are married and have three children: E.D. (age 8),
A.D. (age 6), and G.D. (age 2). As of spring 2022, Mother worked full time as a
housekeeper; Father, who suffers from various physical ailments due to past injuries and
complications from COVID-19, was unemployed and stayed home to care for the
children.
The family came to the attention of the Orange County Social Services
Agency (the Agency) on June 2, 2022, which was E.D. and A.D.’s last day of school.
E.D. went to school that day; A.D. (age 5 at the time) did not. When school staff asked
E.D. why A.D. was absent, E.D. said Father hit A.D. in the face the night before and
made her bleed, and A.D. stayed home to avoid being teased or questioned.
Social workers made an unannounced visit to the family home later that
day. They observed A.D. had a one-half inch circular scab or red mark above her upper
left lip, bruises on her left eyelid and the lower part of her eye, and red marks spanning
across her forehead from temple to temple.
Father allowed the social workers to interview A.D. and E.D. When they
asked A.D. what happened to her face, she answered Father hit her with a belt, and it left
bruises and made her bleed from her mouth. One of the social workers called the police.
The police did not arrive for three hours; during the interim, Father had
contact with A.D. While waiting for the police, the social workers met again with A.D.
and E.D. to ask questions unrelated to the incident. This time, A.D. claimed Father did
not hit her, she was not worried about anything, and she felt safe, but she made limited
eye contact and seemed guarded to the social worker.
3
E.D. likewise denied any domestic violence or physical abuse. When asked
if she had any questions, E.D. volunteered that the reason A.D. did not go to school was
because Father made her bleed. E.D. elaborated that she saw Father hit A.D. about 10
times with an open hand while they were in the kitchen, and she (E.D.) got scared and ran
to the other room.
When the police arrived, one officer stayed with Father, and the other
officer and a social worker interviewed A.D. At first A.D. said she did not know what
happened to her face; she said Father did not hit her and claimed it was E.D. When the
social worker asked about her earlier statement that Father hit her with a belt, A.D
responded, “My dad get mad” and told her “you have to say no.” A.D. also denied
having a fever. The officers observed a scab on A.D.’s lip, the bruising and swelling near
her eye, and red marks on her forehead, and noted she did not have a fever and felt
normal to the touch.
Father remained outside with one police officer while the other officer and
the social worker spoke with E.D. inside. E.D. again confirmed she saw Father hit A.D.
about 10 times with an open hand, raising her hand to show how Father had struck A.D.
E.D. added she saw A.D. bleeding from her mouth, and A.D. ‘“cried a lot.”’ E.D. said
she told Mother what happened, and Mother said ‘“you have to be brave.”’ When asked
about discipline, E.D. recounted Father hit her (E.D.) in the past with an open hand, but
she could not recall the last time it happened.
The police officer and the social worker then spoke with Mother, who
claimed A.D. did not go to school that day because she was sick with a fever. Mother
added that the day before, she had noticed A.D.’s face was red and thought this was
because A.D. fell asleep on the car seatbelt while the family ran errands. Mother said
Father did not use physical discipline on the children, and when she had asked Father
about A.D.’s face, he said he did not know what happened. Mother was noted as being
guarded and not forthcoming during the interview.
4
The police officer and social worker then spoke with Father, who insisted
A.D. stayed home from school because she had a fever. Father added A.D. has
birthmarks on her face that redden when she gets upset. He said he did not know how
she got the bruising but speculated it could have been from the children fighting or from
the car seatbelt. Father said he did not know why A.D. or E.D. would say he hit A.D.,
2
and he noted that E.D. has autism. He did not seem concerned with A.D.’s bruises or the
marks on her face.
Police arrested Father for child cruelty. He was later charged with a
misdemeanor.
At the social worker’s recommendation, Mother took A.D. to the hospital
the next day, where A.D. said Father “hit[ ] her to teach her.” The child was observed to
have a red mark on her face.
About a week later, E.D. and A.D. both participated in forensic Child
Abuse Services Team (CAST) interviews. E.D. recounted Father told her not to tell the
truth and again reported Father hit A.D. with an open hand, and pointed at her temples,
forehead, and eye. E.D. explained Father did this because A.D. had hit Father.
During A.D.’s CAST interview, she first claimed that nobody hit her, and
she did not know what happened, and then that E.D. had been the one who hit her. Later
in the interview, A.D. commented Father hit her hand once, but it no longer hurt.
That same day, a social worker consulted with a CAST child abuse
specialist, who opined the markings on the left side of A.D.’s face had an outline of an
open hand, and the bruising and marks could not have been caused by a car seatbelt.
The social worker also spoke with Mother; she reported Father had been
released from jail and was staying in the family home, and the children did not seem to be
2
E.D. has high functioning autism; according to her therapist, she
understands more than other children as a result.
5
afraid of him. Mother added that both E.D. and A.D. told her that Father hit A.D.,
leaving marks and bruises, and when Mother questioned Father about the marks on A.D.
after he was released from jail, he claimed a stroller fell on her.
Social workers interviewed E.D. and A.D. again on June 21, 2022, and they
observed A.D. had light red marks above her right eye and on her right temple. During
the interview, A.D. again reported Father hit her, gesturing with an open hand and
slapping herself three times on her temples and lip (“like this”).
2. The Petition and Subsequent Proceedings
The next day, a protective custody warrant issued removing the three
children from Father’s custody and leaving them with Mother. The Agency then filed a
jurisdictional petition as to the three children based on Father’s physical abuse of A.D.
and his then unknown whereabouts. Among other things, the petition alleged A.D. fell
under subdivision (a) of section 300 (serious physical harm), all three children fell under
subdivisions (b)(1) (failure to protect), and E.D. and G.D. fell under subdivision (j)
(abuse of sibling).
Father and Mother both appeared at the detention hearing. Mother and the
children were represented by appointed counsel, and Father was represented by privately
retained counsel, Ashley Kagasoff. The juvenile court found a prima facie case existed
under section 300, detained the children from Father only, maintained them in Mother’s
custody with protective orders, and ordered family reunification services and monitored
visitation for Father.
A social worker visited Mother and the children on July 7, 2022. She
observed A.D. had no visible marks or bruises, aside from some blotchy red markings on
her temples and forehead. During the visit, A.D. pointed to her forehead and frowned,
saying Father ‘“hit me here three times.”’ When asked why Father hit her, A.D. ignored
the question and said, “The lady told me to say that he hit me.” When asked why the
6
lady said this, A.D. responded she did not know and shrugged her shoulders. A.D. then
added it was the first time Father had struck her and he needed to say he was sorry.
The social worker also talked to E.D. When asked why Father lived
somewhere else, the child answered, ‘“Because he hit [A.D.] and now he has to live
away.”’ E.D. added that Father told her not to talk to the police.
When the social worker interviewed Mother, Mother claimed that Father
never hit the children, that on the day of the incident A.D. had been hot and red from
playing and being outside, and that her birthmarks are more prominent when her body
temperature increases. Mother insisted neither parent physically disciplined the children.
The social worker also interviewed Father’s sister, who said Father would
never harm the children, and claimed the initial social worker must have exaggerated
A.D.’s marks. The sister showed the social worker photographs of A.D. on her cellphone
that she said were taken the day after the incident, explaining A.D. has a birthmark on her
forehead and temples that becomes more prominent when she runs or plays; she
expressed concern that Father was being blamed for something he did not do.
The children continued to have monitored visitation with Father; these
visits generally went well. During one such visit in July, A.D. and E.D. both told Father
he should apologize for hitting A.D.; Father did so.
In August 2022, lawyer Christopher Engels was associated in as Father’s
retained cocounsel. Soon thereafter, at a meeting held in anticipation of the jurisdiction
hearing, Engels advised the Agency and county counsel that Father would invoke his
Fifth Amendment rights and not respond to any questions about the jurisdictional
allegations. During this meeting, Father repeatedly refused to sign his case plan or
referral paperwork, and he tried several times to deny the allegations against him. The
social worker eventually left the meeting because Father seemed not to understand his
attorney’s instructions not to discuss the allegations.
7
After multiple continuances, the jurisdictional hearing took place in
September 2022. Father did not appear. The juvenile court asked Father’s counsel
whether Father would submit on the Agency’s reports; counsel confirmed he had
discussed the matter with Father and Father desired to submit. Proceeding in Father’s
absence, the court found the allegations in the petition to be true by a preponderance of
the evidence, sustained the petition as to all three children, and set the matter for a
3
contested dispositional hearing.
When the social worker visited the family in their home later that month,
she observed A.D. had a slight redness in her face from running and playing, and the
birthmarks on her forehead and temples appeared to grow darker the more she exerted
herself.
In October 2022, Father’s attorneys declared a conflict; the juvenile court
relieved them and appointed new counsel to represent Father. Father told the social
worker he would show his new attorney evidence establishing his innocence, but he
provided no details.
A few weeks later, Father (acting in propria persona) filed a declaration
avowing that his prior counsel, Ashley Kagasoff, had refused to review documents and
medical reports proving his innocence, such as medical reports documenting A.D.’s
birthmarks on her forehead, as well as pictures taken one day after the incident showing
no facial marks or injuries.
Meanwhile, the children’s visits with Father continued to go well. At a
November 2022 home visit, both E.D. and A.D. said they missed Father and wanted more
visits with him.
3
Father filed a notice of appeal from the jurisdictional findings in November
2022. (Case No. G062006.) This court dismissed the appeal because it was from an
unappealable order, noting that Father may appeal once dispositional orders are entered.
8
The dispositional hearing went forward in January 2023. That morning, all
counsel (including Father’s appointed counsel) submitted proposed orders and findings
declaring the children dependents of the juvenile court under section 360, finding by clear
and convincing evidence that removal from Father was required under section 361, and
approving the Agency’s case plan (which included general counseling, a child abuser’s
treatment program, and a parenting class). The court adopted those proposed orders and
findings. Father filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
1. Substantial Evidence Supports the Findings and Order
Father first contends the Agency failed to credibly establish A.D. suffered
serious physical harm or that the children are at substantial risk of serious physical harm.
According to Father, there was insufficient evidence that he abused A.D. because the
markings on A.D. were birthmarks, not bruises; A.D.’s injuries did not constitute serious
physical harm in any event; and there was insufficient evidence of a future risk of
physical harm. Thus, he contends, both the jurisdictional findings and the dispositional
order must be reversed. We cannot agree.
A juvenile court may assert jurisdiction over a child when “[t]he child has
suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm
inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s parent or guardian.” (§ 300,
subd. (a).) Jurisdiction also lies when the child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk
the child will suffer, serious physical harm as a result of the parent’s failure or inability to
adequately protect the child. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(A).) Finally, the court may also assert
jurisdiction when “[t]he child’s sibling has been abused or neglected, as defined in
subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and there is a substantial risk that the child will be
abused or neglected, as defined in those subdivisions.” (§ 300, subd. (j).) Jurisdictional
findings are made by a preponderance of the evidence. (§ 355, subd. (a).)
9
After jurisdiction has been established, a juvenile court may order a child
physically removed from his or her parent if the court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that the child would be at substantial risk of harm if returned home and there are
no reasonable means by which the child can be protected without removal. (§ 361,
subd. (c)(1).) “The jurisdictional findings are prima facie evidence that the child cannot
safely remain in the home. [Citation.] The parent need not be dangerous and the child
need not have been actually harmed for removal to be appropriate.” (In re Cole C. (2009)
174 Cal.App.4th 900, 917.)
We review a juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional order
for substantial evidence and will affirm if substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, supports those findings. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) “‘“In
making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to
support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light
most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and
credibility are the province of the trial court.” [Citation.] “We do not reweigh the
evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient
facts to support the findings of the trial court.”’” (Ibid.)
In this case, there is substantial evidence that Father abused A.D. by
4
slapping her face. The evidence includes A.D.’s and E.D.’s repeated accounts of Father
striking A.D., the opinion of the CAST child abuse specialist that the markings on the left
side of A.D.’s face had an outline of an open hand, and observations by the police and
social workers of a scab on A.D.’s upper lip, bruises and swelling near her eye, and red
marks on her forehead. Viewed in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s
4
The sisters’ accounts of the abuse varied on certain details. However, both
girls repeatedly corroborated the core details of what happened. In any event, we must
resolve any evidentiary inconsistencies in favor of the juvenile court’s findings.
10
findings and order, this evidence is sufficient to establish that Father repeatedly struck his
then five-year-old daughter’s face, causing bruising, swelling, and bleeding.
Father argues the police officers and social workers mistook A.D.’s
birthmarks for signs of abuse. But even if the birthmarks on her forehead and temples
were mistaken for injuries, that would not explain the scab on A.D.’s lip or the swelling
near her eye. Further, Father’s birthmark explanation conflicts with other evidence: both
sisters reported that Father struck A.D. multiple times in the face, and both girls (who are
familiar with A.D.’s normal appearance) reported it was Father’s strikes to A.D.’s face
that caused her injuries.
Father asserts A.D.’s injuries do not rise to the level of ‘“serious physical
harm”’ within the meaning of section 300. We are not persuaded. Although the term
“serious physical harm” is not defined by statute, “parents of common intelligence can
discern what injuries fall within its reach.” (In re Mariah T. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 428,
438 (Mariah).) Bruising, swelling, and bleeding spread across different parts of a
five-year-old child’s face which were caused by repeated blows from a grown man
qualify as “serious physical harm.” (See also In re David H. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th
1626, 1645 [bruises, red marks, welts, and broken skin on a seven-year-old boy
constituted serious physical harm]; Mariah, at p. 438 [three-year-old boy suffered serious
physical harm when mother hit him with belt and left deep purple bruises]; In re
Benjamin D. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1464, 1472 [pinching that caused bruising that lasted
over four days established substantial risk of serious physical harm]; see also In re D.M.
(2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 634, 641 [collecting cases where physical discipline exceeded
reasonable limits and constituted abuse].)
Substantial evidence also supports the juvenile court’s finding that all three
children are at a risk of future abuse. Father attempts to paint the abuse as an “isolated
act.” However, E.D. reported that Father had physically disciplined her in the past by
hitting her with an open hand. And dependency jurisdiction may exist based on a single
11
episode of endangering conduct, depending on the nature of the conduct, all surrounding
circumstances, and the present circumstances, such as “the parent’s current understanding
of and attitude toward the past conduct that endangered a child.” (In re K.S. (2016)
244 Cal.App.4th 327, 337.) In this case, Father’s attitude supports the juvenile court’s
finding of a future risk of harm to the children: Father proffered inconsistent
explanations about what caused the swelling, bleeding, and bruising on A.D.’s face (e.g.,
a car seatbelt, a falling stroller, or the children fighting), and rather than take any
responsibility for his conduct, he has instead become more adamant in his denials. (See
In re Esmeralda B. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1044 [“denial is a factor often relevant
to determining whether persons are likely to modify their behavior in the future”].)
E.D. reported Father struck A.D. 10 times because A.D. had struck him.
The visceral and violent reaction to misconduct by a five-year-old child could reasonably
support an inference that Father lacks the ability to control himself in the face of
misbehaving children, and that he could pose a future risk to them without appropriate
intervention. In short, as required by the applicable standard of review under which we
must review the record in the light most favorable to the lower court’s determinations and
draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support its findings and orders, we
conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the children are at
5
a risk of future abuse.
We also affirm the dispositional order removing the children from Father’s
custody. To start, Father forfeited any challenge to the dispositional order because his
appointed counsel, together with counsel for the other parties, proposed the dispositional
5
The petition also alleged a count under section 300, subdivision (g) (failure
to support), based on Father’s unknown whereabouts when the petition was filed. Father
argues, and the Agency concedes, that his whereabouts were known by the time of the
jurisdiction hearing, and he had not left the children without provision for support.
Nevertheless, the jurisdictional findings and the subsequent dispositional order are
supported by the core abuse allegations.
12
findings and orders that the juvenile court ultimately adopted. (See In re Richard K.
(1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 580, 589–590 [parent’s submittal on removal recommendation
6
precluded her from challenging removal order on appeal].)
In any event, the evidence of abuse underpinning the jurisdictional findings
also supports the dispositional order. While Father correctly points out that removal
orders are subject to a higher burden of proof (clear and convincing evidence under
section 361), the record before us supports the relevant at-risk findings under both
standards. (See In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1230 [“The fact that the
juvenile court had earlier made jurisdictional findings on some of the same evidence
using a preponderance of the evidence standard does not impugn the validity of the
subsequent dispositional findings”].) For these reasons, we discern no error in the
juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings or dispositional order.
2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Father next contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel because
his attorneys did not properly investigate the case. According to Father, if his attorneys
had done a minimal investigation, they would have learned he had exculpatory evidence
in his possession, including photographs and medical reports documenting A.D.’s
birthmarks. Had this evidence been presented, contends Father, the juvenile court likely
would have dismissed the allegations against him.
6
Father argues on reply that there is no indication in the record that he was
present at the disposition hearing or made aware of the stipulation’s contents or
consequences. However, there is also no indication in the record Father objected to the
stipulation or that the stipulation was unauthorized. The disposition hearing was
unreported, so we have only the proposed dispositional findings and orders and the
juvenile court’s subsequent minute order. On this record, we have no basis to conclude
his attorney’s proposal of the dispositional findings and orders that the court ultimately
adopted was unauthorized.
13
“We address a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the dependency
context by applying a two-part test. In the first step, we examine whether trial counsel
acted in a manner expected of a reasonably competent attorney acting as a diligent
advocate. If the answer is no, we move to the second step in which we examine whether,
had counsel rendered competent service, the outcome of the proceeding would have been
more favorable to the client.” (In re Ana C. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329–1330.)
If the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted in the challenged manner, we
generally affirm ‘“unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one,
or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.”’ (In re Emilye A. (1992)
9 Cal.App.4th 1695, 1716.)
Applying these standards, we conclude Father’s claim of deficient
representation fails. We do not believe Father’s counsel performed below the standard of
a reasonably capable and effective lawyer by failing to present photographs and medical
reports documenting A.D.’s birthmarks, nor do we believe that presenting such evidence
would have resulted in a more favorable outcome for Father. The fact that A.D. bore
birthmarks on her face was hardly disputed; a social worker confirmed their existence.
Faced with A.D.’s and E.D.’s accounts of abuse and the observations of
both law enforcement and the assigned social workers, a competent attorney easily could
have determined Father’s best path to obtaining custodial and visitation rights rested in
foregoing a confrontational and dubious defense based on A.D.’s birthmarks. The fact
that Father has been represented by at least three attorneys in the proceedings below—
two retained and one appointed—none of whom pursued the strategy he now advocates
for, speaks to the fact that a reasonably competent attorney would not have presented the
evidence that Father believes would have resulted in a dismissal.
14
DISPOSITION
The jurisdictional findings and dispositional order are affirmed.
GOETHALS, J.
WE CONCUR:
BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.
MOTOIKE, J.
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